Comparative Analysis

Process

After analyzing the data collected from boys in the study sample and from youth-serving organizations, LINC compared its findings with those of studies of youth crime and responses to youth violence in other cities. At the time of the DC study, the author was involved in research on youth programs and violence prevention in several cities around the Nation. Twelve of these cities (each of which had been the subject of previous research) were selected for comparison with DC. Three (Arlington, TX; Bristol, CT; and Spokane, WA) were selected by a panel of experts for their exemplary approaches to youth crime and violence prevention; four (Eureka, CA; Pocatello, ID; Rapid City, SD; and Redding, CA) had been involved in an ongoing partnership of law enforcement agencies and researchers sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ); and five (Beaufort and Summerville, SC; Philadelphia, PA; and Salinas and San Jose, CA) were cities in which a new violence intervention project (VIP) had recently been piloted by the Girl Scouts of America and evaluated by LINC.1 The approaches to preventing youth violence and furnishing safe places for youth during the after-school hours that were used in these 12 cities provided an instructive contrast to the approaches employed in DC.

The comparison was carried out with two questions in mind: (1) whether the relatively high rates of youth violence in DC were attributable to differences in patterns of delinquency among DC boys; and (2) whether the high rates of youth violence were a product of the way that DC organizations have dealt with children, especially adolescent boys.

Patterns of youth delinquency in different cities have been the subject of criminological inquiry for more than 50 years. Research in the area has included seminal studies in Denver, CO (Huizinga, 1998), Philadelphia, PA (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972), Pittsburgh, PA (Browning and Loeber, 1999), and Rochester, NY (Thornberry and Burch, 1997). As discussed above, the fundamental patterns of delinquency among DC boys are very similar to those found among boys in other cities. For example, most DC boys reported committing at least some minor acts of delinquency involving defiance of authorities (such as drinking alcohol without adult permission). As findings in other studies have also shown, some DC boys were delinquent fighters but limited their criminal offenses to occasional bouts of aggression. Like boys in other cities, a relatively small proportion of DC boys were the most delinquent in terms of the seriousness, spectrum, and number of crimes they committed.

Given the similarities between boys in DC and boys in other cities, LINC considered whether the role of DC agencies and organizations could be a factor in the higher rates of violence among DC youth.

Discussion

In completing its comparative analysis of findings in this study and findings in studies of the 12 cities listed above, LINC concluded that several obstacles stand in the way of DC's effective delivery of youth services. As a result of these obstacles, DC adolescents at the highest risk of violence and delinquency may not be receiving necessary support and services. In particular, LINC's comparative analysis revealed two barriers to the effective delivery of youth services in DC: insufficient involvement of Federal agencies and local businesses and an excess number of unaffiliated and uncoordinated organizations.

Insufficient involvement of Federal agencies and local businesses. LINC found that in other cities, major industries and high-level business executives play an important part in meeting local needs—including those of youth (Chaiken, 1998b). Responding to increases in juvenile violence and crime, for example, business leaders in other communities have taken steps to ensure that the causes of the violence are understood and that measures for preventing violence and delinquency are undertaken (Chaiken, 1998b). Many have donated their time and skills or provided incentives for staff members to work with youth-serving organizations in roles ranging from serving on local boards and commissions to volunteering at local schools to leading afterschool programs at community centers (Chaiken, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).

The Federal Government is the District's major industry. LINC's study found, however, that although Federal employees and elected officials may live in the District and possess valuable leadership and organizational skills that would be of help to community-based organizations, many are not personally involved in any youth-serving or other civic organizations in DC.

Several rationales have been offered by elected officials and Federal employees interviewed about this lack of involvement. Congressional leaders and staff make clear that their primary responsibility is to youth in their own States, not children in DC. Federal employees suggest—correctly or incorrectly—that there is an implicit conflict of interest in providing personal attention to organizations that may receive Federal funds for youth activities. Others say their role is to serve all of the Nation's children—rather than those in a particular city. Others offer the justification that attempts by Federal employees to bring about change in DC would be resented as interfering with home rule. Yet, from a comparative perspective, the major difference between Federal agencies and private industry is that the latter realizes an economic benefit from actively promoting strong programs for youth. In cities such as Arlington, TX, chief executive officers (CEO's) in private companies point out that by solving youth problems and reducing crime, their companies have a competitive advantage in recruiting the best and brightest employees to move to and live in the local area. They also realize that local high-quality afterschool programs that attract and supervise adolescents allow employees with school-age children to work without interruptions and more productively during the hours when school is not in session. CEO's also view the good will generated by encouraging employees to play active roles in delivering services to youth as a form of capital investment.

Excess number of unaffiliated organizations. In many cities, the majority of organizations serving youth are members or affiliates of larger "umbrella" organizations (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1998b). For example, a city may have a large number of Boys & Girls Club programs, all of which operate under the aegis of a regional office of the Boys & Girls Clubs of America organization. Moreover, in cities such as Arlington, TX, and Spokane, WA, there is a high degree of coordination among the various umbrella organizations. Together, the organizations carve out niches of expertise, plan services to ensure that school-age children in all parts of the city are served, and provide a selection of interesting and educational activities for young participants to choose from. Affiliates also cooperate in citywide assessments of children's needs and support one another's fundraising activities. In cities such as Bristol, CT, these organizations work with the police department and the schools to identify youth who are getting into trouble because they are unsupervised; together, these groups have developed a plan to ensure that the identified youth are brought into at least one organization and are involved in skill-building activities.

In DC, no such cooperation is taking place. Organizations have not carved out different areas of expertise to address the multiple needs of children in the District. The ILJ update of the 1994 directory of services showed high turnover of organizations receiving funds to provide youth services. In interviews for this study, administrators in unaffiliated organizations made clear that they found it impossible to carve out a niche of expertise. To continue to exist, administrators explained, organizations needed to shift missions when funding was lost and when additional funding became available.

Program funding, LINC found, appeared to be based on hunches about the needs of children in the District rather than a common base of research. Some administrators, for example, knew about the DC Kids Count program; most did not. Some administrators described certain programs proudly as preventing delinquency by building self-esteem or through athletic activities, even though a growing body of research suggests that such programs are not effective (Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In addition, DC funding was cut for the nationally affiliated Boys & Girls Clubs' Smart Moves programs, even though these programs include components shown to reduce delinquency.


  1. Girl Scout VIP was piloted in other cities that did not provide a reasonable basis for comparison with Washington, DC (Chaiken, 1998a).



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Violent Neighborhoods, Violent Kids Juvenile Justice Bulletin   ·  March 2000