Borders delineate the sovereign territories of nation-states.
Guarding our country’s 9,600 miles of land and sea borders
is one of the federal government’s most fundamental responsibilities—especially in light of the historically open,
lengthy borders with our northern and southern neighbors.
The American government maintains three hundred ports-of-entry, including airports where officials inspect inbound
and outbound individuals, cargo, and conveyances. All are
vulnerable to the drug threat. By curtailing the flow of drugs
across our borders, we reduce drug availability throughout
the United States and decrease the negative consequences of
drug abuse and trafficking in our communities.
In FY 2000, more than eighty million passengers and
crew members arrived in the United States aboard commercial
and private aircraft. Some eleven million came by
marine vessels and 397 million through land border crossings.
People entered America on 211,000 ships; 971,000
aircraft; and 139 million trucks, trains, buses, and automobiles.
Cargo arrived in fifty-two million containers. This
enormous volume of movement makes interdiction of
illegal drugs difficult.
Even harder is the task of intercepting illegal drugs in
cargo shipments because of the ease with which traffickers
can switch modes and routes. Containerized cargo has revolutionized
routes, cargo tracking, port development, and
shipping companies. As the lead federal agency for detection
and monitoring, the Department of Defense provides support
to law enforcement agencies involved in counter-drug
operations. A recent study by the Office of Naval Intelligence
indicated that over 60 percent of the world’s cargo
travels by container. Moreover, vessels carrying as many as
six thousand containers—which have the ability to offload
cargo onto rail or trucks at various ports-of-entry and then
transport it into the heart of the United States—further
complicate the interdiction challenge. Drug-trafficking
organizations take advantage of these dynamics by hiding
illegal substances in cargo or secret compartments. False
seals have been used on containers so shipments can move
unimpeded through initial ports-of-entry. The United States
Customs Service seized more than 1.5 million pounds of
illicit drugs in FY 2000—an 11 percent increase over the
previous year.38 To counteract this threat, the federal government
is constantly seeking new technologies which, together
with capable personnel and timely intelligence, facilitate a
well-coordinated interdiction plan responsive to changing
drug-trafficking trends.
Organizing Against the Drug Threat
The U.S. Customs Service has primary responsibility for
ensuring that all cargo and goods moving through ports-of-entry
comply with federal law. Customs is the lead agency
for preventing drug trafficking through airports, seaports,
and land ports-of-entry. Customs shares responsibility for
stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States via
the air and sea. It accomplishes this mission by detecting
and apprehending drug-smuggling aircraft and vessels trying
to enter the country. The Customs’ Air and Marine
Interdiction Division provides seamless twenty-four-hour
radar surveillance along the entire southern tier of the
United States, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean using a wide
variety of civilian and military ground-based radar, tethered
aerostats, reconnaissance aircraft, and other detection sensors.
In fiscal year 2000, Customs seized 1,442,778 pounds
of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin—a 10.1 percent increase
over seizures in FY 1999. In addition, Customs has
deployed over forty non-intrusive inspection systems as part
of its Five-Year Technology Plan. These systems allow for the
advanced detection of narcotics and other contraband in
various cargo containers, trucks, automobiles, and rail cars.
Such technology has been deployed to ports of entry along
the southern tier of the U.S. where it assisted in the seizure
of over 180,000 pounds of drugs in the past 3 years.
The U.S. Border Patrol specifically focuses on drug smuggling
between land ports of entry. In FY 1998, the USBP
seized 395,316 kilograms of marijuana, 10,285 kilograms of
cocaine, and fourteen kilograms of heroin. In addition, this
agency made 6,402 arrests of suspected traffickers.
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime
drug interdiction and shares responsibility for air interdiction
with the U.S. Customs Service. As such, the Coast
Guard plays a key role in protecting our borders. Coast
Guard air and surface assets patrol over six million square
miles of transit zone that stretches from the Caribbean Basin
to the eastern Pacific Ocean. In FY 2000, the Coast Guard
set a record for the second consecutive year by seizing
132,920 pounds of cocaine—a 19 percent increase over FY
1999. This success has been a result of the service’s Campaign
Steel Web counterdrug strategy, intelligence, and
deployment of non-lethal technologies to counter go-fast
smuggling boats. All the armed forces provide support to
law-enforcement agencies involved in drug-control operations,
particularly in the Southwest border region.
Drug Trafficking Across the
Southwest Border
In FY 2000, 293 million people, eighty-nine million
cars, four-and-a-half million trucks, and 572,000 rail cars
entered the United States from Mexico. More than half of
the cocaine on our streets and large quantities of heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine come across the
Southwest border. Illegal drugs are hidden in all modes of
conveyance—car, truck, train, and pedestrian. The success
that the Border Patrol and Customs have had at and
around ports of entry (through innovative enforcement
strategies and physical security improvements) have
forced smugglers to move through the vast open spaces
between official border crossing points. Approximately,
fifty percent of the border with Mexico is under the jurisdiction
of the federal land management agencies, almost
all of that in rugged, remote areas with limited law
enforcement presence. Drugs cross the desert in armed
pack trains as well as on the backs of human “mules.”
They are tossed over border fences and then whisked away
on foot or by vehicle. Operators of ships find gaps in
U.S./Mexican interdiction coverage and position drugs
close to the border for eventual transfer to the United
States. Small boats in the Gulf of Mexico and eastern
Pacific seek to deliver drugs directly to the United States.
Whenever possible, traffickers try to exploit incidences of
corruption in U.S. border agencies. It is a tribute to the
vast majority of dedicated American officials that
integrity, courage, and respect for human rights overwhelmingly
characterize their service. Rapidly growing
commerce between the United States and Mexico complicates
the attempt to keep drugs out of cross-border traffic.
Since the Southwest border is currently the most porous
part of the nation’s periphery, we must mount a determined
effort to stop the flow of drugs there. At the same
time, we cannot concentrate resources along the Southwest
border at the expense of other vulnerable regions
because traffickers follow the path of least resistance and
funnel drugs to less defended areas.
Five principal departments—Treasury, Justice, Transportation,
State, and Defense—are concerned with
drug-control issues along the Southwest border. These
agencies have collaborated in six drug-control areas: drug
interdiction, anti-money laundering, drug and immigration
enforcement, prosecutions, counter-drug support,
and counter-drug cooperation with Mexico. During the
past decade, the federal presence along the Southwest
border expanded. Customs’ budget for Southwest border
programs increased 72 percent since FY 1993. The number
of assigned DEA special agents increased 37 percent
since FY 1990. DoD’s drug-control budget for the Southwest
border increased 53 percent since FY 1990. The
number of U.S. attorneys handling cases there went up by
80 percent since FY 1990. The Southwest Border Initiative
enabled federal agencies to coordinate intelligence
and operational assignments at Customs, DOJ’s Special
Operations Division, HIDTA, and state and local law-enforcement
agencies.
The United States Coast Guard plays a critical role in
protecting the maritime flanks of the Southwest Border.
Operations Border Shield and Gulf Shield protect the
coastal borders of Southern California and along the Gulf
of Mexico from maritime drug smuggling with USCG air
and surface interdiction assets. The Coast Guard operations
are coordinated, multi-agency efforts that focus on
interdiction to disrupt drug trafficking.
All Borders
We must stop drugs everywhere they enter our country—through the Gulf Coast, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Florida, the northeastern and northwestern
United States, and the Great Lakes. The vulnerability of
Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. territories must also be recognized.
Florida’s location, geography, and dynamic
growth will continue to make that state particularly
attractive to traffickers for the foreseeable future. Florida’s
six hundred miles of coastline render it a major target for
shore and airdrop deliveries in the 1980s. The state is
located astride the drug-trafficking routes of the
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The busy Miami and
Orlando airports and Florida’s seaports—gateways to
drug-source countries in South America—are used as
distribution hubs by international drug rings. To varying
degrees, Florida’s predicament is shared by other border
areas and entry points.
The Department of Justice’s Southern Frontier Initiative
focuses law enforcement on drug-trafficking
organizations operating along the Southwest border and
the Caribbean. Operation Trinity resulted in 1,260 arrests,
including eight hundred members of the five largest drug
syndicates in Mexico and Colombia. DOJ’s Caribbean
Initiative substantially enhanced its counterdrug capabilities
in this region, with more law-enforcement agents,
greater communications, and improved interception.
A major element of the Coast Guard’s comprehensive
multi-year strategy (Campaign Steel Web) is “Operation
Frontier Shield,” which focuses on disrupting maritime
smuggling routes into and around Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
U.S. Seaports
Criminal activity, including the illegal importation of
illicit drugs and the export of controlled commodities and
drug proceeds, with a nexus to U.S. seaports is a serious
problem. In response to the threat that such activities pose
to the people and critical infrastructures of the United
States and its seaport cities, the Interagency Commission
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports was created by
Executive Memorandum in April 1999. The Commission’s
report, released in August 2000, provides an overview of
criminal activity and security measures at the seaports; an
assessment of the nature and effectiveness of ongoing coordination
among federal, state, and local governmental
agencies; and gives recommendations for improvement.39
Organizing for Success
The problems law-enforcement officials face in connection
with illegal drugs are significant but not insurmountable.
Twenty-three separate federal agencies and scores of state and
local governments are involved in drug-control efforts along
our borders, air, and seaports. The Interdiction Committee
(TIC), led by the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and comprised
of the leads of drug-law enforcement agencies, is
working on a review of coordination among federal agencies
responsible for anti-drug operations.
Recently, a separate review of the counterdrug intelligence
architecture concluded that clear, consistent
inter-community and interagency coordination is essential.
To this end, the General Counterdrug Intelligence
Plan (GCIP) strengthened the El Paso Intelligence Center.
Border Coordination Initiative (BCI)
To improve coordination along the land borders of the
United States, the Departments of Justice and Treasury—along with other agencies with border responsibilities—established the Border Coordination Initiative (BCI).
Organized as a five-year program and initially emphasizing
the Southwest border, BCI is helping to create
integrated border management to improve the effectiveness
of this joint effort. It emphasizes increased
cooperation to support the interdiction of drugs, illegal
aliens, and other contraband while maintaining the flow
of legal immigration and commerce. BCI plans call for:
- Port Management—A Customs and INS Port Management
Model that will streamline enforcement, traffic
management, and community partnership at each of
the Southwest border’s twenty-four POEs.
- Investigations—A unified strategy for SWB seizures
that capitalizes on investigative operations and the dissemination
of intelligence to enhance inspections.
- Intelligence—Joint Intelligence Collection Analysis
Teams (ICATs)—comprised of personnel from Customs,
Immigration and Naturalization, and the Border
Patrol—gather and disseminate tactical intelligence in
regard to drug interdiction, illegal aliens, money
laundering, and document fraud.
- Technology—A joint plan to capitalize on future technological
advances while making better use of existing
capabilities.
- Communications—Inter-operable, secure, mutually
supportive, wireless communications through coordinated
fielding, user training, compatible systems, and
shared frequencies. USCS is already 100 percent secure
with over-the-air re-keying and is working to achieve
total voice privacy with the Border Patrol and all other
participating agencies.
- Performance—Measurement Implementation of measures
for the amount of illegal drugs seized and the
number of aliens apprehended in Southern California,
Arizona, West Texas/New Mexico, and South Texas.
The intent is to implement measurements for the
twenty four BCI areas and to tie performance to action
plans in order to provide a basis for analysis of
smuggling trends and the impact of enforcement
actions.
- Integrity—Customs and INS are structuring the
framework for this initiative. Most border crossing locations
are currently conducting random lane swaps, lane
denial, and integrity training. This core initiative also
provides for proactive, joint efforts to prevent integrity
violations by law-enforcement officers.
- Aviation and Marine Joint air interdiction operations
and the identification of opportunities to share air and
marine support facilities.
Port and Border Security Initiative
This initiative seeks to reduce drug availability by preventing
the entry of illegal substances into the United
States. The initiative covers all U.S. ports-of-entry and borders
but focuses on the Southwest border. Over the next
five years, this initiative will result in appropriate investments
in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
inspectors and Border Patrol agents, Customs’ agents, analytic,
and inspection staff, improved communication and
coordination between Customs and INS, employment of
advanced technologies and information management
systems, and greater U.S.-Mexico cooperation.
Working with the Private Sector to
Keep Drugs Out of America
Agreements with the private sector can help deter drug
smuggling via legitimate commercial shipments and conveyances.
As the primary drug-interdiction agency at
ports of entry, the U.S. Customs Service is implementing
programs like the air, sea, and land Carrier Initiative Programs (CIP), the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition
(BASC), and the Americas Counter-Smuggling Initiative
(ACSI) to keep illegal drugs out of licit commerce. These
initiatives have resulted in the seizure of 230,000 pounds
of drugs since 1995.
Harnessing Technology
Technology is an essential component in the effort to
prevent drug smuggling across our borders and via passenger
and commercial transportation systems.
Intelligence-based information systems provide Customs
inspectors with information on suspicious shipments.
Customs P-3 aircraft are used as airborne test platforms
for military and commercial sensor equipment with counterdrug
applications. The U.S. Customs Service is also
deploying advanced non-intrusive inspection technologies
developed in conjunction with Department of Defense
and CTAC to inspect luggage, cars, and shipments from
pallet-sized items to large marine containers for concealed
drugs at ports of entry. A dedicated breeding program for
substance-detecting canines was based upon a cooperative
effort with Australian Customs. Canines derived from this
program are being placed at key ports-of-entry.
Technology can also help prevent trafficking between
ports-of-entry. Over the past two years, efforts have concentrated
on finding technological solutions to meet the
needs of the “street-level” officer. These technologies
provide improved communications, surveillance,
and drug-crime information that makes the law-enforcement
missions more effective and safe.
Advanced non-intrusive inspection concepts employing
gamma ray and neutron technologies have been developed
to detect illegal drug shipments concealed within
containerized cargo entering the United States. These
technologies, along with new ones still being designed in
research laboratories will improve our ability to search
conveyances and cargo for hidden drugs at ports-of-entry.
Other smaller-scale inspection tools include flashlight-size
ultrasonic instruments to detect concealed drugs in
liquid-filled tanks, hand-held gamma-based anomaly
detectors that an officer can use to identify false compartments
in walls or automobiles, canine-breeding strategies
that improve substance detection capabilities, and self-contained
substance identification kits that fit in an
officer’s jacket pocket.
Information-sharing networks with case-management
tools and data-mining software have been developed and
tried in strategic geographic areas throughout the United
States. Advanced tracking and surveillance systems have
been deployed that can integrate crime and case-related
information correlated on a single display with real-time
positional data. Miniaturized surveillance and undercover
communications devices have been developed in conjunction
with federal law enforcement agencies and are now
being deployed for use by state and local agencies as part
of the Technology Transfer Program.
Review of Counterdrug Intelligence
Architecture
In 1997, the Director of ONDCP, the Attorney General,
the Director of Central Intelligence, supported by
the Secretaries of Defense, Transportation, and State,
commissioned a White House Task Force to review the
global U.S. counterdrug intelligence system. The work of
this Task Force culminated on February 14, 2000, when
the President approved the General Counterdrug Intelligence
Plan (GCIP).
In the eight months since the President’s acceptance of
the GCIP, drug control agencies moved swiftly to implement
the Plan’s recommendations in six critical areas:
- National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination—The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group
(CDICG) and its full-time staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence
Executive Secretariat (CDX), were created
under the GCIP to coordinate implementation of
action items contained in the GCIP, promote coordination
between the National Centers with counterdrug
responsibility, and resolve multi-jurisdictional issues.
The CDICG has met six times to oversee the drafting,
clearance, and publication of the GCIP; establish the
CDX infrastructure; and promote intelligence sharing
within the federal counterdrug community. Among its
accomplishments, the CDX and CDICG approved new
guidelines for information release and security involving
foreign liaison officers assigned to the Joint
Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATFs).
- National Centers—The GCIP calls for improved coordination
and elimination of unnecessary duplication
among drug intelligence centers and refines the mission
of each:
- National Drug Intelligence Center—NDIC is
responsible for the production of domestic strategic
counterdrug analysis for use in crafting
national policy and by law-enforcement decision-makers.
- El Paso Intelligence Center—EPIC is charged with
the production of operational and investigative
intelligence.
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network—FinCEN
focuses on the strategic analysis and reporting of
domestic and international money laundering and
financial crimes, in addition to its money laundering
investigative support to law enforcement for
both drug and non-drug related investigations.
- DCI Crime and Narcotics Center—CNC’s charter
addresses the need for foreign strategic counter-drug
intelligence by national decision-makers.
- Regional, State, and Local Cooperation—The GCIP
seeks to consolidate drug intelligence resources and
improve information sharing among federal, state, and
local agencies. The programs at the center of this effort
are the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force, DEA’s and FBI’s State and Local Task Forces,
DEA’s Special Operations Division, HIDTA Investigative
Support Centers (ISC), and DOJ-funded Regional
Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Centers.
- Foreign Coordination—The GCIP works to enhance
drug-intelligence cooperation between foreign nations
and the U.S. In 2000, information sharing and operational
support initiatives were undertaken with many
foreign governments, including Austria, Canada, Germany,
Great Britain, Australia, Mexico, China,
Thailand, and numerous Latin American and
Caribbean nations.
- Analytic Personnel Development and Training—The
GCIP emphasizes the importance of the analyst in the
drug-intelligence process. Issues such as basic hiring
qualifications, analyst career progression, mobility, promotion,
standardized training, mentoring, and
continuing professional education are now being
addressed for the first time among drug-intelligence
agencies. Progress in this area is evidenced by the placement
of numerous additional personnel and
Supervisory Intelligence Analysts throughout the
counterdrug intelligence architecture.
- Information Technology—Technology is a tool which
can be utilized to increase the timely dissemination of
information and intelligence. As such, the GCIP is working
to develop a technical architecture which provides
appropriate data security and maximum connectivity
between drug-intelligence producers and consumers.
