Since 1993, the United States has emphasized that supply
reduction is an essential component of a well-balanced
strategic approach to drug control. When illegal drugs are
readily available, the likelihood increases that they will be
abused. Supply reduction has both international and
domestic components. The vast majority of illicit drugs
used in the United States are produced outside of our borders.
Internationally, supply reduction includes working
with partner nations within the source zones to reduce the
cultivation and production of illicit drugs through drug-crop
substitution and eradication; alternative
development and strengthening public institutions; coordinated
investigations; interdiction; control of precursors;
anti-money laundering initiatives; and building consensus
through bilateral, regional, and global accords. Within the
United States, supply reduction entails regulation
(through the Controlled Substances Act), enforcement of
anti-drug laws, eradication of marijuana cultivation, control
of precursor chemicals, and destruction of illegal
synthetic drug laboratories within our borders.
Breaking Cocaine Sources of Supply
Coca, the raw material for cocaine, is grown primarily in
the Andean region of South America. Dramatic successes
in Bolivia and Peru have been tempered by the continued
expansion of coca cultivation in southern Colombia.
Despite more than doubling of the coca crop in Colombia
between 1995-1999, successes in the rest of the Andes
have helped reduce global cultivation by 15 percent.40 Although crop estimates for 2000 have yet to be finalized,
preliminary indications suggest increases in crop production
in southern Colombia that may offset eradication
efforts and reduced cultivation in Bolivia and Peru.
Bolivia has achieved remarkable counternarcotics successes
over the past half decade. The current Banzer
administration achieved a 55 percent reduction in cultivation
between 1995 and 1999. This achievement, which is
the result of sustained eradication and law-enforcement
efforts combined with extensive alternative crop development,
reduced cocaine production in Bolivia from 255
metric tons in 1994 to seventy mts in 1999. Bolivia continues
to make rapid progress towards its goal of complete
elimination of all illicit coca production by the end of
2002. By the end of 2000, the Chapare region—once
one of the world’s major suppliers of this illegal drug—will probably cease to produce any commercial level of
coca. From a high of 33,900 hectares of coca fields in the
Chapare in 1994, the government eliminated all but a
thousand hectares by November 2000. Bolivia plans to
launch an eradication campaign, preceded by alternative-development
programs, in the Yungas within calendar
year 2001. As eradication efforts move from the Chapare
to the Yungas, the government will leave sufficient forces
to monitor the region and destroy any replanted fields.
More importantly, USAID Bolivia is contributing to
alternative-development programs, using both regular
and supplemental budgets to turn farmers away from illegal
coca in favor of other crops.
In addition to eradication and alternative development,
the United States is helping Bolivia pursue an
aggressive drug and chemical precursor-interdiction campaign.
Increased success in the interdiction of smuggled
substances, particularly in the Chapare region, has raised
the price of many essential chemicals, forcing Bolivian
lab operators to use inferior substitutes, recycled solvents,
and a streamlined production process that virtually eliminates
the oxidation stage. The result has been radically
diminished drug purity to a record low of 47 percent.
This development dramatically affected the marketability
of Bolivian cocaine in Brazil and elsewhere.
A limiting factor in Bolivia’s continued success against
illegal coca cultivation will be the government’s ability to
work with the coca producers. In Fall 2000, government
eradication efforts were beset by civil strife resulting in ten
deaths and approximately a hundred injuries. Funnelling
alternative-development aid to the Chapare and Yungas
will likely determine whether the Banzer government is
able to meet its eradication goals.
The government of Peru made enormous strides toward
eliminating illegal coca cultivation in the past five years.
Despite the rehabilitation of some previously abandoned
coca fields, 24 percent of Peruvian coca was eliminated in
1999 with an overall reduction of 66 percent over the last
four years. Contributing to this figure was a 1999 total of
fifteen thousand fewer hectares under manual coca cultivation.
Peru’s counternarcotics alternative development
program, working through a hundred local governments,
seven hundred communities, and fifteen thousand farmers
significantly strengthened the social and economic infrastructure
in these areas and helped shift the economic
balance in favor of licit activities.
In 2000, the government of Peru continued its eradication
campaign for coca. The country hoped to eliminate some
twenty-two thousand acres (nine thousand hectares) of coca.
However, a deteriorating political situation increased discontent
among coca growers in the Huallaga valley, and
potential spillover from southern Colombia could affect the
positive direction in Peru. In November 2000, growers in the
central upper Huallaga valley conducted the biggest protests
in a decade, slowed eradication efforts, and endangered Peru’s
ability to meet its eradication objectives. However, with sustained
U.S. law enforcement, alternative development,
interdiction assistance, and support for eradication, Peru will
continue to reduce coca cultivation.
In Colombia, President Pastrana and his reform-minded
government took office in August of 1998.
Pastrana faced multiple challenges from the outset of his
administration. Ongoing, inter-related crises in Colombia
threaten U.S. national interests, including: stemming the
flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States, support
for democratic government and the rule of law, respect for
human rights, promoting efforts to reach a negotiated settlement
in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict,
maintaining regional stability, and promoting legitimate
trade and investment.
Rapidly growing cocaine production in Colombia constitutes
a threat to U.S. security and the well-being of our
citizens. Ninety percent of the cocaine entering the
United States originates in or passes through Colombia.
Over the last decade, drug production in Colombia has
increased dramatically. In spite of an aggressive aerial
eradication campaign, Colombian cultivation of coca, the
raw material for cocaine, has more than tripled since
1992. New information about the potency of Colombian
coca, the time required for crops to reach maturity, and
efficiency in the cocaine conversion process has led to a
revision in estimates of Colombia’s 1998 potential cocaine
production from 165 metric tons to 435 metric tons. The
1999 figures indicate that both the number of hectares of
coca under cultivation and the amount of cocaine produced
from those crops continue to skyrocket.
Colombian coca cultivation rose 20 percent to 122,500
hectares in 1999; there was a corresponding 20 percent
increase in potential cocaine production to 520 metric
tons. Left unchecked, these massive increases in drug production
and trafficking could reverse gains achieved over
the last four years in Peru and Bolivia. Continued expansion
of drug production in Colombia is likely to result in
more drugs being shipped to the United States.
President Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia” and the U.S.-Colombia Initiative
In the fall of 1999, the Pastrana government developed
an integrated strategy, Plan Colombia, which recognizes
that solving Colombia’s inter-related problems will
require significant action on a variety of fronts. Plan
Colombia focuses on five strategic issues:
- The peace process.
- The Colombian economy.
- The counterdrug strategy.
- Reform of the justice system and protection of
human rights.
- Democratization and social development.
These five planks reflect a program that addresses
Colombia’s most severe problems. At the core is an effort
to achieve peace through dialogue and strengthen democratic
institutions while increasing the government’s
capacity to carry out policy initiatives. Repairing the
economy will make the Colombian people better able to
provide for themselves and decrease the attraction of the
drug trade and other illicit activities. Breaking up the
drug-trade infrastructure would reduce the threat of corruption,
promote legitimate economic development,
remove a principal source of support from illegal armed
groups, and help make the negotiating table a more
attractive setting for conflict resolution than the battle-field.
Decreasing the scale of the internal conflict also
could facilitate reform of the justice system and improvements
in human rights.
The government of Colombia estimates that implementing
Plan Colombia will cost about $7.5 billion over
the next six years. To execute the plan, Colombia is committed
to spending $4 billion of its own resources and
loans from financial institutions. The Pastrana government
is asking the international community to provide
the remaining $3.5 billion in bilateral foreign assistance.
To date, the United States, Norway, Spain, Japan, and the
United Nations have pledged significant support for President
Pastrana and Plan Colombia. The United States will
continue to support Colombian efforts to obtain more
funding from the international community, especially in
the areas of economic and social development. A European
Union donors conference is scheduled for March
2001 to discuss support for Colombia.
The U.S. initiative involves $1.3 billion in assistance
carefully crafted to respond to the urgent needs of
Colombia and the region. This package provides $442
million for southern Colombia, $465.7 million for
Colombian and regional interdiction support, $116 million
for the Colombian National Police, $174 million for
alternative economic development, and $122 million to
promote respect for human rights and Colombia’s power
to govern. The Colombia Initiative supplements ongoing
U.S. counterdrug programs of $330 million for fiscal
years 2000 and 2001.
By assisting the government of Colombia in implementing
the rule of law in drug-producing regions, we are
helping to decrease drug production and trafficking and
diminish the corrosive influence of drug-related corruption.
Hemispheric programs aimed at reducing drug supply
before it reaches the United States have produced an estimated
18 percent drop in the amount of cocaine available
worldwide over the last four years. That progress and our
national interests are at risk in the face of the 140 percent
increase in Colombian coca production since 1995.
The Use of Mycoherbicides41
Mycoherbicides focus on agricultural-related targets—in this case illicit coca cultivation—using fungal biological
control agents in place of chemical herbicides. The reliance
on naturally-occurring agents means that mycoherbicide
technology involves no genetic engineering or alteration. In
this regard, mycoherbicides are potentially cheaper and
environmentally safer than chemical herbicides.
The research, development, and potential application of
mycoherbicides in a narcotics-control context mirrors the way
mycoherbicides are being used to control pests, promote agricultural
development, and advance environmentally sound
integrated pest management worldwide. So far, the testing of
mycoherbicides to control coca has been limited to laboratory
research and field testing in the U.S. Nevertheless, results have
been promising. Tests have identified a mycoherbicide that
attacks only coca plants, kills them, and does not spread to other
hosts. This organism has been proven effective and, from environmental
and health-safety perspectives, both host and area-specific.
The government of Colombia and the U.N. International
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) are discussing
potential cooperation to test a biological-control agent
that could be used against illicit coca plants. The U.S. allocated $3 million to the U.N. in fiscal year 1999 to help
fund these tests. Coca cultivation and processing pose serious
hazards to Colombia’s ecology. Several hectares of rain
forest are slashed and burned for every hectare of coca
planted. For each hectare of coca grown and processed into
cocaine, farmers and traffickers—with little respect for
the environment—dump an estimated two tons of pesticides,
fertilizers, and toxic processing chemical waste into
Colombia’s soil, streams, and rivers.
The proposed test in Colombia would use only mycoherbicides
that occur naturally in Colombia. No
exogenous biological control agents would be used. The
project calls for the creation of an international panel of
experts to design and approve the final research program.
An international consultant, working with a project manager
from the implementing agency in Colombia, would
monitor the experiments’ progress.
The United States is funding several million dollars
worth of complementary research to identify and develop
safe and effective biological controls to combat pests that
plague cacao, bananas, coffee, and other alternative development
crops to replace narcotics production.
Breaking Heroin Sources of Supply42
The U.S. heroin problem is supplied entirely by foreign
sources of opium. Efforts to reduce domestic heroin availability
face significant problems. Unlike cocaine, where
the supply is concentrated in the Andean region of South
America, heroin available in the United States is produced
in four distinct parts of the world: South America, Mexico,
Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. Worldwide
potential heroin production was estimated at 287 metric
tons in 1999.
Latin America has emerged in recent years as the primary
supplier of heroin to the United States. Colombian
and Mexican heroin comprises 65 and 17 percent respectively
of the heroin seized today in the United States43 The heroin industry in Colombia is still young and growing.
Reports of some opium poppy fields surfaced in the
mid-1980s, but not until the early 1990s was any significant
cultivation confirmed. By the mid-1990s, the
Colombian heroin industry was producing enough high-purity
white heroin to capture the U.S. East Coast
market. Between 1995 and 1998, opium production in
Colombia was sufficient to support more than six metric
tons of heroin annually. In 1999, however, increased cultivation resulted in a larger crop, increasing potential
heroin production to nearly eight metric tons.44
Today, the Colombian heroin trade closely mirrors the
heroin industry in Mexico rather than operations in
Southeast or Southwest Asia. Heroin processing labs in
Colombia operate on a small scale; heroin production is
not dominated by large, well-armed trafficking organizations;
there are no multi-hundred-kilogram internal
movements of opiate products; and Colombian traffickers
rarely attempt to smuggle large shipments of heroin into
other countries. Like the Mexican industry, the heroin
trade in Colombia services the U.S. market almost exclusively.
Production of heroin is more fragmented, with
smaller trafficking groups playing a major role. Individual
couriers smuggle heroin into the United States daily in
small, single-kilogram amounts. In addition, Colombia’s
heroin industry—like Mexico’s—must cope with significant
government opium-poppy eradication.
Significant diversion of the essential precursor acetic
anhydride suggests that Colombian traffickers are prepared
to increase heroin production. In 1999, about
ninety-six metric tons of acetic anhydride—six percent
of Colombia’s legal imports of this chemical for pharmaceutical
use—were hijacked or stolen after arriving in
Colombia. The illegal diversion of acetic anhydride in
1999 alone would be enough to meet heroin production
requirements for the next three to five years.
Low-level opium-poppy cultivation in Venezuela and
even more limited growing in Peru currently serve only marginal
heroin production but could become the foundation
for an expanding opium and heroin industry beyond
Colombia. Opium-poppy cultivation in Venezuela is limited
to the mountains opposite Colombia’s growing area and
appears to be a spillover from cultivation on the Colombian
side of the border. Since 1994, when a thousand hectares of
opium poppy were discovered during a joint U.S.-Venezuelan
aerial reconnaissance mission, Caracas has conducted
periodic eradication operations that reduced the size of the
annual crop to fewer than fifty hectares. The cultivation,
harvesting, and processing of Venezuela’s poppy crop is done
primarily by Colombians who access the growing area from
Colombia. Many of the farmers arrested by Venezuelan
authorities for growing opium are Colombian nationals.
The Venezuelan side of the border is readily accessible from
trails and unimproved roads originating in Colombia.
Reports indicate that opium poppy cultivation in Peru
over the last several years is nearly negligible. However, the
seizure of more than fifty kilograms of opium by police in
1999 suggests that opium production in Peru may be
heading for commercial levels. In Peru, Colombian backers
provide farmers with poppy seeds, teach processing
methods, and buy Peruvian opium; most of the opium
produced in Peru is reportedly shipped to Colombia.
While the cultivation pattern in Peru is similar to that in
Colombia, so far there has been no widespread deforestation
as there was in Colombia when opium-poppy
cultivation virtually exploded.
An intensification of eradication efforts in Colombia
significant enough to reduce opium production might
spur increased cultivation in Peru and Venezuela. Both
governments, however, appear committed to preventing
opium cultivation from becoming a significant problem.
Successful elimination of opium-poppy cultivation in
Venezuela will depend, to a large extent, on Colombia’s
ability to suppress cultivation on its side of the border and
for both Bogota and Caracas to control the mountainous
region where Colombian guerrillas operate on both sides
of the border. The prospects for significant increases in
opium production would be greater in Peru if cultivation
were firmly established there because the growing areas are
isolated and nearly inaccessible to authorities, making
large-scale eradication more difficult.
With long-established trafficking and distribution networks
and exclusive markets for black tar and brown powder
heroin, Mexico’s hold on the U.S. heroin market in the West
seems secure. Mexico grows only about two percent of the
world’s illicit opium, but virtually the entire crop is converted
into heroin for the U.S. market. Despite significant historical
production in Mexico, local consumption of opium and
heroin has never been more than marginal. Unlike in the far
larger source countries of Southeast and Southwest Asia,
opium-poppy cultivation in Mexico—as in Colombia—occur year-round because of the favorable climate. With a
hundred-day growing cycle, single opium fields in Mexico
can yield up to three crops per year although the size and
quality of the plants typically depends on seasonal variations.
The largest crop is generally achieved in the relatively mild
and wet months of December through April. Mexican officials
report that many growers are planting new varieties of
opium poppy in an effort to increase opium yields.
Opium cultivation and production in Mexico have
been relatively stable through most of the 1990s. Between
1993 and 1998, according to the U.S. government’s
annual imagery-based crop survey, Mexico’s opium harvest
averaged fifty-four metric tons, allowing Mexican
traffickers to produce five to six metric tons of heroin
annually. In 1999, a drought in the best growing season
reduced opium cultivation and stunted opium-poppy
growth in many of the fields where plants reached
maturity.
Poppy-crop eradication is the primary constraint against
increased opium production. The Mexican Army’s manual
eradication effort, using more than twenty-thousand soldiers
on any given day, is responsible for roughly 75
percent of the eradicated crop each year. The Attorney
General’s Office (PGR) destroys about one-quarter of the
eradicated crop through helicopter aerial fumigation.
However, a lack of roads and infrastructure in the remote
growing areas makes manual and spray operations difficult
and dangerous. Moreover, counterinsurgency operations
and disaster-relief missions in recent years overburdened
military personnel and may have caused the transfer of some
personnel away from eradication efforts. However, this
change does not seem to have had an appreciable impact on
overall eradication efforts. The combination of drought and
eradication decreased Mexico’s heroin production to slightly
more than four metric tons in 1999.
Historically, most of the world’s illicit opium for heroin
has been grown in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia.
Burma alone has accounted for more than half of all global
production of opium and heroin for most of the last decade.
In the absence of sustained alternative crop-substitution
programs and consistent narcotics crop-eradication efforts
(except in Thailand), only weather fluctuations have had a
significant impact on opium-poppy cultivation and production.
Major droughts in 1994, 1998, and 1999 caused the
region’s opium production to plummet.
No other country surpasses Burma in terms of hectares of
opium cultivation. However, crop yields are much lower
than those in Southwest Asia. Consequently, even if normal
weather conditions were to again prevail in Southeast Asia,
Burma would not challenge Afghanistan as the world’s leading
source of heroin. Although the Burmese government
showed both a willingness and capability to ban poppy cultivation
in areas under its control the last two years,
authorities refrain from entering prime opium-growing
areas controlled by ethnic Wa insurgents.
In Thailand, aggressive eradication and crop-substitution
programs have reduced opium production to less than one
percent of the region’s total. Thailand is now a net importer
of opium to meet its addicts’ demands. Without a meaningful
eradication effort of its own and with little change in the
status of UN-supported crop-substitution projects, Laos
remains the world’s third-largest producer of illicit opium.
Opium production in that country was less affected by
drought than was Burma. Laos accounted for about 12 percent
of Southeast Asia’s opium production in 1999, as
compared to less than 10 percent through most of the 1990s.
The profitability of growing opium poppy as a cash crop
and the lack of resources or commitment by regional governments
to implement crop substitution, alternative
development, or eradication are key factors that predict a
significant rebound in opium production within Southeast
Asia. The remote location and rugged terrain of poppy-growing
areas in Burma and Laos are major obstacles to
establishing crop-substitution programs. The lack of a transportation
infrastructure in most opium-producing regions
further complicates crop substitution because farmers have
difficulty moving alternative crops to distant markets.
Opium buyers, by contrast, typically come to the farmer,
saving him a long trek to the nearest village or city.
Although significant efforts by transit countries over the
past led to the seizure of large amounts of heroin, the key to
curbing heroin production and trafficking in Southeast Asia
lies with the source countries—particularly Burma.
The explosive growth of opium production and development
of an imposing opiate-processing infrastructure in
Afghanistan during the 1990s made Southwest Asia the
world’s leading source of heroin. While Southwest Asian
heroin is unlikely to penetrate much of the American market
share anytime soon, the region’s drug trade significantly
affects U.S. strategic interests—including political stability
and counterterrorism—in that volatile region. In 1999,
Southwest Asia produced an estimated 2,898 metric tons of
opium, compared to 1,236 metric tons in drought-stricken
Southeast Asia. Afghanistan, whose estimated opium production
increased 22 percent from 2,390 metric tons in
1998 to 2,861 metric tons, was solely responsible for Southwest
Asia becoming the world’s leading source of heroin. By
comparison, opium production in Pakistan—the region’s
other source country—declined by half for the second consecutive
year to thirty-seven metric tons.
In the coming decade, additional progress is achievable if
governments can cordon off growing areas, increase their
commitment, and implement counternarcotics programs.
U.S.-backed crop-control programs reduced illicit opium
cultivation in Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, and
Turkey. Both Colombia and Mexico have aggressive heroin-control
programs. Mexico has destroyed between 60 and 70
percent of the crop each year for the past several years. In
Colombia, some eight thousand hectares of poppies were
fumigated from the air in 1999. However, little progress is
likely if the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan doesn’t commit to
narcotics control. In Burma, the future is also uncertain as
long as the country fails to muster the political will to make
in-roads against the opium cultivation in areas ruled by the
Wa Army.
The United States continues to help strengthen law-enforcement
in heroin source countries by supporting
training programs, information sharing, extradition of fugitives,
and anti-money laundering measures. In addition,
America will work through diplomatic and public channels
to increase the level of international cooperation and support
the ambitious UNDCP initiative to eradicate illicit
opium-poppy cultivation in ten years.
Countering the Spread of Synthetic
Drugs
Methamphetamine—Like cocaine, methamphetamine
is a potent central nervous-system stimulant. According to
the Drug Enforcement Administration, “meth” represents
the fastest-growing drug threat in the U.S. today. The
1999 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
estimated that 9.4 million Americans have tried
methamphetamine. This figure shows a marked increase
from the 1994 estimate of 3.8 million people.
International Methamphetamine Trafficking—In FY
1999, the U.S. Customs Service seized 41 percent of the
total methamphetamine confiscated by all federal agencies
and 2,872 pounds of the drug in FY 2000, an indication
of the threat international methamphetamine trafficking
poses to the United States. According to the DEA, well-organized
manufacturing and trafficking groups based in
Mexico are the primary source of this illicit drug.45 Over
the past several years, established drug trafficking organizations—based in Mexico and California—took control of approximately 85 percent of the methamphetamine
trade. The principal reasons for this new
dominance is the exploitation by these organizations of
existing, well-established transportation and distribution
networks on both sides of the border as well as their ability to secure large quantities of precursor chemicals. These
drug-trafficking organizations have revolutionized the
illegal methamphetamine business by operating large-scale
laboratories in Mexico that are capable of producing
unprecedented amounts of methamphetamine. Because
methamphetamine is a synthetic drug created from a mixture
of chemicals, traffickers based in Mexico need not
rely on other nations to provide coca or finished cocaine
for distribution. In addition, fewer controls on precursor
chemicals exist in Mexico and overseas than in the United
States, a fact that encourages the organizations to produce
high purity methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories
within Mexico. Methamphetamine organizations based
there have developed international connections with
chemical suppliers in Europe, Asia, and the Far East, and
with these connections, they have been able to obtain
large shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
needed to manufacture both methamphetamine and
amphetamine.
According to the El Paso Intelligence Center, the
amount of methamphetamine seized annually in transit
from Mexico to the United States has increased dramatically
since 1992. Authorities confiscated 560 kilograms of
methamphetamine along the border in 1998, compared
with only 6.5 kilograms in 1992. Customs seizures of
methamphetamine increased roughly 20 percent in FY
2000, mostly along the Southwest border.
In August 2000, the DEA indicated that it was optimistic
about chemical-control efforts which, when
combined with aggressive law-enforcement, have been the
catalyst for decreases in methamphetamine purity. In the
past year, several DEA offices in the Midwest and
California reported that the purity of Mexican methamphetamine
had dropped significantly. Many law-enforcement
agencies in the Midwest and California note
that the previous high purity (80 percent + range) of Mexican
methamphetamine has dropped to less than 30
percent. Information provided by DEA indicates that
nationally, the average purity for methamphetamine
decreased from 71.9 percent in 1994 to an average of 31.1
percent in 1999.
Domestic Methamphetamine Production—Because
meth production and trafficking used to be concentrated
in the West and Southwest United States—particularly
California, Arizona, Utah, and Texas—availability and
abuse were (and still are) higher in those areas. In fact,
most methamphetamine in the U.S. is still produced in
large clandestine laboratories in California. However,
along with increased international production, the growth
of independent domestic laboratories dramatically
increased the availability and abuse of meth in the Pacific
Northwest, Midwest, and some portions of the Southeast,
particularly Georgia, Tennessee, and surrounding states.
There is also evidence that meth production and
availability are beginning to spread to Mid-Atlantic states
like Virginia, and even as far north as New England. In
1998, meth labs were found for the first time in New
Jersey, Delaware, and Massachusetts.
Methamphetamine labs and dumpsites on federal public
and tribal lands are creating a significant safety risk for
the visiting public and Department of Interior and
Department of Agriculture/Forest Service employees. In
addition, toxic chemicals, pesticides, and fertilizers are
negatively affecting soils, vegetation, watersheds, and
wildlife. In CY 2000, over 300 labs and dumpsites were
taken off of the Mark Twain National Forest in Missouri
alone. This is in comparison to 107 found nationwide on
National Forest System (NFS) lands in CY 1999.
Land management agencies typically discover small labs
run by individuals. Producers are utilizing the back of
pickup trucks, small recreation trailers, tents, abandoned
buildings, old mine shafts, cabins, house boats and open
fields to produce methamphetamine. In at least one
instance, a wild land fire was attributed to the explosion
of such a lab on NFS lands in Illinois in October 2000.
By using rural areas that are difficult to patrol by law
enforcement agencies, the drug producers have reduced
the possibility of apprehension and arrest. The proliferation
of these small, highly mobile clandestine laboratories
will continue to increase the incidents of violence and
environmental damage from hazardous materials on our
public lands.
The 1996 National Methamphetamine Strategy (updated
in May 1997) remains the basis for the federal response to
this problem. Supporting it is the Comprehensive
Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, which increased
penalties for production and trafficking while expanding
control over precursor chemicals like ephedrine, pseudoephedrine,
and phenylpropanolamine. Most recently,
President Clinton signed the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation
Act of 2000, which effectively equalized
penalties for amphetamine and methamphetamine and
directed additional funds toward drug treatment and law
enforcement. The legal sales threshold for all such over-the-counter products not packaged in blister packages or certain liquids will be lowered to nine grams per transaction
in the first quarter of FY 2002. As an adjunct to the
National Methamphetamine Strategy, the Attorney General
issued a Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical
Strategy in October of 2000. This strategy commits the
Department of Justice to continued enforcement operations
and tighter regulations that apply to listed chemicals.
Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Activities—Cleaning up a seized clandestine drug laboratory is a complex,
dangerous, expensive, and time-consuming task. The amount
of waste material and chemicals taken from such a site varies
from a few pounds to several tons depending on the size of the
operation and its manufacturing capability. The chemicals
required to manufacture illegal drugs and their by-products
include toxic, flammable, corrosive, unstable, reactive, and (in
some cases) radioactive substances. These materials are
responsible for numerous fires and explosions as well as the
contamination of homes, apartments, motels, streams, lakes,
septic tanks, and roadways.
Since 1991, DEA has had a program in place to respond
to and assist law enforcement in the removal of dangerous
wastes. This program helps to ensure officer safety and the
proper disposal of hazardous materials at proper facilities.
Additionally, property owners, environmental agencies,
and health departments are alerted to potential threats as a
result of contamination incidents. The average cost per
DEA site cleanup has declined from $17,000 in FY 1991
to less than $4,000 in FY 2000. This decline is due to
improvements in contracting procedures and services. The
average cost to state and local agencies for an illegal laboratory
cleanup has increased from $2,300 in FY 1998 to
$3,400 in FY 2000 due to the proliferation of larger, more
complex clandestine manufacturing sites.
Ecstasy—With the scientific name 3,4-Methylenedioxy-methamphetamine
(MDMA), Ecstasy is a Schedule I drug
under the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). This drug is a
synthetic, psychoactive substance possessing stimulant and
mild hallucinogenic properties. MDMA can produce
stimulant effects like an enhanced sense of pleasure, self-confidence,
and increased energy. Its hallucinogenic
properties include feelings of peacefulness, acceptance, and
empathy. Users claim they experience closeness with others
and a desire to touch. Consequently, the MDMA user has
embraced the misconception that it is relatively safe. However, various researchers have shown that this drug
can cause serious health problems and, in some cases,
death. Used in combination with alcohol, MDMA and
others of the so-called “club drugs” become even more
dangerous. The long-term psychological effects of MDMA
can include confusion, depression, sleep problems, anxiety,
and paranoia.
The ecstasy market in the United States is supplied by
Western European-based drug traffickers. MDMA is clandestinely
manufactured in Western Europe, primarily in
the Netherlands and Belgium. An estimated 90 percent of
MDMA distributed worldwide is produced in these countries.
While a few MDMA labs have been discovered in the
United States, the skills and sophisticated equipment
needed to manufacture the drug are likely to prevent wide-spread
domestic production like methamphetamine. In
recent years, Israeli Organized Crime syndicates—some
composed of émigrés associated with Russian Organized
Crime syndicates—have forged relationships with Western
European traffickers and gained control over a
significant share of the European market. Moreover, Israeli
syndicates remain the primary source for U.S. distribution
groups. The increasing involvement of organized crime signifies
the “professionalization” of the MDMA market.
These organizations are capable of producing and smuggling
significant quantities of MDMA from source
countries in Europe to the United States. Their distribution
networks are expanding from coast to coast, enabling a relatively
few organizations to dominate MDMA markets
nationwide.
Reducing Domestic Marijuana
Cultivation
Marijuana is the most readily available illegal drug in the
United States. While no comprehensive survey of domestic
cannabis cultivation has been conducted, the DEA estimates
that much of the marijuana consumed in the United States is
grown domestically, both outdoors and indoors, by commercial
and private operators. Federal officials estimate that more
than one-half of the domestically produced marijuana is
grown on America’s federal public lands. In recent years, the
size of individual gardens has expanded from a few hundreds
of plants, to gardens with gardens containing more than
20,000 marijuana plants. The DEA-coordinated Domestic
Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program provides
support to state and local law-enforcement agencies. In FY
1998, this program contributed to the seizure of more than
2.5 million marijuana plants, of which more than one third
were seized on federal public lands. In calendar year 200,
over 630,000 plants were eradicated from National Forest
System lands alone.
The Department of the Interior and Department of
Agriculture/Forest Service are deeply concerned about
marijuana cultivation on the 716 million acres of public
and tribal lands and the increasing violence associated
with it. As illegal producers invest larger sums of money
in their crop, they undertake greater efforts to protect
their gardens.
Recognizing that successful domestic cannabis eradication
must be supported by information about the acreage of
illegal drug cultivation, Congress directed the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1998 to submit to the Director of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy an annual assessment of
illegal drug cultivation in the United States.46 The detection
of cannabis from aerial platforms remains a problem due to
difficulty in developing spectral signatures unique to
cannabis. This problem is primarily due to the high degree
of genetic heterogeneity of illicit cannabis as well as the general
practice of concealing small plots within agricultural
plantings, e.g. corn, or on public lands. Because the land
under cultivation is often small, satellite imagery is not a
viable option. Despite these difficulties, the Agricultural
Research Service—in cooperation with NASA and the
Naval Systems Weapons Laboratory—made progress in
developing hand-held sensors for deployment in helicopters.
Interdiction Operations
The U.S. government designs coordinated interdiction
operations that anticipate shifting drug-trafficking patterns.
These integrated actions are led by the two Joint Inter-Agency
Task Forces (JIATF-East based in Key West, Florida
and JIATF-West in Alameda, California) that coordinate
source and transit zone activities; the Customs’ Air and
Marine Interdiction Coordination Center (in Riverside,
California) that monitors air approaches to the United
States; and the El Paso, Texas-based Joint Task Force Six and
Operation Alliance that coordinate activities along the
Southwest border. The Interdiction Coordinator, responsible
for deploying U.S. assets committed to international
interdiction, is the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
JIATF-East counterdrug air detection and monitoring
missions are carried out from a number of bases in the
continental United States and the Caribbean. Assets
previously based out of Howard Air Force Base, Panama
are now operating from three forward operating locations
in the Caribbean and South America.
In November 1999, the U.S. government concluded a
long-term agreement with Ecuador for use of an airfield in
Manta. In March 2000, the United States concluded a
long-term agreement with the government of the Netherlands
for use of the twin airfields at Aruba and Curacao.
Also in March 2000, we finalized an agreement with El Salvador
for a forward operating location at Comalapa. All
three are currently operational. There has been an increase
in the total number of counterdrug detection and monitoring
flight hours compared to the ones that previously
originated from Howard Air Force Base. Facility upgrades
at all these locations in FY 2001 will improve their capability,
allowing for flexible source and transit zone operations.
Forward Operating Location
Architecture
The closure of Rodman Naval Station in Panama had a significant
effect on the cost of operations in the Eastern Pacific.
This impact was further exacerbated by changes in cocaine
flow that necessitated an increase in operational tempo within
the region. International maritime support provided expeditionary
forces that increased the number of operations
adjacent to these high-threat drug trafficking routes.
The recently-signed bilateral maritime agreement made
Costa Rica the obvious choice to initiate the first cooperative
operations. The Coast Guard, working with the State
Department, developed operating guidelines for the first
counterdrug International Maritime Interdiction Support
arrangement. Final concurrence for these guidelines was
obtained in May of 2000 and the arrangement became
operational in July of 2000.
This landmark pact will be the regional model for
future negotiations. Maritime ports throughout the
region will allow interdiction units to obtain reliable,
short-notice fuel, provisions, and maintenance support
while providing a staging area for incoming and
outbound personnel. This initiative will increase law-enforcement
effectiveness by increasing the amount of
time ships spend “on-station” conducting interdiction
operations. The Coast Guard will continue to work with
the interagency and international partners to establish
new agreements throughout Central America and develop
a funding mechanism to reimburse cooperative states.
Operations in the Transit Zone
Drugs coming to the United States from South America
pass through a six million square-mile transit zone
roughly the size of the continental U.S. This zone
includes the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern
Pacific Ocean. The interagency mission is to reduce the
supply of drugs from source countries by denying smugglers
the use of air and maritime routes. In patrolling this
vast area, U.S. federal agencies closely coordinate their
operations with the interdiction forces of a number of
nations. One example of such successful international
cooperation is the U.S. Custom Service’s Operation HALCON.
Since 1990, this joint U.S.-Mexican operation
involving USCS intercept aircraft stationed in Mexico
and Mexican government apprehension aircraft has
produced significant seizures and arrests. In FY 2000
alone, USCS air and marine interdiction assets participated
in the seizure of 5,547 pounds of cocaine, 18,477
pounds of marijuana, 27 aircraft, two maritime vessels,
and two vehicles in the transit zone.
Intelligence sources estimate that the annual cocaine flow
through the Transit Zone is in excess of five hundred metric
tons. Non-commercial maritime conveyances account for
more than 80 percent of this transit zone flow. The largest
challenge is the elusive, high-speed smuggling boat, or “go-fast.”
The number of go-fast boats involved in smuggling has
increased substantially since 1995. Go-fasts accounted for the
majority of known maritime smuggling during FY 2000. Such
craft are small, very fast, nearly invisible to radar, and difficult
to see in daylight. In the vast majority of cases, interdiction
assets lack the speed required to intercept and board suspect
vessels. The estimated success rate for go-fast deliveries is close
to 90 percent. Until recently, the few successful go-fast interdictions
have been either the result of mechanical failure on the
part of the suspect vessel or intervention by other nations with
a more liberal use of force policy.47 The Coast Guard is acquiring
new equipment and developing capabilities to use armed
helicopters, over-the-horizon cutter boats, and non-lethal, vessel-
stopping technologies (such as those employed in
“Operation New Frontier”) to address the go-fast threat.
Record Coast Guard seizures—Coast Guard interdiction
efforts resulted in a record year for drug seizures,
including 132,919 pounds of cocaine and 50,463 pounds
of marijuana. Cocaine seizures surpassed the previous
record set in FY 1999: 111,689 pounds.
Throughout the year 2000, the United States Coast
Guard enjoyed an effective working relationship with the
Dutch Navy conducting counterdrug operations in the
Transit Zone. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments
(LEDETs)have deployed aboard Dutch warships
since 1994. However, cooperation reached a high point
this year with two large cooperative seizures.
- On June 19, 2000, while embarked on HNLMS Van
Galen, a Coast Guard LEDET seized 5,258 pounds of
cocaine from F/V Paul (of Cape Verde registry) in the
eastern Caribbean.
- On October 30, 2000, while embarked on HNLMS Van
Galen, a Coast Guard LEDET seized 6,404 pounds of
marijuana located onboard S/V Che Ca Che (of Colombia
registry), seized the vessel, and detained the crew.
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard pursued maritime
interdiction cooperation initiatives with the Mexican
Navy in 2000. This cooperation was instrumental in
seizing over thirty thousand pounds of cocaine.
The Coast Guard’s Campaign Steel Web continued its
success in FY 2000. Under this broad Campaign, the
USCG carried out multiple operations including: Frontier
Shield, New Frontier, Frontier Saber, Border Shield,
and Gulf Shield, all targeting maritime drug trafficking in
the transit zone. In FY 2000, Operations Frontier Shield,
Border Shield, and Gulf Shield resulted in the seizures of
over twenty-three thousand pounds of illicit drugs.48
Stopping drugs in the transit zone involves more than
intercepting drug shipments at sea or in the air. It entails
denying traffickers safe haven in countries within the transit
zone and preventing the corruption of institutions or
financial systems that could launder profits. During the
past year, U.S. law-enforcement agencies—in cooperation
with partner nations in the Caribbean and in South America—have been successful in stemming the tide of drugs.
Operation Conquistador in the spring of 2000 was
launched simultaneously in twenty-six Caribbean, South
American, and Central American countries. Operation
Conquistador illustrates what can be achieved through
well-coordinated, multinational law-enforcement operations.
The arrest of 2,331 individuals, seizure of fifty-five
kilos of heroin, 4,997 kilos of cocaine, thirteen boats, 172
vehicles, $132,772 in U.S. currency, and the destruction
of 4,274 acres of coca demonstrate the scope of this effort.
The operation was highlighted by the expeditious
exchange of information through the Unified Caribbean
On-line Regional Network (UNICORN) throughout the
twenty-six participating countries.
In August 2000, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the U.S. Customs Service, and the Joint Interagency
Task Force-East (JIATF-East) concluded Operation Journey.
This initiative involved a two-year, multinational
effort against a Colombian drug transportation organization
that used commercial vessels to haul multi-ton loads
of cocaine to twelve countries, most in North America
and Europe. The investigation resulted in the arrest of
forty individuals, including the alleged leader of the maritime
drug transportation organization, Ivan De La Vega,
several of his subordinates, and the seizure of more than
sixteen tons of cocaine over a two-year period.
International cooperation and assistance is an essential
aspect of a comprehensive transit-zone strategy. The United
States will continue working with other nations to implement
a broad drug-control agenda that includes modernizing laws,
strengthening law-enforcement and judicial institutions,
developing anti-corruption measures, opposing money laudering,
and backing cooperative interdiction.
Targeting International Drug-Trafficking
Organizations
Over the last decade, Latin American drug-trafficking
organizations fundamentally changed the way they do
business. A diverse group of smaller, specialized Colombian
drug rings have emerged following the collapse of
the Medellin and Cali cartels. The smaller suppliers in
South America and the transportation groups in the
Caribbean and Mexico filled the void left by the demise
of the large cartels and expanded their roles in the
international cocaine industry.
The increase in smaller suppliers, producers, and
trafficking groups made targeting drug-trafficking
organizations much more difficult. The sheer power, influence,
and sophistication of these groups put them in a
category by themselves. Whereas traditional Mafia families
bribed officers and judges, today’s international drug
organizations corrupt entire institutions of government.
These traffickers model their operations on international
terrorism. They maintain tight control of their workers
through highly compartmentalized cell structures that separate
production, shipment, distribution, money laundering,
communications, security, and recruitment. Traffickers have
at their disposal the most technologically advanced airplanes,
boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment,
and weapons. They have also established vast counter-intelligence
capabilities and transportation networks.
Efforts to Control Precursor
Chemicals
With the exception of cannabis, every illicit drug
requires chemicals in order to be refined to its final form
(e.g. the coca plant to cocaine, the poppy plant to heroin),
or is purely the result of chemical synthesis (e.g. methamphetamine,
MDMA, etc.). The strategy of chemical
control offers several advantages as an adjunct to
traditional law-enforcement measures. Chemical control
offers a means of attacking illicit drug production and disrupting
the process before the drugs have entered the
market.
Law-enforcement agencies have increasingly acknowledged
that chemical control is a critical element in the
struggle against illegal narcotics and synthetic drugs.
Because many legitimate industrial chemicals are also critical
to the processing and synthesis of most illicitly
produced drugs, preventing the diversion of these
chemicals from legitimate commerce to illicit drug
manufacturing is a difficult job.
Historically, chemicals critical to the production of
cocaine are introduced into the Andean region through
legitimate purchases by companies that are registered and
licensed as chemical importers. Once in a country, the
chemicals are diverted either directly from rogue
importers or as a result of coercion on the part of drug
traffickers. In response to stricter international controls,
drug traffickers have increasingly been forced to divert the
chemicals by mislabeling the containers, forging
documents, establishing front companies, using circuitous
routing, hijacking shipments, bribing officials, or
smuggling products across neighboring borders.
Through the DEA, the United States plays a vital role in
coordinating chemical-enforcement operations in Latin
American countries that produce cocaine or serve as transit
points for cocaine chemicals. Operation Purple is a DEA-driven
international chemical control initiative aimed at
disrupting the illicit manufacture of cocaine in the Andean
Region by monitoring and tracking shipments of potassium
permanganate (PP), the chemical oxidizer of choice
for cocaine production. The cornerstone of the operation
is the intensive PP tracking program aimed at identifying
and intercepting diversion; identifying rogue firms and
suspect individuals; gathering intelligence on diversion
methods, trafficking trends, and shipping routes; and taking
administrative, civil, and/or criminal action as
appropriate. Critical to the success of this operation is the
communication network that gives notification of shipments
and provides the government of the importer
sufficient time to verify the legitimacy of the transaction
and take appropriate action. The effects of this initiative
have been dramatic and far-reaching. Operation Purple has
exposed a significant vulnerability among traffickers and
has grown to almost thirty nations. Since its inception in
April 1999, 597 shipments have been tracked, totaling sixteen
million kilograms of PP. There have been thirty-five
arrests reported during this operation, and fifty-one shipments
seized or stopped, which accounts for 2.9 million
kilograms of PP. Had this PP been used for processing
cocaine, up to twenty-nine million kilograms of cocaine
could have been created. DEA’s Special Testing and
Research Laboratory, through its Cocaine Signature Program,
reports that the percentage of highly oxidized
cocaine samples is now at an all-time low (8 percent)
which may, in part, be a result of the intense international
tracking of PP. Operation Purple is the first international
chemical control initiative of its kind and has become the
template for similar initiatives in the future.
Acetic anhydride, the most commonly used agent in
heroin processing, is virtually irreplaceable. Among
heroin source countries, only Mexico has indigenous
acetic anhydride production capability, producing 87,000
metric tons in 1999 alone. All other heroin-producing
countries must import large amounts of acetic anhydride.
The diversion of this chemical to Colombian heroin laboratories
is a continuing problem. In 1999, three major
hijackings of tanker trucks of acetic anhydride in Colombia,
totaling 95.9 metric tons, were sufficient to supply
the Colombian heroin trade for the next five years. However,
the largest markets for diverted acetic anhydride
continue to be heroin laboratories in Afghanistan and
Burma. Of particular note was a March, 2000 seizure of
72.8 metric tons of AA in Turkmenistan, en route to
heroin laboratories in Afghanistan. Ton quantity shipments
of diverted acetic anhydride are routinely seized by
authorities in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan.
Operation Topaz, which is still in the initial stages of
development, is an effort to develop an international strategy
targeting acetic anhydride that will certainly include a
monitoring program. DEA fully supports these efforts and
already has implemented a comprehensive study to expand
its knowledge of this chemical. If international consensus
can be reached to deny drug traffickers access to acetic
anhydride, then tracking the movement of this chemical
from production to end user can become a significant tool
in the worldwide attempt to prevent its diversion.
In addition, DEA is proposing Operation Acid Wash, a
special enforcement program targeting traffickers and
brokers of illicitly obtained acetic anhydride. Such a program
would enable DEA to support the criminal
investigations targeting heroin production organizations.
The methamphetamine situation changed in the mid-1990s
with the entrance of Mexican organized crime into
production and distribution. A seizure of 3.5 metric tons of
pseudoephedrine in Texas in 1994 revealed that Mexican
trafficking groups were using a different method of making
methamphetamine and the organization was actually doing
so on an unprecedented scale, with potentially serious
repercussions for drug abuse throughout the United States.
DEA has developed several strategies to deal with the
methamphetamine chemical diversion threat. First, the
agency instituted a series of special enforcement operations
directed against chemical traffickers, including: Operation
Chemex targeting Mexican criminal organizations involved
in chemical diversion; Operation Backtrack, which attacked
domestic distributors of precursor chemicals who knowingly
sell their products to clandestine laboratory operators; and,
most recently, Operation Mountain Express. To support
enforcement operations, DEA has also embarked on a
methamphetamine chemical action plan to tighten controls
over these precursor chemicals.
Although many governments, encouraged by the success
of Operation Purple are considering chemical tracking
initiatives for other products, DEA recognizes that international
tracking of chemicals alone cannot be
successfully utilized for all drugs and chemicals. DEA is,
however, currently involved in the development of a program
to track those chemicals used in the manufacture of
amphetamine-type stimulants. China, India, and the
Czech Republic as well as Eastern Europe, Canada, and
Mexico will most likely be involved in this initiative.
Since January 1999, DEA’s Office of Diversion Control
has blocked 163 U.S. chemical shipments totaling 490.2
metric tons and caused additional twelve shipments to be
blocked by other countries. During this same period, there
have been 73 seizures of methamphetamine-related chemicals
in Mexico. In the past year and a half, there have been
thirteen seizures of potassium permanganate in Latin America
and thirty-eight stopped shipments around the world.
The thirty-five chemicals most commonly used in illicit
drug production also have extensive industrial applications.
For this reason, an important element in the U.S. drug-control
policy is to insure that all countries have a flexible
monitoring system that regulates the flow of precursor
chemicals without jeopardizing legitimate commerce. The
Multilateral Chemical Reporting Initiative, formulated with
international consensus under U.S. leadership, encourages
governments to exchange information on a voluntary basis
in order to monitor international chemical shipments. Over
the past decade, key international bodies like the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs and the U.N. General Assembly’s
Special Session (UNGASS) have addressed the issue of
chemical diversion in conjunction with U.S. efforts. These
organizations raised specific concerns about potassium permanganate
(a chemical essential in making cocaine) and
acetic anhydride (a heroin precursor).
To facilitate the international flow of information about
precursor chemicals, the United States through its relationship
with the Inter-American Drug Control Abuse
Commission (CICAD), continues to evaluate the use of
precursor chemicals and assist countries in strengthening
controls. Many nations still lack the capacity to determine
whether the import or export of precursor chemicals is
related to legitimate needs or illicit drugs. The problem is
complicated by the fact that many chemical shipments are
either brokered or transshipped through third countries in
an attempt to disguise their purpose and destination.
In countries where strict chemical controls were put in
place, illicit drug production has been seriously affected. For
example, few of the chemicals needed to process coca leaf
into cocaine are manufactured in Bolivia or Peru. Most are
smuggled in from neighboring countries with advanced
chemical industries or diverted from a small number of licit
handlers. Increased interdiction of chemicals in Peru and
Bolivia has contributed to a rise in samples with of lower
quality, minimally oxidized cocaine. Bolivian lab operators
are now using inferior substitutes (cement instead of lime,
sodium bicarbonate for ammonia), recycled solvents (ether),
and a streamlined production process that virtually eliminates
oxidation in producing cocaine base. Some
laboratories are not using sulfuric acid during the maceration
state; consequently, less cocaine alkaloid is extracted
from the leaf, producing less HCl. Heroin-producing countries
similarly depend on supplies of acetic anhydride from
the international market. This heroin precursor continues to
account for the largest volume of internationally seized
chemicals, according to the International Narcotics Control
Board. Since July 1999, there have been several notable
seizures of acetic anhydride in Turkey (amounting to nearly
seventeen metric tons) and in Turkmenistan (totaling seventy-three metric tons). These seizures alone indicate the
need for expanded DEA training of local authorities in these
and other countries targeted by illicit chemical traffickers.
International Money Laundering and
Asset Forfeiture
The United States supports global efforts to disrupt the
flow of illicit capital, track criminal sources of funds, forfeit
ill-gained assets, and prosecute offenders. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), formed by the G-7
Economic Summit in 1989, is dedicated to promoting
anti-money laundering controls around the world. As a
result, all members of the FATF have now criminalized
money laundering and are working toward implementing
a full range of international anti-money laundering standards.
In June 2000, the FATF cited fifteen nations as
Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCT). In
July 2000, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) followed by issuing advisories on these
jurisdictions to the U.S. financial community. The impact
of these combined actions was immediately evident as
new money laundering legislation was passed by seven of
the named jurisdictions. Legislation is pending in several
others. Further evidence that the international effort to
combat money laundering is working is the voluntary
adoption of Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines
for Private Banking and the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering
Principles by twelve of the world’s largest banks,
including Citigroup, Inc. These guidelines will establish
heightened “due diligence” and “know your customer”
standards among these banks.
Efforts to build effective international cooperation
encompass two major areas of activity: (1) establishing or
strengthening countries’ financial intelligence unit counterparts,
and (2) facilitating the exchange of information
among these institutions in support of anti-money laundering
investigations. The United States has been
working with the Egmont Group* to develop Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs), which receive, analyze, and
(where appropriate) refer for prosecution suspicious
transactions reported by financial institutions. There are
now fifty-three FIUs in operation with more in the planning
stages.
* The Egmont Group of FIUs, is an international body formed in 1995 to increase the effectiveness of FIUs across national borders, cooperate through information exchange, and reach out to other nations that are
starting to develop anti-money laundering programs.
The operation of financial intelligence units (FIUs) may
prove to be one of the most effective means for combating
money laundering around the globe. This development
provides a centralized mechanism for tracking criminal
proceeds, collecting investigative data, and contributing to
international cooperation by combating money laundering.
Currently, FinCEN is working with Egmont member governments
to share information through a secure Intranet.
During 2000, the governments of the United States,
Colombia, Panama, Aruba and Venezuela signed a multilateral
agreement to establish a working group of experts
to study and make recommendations on combating
trade-based money laundering. The Department of State’s
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs coordinates and funds all U.S. government bilateral
and multilateral anti-money laundering training in an
effort to increase the number of countries engaged in this
fight. All federal law enforcement agencies participate in
this endeavor.
Counterfeiting is another threat that is on the rise. The
United States Secret Service reports that approximately
one-third of all counterfeit currency in circulation originates
in Colombia. The established routes and
distribution networks for counterfeit currency are being
used increasingly for the funneling of currency into the
U.S. economy. To combat this threat, the Secret Service
has provided equipment and numerous forensic and
investigative training seminars for Colombia’s DAS,
DIJIN, and armed services.49
The United States government is also attacking the
financial networks of international drug trafficking organizations.
In December of 1999, President Clinton signed
into law the Foreign Narcotic Kingpin Designation Act,
which established a global program targeting the activities
of narcotics traffickers. The act provides a statutory
framework for the President to institute sanctions against
foreign drug kingpins in order to deny their front organizations
access to the U.S. financial system and benefits
from U.S. trade. Once locked out of American trade,
criminal organizations have difficulty participating in
open commerce. On June 1, 2000, President Clinton
named twelve foreign nationals as drug kingpins, and the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) took actions to block all assets and payments
belonging to these kingpins and their associated entities.
In response to the goals of the National Money Laundering
Strategy for 2000, U.S. law enforcement has identified
and targeted major money laundering organizations in
the United States that attempt to move illicit drug proceeds
internationally. Additional scrutiny is needed when
monitoring bulk cash smuggling, money services businesses
(MSBs), in particular wire remittance businesses,
and the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE)
system. These potential money laundering systems are
being attacked on several fronts: pro-active investigations
and prosecutions; civil asset forfeiture and consent decrees
with non-compliant businesses; multi-agency training initiatives
for law enforcement and the financial and
industry components exploited by these money laundering
systems; and multi-lateral initiatives with foreign
governments.
Certification for Major Illicit Drug-Producing
and Transit Countries
The statutorily-mandated certification process is an
important instrument in our international narcotics-control
policy. Under this law, the president is required to
identify major illicit drug-producing and transit countries
on an annual basis and then “certify” whether these
nations cooperated fully with the United States or took
adequate steps on their own to implement the 1988 UN
Drug Convention. The president must impose certain
economic sanctions on countries that do not meet these
requirements unless he certifies that vital interests of the
United States preclude such sanctions. The sanctions
include cutting off foreign assistance (other than humanitarian
and counternarcotics aid) and voting against
requests for loans from multilateral lending institutions.
The certification process helps underscore the importance
the United States attaches to international narcotics control
and encourages some countries to take steps they
might otherwise have avoided in pursuit of sound drug-control
policy.
On November 1, 2000, the president approved and
sent to Congress the Majors List for 2000. The twenty-four
countries included were: Afghanistan, the Bahamas,
Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, China, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
Two international entities, Hong Kong and Taiwan,
were removed from the Majors List in 2000. Hong Kong
has been considered a major drug-transit country since
1987 when the first Majors List was prepared. Over the
past few years, however, Hong Kong’s role as a transit
point for U.S.-bound drugs has declined markedly. Stringent
enforcement measures and extradition agreements
with various countries, including the United States, and
the risk of having narcotics shipments seized have become
effective deterrents to shipping drugs through Hong
Kong. Seizure rates in both the United States and Hong
Kong suggest that trafficking organizations are no longer
using Hong Kong as a transit point for U.S.-destined
heroin.
In the early 1990s, Taiwan became a transit point for
Asian drug-trafficking organizations moving heroin to the
Western Hemisphere. Taiwan’s role as a transit point for
drugs destined for the United States, however, has
changed radically in the past few years. Strict law-enforcement
procedures, together with improved customs
inspection and surveillance methods, have all but cut off
the serious flows of heroin from Taiwan to the United
States. Since Taiwan was designated a major drug-transit
country, there have been no seizures in the United States
of heroin that passed through Taiwan, nor have Taiwan
authorities identified any important drug shipments destined
for the United States.
International Drug-Control
Cooperation
The transnational nature of the drug threat prevents
any country from successfully combating it unilaterally.
Our efforts to reduce drug availability, abuse, and adverse
consequences within the United States are supported by
extensive international activities. Global programs confront
illegal drug cultivation, production, trafficking,
abuse, diversion of precursor chemicals, and the corrosive
effects of the illegal drug trade—including corruption,
violence, environmental degradation, damage to democratic
institutions, and economic distortion.
A series of bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional,
regional, and global accords creates a network for
anti-drug measures. The international community’s
mature understanding of the scope of this problem is
helping dissolve the myth that the U.S. market is the
engine driving the global drug trade. In fact, the
United States comprises just two percent of the
world’s consumers. Even with the relatively high price
Americans are willing to pay for illegal drugs, U.S.
citizens still account for only 10 to 15 percent of
more than four hundred billion dollars spent globally
on drugs every year.50
Bilateral Cooperation with Mexico
Most of the cocaine and much of the marijuana,
heroin, and methamphetamine consumed in the U.S.
comes through Mexico. Mexican drug networks control a
substantial portion of the illicit substances distributed in
the United States. Conversely, cash and firearms derived
from illegal drug trafficking move South from the U.S.
into Mexico.
The creation of the High-Level Contact Group (HLCG)—a senior level, bilateral consultation mechanism specializing
in drug control—has facilitated the decision-making
and agreement processes between both governments, allowing
the cooperative efforts against drug consumption,
trafficking and related crimes to be led effectively. Since the
inception of the HLCG, the U.S. and Mexico have proceeded
with technical exchanges and joint projects in illicit
cultivation control, drug treatment, and demand reduction.
In the area of law enforcement, the U.S. and Mexico have
cooperated in the arrest of major traffickers. The U.S.-Mexico
Bilateral Chemical Control Working Group denies
criminal organizations access to precursor chemicals needed
for the production of illegal drugs.
Over the past year, the United States and Mexico
increased their cooperation among both governmental and
NGOs in addressing the causes and consequences of drug
abuse in both countries. The third Binational Drug-Demand
Reduction Conference was held May 31-June 2,
2000 in Phoenix, Arizona.51 Four hundred people attended
this event, which continued to feature professional-development,
a binational research symposium linking public
health and safety, treatment methods, prevention strategies,
youth coalitions, and dissemination of materials. The conference
strengthened a sustainable mechanism for future
binational collaboration. Mexico has agreed to host a fourth
conference in 2001.
Regional Drug Control in the Western
Hemisphere and the Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism
The Organization of American States’ Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) has
become an essential link in our international drug-control
regime.
At the Second Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago,
Chile in 1998, thirty-four presidents, including President
Clinton, agreed to create a new Hemispheric Alliance against
Drugs. The centerpiece of this agreement was a pledge to create
a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism—essentially a
hemispheric system of performance measurement. The Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) is an unprecedented
initiative designed to ensure that every nation in the hemisphere
develops and implements comprehensive national
drug-control strategies. Specifically, Summit participants
agreed to: “...develop, within the framework of the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD-OAS), a singular and objective process of multilateral
governmental evaluation in order to monitor the
progress of their individual and collective efforts in the hemisphere....”
After eighteen months of discussion and
negotiation, the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM)
was inaugurated during the twenty-sixth regular session of
CICAD in Montevideo, Uruguay in 1999. The establishment
of the MEM will have no direct impact on the United
States’ annual drug-certification process, which is required by
law. The MEM, however, should facilitate more effective
counterdrug efforts by all the nations in the hemisphere.
The MEM is designed to develop an adequate system to
collect and report basic statistics on drug use, production,
seizures, arrests, money laundering, chemical diversion, and
drug trafficking. Previously, although many countries within
the hemisphere had been collecting information on their
own strategies, the data was often based on different methodologies.
This fact prevented accurate regional comparisons,
discouraged information sharing, and interfered with efforts
to develop a hemispheric picture of the drug problem.
The initial steps in implementing the MEM have
already begun. National evaluation reports, and a hemispheric
report—both with recommendations—has
been written by an independent MEM Government
Experts Group (with representatives from each of our
thirty-four countries) and approved by CICAD. Results
of the first round of evaluations will be formally reported
prior to the hemisphere’s presidents at the third Summit
of the Americas in April 2001 in Quebec City, Canada.
U.S. contributions to OAS/CICAD have also produced
the following such direct results:
- Model regulations on money laundering and asset forfeiture,
chemical diversion, and trafficking in firearms along
with training and technical assistance to governments in
implementing them.
- The Inter-American Telecommunications Network for
Drug Control (RETCOD) to improve the ability of
national drug commissions to communicate with each
other and CICAD.
- A regional Central American legal development and
training center, which assists governments in developing
counternarcotics laws and sentencing guidelines.
- A regional demand reduction strategy for the hemisphere,
stimulating public awareness and drug-abuse
prevention through governmental and non-governmental
organizations.
- Coordination of demand-reduction programming for
street children and women.
- A standardized system of ongoing epidemiological surveillance,
which has been implemented in Central
America and is being expanded to other subregions.
- Drug abuse prevention programs for under-served
indigenous communities in Central America.
- Drug abuse prevention and treatment training for nursing-school personnel, counselors, and others who work
with street children along with and research and fellowships
for technical personnel.
- Projects to promote communication and cooperation
among regional customs services, among port authorities,
and drug law enforcement agencies.
- Establishment of a telecommunications network for
control of precursor chemicals in Andean Ridge countries
and neighboring states.
- Money laundering prevention programs for financial
institutions throughout the hemisphere, including training
for bank regulators and supervisory agencies, judges,
prosecutors, and financial intelligence/analysis units.
Drug-Control Efforts through Other
International Organizations
A significant increase in the U.S. contribution to the UN
drug effort in 1999 helped foster greater international focus
on implementing the commitments of UN conventions—particularly in developing and promoting programs to
eliminate illicit crops. The United States was also able to
achieve an important objective by developing a useful follow-up program to assess whether nations are implementing
the UNGA Special Session goals and key target deadlines.
U.S. contributions to UNDCP have had a significant
impact on the operations and expansion of UN counternarcotics
programs and policy and have led to increased
commitment from other donors, whose primary vehicle for
international drug-control efforts continues to be the UN.
Recent U.S. contributions to UNDCP fostered an
expansion of the Southeast Asia program which targets
the second-largest opium producer, Burma, where heroin
production is beginning to decline. This UN-led program
encompasses China, Thailand, and Laos. It also includes
three projects in the Wa-controlled area of Burma and one
project for the Kachin-controlled area. A program to
support eradication campaign in Afghanistan, the largest
opium producer, training and advice to bolster
law-enforcement, and customs institutions in areas
surrounding Afghanistan.
As a result of the Colombia Plan’s regional demand-reduction
training in Southwest and Southeast Asia,
nations have developed self-sufficient prevention, education,
treatment, and after-care programs in addition to
national and regional-level networks of public and private
sector demand-reduction programs that are designed to
build strong public support and strengthen political will.
One area of interest to the international community is the
model after-care and correctional drug-intervention
programs for juveniles developed in Southeast Asia.
U.S. contributions to the Colombo Plan’s Drug Advisory
Program (DAP) are having a significant impact on
the development and administration of demand-reduction
programs in Southeast and Southwest Asia. The DAP
assisted with the creation of the first-ever international
network of drug prevention NGOs through co-sponsorship
of an international drug prevention summit in
Bangkok in November 1999. The level of U.S. contributions
led to increased commitment from other donors,
particularly Japan, Korea, and Australia. Recent U.S. contributions
to the DAP fostered: development of host
government-funded treatment programs in Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, China, and
the Philippines; development of a coalition of drug prevention
programs in Southwest Asia; development of a
drug prevention curriculum for Pakistani school systems;
a major regional coalition of drug-prevention programs in
Southeast Asia (IFNGO); and a number of government-funded
community and school-based prevention
initiatives in ASEAN countries with IFNGO support.
Promoting International Demand
Reduction
All countries are affected by the devastating consequences
of drug use and its adverse effects on the health
and safety of citizens, families, and communities. Recognizing
that no government can reduce drug use and its
consequences by itself, the United States works closely
with individual countries and regional organizations on
demand-reduction initiatives. U.S. objectives in international
demand reduction include: (1) strengthening
international interest in comprehensive anti-drug policies
comparable to those in the U.S.; (2) increasing understanding
in key countries and regions of drug-consumption
problems through better epidemiological
surveys and public-awareness initiatives; (3) educating the
international community about U.S. policies, programs,
and successes in combating drug abuse; and (4) building
multilateral alliances to combat drug use.
The United States enjoys an excellent relationship in
counterdrug cooperation with the United Kingdom,
whose national drug-control strategy is quite similar to
ours. In addition to cooperating on law-enforcement matters,
our two nations are helping one another in many
other areas, including research, development, and technology
exchange; additional drug treatment outcome
evaluations; sharing information on the use of drug
courts; and policy issues.
Supporting Democracy and
Human Rights
Democracies make peaceful neighbors and reliable
trade partners. They are good for security and provide an
environment for cooperation. Democracies have a greater
propensity to respect human rights, are less tolerant of
corruption, and are more likely to build legal systems that
set fair ground-rules for everybody—including foreign
investors. If any areas in the world exhibit a sweeping
trend toward greater respect for democratic practices in
the past quarter-century, Latin America and the
Caribbean can be proud of their efforts. Civil society is
still weak in some countries. Greater honesty and ethics in
government, improved administration of justice, effective
and humane law enforcement, and greater respect for free
expression are all needed.The United States Government
continues to promote respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law. In accordance with current
U.S. law and policy, the U.S. Government does not provide
assistance to units of foreign security forces if there is
credible evidence of unanswered allegations of gross violations
of human rights in connection with those units.
Our government consistently urges partner nation governments
to thoroughly investigate allegations of human
rights violations in a timely manner and to bring the
alleged perpetrators to justice.
The Department of Defense includes human rights elements
in all of its counterdrug training courses for foreign
security forces. The Department of Justice and the U.S.
Agency for International Development both have programs
in several countries to promote respect for human
rights, and to train and protect investigators and judges
involved in human rights cases.
Reducing Corruption
Around the world, corruption diverts resources from
productive use, distorts economies, reduces growth, and
causes enormous social tension. High levels of corruption
make it difficult for countries to grow and develop, even
with good macroeconomic policies. Drug syndicates exacerbate
corruption through wealth. Enormous resources
give large, illegal drug organizations a nearly open-ended
capacity to corrupt. Although individual governments
must take the lead in combating corruption, the global
community can help. The U.S supports such efforts as the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the OAS Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption. The OAS
corruption convention was the first instrument of its kind
to be negotiated. It requires parties to criminalize acts of
corruption and has the potential to enhance cooperation
among nations of the hemisphere in the battle against
both domestic and transnational corruption.
