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Chapter III (continued)
6. Reducing
the Supply of Illegal Drugs
Supply
reduction is an essential component of a well-balanced strategic
approach to drug control. When illegal drugs are readily available,
the likelihood increases that they will be abused. Supply reduction
has both domestic and international dimensions. Within the United
States, supply reduction includes regulation (through the Controlled
Substances Act), enforcement of anti-drug laws, eradication of marijuana
cultivation, control of precursor chemicals, inspection of commerce
and persons entering the country, screening for drugs in prisons,
and the creation of drug-free school zones. Internationally, supply
reduction includes building consensus; bilateral, regional, and
global accords; coordinated investigations; interdiction; control
of precursors; anti-money-laundering initiatives; drug-crop substitution
and eradication; alternative development; strengthening public institutions;
and foreign assistance.
Interdiction
Operations
Despite
our best efforts, we will never seize all drugs that arrive at our
borders or air and seaports. Drug traffickers are adaptable and
react to interdiction successes by shifting routes and modes of
transportation. International drug organizations also have access
to sophisticated technology to support their crimes. The United
States Interdiction Community must be adaptable to this ever-changing
threat.
The
U.S. government designs coordinated interdiction operations that
anticipate shifting drug-trafficking patterns. These integrated
actions are led by the two Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATF-East
based in Key West, FL and JIATF-West in Alameda, CA) that coordinate
transit zone activities; the Customs' Air and Maritime Interdiction
Coordination Center (in Riverside, CA) that monitors air approaches
to the United States; and the El Paso, Texas-based Joint Task Force
Six and Operation Alliance that coordinate activities along the
Southwest border. The current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, who
is responsible for efficiently deploying and integrating the U.S.
assets committed to international interdiction effort, is the Commandant
of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Several
key changes were made in 1999 to the regional counterdrug support
architecture of the United States. In May of 1999, JIATF-East added
to its set of responsibilities the Source Zone-focused counterdrug
support missions previously executed by JIATF-South. The merger
of JIATF-East and JIATF-South offers a considerable opportunity
for maximizing the efficient operation of these counterdrug missions
in the years to come.
JIATF-East
counterdrug air detection and monitoring missions are carried out
from a number of bases in the continental United States and the
Caribbean. Assets previously based out of Howard Air Force Base
(AFB), Panama are now operating from three Forward Operating Locations
(FOLs) and Forward Operating Sites (FOSs) in the Caribbean and South
America. The U.S. government has obtained a long-term agreement
with Ecuador to operate from an FOL in their territory. A second
FOL, based in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, is operating under
a temporary agreement. In 2000, the United States expects to sign
a long-term FOL agreement with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, ensuring
continued detection and monitoring coverage in the region. There
is also a tentative plan for a third FOL in Central America. The
United States anticipates an increase in the total number of counterdrug
detection and monitoring flight hours that previously originated
from Howard AFB.52
Transit
Zone Operations
Drugs
coming to the United States from South America pass through a six
million square-mile transit zone roughly the size of the continental
United States. This zone includes the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico,
and eastern Pacific Ocean. The interagency mission is to reduce
the supply of drugs from source countries by denying smugglers the
use of air and maritime routes. In patrolling this vast area, U.S.
federal agencies closely coordinate their operations with the interdiction
forces of a number of nations.
The
Coast Guard is key to reducing the maritime flow of drugs through
the transit zone. Through a strategic plan designed to meet the
interdiction performance goals of the National Drug Control Strategy,
the Coast Guard works to deny smugglers use of maritime routes by
concentrating assets and operations in high-threat areas. These
forces locate, intercept, stop, and board suspect vessels. A primary
force provider for the JIATF force structure, the Coast Guard also
deploys Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) aboard ships of the
U.S. Navy and international partners in the Caribbean and Eastern
Pacific. In 1999, LEDETs were responsible for nearly one-third of
Coast Guard cocaine seizures.
"Go-fast"
boats* accounted
for approximately 70 percent of known maritime smuggling events
during fiscal year 1999. The Coast Guard has responded to the threat
by acquiring new equipment, developing new capabilities, and changing
use-of-force policies. Initial deployments of specially configured
helicopters and pursuit boats utilizing a new policy of warning
shots and disabling fire was highly successful, resulting in the
seizure of 3,014 pounds of cocaine and 3,875 pounds of marijuana
in a two month period. Additionally, multi-national operations have
allowed the Coast Guard to assist Caribbean nations in maintaining
regional interdiction efforts through the training of host-nation
law enforcement personnel.
In
1999, Customs consolidated its air and marine assets to maximize
efficiency and effectiveness in combating the drug smuggling threat
in the Western Hemisphere. The Customs Air and Marine Interdiction
Division supports all facets of interdiction in the transit zone
including intelligence gathering with detection and monitoring aircraft,
monitoring a composite of radar and sensor inputs and interdicting
suspect aircraft and vessels. In FY 1999, Customs air and marine
interdiction assets participated in the seizure of 47,258 kilograms
of cocaine, 280,149 kilograms of marijuana, 30 kilograms of heroin,
1,141 kilograms of hashish, 35 aircraft, 60 vessels and 221 vehicles.
The
decline in the cocaine trafficking in Jamaica, the Bahamas, and
Cuba followed the execution of several joint interdiction operations
in the area. There were, however, increases in overall drug trafficking
in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico as well as smuggling
through fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific. In fiscal year 1999,
seventy-eight metric tons of cocaine were seized in the Transit
Zone. Coast Guard interdiction efforts in 1999 seized 111,689 pounds
of cocaine and 61,506 pounds of marijuana. Cocaine seizures surpassed
the previous record of 103,617 pounds set in FY 1997. The retail
value of these drugs was estimated at $3.7 billion.
The
Department of Defense (DoD) helps reduce the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States through command and control, high-tech communications,
intelligence sharing, detection, and monitoring. As the interagency
lead for detection and monitoring, DoD quickly disseminates information
gathered by detection platforms through the JIATF structure to the
appropriate interdiction agency. Customs is a primary force provider
for airborne detection and monitoring missions in support of DoD.
Stopping
drugs in the transit zone involves more than intercepting drug shipments
at sea or in the air. It also entails denying traffickers safe haven
in countries within the transit zone and preventing the corruption
of institutions or financial systems to launder profits. Consequently,
international cooperation and assistance is an essential aspect
of a comprehensive transit-zone strategy. The United States will
continue helping Caribbean and Central American nations to implement
a broad drug-control agenda that includes modernizing laws, strengthening
law-enforcement and judicial institutions, developing anti-corruption
measures, opposing money laundering, and backing cooperative interdiction.
Breaking
Cocaine Sources of Supply
Coca,
the raw material for cocaine, is grown primarily in the Andean Region
of South America. Dramatic successes in Bolivia and Peru have been
tempered by the continued expansion of coca cultivation in Southern
Colombia. Despite a more than doubling of the coca crop in Colombia
between 1995-1999, successes in the rest of the Andes has reduced
global cultivation by 15 percent.53
The
government of Bolivia achieved a 55 percent reduction in coca cultivation
since 1995. An extremely effective eradication program in the principal
growing regions surpassed last year's results. In addition, a successful
chemical interdiction program forced the remaining Bolivian coca
traffickers to rely on inferior substitutes and a less efficient
production process, which has reduced the purity of Bolivian cocaine.
These actions, combined with an extensive alternative development
program, decreases potential cocaine production in Bolivia from
240 metric tons in 1995 to 70 metric tons in 1999.54
The current Banzer administration continues to make progress towards
eliminating all illegal coca from Bolivia by 2002.
However,
challenges remain. Coca prices make its cultivation lucrative and
disruption of the cocaine industry is incomplete. Although coca
growers have committed only sporadic acts of violence and have been
unable to create a mass movement to resist eradication efforts,
the potential for violence in the Chapare and Yungas growing regions
remains a serious concern.
Source: DCI Crime and Narcotics Center
The
government of Peru also made enormous strides toward eliminating
illegal coca cultivation. Since 1995, Peru achieved a 66 percent
reduction in areas under coca cultivation and a corresponding 62
percent drop in cocaine production.55
This reduction is due to a combination of eradication, law enforcement,
and alternative development. In previous years, the Peruvian Air
Force directed a successful drug interdiction effort, which prevented
drug crops from reaching secondary markets and disrupted the coca
industry in Peru. However, in 1999 air interdiction played a less
prominent role as Peruvian cocaine production decreased (resulting
in fewer flights) and drug traffickers increased their operational
security.
The
Fujimori government adjusted its own tactics and augmented its law-enforcement
for ground eradication by 350 personnel in 1999. In both Peru and
Bolivia, eradicators are using a new tool to pull coca plants out
by the roots. This method eliminates coca field rehabilitation efforts.
Law-enforcement has constricted the flow of precursor chemical into
the growing region, and alternative development efforts provided
licit economic opportunities for former coca growers. Despite rising
coca leaf prices, Peru achieved a 24 percent reduction in coca cultivation
last year.56
Some
90 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States originates
in or passes through Colombia. Up to six metric tons of heroin are
also produced in Colombia annually. Coca cultivation has more than
tripled in Colombia since 1992.57
Colombian traffickers and coca farmers have adopted new cultivation
and processing techniques, increasing the amount of drugs processed
from each acre of crop. Colombia now cultivates two-thirds of the
coca leaf grown in the world. If unchecked, the rapid expansion
of coca crops and cocaine production in Colombia threatens to increase
the global supply of cocaine over the next several years.
Colombia's
efforts to attack the drug trade are hampered by guerrillas and
paramilitary groups that control the major drug-producing regions.
Lack of government presence makes eradication and interdiction difficult
and dangerous in most of Colombia's coca-growing regions. The lack
of security in southern Colombia prevents the government from implementing
alternative development programs.
In
addition to armed groups that control large swaths of Colombia's
countryside, Colombia's stability is threatened by organized drug
mafias that handle international narcotics distribution. The vast
amount of money in the hands of these outlaw groups generates violence
and corruption. It also threatens Colombia's democratic institutions.
The drug threat, violence, and insecurity have compounded the problems
associated with Colombia's worst economic recession in seventy years.
The
government of Colombia has responded to the problem by increasing
law-enforcement and eradication efforts in areas accessible to security
and police forces. U.S.-supported Colombian efforts have achieved
reductions in cultivation in both the Guaviare and Caqueta growing
regions. Despite the gains in Guaviare, coca cultivation continues
to explode in the Putumayo and northern region of Norte de Santander,
remote areas where government anti-drug operations are constrained
by large numbers of well-armed and well-organized insurgent forces.
The Colombian National Police has disrupted lab production in some
areas while leaving the lab infrastructure untouched in regions
beyond government control.
In
1998, the Colombian government formed a counter-drug joint task
force with elements from all the military services and the National
Police. In December 1999, after receiving extensive training from
DoD, the first of three planned counterdrug battalions became operational.
Supported by U.S.-provided air mobility and a DoD-trained joint
military-police intelligence center, these battalions will provide
Colombian security forces with a framework for eventually moving
into less accessible drug-producing regions in southern and eastern
Colombia.
President
Andres Pastrana devised a comprehensive, integrated strategy called
"Plan Colombia" to address the country's drug and interrelated social
and economic troubles. The Colombian government estimates that Plan
Colombia — a comprehensive, three-year plan — will cost
seven billion dollars. The government of Colombia will fund more
than half the cost and wants the United States and the international
community to support the additional $3.5 billion dollars.
To
assist the government of President Pastrana, the Clinton Administration
proposed $1.6 billion in additional aid to Colombia and other source
countries over the next two years. The budget proposes to increase
assistance programs through an emergency supplemental of $954 million
in FY 2000 and $318 million in FY 2001. Funds will be used for Colombian
counterdrug efforts and for other programs to help President Pastrana
strengthen democracy and promote prosperity. The proposal would
enhance alternative development, strengthen the justice system and
other democratic institutions, and provide counterdrug equipment,
training, and technical assistance to Colombian police and military
forces. The Administration is also encouraging U.S. allies and international
institutions to assist Colombia in implementing Plan Colombia.
The budget proposal would also provide additional funding to shore
up significant gains against drug production in Peru and Bolivia
and prevent the traffickers from simply moving their operations
to avoid law enforcement.
The
counterdrug strategy in the Source region of southeast Colombia
attacks the two strategic vulnerabilities of the cocaine industry:
(1) air transportation from the HCL labs east of the Andes to the
west and north Colombian coast transshipment regions and (2) the
clear susceptibility of coca cultivation to aggressive eradication.
Replication in Colombia of the air interdiction results achieved
in Peru could mean a dramatic decline in the world's cocaine production.
Breaking
Heroin Sources of Supply
The
U.S. heroin problem is supplied entirely from foreign sources of
opium. Efforts to reduce domestic heroin availability face significant
problems. Unlike cocaine where the supply is concentrated in the
Andean region of South America, heroin available in the United States
is produced in four distinct geographical areas: South America,
Mexico, and Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. Worldwide heroin
production was estimated at 313 metric tons in 1998 with between
twelve and eighteen metrics tons available for consumption in the
United States.58
Latin
America has emerged in recent years as the primary supplier of heroin
to the United States. Although potential production in Latin America
stabilized at twelve tons of pure heroin, which accounts for less
than 5 percent of worldwide production, Mexican and Colombian heroin
comprises 17 and 65 percent respectively of the heroin seized today
in the United States. Both countries have been aggressive in their
heroin-control programs. Mexican eradication has destroyed between
60 and 70 percent of the crop each year for the past several years.
In 1999, the government of Mexico removed from production 7,900
hectares of poppies and interdicted 2.13 metric tons of the remaining
opium. Aerial spraying in Colombia — some 8,000 hectares of
poppies were fumigated in 1999 — has been used to combat the
heroin threat. Despite spray operations, in 1999, Colombia's illicit
poppy crop increased some 1,400 hectares to 7,500 hectares.59
This amount of cultivation could potentially produce nearly eight
metric tons of heroin. Although Colombia accounts for only 2 percent
of worldwide production, almost all of that is destined for U.S.
markets.
Total
illicit opium production in Asia continued to decline over the last
three years, with a net drop of 11 percent in 1999 — primarily
due to a drought in Southeast Asia. A dramatic increase in opium
production in Afghanistan kept this decline from being even greater.
Afghanistan production increased 24 percent in the past year. The
government of Pakistan, after years of work and with the assistance
of funding from U.S. crop-control programs, has essentially eradicated
poppy cultivation in areas were alternative development has been
established. Thailand's crop substitution program remains the world's
most effective and has contributed to a 91 percent drop in net production
since 1985. Eradication programs through the UNDCP resulted in decreases
in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos and to a lesser extent in
Burma, but an important factor in this decline was adverse weather,
which caused a 38 percent reduction in potential opium production.
In
the coming decade, additional progress is achievable if governments
can cordon off growing areas, increase their commitment, and implement
counternarcotics programs. U.S.-backed crop-control programs reduced
illicit opium cultivation in countries like Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan,
Thailand, and Turkey. However, progress is unlikely in Afghanistan
where the ruling Taliban does not appear committed to narcotics
control. The United States will continue supporting UN drug-control
programs in Burma and other countries, pressing the Burmese government
to take effective anti-drug action. In Colombia, the U.S. will provide
additional support to the CNP opium poppy eradication campaign.
Twelve twin-engine helicopters (six Bell 212s and six UH-60s) have
been given to the CNP to facilitate high-altitude operations. We
will help strengthen law-enforcement in heroin source countries
by supporting training programs, information sharing, extradition
of fugitives, and anti-money laundering measures. Finally, the United
States will work through diplomatic and public channels to increase
the level of international cooperation and support the ambitious
UNDCP initiative to eradicate illicit opium poppy cultivation in
ten years.
Domestic
heroin demand-reduction programs are all the more essential due
to difficulties in attacking heroin sources of supply. U.S. law-enforcement
agencies use strategic information about domestic heroin distribution
rings to break up international crime rings. The ad-hoc task force
established in Plano, Texas is an excellent example of this approach.
It consists of representatives from numerous area sheriffs' offices
and police departments as well as the Texas Department of Public
Safety, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the FBI, and DEA.
Source: DCI Crime and Narcotics Center
Countering
the Spread of Methamphetamine
Since
the mid-1980s, the world has faced a wave of synthetic stimulant
abuse. Approximately nine times the quantity of such drugs were
seized in 1993 compared to 1978, the equivalent of a 16 percent
average annual increase.60
The principal synthetic drugs produced clandestinely are amphetamine-type
stimulants. Domestic manufacture and importation of methamphetamine
poses a continuing public-health threat. In the past, outlaw motorcycle
gangs largely supplied methamphetamine. More recently, Mexican-based
trafficking groups dominated wholesale trade in the United States.
These organized crime groups have developed large-scale laboratories
— both in Mexico and the United States — capable of producing
enormous quantities of methamphetamine. The manufacturing process
involves toxic and flammable chemicals. Abandoned labs require expensive,
dangerous clean-up.
The
1996 National Methamphetamine Strategy (updated in May of 1997)
remains the basis for the federal response to this problem. It was
buttressed by the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996,
which increased penalties for production and trafficking while expanding
control over precursor chemicals like ephedrine, pseudoephedrine,
and phenylpropanolamine. It also created a Methamphetamine Interagency
Task Force, co-chaired by the Attorney General and the Director
of ONDCP. The Methamphetamine Trafficking Penalty Enhancement Act
of 1998 was signed into law as part of the omnibus spending agreement
for FY 1999, further stiffening sanctions against this dangerous
drug. Federal, state, and local investigators are targeting companies
that supply precursor chemicals to methamphetamine producers. The
DEA also supports law-enforcement agencies by conducting training
in Kansas City and San Diego. Many retailers are adopting tighter
controls for over-the-counter drugs containing ingredients that
can be made into methamphetamine. Useful actions include educating
employees, limiting shelf space for these products, and capping
sales.
Internationally,
the United States is promoting controls over precursor chemicals.
Cooperation with Mexico, which is home to powerful methamphetamine
trafficking organizations, is crucial. A bilateral chemical-control
working group enhances the sharing of information and facilitates
mutual assistance on investigations and regulatory matters of interest
to both countries. Mexico recently came into compliance with the
1988 U.N. Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.
Reducing
Domestic Marijuana Cultivation
Marijuana
is the most readily available illegal drug in the United States.
While no comprehensive survey of domestic cannabis cultivation has
been conducted, the DEA estimates that much of the marijuana consumed
in the United States is grown domestically, both outdoors and indoors,
by commercial and private operators. The DEA-coordinated Domestic
Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program provides support to
state and local law-enforcement agencies. In FY 1998, this program
contributed to the seizure of more than 2.5 million marijuana plants.
The Department of the Interior is deeply concerned about marijuana
cultivation on public and tribal lands. Suppression of marijuana
cultivation (and clandestine drug laboratories) on approximately
525 million acres for which the Interior Department has stewardship
is a priority for its four bureaus with major law-enforcement responsibilities.
Recognizing
that successful domestic cannabis eradication must be supported
by information about the acreage of illegal drug cultivation, Congress,
in ONDCP's 1998 reauthorization, directed the Secretary of Agriculture
to submit to the ONDCP director an annual assessment of illegal
drug cultivation in the United States.61
The detection of cannabis from aerial platforms remains a problem
due to difficulty in developing spectral signatures unique to cannabis.
This problem is primarily due to the high degree of genetic heterogeneity
of illicit cannabis as well as the general practice of concealing
small plots within agricultural plantings, e.g. corn, or on public
lands. Because the plots of land are often small, satellite imagery
is not a viable option. Despite these difficulties, the Agricultural
Research Service, in cooperation with NASA and the Naval Systems
Weapons Laboratory, made progress in developing hand-held sensors
for deployment in helicopters.
Mycoherbicides
Mycoherbicides
utilize naturally occurring microbial enemies of the coca, opium
poppy, and marijuana plant that cause the crop to wilt. ONDCP stated
in its March 1, 1999 report to Congress that mycoherbicides could
become a critical tool in controlling coca and poppy production
abroad and marijuana cultivation within the United States. ONDCP
transferred $4.5 million in fiscal year 1999 to the United States
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agriculture Research Service
to support studies dealing with biocontrol alternatives to herbicidal
eradication. These funds, along with nearly $23 million Congress
provided through the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement for use on bio-control of
narcotics crops in fiscal year 1999, represent a significant investment
in the future of illicit crop eradication. The grant also provided
for the detection and estimation of illicit narcotics crops and
the development of economic alternatives to drug cultivation in
foreign countries. In the coming year, the United States and the
United Nations are working together to begin small-scale field testing
of mycoherbicides.
*
A “Go-fast” boat is the term used to describe the small, very fast,
and difficult to detect vessels favored by drug traffickers.
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