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**Author(s): George L. Kelling ; Mary A. Wycoff**

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**The Evolving Strategy of Policing:  
Case Studies of Strategic Change**

**May 2001**

**George L. Kelling  
Mary Ann Wycoff**

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## PROLOGUE

Orlando W. Wilson was the most important police leader of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His thinking and writing singularly dominated policing from the 1940s through the 1970s. His mentor, August Vollmer, may achieve similar status in the future, since his practice, as against his later writings, was prescient of many of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century trends in policing. Vollmer's patrol officers as "chiefs of their beats," "college cops" (the majority of his officers were either college graduates or in college), and his "Friday crab club" meetings (meetings of off-duty officers to discuss their work with him and their peers) were the first stirrings of genuine professionalism in policing. What Vollmer practiced, however, was a road not taken by policing, at least until the 1980s with the development of community policing

O. W. Wilson's preeminence is based on his practical, creative, and original thinking and his ability to put that thinking into clear and precise writing. His texts on police administration and on planning became the standards of the field, used in generations of training, education, and civil service examinations. No other book on policing was as influential as *Police Administration* in its various editions in shaping policing's basic strategy.<sup>1</sup>

During the era dominated by O. W. Wilson and his colleagues, roughly the 1920s through the 1970s, police departments shifted from being an integral part of urban political machines with a broad service mandate, to autonomous "professional" organizations narrowly focused on "serious" crime. Allied with the Progressives, reformers struggled to extricate policing at all levels from the influence of late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> century urban politics. In doing so, they developed a strategy of police that

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Orlando W. Wilson, *Police Administration*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963.

emphasized bureaucratic autonomy, efficiency, and internal accountability through command and control systems. The business of police was serious crime as defined by the Uniform Crime Reports (developed by Wilson's colleagues under the auspices of the International Association of Chief of Police). The organizational structure and administrative processes of police departments were patterned after the classical models developed by Frederick Taylor, the great organizational theorist of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The methods for dealing with serious crime included criminal investigation, random preventive patrol by automobile, and rapid response to calls for service. O. W. Wilson emerged as the primary architect of both the administrative/organizational and tactical elements of this strategy. His administrative texts, conceived and written during the 1940s and 1950s, remained basic police lore until well into the 1980s.

Reformers had extraordinary confidence in this strategy. Many believed that the car and radio could eliminate urban crime completely.<sup>2</sup>

By means of police radio, headquarters can broadcast information instantly to every precinct station and every police auto. Orders can be given to descend upon the scene of the crime from various directions by police cars. The net is quickly formed and tightened. Often the criminal is caught at the scene of the crime: usually not far away. If he should get outside the net the chase may be taken up and directed by radio.<sup>3</sup>

This confidence remained until well into the 1960s. For reformers, further development of policing and its ability to deal with problems focused on resources and implementation: if only police were recruited, trained, supervised, and deployed properly, urban crime could be subdued. During the resources heyday of the late 1960s and early

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<sup>2</sup> Jonathan Rubinstein, *City Police*, New York, Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Roscoe Kent, "Catching the Criminal by Police Radio," *The American City*, vol. 45, November 1931, p. 106.

1970s, police chief after police chief testified to city councils that, given enough officers and proper adherence to reform principles, surging crime could be contained.

Wilson's writings led the way to command and control organizations, heavy emphasis on rules and regulations, preventive patrol by automobile, rapid response to calls for service, beat construction on the basis of "hazards," and other such innovations that created the basis of what we refer to as the "reform" model of policing.<sup>4</sup>

Close reading of Wilson's texts gives at least two impressions. First, one can find the origins of many of the excesses of the reform model: the failure to understand police discretion; the over-reliance on the automobile; the isolation of police in those automobiles; the remoteness of police from neighborhoods and communities; the narrow focus on felonies; and the emphasis on law enforcement as opposed to crime prevention. But one also gets a second impression: Wilson's view of policing is much more complex than one would surmise if simply judged by how it was implemented throughout the US.

For example: in the second edition of *Police Administration*, Appendix B is "Administrative Checklist."<sup>5</sup> It is comprised of 301 questions "to facilitate an inventory of department organization detail and operational procedures."<sup>6</sup> Questions are to be answered with a yes or no; the implication being that a no justifies some change inside the organization under review. For example, the first question is: "Is there an

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<sup>4</sup> We use reform, as opposed to "professional" even though police reformers dubbed it as such. During the 1920s, the term "scientific" was used to describe the emerging strategy, however, it later became widely known as the professional model. We are reluctant to use professional to describe Wilson's model because it is a highly idiosyncratic use of the term. Clearly the police occupation, with its traditional focus on command and control and rules and regulations, was markedly different than the traditional professions: clergy, physicians, lawyers, and professors. Without going into detail, the most apt appellation would have been "bureaucratic."

<sup>5</sup> Orlando Winfield Wilson, *Police Administration*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963, pp. 479-493.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 479.

organization chart of the department?" A no implies a need for one. Wilson's confidence in this checklist was so great that when the American Bar Foundation asked him to consult on the famous American Bar Foundation survey (discussed below), he presented his checklist as the means by which police departments could be evaluated.

The questions on the checklist are broken down into fourteen categories:

Organization (Questions 1-18), Planning (19-38), Inspections (20-67), Public Relations (68-113), Patrol (114-128), Detective Division (129-154), Youth Division (155-175), Traffic Division (156-245), Dispatching (246-255), Jail (256-266), Laboratory (267-271), Headquarters Building (272-280), Equipment (281-291), and District stations (292-301).

If, for example, one reads the section on patrol, the reform model's aversion to foot patrol is immediately evident: "118. Has the number of foot patrolmen been reduced to the bare essentials?"<sup>7</sup> (Again, the desired answer is always yes.) It is more complex than this, however, for question 121 is: "Do motorized patrolmen recognize that their patrol car is designed primarily as a device to transport them quickly and without fatigue from the location of one task to that of another?"<sup>8</sup> (The desired answer is "yes.") And, question 122: "Do motorized patrolmen spend an adequate proportion of their time in foot patrol and at inspectional duties? Do they avoid sitting in their cars when they are not in motion?"<sup>9</sup> (Again, the answer should be "yes.") So to say that Wilson opposes foot patrol is not quite right. Wilson does not want officers dedicated to foot patrol without vehicles available. Walking to post is a waste of time. And one cannot respond to an emergency rapidly while on foot. Likewise, one can deduce that while he wants officers

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 484.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 485.

to randomly patrol, that picture too is more complicated by his desire that officers patrol on foot and conduct inspectional duties.

One can read through these questions and, without stretching, conclude that Wilson's view of policing was much more subtle and complex than the reform model came to represent in practice. For example: frequent changes of officers among beats were to be avoided; patrol officers were to conduct preliminary investigations; officers were to get to know citizens and businesspeople on their beats; and, citizens were to be encouraged to bring non-criminal problems to police. Most of these prescriptions were lost on the generation of police chiefs who led police during the 1940s to 1970s era, most likely out of their zeal to turn police into "crime fighters" and to insulate police from political and community influences.

Yet, in another sense, the checklist indicates the confidence reformers must have felt in their model of policing, especially Wilson himself. The questions were specific and there were no neutral response categories. If one had an organization that could answer "yes" to a set of 301 questions about the organization and its policies and procedures, one could confidently aver that the organization was performing at a high level. Lost in this, of course, were the culture of the organization, its informal functioning, and many aspects of its line performance. An idea that researchers and most thoughtful police executives now find commonplace – that organizations look very different at executive levels than they do on the ground – simply was not evident to reformers like O. W. Wilson. Nonetheless, the views of police reformers were so strong and so widely accepted that they continued to dominate mainstream American policing well into the 1980s. Their views on police largely dominated President Johnson's

Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice – the report of which dominated criminal justice thinking and practice from its publication in 1965 until the last decade of the century.

By the late 1970s, however, O.W. Wilson's thinking had largely run its course and, in a series of setbacks, began to unravel. This monograph will document both its unraveling and the evolution of a new strategy of policing which, by the end of the 1990s while still lagging in implementation, nonetheless completely dominated police thinking – both at the policy and practice level.

## INTRODUCTION

This is a monograph about strategic change in policing over the last half-century in the United States. It assumes that policing is going through a historic shift of strategy that is as dramatic as the early 20<sup>th</sup> century shift led by O. W. Wilson and his colleagues. The data on which this monograph is based are case studies of police departments in the process of implementing change. The authors of this monograph initiated the first case study of policing in Dallas (TX) in 1971 under the auspices of the Police Foundation. Harvard case writers finished the ten most recent cases in 1999 for the Urban Institute under a grant from COPS. The rest are cases that the authors have drafted or rewritten expressly as background for this monograph. We rewrote Dallas, wrote New Haven (CN) and the New York Transit Police (TPD), and synthesized and rewrote previously written materials from Houston (TX) and Madison (WI) (sites in which Wycoff has worked in one capacity or another since the early 1980s). As noted, the Dallas case recounted events that occurred during the early 1970s. The Houston and Madison cases narrate efforts at change that were initiated during the mid-1980s. And, both New Haven and the TPD cases record activities that happened around 1990.

Although our primary data sources are these 15 cases, we will not limit this analysis to them. Each of us has been working in the field, exploring a number of subjects, since the early 1970s. For example, Wycoff's work on criminal investigation shapes her views on strategic change and will be reflected. Likewise, Kelling evaluated the Department of Justice's Comprehensive Community Program that included case studies of changes in policing in sixteen sites. Moreover, Kelling, while at Harvard, maintained close relations with the Boston Police Department for 20 years. Wycoff has

maintained special relationships with the Madison and Houston Police Departments for at least as long. Each of us continues to lecture and do research in, and consult with, many police departments. Moreover, Kelling developed close ties with the police union movement from its formal inception during the 1960s to the present time. Finally, each of us has maintained close relations with several chiefs over the years, both in and out of office.

Readers familiar with policing will understand that some of the cases represent departments that have special historical significance: Dallas, under Chief Frank Dyson, broke ground in almost all the areas that still today are being implemented as progressive changes; Houston, under Chief Lee Brown, was a pioneer in community policing, as was Madison under David Couper; New York's Transit Police Department was the testing ground both for "broken windows" policies and for Bratton's New York City Police Department management innovations during the mid-1990s. Kansas City, of course, played a singular role in policing, and Kelling worked there extensively during the early 1970s. Other cities, with which we are less personally familiar, played unique roles as well. Three stand out: Cincinnati, Dayton, and San Diego. Cincinnati represents both the most ambitious attempt to implement team policing during the 1970s and the most closely evaluated. The Dayton Police Department was a singularly innovative organization under Chief Igleburger during the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the ideas that were experimented with during the 1970s had their origins in Dayton where Robert Wasserman played an important role as a civilian advisor to Igleburger. And, although places like Baltimore County and Newport News were early innovators with problem-oriented policing, San Diego really built its future around it and, as such, was unique

In respects, each decade was unique. The 1960s represented both high and low points in American policing. During this decade, the reform image of policing reached its zenith – police in cars, rapidly responding to calls for service, maintaining a “professional” relationship with citizens. Moreover, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice adopted the basic elements of this strategy. Yet even at its pinnacle, two major cracks appeared in policing’s image. First, the United States Supreme Court intervened in criminal investigations, rectifying the chronic problem of torture in the conduct of investigations by ensuring that suspects had proper legal representation and that evidence that was gathered illegally would not be admissible in court. Second, African Americans in city after city rioted against police.

During the 1970s, research into police practices called into question the core competencies of police: preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. And, while no one doubted that criminal investigation was and should remain a basic method of policing, research suggested that throughout the country criminal investigations were conducted in a slipshod and haphazard fashion. Finally, research confirmed that despite official police rhetoric that police practiced non-discretionary law enforcement, discretion was found to be rife in policing, and largely unmanaged at that.

The 1980s was a decade of discovery – both *rediscovery* of the basic principles of preventive policing in a democratic society and discovery of new principles that would guide policing through the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As such, rigorous thinking and experimentation characterized the decade. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) concentrated on fleshing out and experimenting with problem solving, a method developed by University of Wisconsin Professor Herman Goldstein. Michigan State

University's National Center on Community Policing under Robert Trojanowicz developed and actively promulgated a set of ideas around "community policing" and then later combined efforts with the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard University and the National Institute of Justice in the conduct of Executive Sessions on Community Policing. Meantime, major experiments in community policing were implemented in Houston, Texas, and Madison, Wisconsin.

These ideas largely congealed by the 1990s and the focus shifted from "where is policing going" to "how does policing get where it's going." In other words, by the early 1990s, a clearly identifiable "organizational strategy" developed that, while subject to local variations, captured the vision of political, policy, and police leaders. This strategy (paradigm, model) not only was to drive US policing, it pointed the way to the future for all criminal justice agencies, as well as many areas of urban government.

A final introductory note: a surprise finding of this re-reading of studies of organizational change is the extent to which the need to restructure policing's relationship to communities, especially African American and minority communities, drove change in American policing. This remained true throughout the final three decades of the century but was modified during the early 1990s when crime and disorder escalated to new heights, control over many public spaces was lost, and many criminologists were warning the public that, given the upcoming increase in the numbers of youth, we hadn't seen the worst yet. Crime control, often at the periphery of the concerns of police reformers, re-emerged as a central concern and, in the process, set off a bitter criminological dispute about the origins of the crime declines of the mid- and late 1990s – a debate closely linked to the issue of police and minority communities.

## SECTION I

### THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

This monograph explores change in policing over time. Rather than studying organizational change cross-sectionally – that is, how organizations change or adjust at a particular moment in history – we will be studying change horizontally, or historically. Our reasons for doing so are two-fold. First, it is central to our interests: both Wycoff and Kelling have been active in policing for over thirty years and have observed the changes in policing and ruminated over the years about their meaning and direction. This research allows us to organize those ruminations somewhat more systematically and put them forward for the field to consider. Second, between the conceptualization of this study and its execution, the National Institute of Justice funded a study of organizational change as a result of the COPS program. This study, part of a larger evaluation of the COPS program by the Urban Institute, was conducted under the direction of Mark M. Moore at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Given the size and focus of that study, we decided not to replicate it, but rather to use it as an opportunity to pursue the interests identified above, namely change over time in the business of policing – at least as represented by the cases then at hand. The binding concept for our analysis will be that of *organizational strategy*.

The concept of organizational strategy is one that is derived largely from the private sector concept of corporate strategy. Corporate strategy is defined as:

the pattern of major objectives, purposes, or goals and essential policies and plans for achieving those goals stated in such a way as to define what

business the company is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be.<sup>1</sup>

Note that this definition includes two key elements: the determination of long-term goals, and the adoption of courses of action and allocation of resources to obtain them. Most importantly, they are stated in ways that define the business of the company.

The popularity of this concept in the private sector came about primarily as a consequence of the convulsions American businesses experienced during the 1960s and 1970s. During this era, rapidly changing technology, global competition, slower growth, the information explosion, deregulation, political instability, profound value changes, and other discontinuities sent many companies and industries into a spin.

Traditional methods seemed useless in light of such discontinuities. Without going into detail, the old model of organizational change, plan – act – evaluate, generally assumed social, political, technological, and economic stability; indeed, external or environmental change was the enemy. Traditional management assumed a stable environment: companies knew what business they were in; markets were stable; manufacturing techniques were tried and true. But, these assumptions – often unstated or unexamined were wrong: the environment was not stable. "Business as usual" was often a shortcut to organizational and financial disaster.

Chief executive officers learned that if companies were to renew themselves, new approaches would have to be developed which differentiated between the *development* of organizational strategy and *service* of an existing strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Chandler 1962:13

Planning for change took on a very different form once CEOs started to consider their needs in the new world of business. Stonich identified critical differences between the two approaches:

Strategy formulation develops a strategy, while planning describes the current strategy to top management and provides the link to detailed programming and budgeting;

Strategy formulation studies are done periodically when the need arises for a new strategy, while planning is done every year at the same time to communicate all current strategies concurrently to management;

Strategy formulation is typically an exhaustive analysis involving top management as well as many line and staff managers. Planning generally involves less effort and fewer people; and,

Strategy formulation is done in reaction to or in anticipation of changes in the environment. Planning profiles those changes and their impact on the strategy.<sup>2</sup>

Essentially, strategy formulation rejects the idea that change is the enemy.

... The companies that capitalized on the discontinuities of the 1970s viewed the world differently. . . . New ideas, new technologies, new ways to meet customer needs, new distribution and sourcing strategies, and new modes of motivation were the ingredients of their competitive success. They accelerated change in their industries much faster than the more traditional companies would have done. And, to a large extent, much of the planning of these companies was inextricably entwined with execution. They were devotees of the "do it, try it, fix it" approach.<sup>3</sup>

In sum, the idea of corporate strategy, new strategic planning, and strategic change has developed in the private sector in response to dramatic changes in the world. It emphasizes CEO involvement, strategy development as a line management responsibility, creativity, recognizing change and turning it to competitive advantage

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<sup>2</sup> Paul J. Stonich, *Implementing Strategy: Making Strategy Happen*, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA., 1982. pp 86-87.

<sup>3</sup> Gluck 1986:1.5

rather than assuming the future will be much like the past, and it has a penchant for action.

The world of public sector service organizations has been no less tumultuous than that of private corporations. Many of the same events have had important consequences for public organizations: rapidly changing technology, slower or faster economic growth, the information explosion, political instability, and profound value changes. Other changes have had their impact as well: growing disparities in income, the changing demographic structure of the population, the rapid growth of many major cities, gentrification of some areas of cities and continued deterioration of others, the increase in low-paying service jobs and the decrease in higher-paying positions in industry and manufacturing, the increasing demands for equity on the part of several social groups, as well as other discontinuities.

In response to these changes, public sector organizations have had to rethink the kinds of businesses they are in, the kinds of services they need to deliver. Some moved vigorously to reformulate their values and missions. Some were pushed into change by diminishing public support or emerging competition (often from the private sector). Others vigorously resisted change. Yet others, comforted by the annual renewals of their budgets, remained intransigent.

In these circumstances, the concept of corporate strategy has been important both for organizational analysts and agency administrators. Adapted as organizational strategy, the concept of corporate strategy helps public sector organizations understand their past and current strategies, and serves as a guide to develop strategies for the future. This set of ideas is not only useful in analyzing individual organizations, it is also

valuable in identifying and evaluating an *industry's* or a *profession's* strategy either at a moment in time or over time. Kelling and Moore, for example, adapted the concept of corporate strategy and used it to review policing's past *organizational* strategy, describe its current strategy, and to characterize emerging strategic developments.<sup>4</sup>

Organizational strategy, paralleling the definition of corporate strategy, consists of the following elements:

- authorization (mandate);
- function;
- organization;
- demand;
- environment;
- tactics; and,
- outcome.

*Authorization.* Authorization, akin to capital in the private sector, refers to the sources of authority that provide the mandate and resources for the agency to operate. In the case of police, sources of authority could include law, legislative intent, politics, ongoing financial support (annual appropriations), governmental grants, professional expertise, tradition, public opinion and others.

*Function.* Function refers to the values, missions, and goals of an organization. Values in the case of police could include respect for the individual, civil rights, protection of the community, concern for victims, protection of life, and others. Mission could include

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<sup>4</sup> George L. Kelling and Mark M. Moore, "The Evolving Strategy of Policing,"

crime prevention, law enforcement, and others. Basically function refers to the "business" of an organization.

*Organization and Administrative Processes.* Organization refers to the structure, human resources, management processes, and culture of agencies. Agencies can be structured in a variety of ways -- by function or geography, centralized or decentralized, professionally, militarily or quasi-militarily, by division, in matrices, as quasi-holding companies, and in other ways. Human resources refer to the portfolio of skills, experiences, abilities, and capabilities that an organization must have if it is to accomplish its goals. Management processes include planning, programming, rewarding and disciplining, and accounting and budgeting systems of the organization. Culture refers to the myths and beliefs of an organization, its informal patterns of communications and expected roles, personal values, attitudes and beliefs about why things happen, and how decisions are made.

*Demand.* Demand refers to requests for an organization's service and how an organization shapes and manages those requests. Demand can come from politicians, community groups, individuals seeking help, advocacy groups, governmental agencies, the corporate and business sector, and other sources. Police departments shape and manage those demands by establishing priorities and setting up management systems to ensure that line service personnel adhere to those priorities and to support their efforts.

*Environment.* Environment refers to the pattern of external conditions that affect the organization. Most often environmental influences are technological, economic, social, and political in kind. Technology has to do with the discoveries of new means of producing products or services; economics refers to the consequences of economic trends

on financial resources available to the organization, on other relevant organizations, on staff, and on clients (or the pool of potential clients). Social developments include influential forces such as civil rights, women's rights, changing patterns of work and leisure, the emergence and spread of AIDS, rising or falling crime, changing mores, and the aging of the population. Political factors refer to election of office-holders, the relationship between levels of government, the politicization of social movements or issues (crime, AIDS, race), and other processes and issues.

*Tactics.* Tactics are the methodologies that organizations use to obtain their goals. (Other descriptive words are *activities* or *outputs*.) These activities can be at the level of an individual worker, combinations of workers, or units in the organization. In policing, tactics would include an officer arresting offenders, patrolling in an automobile, responding to calls for service, settling disputes, etc.

*Outcomes.* Outcomes are the results of an organization's activities – anticipated or unanticipated, desirable or undesirable. Of special interest are the nature of the outcomes counted by organizations. Stated objectives that are not matched by measured outcomes are the hallmarks of a dysfunctional strategy.

Finally, criteria used to evaluate an organizational strategy include:

- identifiability;
- internal coherence;
- extent of exploitation of current opportunities;
- consistency with competence and resources;
- consistency between the strategy and personal values of key managers;
- effectiveness;

- maximum contribution to society ; and,
- extent of stimulation of the organization to ongoing productivity and creativity.

If one were to evaluate the reform strategy of policing using these standards, one could consider it a success insofar as it was clearly identifiable, was internally coherent, and was consistent with the personal values of key managers. In terms of identifiability, the police automobile, as much as anything, came to epitomize the reform model of policing – sirens wailing, careening through city streets, directed by computer aided dispatch, responding rapidly to someone in distress – symbolizing high technology, power, speed, and efficiency. And police did all they could do to enhance this image: regardless of the medium – posters, radio, movies and television, promotional materials – the car, or in the case of radio, its siren-- embodied policing. The business of policing was well understood both internally and externally.

High levels of internal consistency also characterized the reform strategy. Again, the car was central. Patrolling quickly through city streets ostensibly created a feeling of police omnipresence. Patrolling within prescribed beats or areas also made police available to respond immediately to calls for service. Beats were constructed to minimize response times, especially to serious crimes. But the automobile not only was tactically important, it served other goals. Police in cars were easier to find and supervise. Cars also isolated police from citizens, reducing opportunities for distraction (“idle conversation” with citizens, prohibited in many police departments) or corruption. Police were also less available to citizens for direct requests for service, which allowed telephone based reporting and dispatching to focus police resources on departmental priorities, e.g., serious crimes (as opposed to minor offenses, disorderly conditions, or

despised “social work”). And, of course, police in cars could patrol much larger areas – improving efficiency. But we will return to internal coherence later because the issue is somewhat more complicated than suggested here.

Finally, the reform image of police attracted both police leaders and line personnel. The image of police as tough and impersonal “crime fighters” – the thin blue line protecting helpless citizens – was direct and powerful. A generation of police rallied around it to such an extent that to challenge it was tantamount to denigrating the occupation. As one insulted and enraged New York Transit Police officer yelled at Kelling during the late 1980s: “Where in the hell did you get the goddam idea that our job is dealing with disorder? I’m here to fight crime.”

But in virtually every other dimension, the reform strategy failed. First, it did not exploit opportunities. Indeed, by narrowing its legitimacy to criminal law and professionalism, the reform strategy failed to maintain and/or build the community consent that is essential to policing a democratic society. By limiting its function to law enforcement, the reform strategy lost touch with crime *prevention*, the mainstay of current and developing police crime control strategies. Patrol by automobile was supposed to prevent crime but, on reflection, it rested on thin and poorly understood underpinnings.

Second, the reform strategy was not consistent with its competence and resources. In respects, although historical evidence is spotty, it can be argued that at their best early police performed their “watchmen,” order maintenance, and peacekeeping roles rather well. The “hook” in the previous sentence is, of course, “at their best.” At their worst, police abused minorities and were woefully corrupt. It doesn’t trivialize these problems,

however, to suggest that early police tactics were not entirely unredeemable. British police “won the day” during the later half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century after considerable initial skepticism and hostility. Likewise, police in American urban centers had their victories as well. In each case, the police role was largely and recognizably preventive. Police were to prevent crime by their presence, by reducing opportunities for crime, by order maintenance, by persuasion, and by law enforcement.

Third, police confidence with the wisdom of their strategy was such that surrogate measures replaced legitimate outcomes of police activities. To be sure, the reformers emphasized crime. In fact, as noted in the Prologue, it was the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), under Bruce Smith’s leadership, that developed the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Later, of course, the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar Hoover adopted the UCR and absorbed them into a Bureau function. But the focus on response time, arrests, and later “passings” (the number of times a police car passes a particular location or hazard) assumed a relationship among reform police *activities* (preventive patrol by automobile, rapid response to calls for service, and interception patrol) and *outcomes* (reduced crime and citizen satisfaction), that was never established empirically. Ultimately, all the evidence would indicate that these activities were of limited value, regardless of the measured outcome.

Fourth, one can argue that the reform strategy contributed extraordinarily little to society. Actually, it is not much of an exaggeration to suggest that the strategy “depoliced” city streets. Although nobody noticed it at the time, and the benefits of automobile mobility seemed so great, the act of putting police in cars was a radical departure from the early assumptions of Anglo Saxon policing that relied so heavily on

community support to achieve its goals. Isolating police in cars virtually bivouacked them and contributed to the creation of an isolated police culture that came to see the community as the enemy rather than as a partner.

Fifth, the reform strategy did little to stimulate productivity and creativity. It is not too strong to write that since all the questions had been asked and all the answers given – a la Wilson's checklist – the goal of police leaders was to do better that which they already were doing. So, to improve policing, the reform strategy emphasized improved recruitment and training, better and more extensive supervision, adherence to the assumptions of command and control organizations, and increased use of technology to improve current functioning. Rules and regulations, training, command, and administrative processes sent a clear message: officers were to do as they told. Information was to flow up the chain of command and orders, down.

Finally, to return to the idea of internal coherence. Above, we suggested that the reform strategy was in respects an internally coherent strategy. And, in the terms that we described above, it was. The automobile clearly created internal coherence, at least tactically and in the control of officers. Yet, in other ways the strategy was critically incoherent and, thus, fatally flawed. Most notably, the organizational structure and administrative processes were unrelated to how police work was conducted. The assumptions of police organizations, based as they were on Frederick Taylor's classical model of organizations, were that police work was routinized, non-discretionary, and available for oversight. To the contrary, police work was complex, highly discretionary, and conducted out of the purview of supervisors and managers. The result was that although police organizations had all the accoutrements of control and accountability

(rules and regulations, span of control, etc.), in reality (and, of necessity) police were making highly complex discretionary decisions outside of these control mechanisms.

In sum, if one uses the criteria that most corporations use to evaluate their strategy, the reform strategy does not hold up very well. To be sure, reformers bureaucratized unruly primitive organizations; they largely restructured the relationship between politicians and police departments; they substantially reduced corruption; and, they captured a vision of police work that drove a police culture. None of these accomplishments, however, demonstrably improved the capacity of police to control crime, win the approval of citizens, or substantially contribute to community peace and harmony.

## SECTION II

### **THE POLICE CRISES OF THE 1960s AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE**

Crime and the functioning of justice agencies were contentious issues during the 1960s and into the 1970s (and they remain so). Many long-festering problems erupted. Internal to policing, the unwillingness or inability of police executives to reign in detectives finally brought the wrath of the Supreme Court down on policing. It had been widely understood and acknowledged by police leaders that torture, the "third degree," was a common practice. The public acknowledgement of this reality was put forward by the first national examination of policing, the Wickersham Commission (DATE). With August Vollmer as one of the principal authors, the Commission made it abundantly clear that torture persisted and constituted a national scandal. Little progress, however, was made in eradicating it by the 1960s. Impatient with the profession's response, the Court simply mandated that offenders could have representation at all moments of the criminal investigation, that offenders had a right to be informed of this (Miranda, 1966), and that any evidence that the police gathered illegally, whether intentionally or not, would simply be barred from used in evidence in criminal proceedings (the Exclusionary Rule, 1961).

The second major crisis was the urban riots of the 1960s. While few blamed the police for the social conditions that led to the riots, every major riot was triggered by police actions in minority communities. The conflagrations that resulted stunned the general public, with ubiquitous television bringing the grim reality of the riots into living rooms for the first time.

Moreover, the police response to 1960s civil rights and anti-war demonstrations also became the subject of controversy. Police use of dogs and water cannons to subdue what were often peaceful demonstrators was, again, brought nightly into homes. While a national consensus did not then exist about the legitimacy of the social issues, and while “support your local police” became a partisan rallying cry, a fairly broad consensus developed that police were inheriting their own unsavory past with minority communities and were responding to many demonstrations inappropriately. Perhaps nothing crystallized this view more than the riots, demonstrations, and police responses at the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago. Few will ever forget television’s coverage of both citizens and police rioting while Senator Abraham Ribicoff and Chicago’s former Mayor Richard Daley yelled at each other – Ribicoff from the stage and Daley from the floor of the convention.

And, crime itself emerged as a national issue. Republicans, whether based on a realistic assessment of the problem or not, had made crime a central issue during the 1964 presidential campaign. President Johnson, while trying to deflect crime as an issue, nonetheless, once elected, created his presidential crime commission in July 1965. The commission published its report, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, in 1967. Moreover, two other commissions published reports during the 1960s: the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1966), and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).

The reports of these three commissions share common themes. All emphasize the tragic consequences of racism, poverty, and social injustice and link them to crime, social disorder, and violence. Not surprisingly, their prescriptions for reform emphasize

amelioration of the social problems as the primary means of reducing crime, disorder, and violence. All, as well, while reflecting on criminal justice in its broadest sense, give special attention to the police.

The thinking of the President's Commission about police combines at least three strands of thought. The first has been discussed in the introduction: the reform movement in policing led by O. W. Wilson. The second is a cluster of 1960s ideas about civil rights, racism, poverty, and the role of police in minority communities. The third strand emerges from research funded by the Ford Foundation and conducted by the American Bar Association and, later by its offshoot, the American Bar Foundation. The product is the American Bar Foundation's Survey of Criminal Justice. The first two strands are dominant themes in the President's report, the later, a minor theme (although powerfully put forward and subsequently important).

**Civil Rights, Poverty, and Police.** The Commission's report was, as noted above, a product of the social tumult of the 1960s: an era of the civil rights revolution, the individual rights revolution, urban riots, Vietnam War demonstrations, white "backlash," serious antagonism between minorities and police, the law and order movement, and Supreme Court decisions like Miranda and the exclusionary rule. Moreover, the report was drafted in the intellectual shadow of the "war on poverty." There is no need to recount this story here. It is alluded to above and will be mentioned again in what follows. The importance of police in all of this is that they are the most visible and accessible agents of government, are active in neighborhoods and communities, are the gatekeepers for other criminal justice agencies, use force to enforce

laws and obligate citizens, and deal with citizens during times of great crises – demonstrations, riots, domestic disputes, and a host of other conflictual circumstances. **American Bar Foundation Survey.** The final strand of reform had its genesis during the 1950s: the seminal research of the American Bar Association and, later, the American Bar Foundation (ABF). Again, a considerable literature exists about the work and implications of the ABF Survey and there is no need to repeat it at length here.<sup>1</sup> This survey departed from then-traditional thinking in two ways: it concentrated on how the law operated rather than how it appeared on the books, and it emphasized how organizations function in the real world rather than how they are formally organized. If the mainstream of police reform focused on administration and tactics, those following the ABF Survey attended to the substance of policing: the kinds of problems police faced, their complexity, and the high levels of discretion that operated at all levels of criminal justice organizations, especially police.

Moreover, the Survey articulated the idea of a criminal justice “system.” Noting that the policies and practices of one agency, say the police, have an impact on other agencies, say prosecutors, and that persons moving from one agency to another perceive continuity, Survey staff reasoned that such agencies comprise a system.

The influence of these strands of thought – civil rights, etc., police reformers a la O. W. Wilson, and the ABF Survey – are identifiable in the President’s Commission report on police. “Root causes,” prevention through broad social change, and improved police community relations (read improved relations between minorities and police) have their origins in the movements of the 1960s. System improvement through improved

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<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Ohlin and Frank Remington, eds., *Discretion in Criminal Justice: the Tension Between Individualism and Uniformity*, Albany, The State University of New York Press, 1993.

administrative processes (recruitment, training, and supervision), enhanced use of technology, focus on serious crimes, and narrowed functioning have their origins in the Progressive reform tradition. And the concepts of complexity, discretion, and the criminal justice system flow from the ABF Survey.

Clearly, however, with the exception of the "system" idea, the first two strands of reform dominate the Commission's report on police. The implications of complexity and discretion are, for the most part, relegated to a Task Force Report: *The Police*.<sup>2</sup> Chapter 2 of this report, authored by Frank Remington and Herman Goldstein, gave rise to the police guidelines movement during the 1970s, but unfortunately, police showed little interest in it. During this era, police leaders may have acknowledged complexity and discretion, but they were ill prepared to think about it except in the then-conventional terms of regulations and command and control.<sup>3</sup> Complexity and discretion don't come into their own in police thinking until the mid-1980s. And, even at the turn of the century, few police departments systematically think through their implications.

In anticipation of the Commission's report, President Johnson pushed for passage of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 and established the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) with limited funding. The purpose of OLEA was to provide funds to improve criminal justice functioning; however, its limited funding precluded it having major impact. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act that created the Law Enforcement Assistance and ultimately channeled \$8 billion into the "war on crime" – a lion's share of it going to police – during

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<sup>2</sup> *Task Force Report: The Police*, Task Force on the Police, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> George L. Kelling, *Broken Windows and Police Discretion*, National Institute of Justice, Washington DC, 1999.

its 12 year existence. For the first time in American history, the national government involved itself in local crime control.

Congress established a new agency to administer federal funds. Planning agencies were organized in every state, and local police were equipped with countless tons of hardware. Eight billion dollars in federal funds was spent on local police, courts, corrections, juvenile justice, and community programs.<sup>4</sup>

By 1972, the national government's intervention was in trouble. Even the executive director of the Commission, Harvard Law School Professor James Vorenberg, reported sadly:

The Crime Commission's final conclusion was that "controlling crime in American is an endeavor that will be hard and costly. But America can control crime if it will." At that time I thought there was hope for changes that would both strengthen the agencies of criminal administration and reduce the injustices that underlie much crime. I still do not believe that we have to settle for a society where we live in fear of each other. But today, I find it hard to point to anything that is being done that is likely to reduce crime even to the level of five years ago.<sup>5</sup>

Vorenberg's pessimism had several bases. Clearly, political disputes over how the \$8b should be distributed frustrated Vorenberg. Democrats wanted to provide funds directly to local agencies as a form of leverage to force change. As Vorenberg notes: "The principal justification for federal aid was that it would provide an incentive for cities and states to make changes in criminal justice agencies." Republicans, however, stymied such efforts by substituting block grants of federal funds to the states. There, criminal justice planning agencies would disperse funds. Moreover, at the same time, the

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<sup>4</sup> Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E Milakovich, *U.S. v. Crime in the Streets*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1981, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> James Vorenberg, "The War on Crime: The First Five Years," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1972, (Internet download).

House Appropriations Committee chairman, John Rooney of Brooklyn, froze all funds for research for five years.<sup>6</sup>

Most ominously for American society, however, crime was escalating rapidly. Between 1965 and 1970, crimes against property increased 147 percent and crimes of violence 126 percent. And, there were no signs that it was letting up: during the first nine months of 1971, violent crime increased 10 percent and property crimes 6 percent over the same period in 1970.<sup>7</sup>

But it was not just the national government that was concerned about crime and the quality of criminal justice; private foundations were active as well – especially the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation had funded the 1950's ABF Survey as part of the \$31m it invested in reform and research during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s alone, Ford funneled substantial funds for police improvement to institutions like the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation (\$406k), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (\$400k), Southern Police Institute (\$700k), American Law Institute (\$445k), New York City Police Department (\$167k), City of San Francisco (\$600k), US Conference of Mayors (718k), Northwestern University (\$665k), Vera Institute of Justice (\$1.1m), University of Wisconsin (\$260k), and a variety of smaller grants to other institutions. (These grants were for police alone. Comparable funds were spent on courts, juvenile delinquency, research, and other criminal justice agencies and issues.)<sup>8</sup>

Most important in this context, in 1970 the Ford Foundation created the Police Development Fund, later to be known as the Police Foundation. The Ford Foundation

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *A More Effective Arm: A Report on a Police Development Fund, Newly Established by the Ford Foundation*, New York, Ford Foundation, 1970.

initially viewed police education and training as the appropriate principal concern of its new agency. Evidence of this concern is found in the grants to universities noted above as well as in many of the other grants, i.e., to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), that focused on education and training. Increasingly, however, staff of the Ford Foundation began to believe that LEAA was providing sufficient funds for education and training. Consequently, “. . . the Foundation and the authorities it consulted concluded that far more leverage could be exerted through projects focusing on police operations.”<sup>9</sup> It became clear that the Ford Foundation saw the future program of the Police Foundation as an extension of the ideas in the President’s Commission:

Many of the more than 200 recommendations of the President’s Crime Commission called for basic improvements in police operations and practices, including higher standards of selection, more effective community relations, better management, and greater coordination of services. Specific recommendations urged division of the police function among three kinds of officers, expanded recruitment on college campuses and inner city neighborhoods, removal of restrictions on lateral entry, and employment of police legal advisors. Despite the increased Federal funding, little progress has been made toward the implementation of any of these recommendations.

While the Police Development Fund cannot be expected to stimulate widespread changes in the police system, a few selective grants given to cities where there is a genuine spirit of innovation can have a significant demonstration impact. Thus, the Fund will seek to implement the Crime Commission’s recommendations and other improvements through three types of grants: large, major impact grants to police departments in three to five cities for major reforms; special project grants in some ten to twelve additional cities; and a relatively small number of education and training grants with clearly specified purposes.<sup>10</sup>

The trouble was that there was little, at least in contemporary terms, in the Commission’s report that offered operational guidance in crime control. Rapid response

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *A More Effective Arm*, p. 9.

to calls for service remained a mainstay of Commission thinking.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, after listing a series of methods of crime prevention including strengthening the family, improving slum schools, combating school segregation, and providing employment opportunities, reducing response time is the first operational recommendation of the Commission. This was congruent with the high hopes that the Commission had for technology.

Another ubiquitous assumption was that high technology promised exciting and quick new breakthroughs in crime control. The president's crime commission, police chiefs, Ramsey Clark, academic authorities – all agreed that computers, walkie-talkies, surveillance technology, and the like, were about to conquer crime as they had conquered space. Liberals were as enthusiastic as “law and order” conservatives. The U.S. Conference of Mayors was sure that the new Crime Control Act “provides the means for tapping our technological resources to benefit law enforcement's battle in controlling crime.” Senator Edward Kennedy, later a critic of LEAA spending on hardware, was delighted that secret techniques used by the military to protect missile installations would soon become available to police.<sup>12</sup>

To be sure, the Commission, LEAA, and the Police Foundation had glimmers of promising operational innovations. Technology aside, the recommendations that police departments experiment with “team policing” were to have later promise, although that promise would not materialize until well into the 1980s when the principles of team policing were drawn into and restated as “community policing” – but more about this later. In some respects the operational relevance of then contemporary thinking about police improvement should not have been surprising. A task force set up by domestic policy aides of President Johnson and chaired by James Q. Wilson noted this in 1967.<sup>13</sup>

If every recommendation of the Crime Commission were implemented tomorrow, it is unlikely that there would be a dramatic reduction in crime

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<sup>11</sup> *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, p. vi.

<sup>12</sup> Richard S. Allinson, “LEAA's Impact on Criminal Justice: A Review of the Literature,” *Criminal Justice Abstracts*, December 1979, pp. 616-617.

<sup>13</sup> Cronin, et al., p. 42.

rates. There is no device, no technology, no tested program that will make the streets measurably safer in the short term.<sup>14</sup>

The “new” thinking about policing in the 1960s and 1970s served primarily to reinforce the traditional strategy. It did not take into account the dramatically changing nature of the environment in which police functioned.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 43.

### **SECTION III:**

#### **POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS, TEAM POLICING, AND DALLAS – THE FIRST ROUND OF CHANGE**

The President's Commission strongly urged that police develop community relations programs to offset the unpopularity of police, or particular police tactics, especially in minority communities. Indeed, in many cities, the development of community relations units or programs became the acid test of a department's or city's willingness to try to improve its relations with the African American community and was the source of heated controversy. In Milwaukee (WI), for example, Chief Harold Brier was having nothing to do with community relations during the 1960s and 1970s. The business of police was fighting crime, every officer was a community relations officer, and no time would be wasted in going to neighborhood meetings to placate citizens – especially those who might be hostile to police. District commanders clearly understood this. While many of them might have been personally inclined to meet with citizens, especially in Milwaukee's near north side that was populated primarily by African Americans, they understood they would jeopardize their careers if they did. The controversy became so heated that the Milwaukee police union, under the leadership of Robert Kliesmet (who later was to become president of the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, started to send representatives to meetings and even applied (unsuccessfully) for LEAA funds to conduct its own community relations programs. The union rationale was simple: it isn't the chief who has to confront hostile citizens day after day, it's line officers – if meeting with citizens will decrease the hostility between African Americans and police, then meet with them.

The response of the Milwaukee police union, however, was not typical. While many departments implemented community relations programs, they were widely denigrated within policing, especially among line police officers. In Kansas City (MO) during the 1970s, for example, police community relations officers were part of the “empty holster crowd,” akin to officers who were assigned to limited duty because of drinking or other problems and not allowed to carry their weapons. Nonetheless, community relations programs were implemented in many cities, were largely supported by the media, were the subject of countless textbooks and college courses, and were strongly promulgated by groups like the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

Police community relations programs had at least two origins. One was clearly in public relations. The second was specific to race – developed in response to the 1943 race riots, especially the Detroit riot in which 34 people died.

First, police had become active marketers of their services from the 1930s forward. J. Edgar Hoover taught local chiefs much about “selling” the image of an organization to the public. Not only did Hoover focus the Federal Bureau of Investigation on high visibility crime and criminals (the ten most wanted list, John Dillinger and “Pretty Boy” Floyd), he aggressively marketed the FBI through the media and other outlets. Local police, tainted with the images of being corrupt “adjuncts” to political machines and of being bungling “Keystone Cops,” sought to improve how they were viewed as well.<sup>1</sup> Both the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and local police departments created speakers bureaus, worked with radio producers, published newsletters, wrote newspaper editorials, put up displays at fairs, and became involved in a host of charitable activities. Their target was the middle class on which

they relied for political and financial support as they tried to disentangle themselves from politicians.

Second, the police community relations programs of the 1940s grew out of the belief that antagonism between police and African Americans contributed both to the causes of the riots and to injustices during police handling of the riots.<sup>2</sup> While not a popular movement in policing (evidence was that most chiefs and the IACP largely ignored it), it nonetheless was a beginning acknowledgement of a serious problem that was to preoccupy police departments into the next century. The movement was headed by Chief Joseph Kluchesky of Milwaukee (WI) and contained four basic elements: race relations training for recruits, formal contact with African American leaders, recruitment of black officers, and prescribed techniques for handling disorders.<sup>3</sup>

Community relations programs in the 1970s were, for the most part, warmed over public relations and 1940s community relations programs targeted at the lower socio-economic classes and minorities. At their worst, such efforts were one-way streets: police would "sell" their "effective but unpopular" tactics, especially aggressive anti-crime tactics and units. Egon Bittner described them as "simple one-way public relations efforts that do not even pretend to be reciprocal."<sup>4</sup> At their best, however, they had considerable potential, both in terms of what they meant to communities and what they meant to police organizations themselves.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Fogelson, *Big-City Police*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> See, Samuel E. Walker, "The Origins of the Police-Community Relations Movement: The 1940s," in *Criminal Justice History: An International Journal*, Vol. 1, 1980, John Jay Press, New York, pp. 225-246, for a detailed history of police community relations during this era.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 234.

<sup>4</sup> Egon Bittner, "The Impact of Police-Community Relations on the Police System," in *Community Relations and the Administration of Justice*, David Patrick Geary ed., John Wiley and Son, New York, 1972, p. 371.

San Francisco was an example of a serious attempt to relate to minority communities differently and, in many respects, was a harbinger of things to come. Bittner wrote in 1972 about the San Francisco Police Community Relations unit headed by Lieutenant Dante Andreotti.

The routine work of the officers assigned to the unit concentrated . . . on everyday kinds of predicaments, such as protecting persons who were not resourceful on their own, or helping persons with police records find employment or lodgings. What the officers did was to act upon the realization that life in the city has many conditions, circumstances, and troubled people, and when troubled people are left to themselves, they are likely to cause, or get into, great calamities of various sorts.<sup>5</sup>

Acknowledging that these police-community relations officers were not the first to help citizens in these ways, Bittner goes on to identify the real innovations.

The innovation must be found in two additional aspects of their work: first, they did not simply go out to solve some problem; rather, they always dealt with problems in conjunction with other community resources. . . . Second, the men in the unit felt that providing services to citizens was their primary job.<sup>6</sup>

Based on such experiences, community relations programs contributed, or had the potential to contribute, to police departments and communities in a variety of ways.

- They started a dialogue among police and citizens that went beyond “mau mauing the flak catchers” – that is, some understandings did develop between police and citizens;<sup>7</sup>
- Citizens did get an opportunity to put forward their priorities. Police might not have been able to respond to them yet, but they were starting to hear them;
- Some police community relations programs gave police experience collaborating with other agencies;
- Community relations programs led to some police problem solving before problem solving was articulated by Herman Goldstein and gained its current, highly specific, meaning;

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 376.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, pp. 376-377.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Wolf,

- Community relations programs gave groups of officers the experience of working in communities, a set of relationships within some neighborhoods, and some methods of identifying and solving problems.

In other words, community relations programs were similar to “skunk works” in the private sector: that is, small units in corporations that are out of the mainstream but which, with little official recognition or fanfare, are developing innovations to meet newly emerging markets or needs. Similarly, while not in the mainstream of the then-current strategy of policing, community relations programs were giving some departments an institutional capacity to work successfully in neighborhoods and to establish meaningful understandings, if not relationships.

The San Diego Community Profile project represents an early move to incorporate the best features of police community relations into mainline patrol work.<sup>8</sup> Conceived in 1972 by Robert Wasserman, a Police Foundation consultant, and Norm Stamper, then a lieutenant in San Diego, it was the first in a series of three Police Foundation projects in the San Diego department. Like police community relations programs, the project was driven by an intense concern about the relationship between police and African Americans, but it assumed that police simply did not have enough information about neighborhoods to police them effectively.

The project gave 24 randomly selected patrol officers and their 3 sergeants responsibility and accountability for their beats for one year. Their goals were:

To improve police patrol practice by requiring each profile officer to (1) systematically learn his beat, (2) identify and document the full range of beat problems, and (3) develop patrol strategies to solve these problems at his level.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Boydston and Sherry, 1975

<sup>9</sup> Boydston and Sherry, p. 72

Stamper was clear about the difference between San Diego's "profiling" approach and police community relations, at least at their worst. He wrote:

If it is to be at all meaningful, moreover, such community involvement must be based on the officer's knowledge and competence to solve beat problems at his level. Community involvement, in this sense, entails a demanding process of police-community interaction oriented to problem-solving, rather than an image-selling program of "public relations."<sup>10</sup>

Through community meetings, a variety of data collection efforts, and staff conferences, officers were to increase their beat knowledge to include:

an awareness of community structure (demography, socioeconomic conditions, institutions, agencies, groups, community leader, and the like), as well as an analysis of beat patterns and trends of criminal, noncriminal, traffic, and police-community problems.

....

Community Profile Development Project (CPDP) officers were encouraged to replace, where appropriate, the common practice of routine random preventive patrol with more responsive and effective patrol strategies based on their growing community profiles.<sup>11</sup>

The goal was to develop highly committed, involved, motivated officers who would be thinking constantly about ways to improve the quality of life in their beats through cooperative efforts with the people who lived and worked there.

Although the focus of the project was on changing the knowledge base, the attitudes, and the activities of officers, Stamper and Chief Hoobler understood that major organizational efforts would be required to promote and undergird these changes.

The community profiling approach demanded considerably more work from patrol officers on an everyday basis. But in raising the organization's expectations of officers' work, the CPDP also raised the officers' expectations of the organization, and specifically of its obligation to provide conducive conditions and support for their work. In order to establish a requisite support base, the CPDP focused on such organizational concerns as direction, communication, evaluation, motivation and work satisfaction; and it introduced such

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<sup>10</sup> Boydston and Sherry, p. 73

<sup>11</sup> Boydston and Sherry, p. 73

organizational innovations as special training, staff conferences, and an alternative performance assessment system.<sup>12</sup>

It was understood in San Diego (and also in Dallas at approximately the same time), that expectations of new kinds of performances from officers would require major organizational changes in support of these individual efforts. This recognition continues to be a critical insight for police managers.<sup>13</sup>

An independent evaluation of the profiling project concluded that it had achieved its objectives.

In summary, it is clear that the vast majority of the Experimental Officers felt that they had greatly increased: (1) their sense of beat responsibility; (2) their level of knowledge about their beats; and (3) their level of involvement in the communities they served. SDC's (System Development Corporation's) conclusion is that the available evidence confirms these reported changes.<sup>14</sup>

In early 1975, the San Diego Police Department announced it would adopt Community Oriented Policing on a citywide basis by the summer. Although it would take some time for that transition to actually take place, the community profiling project laid the groundwork for, first, a department wide focus on problem solving and, second, a shift to community policing in the 1990s.

In other places police community relations provided a bridge to approaches such as team policing and, ultimately, community policing. In St. Paul, for example, current

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<sup>12</sup> Boydston and Sherry, p. 74

<sup>13</sup> National surveys of police executives, conducted in 1993 and again in 1997, found that only 25% of police leaders believe that community policing requires "extensive reorganization of police agencies". Only 44% in either survey believed it required "major changes in organizational policies, goals, or missions statements". (ORC Macro and Police Executive Research Forum, 2000)

Either police departments already are well aligned for the adoption of a different approach to the delivery of police service, or police leaders are woefully unaware of the kinds of organizational commitment required to support the change in service philosophy.

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staff members recall a clear linkage between their police community relations program and team policing.

By the early 1970s, relations between African-American residents of public housing in Saint Paul and police were hostile enough that police were hesitant to enter the projects. In 1970, an SPPD officer was assassinated. Chief Finney himself remembers that both citizens and officers were angry: citizens, especially African-American residents, wanted police to be more respectful. They also wanted more African-American police officers.<sup>15</sup>

To deal with these problems, the St. Paul Police Department created a Police Community Relations Unit that both operated out of a storefront and developed a special project in public housing called HELP-P. HELP-P ultimately became the city's first team policing experiment, one that was followed by an experimental district. A lieutenant who spearheaded these initiatives later rose through the ranks and became a commander in the SPPD. We don't know how typical St. Paul was of police departments nationally in this regard, but it is a clear example of an organization responding to a crisis with a program that gave the organization an institutional capacity it previously didn't have – a capacity which ultimately moved into the mainstream of the organization. We will return to St. Paul later, as it is one of the clearest examples of the movement from team policing to community policing about which we know.

Sherman, Milton, and Kelly<sup>16</sup> have briefly summarized the history of team policing. Its origins were in Scotland and England and Patrick V. Murphy, former chief of the Syracuse and Detroit Police Departments and commissioner of the New York Police Department, was one of its staunchest American advocates. (Murphy attempted to implement team policing in these three cities.) Although Sherman et al. acknowledge

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<sup>15</sup> Catherine Coles, National Cops Evaluation Organizational Change Case Study: St. Paul, Minnesota, Case Study Prepared for the Urban Institute, 1999, p.6.

that team policing had many definitions, they identify three common elements:

“geographic stability of patrol, maximum interaction among team members, and maximum communication among team members and the community.”<sup>17</sup> Moreover, they identified organizational supports for community policing:

The departments which were most successful in implementing these elements also had in common certain organizational supports: unity of supervision, lower-level flexibility in policy-making, unified delivery of services, and combined investigative and patrol functions.<sup>18</sup>

Basically, the major goal of team policing was to increase the sensitivity and responsiveness of police to communities. In most communities in which team policing was launched, the introduction generally was accomplished with considerable flourish. Although participating police were initially skeptical, most came to like it. Citizen approval was generally seen as high. In some locations, reported crime declined. Yet, as early as 1973, Sherman and his colleagues were already reporting that team policing had either failed or had been only partially implemented. They reported that three factors appeared to explain these circumstances:

1. Mid-management of the departments, seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and, in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans.
2. The dispatching technology did not permit patrol officers to remain in their neighborhoods, despite the stated intentions of adjusting that technology to the pilot projects.
3. The patrols never received a sufficiently clear definition of how their behavior and role should differ from that of a regular patrol; at the same time, they were considered an elite group by their peers who often resented not having been chosen for the project.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 107-108.

The most carefully conceived and examined experiment in team policing was in Cincinnati (OH).<sup>20</sup> With funds from the Police Foundation, the experiment was planned for two years. Implementation went smoothly with officers being enthusiastic and top management providing the necessary support and resources. Although some problems developed (for example, disagreement about the authority of team leaders to assign officers to work in plain clothes), at the end of the experimental period, team policing was found to be more effective than routine patrol in crime reduction, clearances, fear reduction, and citizen satisfaction. The city decided to implement team policing citywide. At the same time, the CPD decided to implement management by objectives (MBO). Established teams, however, found themselves in constant conflict with central management over priorities and the imposition of standardized measures of performance.<sup>21</sup> Teams for the rest of the city, expected to implement teams without any planning, never got off the ground. At the end of two years, evaluators found that the teams had largely been abandoned – business as usual had been restored. Basically, evaluators believed that while some mid- and top management resistance had been noted during the experimental phase, the imposition of MBO with its centralized control, doomed team policing. It was the tool by which centralized management could reassert control:

[MBO] became a means through which headquarters imposed standardized demands for increasingly rigid levels of measurable activities. [Team policing] officers found their MBO plans were being continually returned until they included all CPD priorities. Perhaps

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<sup>20</sup> Alfred I. Schwartz and Sumner M. Claren, *The Cincinnati Team Policing Experiment: A Summary Report*, Police Foundation, Washington D.C., 1977.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46.

inadvertently, MBO helped to destroy the autonomy of team policing and to recentralize control of the police.<sup>22</sup>

These findings were not dissimilar to those of Sherman and his colleagues. But the MBO issue stands out. It is somewhat stunning in retrospect that when a department was attempting to implement team policing citywide, it would adopt MBO as a centralized planning and control system. Sumner and Claren suggest that MBO was adopted "perhaps inadvertently," but one wonders. The central idea of team policing is decentralization. In respects, MBO a clever way for centralized management to kill team policing: simply reject every team plan that reflects neighborhood rather than imposed, generalized priorities. The message would get across very quickly. The imposition of standardized outcome and performance measures across the city, again in retrospect, flies in the face of what we now understand about community and neighborhood problems.

But this is the story of virtually every team policing experiment: great promise, initial success, plans for expansion, and then it vanishes-- if not in form, in substance. Conceptually, it is probably the case that even the most ardent supporters of team policing were still too far into the reform "box," with all its assumptions, to understand just how radical of a change team policing was. In the shadows, constantly, were the memories of the "bad old days" of corruption and political manipulation of police departments. In an interesting "Foreword" to *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies* James Q. Wilson recognized this:

The police administrator faces a dilemma. He is aware that corruption and the abuse of authority are constant dangers on his force, that rioting and collective violence have occurred before in his city and may occur again, and that people are frightened and want visible evidence of a massive police presence that will reduce crime. He also knows that, however much the city council may complain of rising crime rates, it is also concerned

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

about rising tax rates and thus wants the police department run as economically as possible. For all these reasons, the police administrator is tempted to organize and operate his department along tight, quasi-military lines with strict supervision of patrol officers, a strong command structure that can deploy effectively large numbers of police in emergency situations, powerful and mobile tactical forces that can saturate areas experiencing high crime rates, and close control over costs, scheduling, assignments and discipline.<sup>23</sup>

In other words, it is very hard to let go. The stakes are high.

Although the Dallas effort at reform of its police department was not widely understood as a shift towards team policing, it had many elements in common with the other efforts.

**Dallas.** Several notes to readers before proceeding: first, the Police Foundation discussed here is to be distinguished from at least three other entities. First, the current Police Foundation, based in Washington DC, is descended from the original Foundation. In many respects, it is now a different organization. Primarily, it has shifted from a grant *giving* organization to a grant *getting* organization – a police think tank that, while having a Ford Foundation endowment, no longer gives money to other organizations. For all practical purposes the original Police Foundation ended its role as a funding organization during the late 1970s. The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment was the last major project (not to be confused with “major cities” program) that the Foundation conducted. Second, the New York City Police Foundation is a completely independent entity that, with donated corporate monies, funds projects within the New York City Police Department. Finally, there is a Police Foundation in England that, like the current Police Foundation in the United States, is a think tank that obtains grants and donations to conduct police research and other projects.

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<sup>23</sup> Sherman, et al., p. ix.

The focus of the original research by Wycoff and Kelling in Dallas was on a set of projects: the extent of their implementation and their impact. The original motivation for our qualitative research – monitoring the department’s efforts to implement the projects – was to record the strength of the programs relative to whatever outcomes were discovered. The research was driven by a belief that many programmatic “good ideas” that appeared to have failed were, in fact, failures of implementation. Although a commonplace notion now, it was not commonplace during the early 1970s when this study was designed and executed. In Dallas, attempts to implement several projects cascaded through the department with enormous consequences. As we documented implementation efforts, their organizational consequences appeared in bold relief.

Both the Police Foundation and the DPD were experiencing crises. The crisis of the Police Foundation was that of a new organization. It had to develop a staff, define the relationship of the staff to the board of directors, define its priorities and methods, structure a relationship to the policing community (quite a chore at that time, even for an organization with a lot of money to give away), resolve staff hierarchies and relationships, and so on. Dallas, being the first major project, was *the* test for the staff.

The crisis of the DPD, on the other hand, was chronic: even in 1971 it was still experiencing the shame of President Kennedy’s assassination and its aftermath. The first iteration of its future plan was Project Pride – the title of which betrayed the organization’s struggle to regain its dignity after its national embarrassment. If, as it was said, everybody recalled afterwards where they were the moment they heard of Kennedy’s assassination, this was doubly so for Dallas police officers. Moreover, the far political right was active and vocal about its opposition to any outside influences on the

DPD, whether by the Federal government or the despised “eastern establishment.” And nothing could have been more “eastern establishment” for Dallas arch-conservatives than the Ford Foundation. Over time, this opposition was to become more vocal and harder to put off.

The Dallas story is complicated as well because the Police Foundation saw itself as a “change agent.” Its purpose was to promote reform and Foundation staff believed that it had something to say in its own right regarding the substance and agenda of reform in policing. The agenda of the President’s Commission was explicitly on the table – especially those aspects that were congruent with views of the Ford Foundation. Also, key Police Foundation staff, especially staff initially dealing with Dallas, had special relationships with Herman Goldstein and Frank Remington (also a member of the Police Foundation’s Board of Directors), both closely linked to the ABF Survey. (In fact, it was while Kelling was a doctoral student at the University of Wisconsin that Goldstein introduced him to staff of the Police Foundation as a potential staff member or evaluator. It was later that Kelling hired Wycoff, also a doctoral student at the University of Wisconsin, as a staff member who later would become the director of the Dallas evaluation). The views of Goldstein and Remington, while not programmatically explicit at that time, focused Foundation staff on the *substance* of policing, as opposed to organizational tinkering. Already, Goldstein and Remington were talking about the problems with which police deal – an emphasis that later was to result in problem-oriented policing. Even then, Goldstein and Remington stood against an orientation of learning to do better, that which was already being done.

The Dallas Police Department was the first of what was to have been five “major city” reform projects funded by the Police Foundation. Despite the original plans, only one other city, Cincinnati, was funded under this program. The reasons for the demise of the Major Cities Program are complicated and some have to do with the internal organizational politics of the Police Foundation. But the “Dallas experience” as Wycoff and Kelling called it then was a major factor.

Finally, readers must understand that policing is a very different world now than it was during the early 1970s. Policing was largely closed then – one of the most insular institutions in the United States. Deeply suspicious, in some departments to the point of paranoia, police viewed police business as just that – *police* business! The early understandings that police in a democratic society were people’s police were largely put aside. In Milwaukee during the 1960s, for example, city council members demanded that Chief Brier make the department’s rules and regulations available to them. The chief refused; the rules and regulations were secret and none of their business. Given the 1960s riots and demonstrations, both about civil rights and Vietnam, many police departments felt under siege. Scholars who wanted to study police were viewed with special suspicion. Many police felt badly burned by the research of Reiss and Black for the President’s Commission. To gain entry to the three departments they studied (Buffalo, Chicago and ----), Reiss and Black lied. They told police they were studying the response of citizens to police when, in reality, they were studying the exact opposite. In our own experience in the conduct of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, more than once Chief Clarence Kelley, recalling that experience, drew explicit promises from Kelling that only data directly relevant to the experiment would be collected. And,

at least on one occasion when a story went out about the collection of data that were not project relevant, Kelling was called to a hearing of the command staff to justify why the experiment should not be ended. Nevertheless, Clarence Kelley was supportive of research when compared with the vast majority of police executives of the era.

It is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which policing has changed. One just has to mention the collaborations between universities and police throughout the country. Such collaborations were the rare exception in the 1970s; they are now the rule for most large city police departments. But to return to the Dallas story.

The Dallas effort was made up of three major "projects:" decentralization, generalist-specialist officers, and the human resource development project.

*Decentralization.* The guiding principle behind the DPD's plan for decentralization was "neighborhood police operations." Districts, to be formed, would have substantial autonomy and, in turn, would be further broken down into neighborhood satellite stations. These neighborhood stations would house the basic policing unit in Dallas: the neighborhood based team.

*Generalist/Specialist Police Officers.* Dallas police were to be autonomous professionals. Every officer in the department was to be a police officer first and foremost. Then, on top of the role of generalist, officers would have the opportunity to do additional training in specialties: domestic relations, community relations, criminal investigation, and so on. Teams were to be constructed that included officers with a variety of specialties so that teams could provide full service to their geographic areas.

*Human Resource Development:* The underpinnings of this new approach to policing were to be recruitment, pre-service education, and in-service education. Officers

of diverse background were to be recruited. Pre-service education would prepare officers for their generalist role; in-service, for maintaining skills and learning specialties. Universities would be important partners in education at all levels and would also conduct policy research to upgrade the professional knowledge and skills of policing.

It is impossible now to reconstruct with precision, the origins of specific ideas in the DPD. The DPD presented two major documents to the Police Foundation during the funding process: Project Pride, dated January 1971, and the Five Year Plan, dated October 1972. They are very different documents. The first deals exclusively with administrative processes: personnel recruitment, education, training, and development. The second articulates the Human Resource Development project, a direct outgrowth of personnel issues that made up Project Pride, but goes well beyond administrative processes. Included are decentralization to districts and substations, developing close working relationships with neighborhood groups, police teams in neighborhoods; and Project Pride personnel processes are articulated into a generalist-specialist model for patrol officers. Many of these emphases are consistent with the agenda, explicit and not, of the Police Foundation. Also, we know that the Police Foundation pushed and assisted the DPD throughout the grant writing and selection process.

At least three interpretations of the origins of these ideas are possible. The first is that Chief Dyson generated the ideas of the Five-Year Plan, but was reluctant to make them explicit out of fear of raising political and organizational resistance. A second interpretation is that Foundation staff members forced some of these ideas on Dyson. The third is that the ideas were Dyson's but that the DPD simply lacked the skills to put

the ideas in a coherent form. The response of the Police Foundation, in this interpretation, was helpful, but resented by staff nonetheless.

As part of the change effort, Dyson created a planning unit called the Office of Professional Assistance (OPA) and appointed his most trusted colleague, an assistant chief, to head it. Three DPD officers were assigned to the OPA, as well. Ultimately, this assistant chief hired a relatively large staff of civilians. The purpose of this unit was to obtain funding, to develop the operational details of the plan, develop a timetable for implementation, and, in general, oversee the project and its implementation. Moreover, the unit was to liaise with Police Foundation evaluation staff and Southern Methodist University, a subcontractor that was supposed to provide educational support to the project.

The creation of OPA and the assignment of a particular assistant chief to head it were singularly important events. The assistant chief in question was, at least by police standards of the time, an organizational outsider – very remote from his peers, but close to Dyson. Although extremely bright intellectually, and supportive of major changes in policing, his outsider role and his secretiveness were a deadly mix for a planning unit that was to reorient the department. Nonetheless, he was completely trusted by Dyson and was the *only* route to Dyson regarding anything related to the project.

The conflicts between Foundation staff and the DPD, especially with the head of OPA, reverberated within the Police Foundation as well as in the DPD. Conflicts among Police Foundation staff reached its board, exacerbating differences between the Police Foundation president and key board members, including James Vorenberg, over the programmatic directions of the Foundation. This conflict ultimately resulted in the resignation of the president and several staff members, including the original program officer for Dallas. (Police Foundation

evaluation staff – e.g, Kelling and Wycoff – managed to isolate themselves rather successfully from the conflict.) The main point of recounting these events, however, is to underscore that the stakes were high in this project – for the Police Foundation as well as the DPD.

The grant originally approved by the Police Foundation was a planning grant and the DPD was to return to the board by November 1971 for the sizable Major Cities implementation grant. The project was funded; however, even before it was really started, those who would ultimately defeat it had developed the storyline of their resistance. In a colossal blunder, when the submitted and funded grant proposal was finally released to selected staff, the first 13 pages were withheld – the document started on page 14. Now opponents of change in the DPD had their case: a secret project, cooked up by a secretive assistant chief (who, in the eyes of most police in Dallas, was never a real cop anyway), and an elite remote unit that included civilians, and written in conjunction with a branch of the despised eastern liberal establishment, was to be foisted on the DPD.

Gradually, things began to unravel. The relationship between OPA and other city agencies—especially the city's fiscal office-- began to sour. The OPA wanted to deviate from traditional city procedures; the city, which had not previously handled outside funding, insisted that all its rules and regulations be followed. The relationship between OPA and SMU grew tense: the OPA assistant chief felt that SMU was competing for the same potential staff members – and, at an advantage, given the city's civil service rules and regulations. Nonetheless, OPA staff grew to such a size that they needed new space. OPA rented space in the same building in which Police Foundation evaluation staff was housed – more evidence to skeptics of Foundation meddling. Dyson appointed an entirely new command staff, bypassing many older and senior officers with younger persons. These new leaders were to form a team

and make decisions collegially. Instead, they set to bickering—in competition to see who would be Number Two in the department. Most ominously, OPA was hiring staff, but nothing was happening.

Troubles for Dyson and the project began to mount. During October 1972, Dallas police officers shot five black citizens, three of whom died. The chief's relationship with the press began to change. Initially, Dyson had been open and available to the press. Under attack, however, he withdrew and became unavailable. The police union, under the control of detectives who opposed decentralization, and "informed sources" were more than happy to fill the void. The stress of the project and their ambiguous roles began to take their toll on assistant chiefs. Two chiefs had nervous breakdowns within a few months of each other and, after the second, politicians started to take notice. The mayor of Dallas formed a city council investigative committee to probe "rumors of police irregularities." (None were found.) A new pension plan was offered, and a relatively large group of officers retired, giving some disaffected observers the opportunity to suggest that the change effort was driving out experienced officers. The media started to note that decentralization was running into trouble.

The program lurched ahead for some months. Chief Dyson presented his plan to the city council and they basically endorsed it. The editorial response of the *Dallas Morning News*, however, was cool and ended with a warning: "If the 5-year plan proves unworkable, if morale is wrecked or if outside interference develops, it should be revised sharply or abandoned."<sup>24</sup> Sure enough, a wealthy businessperson began buying newspaper ads with headlines like: "PROVEN: Outside Control of Dallas Police Department," "TERMINATE OUTSIDE MONEY: TERMINATE OUTSIDE CONTROL," and mentioned despised figures like Nicolas

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<sup>24</sup> *Dallas Morning News*, February 28, 1973.

Katzenbach, McGeorge Bundy, Kingman Brewster, as well as the Ford Foundation.<sup>25</sup> A minor fuss developed over the fact that OPA had a credit card (up to then not allowed by city policy). But in June of 1972, after a lull, the endgame began. First, an officer held a gun to the boy's head in order to gain information about a burglary from a soft drink machine and shot a 12-year-old Mexican-American youth to death. Protests followed. One got out of control: five officers were injured, two police motorcycles were burned, 38 people were arrested and approximately \$50,000 in damage was done to downtown store windows. While Dyson and the department were broadly praised for the restraint of their response, inside the department charges were made that tactical officers had been prevented from assisting other officers under attack and that the chief had jeopardized his officers. The Dallas Police Association seized this opportunity not only to accuse Dyson of not supporting officers but to challenge the Five-Year Plan as well. Dyson responded that unless they were able to support the public charges they had made, he no longer would deal with them as a group.

In July the Dallas crime rate jumped dramatically by 12 percent. The dispute between the union and the chief raged through August. In October, Chief Dyson resigned.

The demise of Chief Dyson brought an end to the most ambitious effort yet of a police department to move away from the reform paradigm. Most of the elements of the Human Resources Development efforts were continued, although the operational ideas and the generalist-specialist model were abandoned. The Police Foundation continued to fund discrete projects, although it abandoned its Major Cities concept. Although another story, the Foundation moved in the direction of funding substantive ideas, rather than departments. Kansas City, especially with the Preventive Patrol Experiment, characterized its new approach. The Dallas

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, March 28, 1973.

evaluation staff continued its work and ultimately published two volumes. The first has been cited and quoted throughout this manuscript; the second evaluated the Human Resource Development projects.<sup>26</sup> Dyson, within a relatively brief time, moved on to become chief in Austin, Texas, and retired during the late 1980s,

In retrospect it is not hard to understand what went wrong: excessive planning without doing, an overwhelming amount of external funding and new programs, delays that allowed for resistances to develop, secrecy, and inadequate dealing with the DPD's political and media environment, and others. Moreover, the mix of secrecy and long delay made the outcome inevitable. Dyson stood almost alone. Few in the DPD shared or understood his vision. He was working in an environment of very little "organizational readiness" for change. Once Dyson retreated into silence, those who did support him had no way to help or defend him.

But yet it was more complicated than this. Although we don't think Dyson knew it (and we certainly didn't, he was mounting a revolution: he was challenging the basic strategy of American policing. Like team policing, which was misunderstood as a tactical innovation, Dyson's vision of policing moved "outside of the box" of the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century police paradigm and neither he, nor we, at the time were able to properly conceptualize the developments. The roadmaps that were later to develop – the historical works of Robert Fogelson, Samuel Walker, and Eric Monkkonen and the patrol experiments – were, at best, in draft or design stages. Even then, it wasn't until the mid 1980s that the full impacts of much of this work were to be understood. Probably the most basic misunderstanding was the failure to recognize that the existent police paradigm was more about the business of control than it was about delivering police services. So, whether we talk about sources of authority for the DPD, its goals, how it

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<sup>26</sup> Mary Ann Wycoff and George L. Kelling, *The Dallas Experience: Human Resource Development*, Police Foundation, Washington DC, 1978.

was structured and its administrative processes, its sources and content of demand for services, the DPD's relationship to the environment, its methodologies and tactics, or what the outcomes of the DPD were to be, they were all put on the table by Dyson's plan for the future. On the one hand, people knew that some change was involved; nobody understood, however, that the reform paradigm was being challenged or how resilient it would to prove to be. As we will recognize in future studies of change, it is tough enough for reformers or chiefs when they understand all of this, but when they don't understand it, they are operating in the dark.

In closing, Frank Dyson was a visionary. As an administrator he made some key mistakes. But, the field – practitioners and researchers – had little inkling then about where it was heading. Dyson gave us one of the first peeks at what was coming in policing, but we suspect that even if his attempt to implement his strategy had been unblemished, he still would have failed. Too much historical, theoretical, and empirical work necessary for the successful repositioning of an organization was still in the wings. Robert Igleburger, chief in Dayton, Ohio, was another true policing visionary of this era. His comment to Kelling in the mid-80s, after he retired, explained much: "Police departments are like rubber bands: you can stretch them, pull them, and hold them in various shapes. But as soon as you let go, they snap back into their original form." In other words, projects in police departments ultimately became easy to implement. Basic change of the organization was another matter.

Along with Cincinnati and Dallas, a third police department—Kansas City, Missouri--aspired to become a Major City of the Police Foundation. While it did not succeed, it demonstrated the capacity of police departments to conduct projects, some of which were very complicated.

### **The Kansas City Police Department**

The Kansas City Police Department has a well-deserved reputation as being a major contributor to the changes that have taken place in policing during the past three decades. Under Chief Clarence Kelley, who was chief in Kansas City from 1961 until he became the director of the FBI in 1973(?), the KCPD was turned from a relatively corrupt police department into one of the more progressive and well run police departments of the era.

Kelley was a strong chief. His leadership style was such that few chiefs in the United States could match the esteem and respect with which he was held by line officers. His use of multi-rank task forces involved officers in important decision-making, yet Kelley ran a relatively tight command and control organization. Nobody doubted who was in control and the chain of command operated efficiently. His leadership also extended into the community where he was considered to be an integral part of the power structure of Kansas City. Also, he was relatively immune to politics: Kansas City at that time was one of three cities in the country that was under state control.

Kelley had hoped Kansas City would become one of the Police Foundation's Major Cities. Two factors precluded that: first, the Major Cities Program of the Foundation was being put on hold and ultimately would be disbanded – the Dallas experience was proving too unsatisfactory. Second, Kelley, as distinct from chiefs like Dyson and Igleburger, was not driven to the same extent by a new vision of policing. Kelley was not a reformer: he wanted to do better than which he believed the department was already doing well.

Like many other chiefs during the early 1970s, Kelley requested and received appropriations for additional officers – 350 in the case of Kansas City. In lieu of becoming a Major City, Kelley requested assistance from the Police Foundation in deciding how to use these new officers most effectively and for assistance in evaluating those efforts. Consequently, the Police Foundation sent in a consulting team headed by Robert Wasserman and an evaluator, Kelling.

With Chief Kelley presiding and with Wasserman facilitating, a series of meetings was held with the command staff to discuss plans for allocating the new officers. The meetings were uninspired. The two proposals that came forward were to reduce beat size or to add more officers to existent beats. Both were to increase the amount of preventive patrol and to reduce response time. (Kansas City was a “full service” police department – at the time this meant that all calls for service were to be responded to in 3 minutes.) Kelley and Wasserman decided to resurrect multi-rank task forces. Four were created: one in each of the three districts and one in special operations. Wasserman would head the South Patrol Task Force, other consultants would assist the other three, and Kelling would plan evaluations for all four. The charge to each task force was to come up with a plan to use additional officers in their unit.

The South Patrol Task Force, as the result of a problem-solving exercise, decided that the major problem of the district was juveniles around schools. They were unanimous about this. They split, however, on what should be done. One group adamantly argued that new officers should be used to deal with this problem; the other group, equally adamant, argued that while the problem they identified was correct, preventive patrol and rapid response were so essential to the district’s welfare that new

officers must be used to enhance these methods. Some officers in the first group went so far as to suggest that both preventive patrol and rapid response were a waste of time. Wasserman suggested that they devise an experiment in preventive patrol. They agreed and Wasserman turned the task force over to Kelling.

There is no need for further retelling of the story. Despite the dominant view that police were quite hostile to research, especially research by outsiders, the climate in the KCPD was such that if Kelley wanted to conduct this research, there would be little internal or external resistance to it. Moreover, the officers in the task force came to believe in its value and championed it with other officers. And it turns out that command and control organizations, with good leadership and nurtured young talent, are quite hospitable to research, even complex experiments. Moreover, as things played out, the KCPD, in the later conduct of the first major response time study, demonstrated that with some technical assistance, police departments can mount and conduct complicated research on their own.

It should be emphasized that the research conducted by the KCPD was conducted on the core competencies of police: preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. Up until this time, traditionalists were able to say that reform tactics were “unpopular but effective.” Now, they were confronted with the worst case: unpopular and ineffective.

The KCPD’s contribution to change in policing, then, was quite distinct when compared to other innovative departments at the time. Its accomplishments were twofold. First, it demonstrated that police departments were capable of research. Second, it undermined the tactical underpinnings of reform policing.

Adding to the impact of the preventive patrol study was the fact that Patrick V. Murphy had been named president of the Police Foundation. Murphy, who it will be recalled attempted to implement team policing in Syracuse, Detroit, and New York City, was in a running battle with a good share of the police establishment including the International Association of Chiefs of Police. He was uncanny in his ability to goad this establishment into attacks on him that he, in turn, could use as a platform to get his message out to policy and political leaders. Part of this was a testimony to his skill with the media. Also, however, the resources of the Police Foundation, including a media savvy head of communications, Tom Brady, were at his disposal. He literally orchestrated publicity about the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study.

The patrol study, followed in quick order by the Rand study of detectives and the response time studies, threatened more than just the tactical foundations of reform policing. Use of police cars and dispatch systems were also at the core of policing's mechanisms to control officers and to focus the organization on serious crime – that is, to control demand.

These then were the circumstances by the end of the 1970s. Police community relations programs, at worst, were trivial public relations programs; at best, they began to take community concerns seriously and to solve problems, often in collaboration with other agencies. Team policing had similar accomplishments but was incompatible with the reform paradigm. Thoughtful chiefs throughout the country still struggled to somehow work more effectively with neighborhoods and communities, but it was not clear how to do this except with special projects or units. Research largely demonstrated what did not work. During the last years of 1970, independent foot patrol research was

mounted in Flint (MI) and Newark (NJ); Patrick V. Murphy created a new police organization – the Police Executive Research Forum; and, Herman Goldstein published an article about problem solving in *Crime and Delinquency*.

Conditions were ripe for dramatic developments in the profession.

## SECTION IV

### THE EMERGENCE AND SHAPING OF POLICE UNIONS<sup>1</sup>

Police unions, which had been dormant or non-existent since the famous Boston police strike of 1919, emerged as a major force in policing during the 1960s. They remain an enigma, however. No one denies their importance. Since the 1960s they have become ubiquitous in policing: whether or not state or local collective bargaining laws exist, police associations and unions have become major players on cities' social and political turf. Yet, the academic police literature is virtually silent about their existence, their nature, or their impact. If discussed in administrative texts, generally a small section in the "Personnel" chapter gives a cursory overview of their history and role, followed by admonitions and advice to administrators about how to minimize unions' impact through thorough preparation and good administration. Generally, however, unions seem to cause academic embarrassment or resignation: they're there; they have to be dealt with; but what to make of them remains elusive.

Although their influence remains unstudied, they are vitally important in the evolution of the current police strategy. In many police departments, it is not too strong to say that unions control their culture. Few important rules, regulations, policies, or guidelines are alterable without union approval. Management "rights" are those maintained or won at the bargaining table. It is important to understand how these circumstances came about. As will also become clear, the form that unionism took in

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<sup>1</sup> Materials for this chapter were taken from a paper drafted for the Executive Sessions in Policing entitled "Unions, Participation, and Innovation." It was authored by Kelling and Robert B. Kliesmet, former president of the International Union of Police Associations and is dated November 14 1991. Some of these materials were also used in George L. Kelling and Robert B. Kliesmet "Police Unions, Police Culture, and Police Use of Force," in *Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force*, Eds. William A. Geller and Hans Toch, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996, pp. 191-212.

policing was a direct outgrowth of the excesses of Taylorism in the organization and management of American policing. It will also become clear that the term “collective bargaining” has a special meaning in the public sector: in the private sector, collective bargaining is driven by economics; in the public sector, collective bargaining is driven by politics.

**Police Unionism.** Police fraternal, benevolent, and social clubs formed after the Civil War quite naturally, both as a result of the ethnic and political affinities of members and out of a need to provide relief to sick or disabled police. Organized labor was not enthusiastic about police joining their ranks: police, especially state police, had been widely used on behalf of management against labor during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. As early as 1887, the American Federation of Labor rejected the formation of a police council. In 1919, that decision was reversed and 37 police unions were admitted to the AFL.

However, Samuel Gompers, then President of the AFL, admonished that police should not be allowed to strike (despite the fact that by 1919 police had already gone out on strike in Cincinnati and London without dire consequences). Police reformers like August Vollmer and chiefs and commissioners immediately and vociferously protested unionization and set out to eliminate it. The idea of unions cut to the heart of their struggles to wrest control of police departments from politicians and bring rank-and-file officers under their administrative purview. In their view, the military model, a tenet of early 20th century police reform, made unions inconceivable: police could no more be unionized than could soldiers. This view dominated until well after WWII.

Few today recall just how far administrative control could be extended over police officers.

They (police authorities) also imposed all kinds of conditions on officers' private lives, conditions designed to minimize exposure to temptation and corrupt influence. These included restricting officers from living in the areas they policed, from incurring debts, or from being involved in businesses in their areas, as well as requiring them to declare the business interests of their families.<sup>2</sup>

Administrative control over private life was even more extensive. Officers had to live within a certain distance of police stations, had to carry weapons while off-duty, had their financial and sexual lives monitored and regulated, and, in some cities, had to take their police cars home with them.

And reformers made their objections to unionism stick. Chiefs simply threatened to fire police union organizers or members. Commissioner E. U. Curtis of Boston did, triggering the infamous 1919 Boston police strike.<sup>3</sup> This strike not only shaped the relationship between management and police in the Boston Police Department for the whole 20<sup>th</sup> century, it shaped the union movement nationally as well.

Interpretations of the Boston strike are colored by ideology. Calvin Coolidge, then governor of Massachusetts, catapulted into the national spotlight by his "forceful action" of firing 1,134 of the 1,544 Boston officers who struck in sympathy for their leaders. His statement "there is no right to strike against the public safety, anywhere, any time" became a shibboleth of anti-union sentiment. President Woodrow Wilson branded the strike as "a crime against civilization." Reformers, commissioners, chiefs, and public officials saw it, and publicly touted it, as vindicating their strong opposition to unionism. Others, however, saw in the Boston police strike a prototypical political exploitation of a crisis created by first, the city's refusal to negotiate in good faith about wages; second,

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<sup>2</sup>. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*, Basic Books, 1990, pp. 36-37.

management excesses and authoritarianism; and finally, the city's and management's cynical failure to plan for the possibility of a strike despite experiences in Cincinnati and London.<sup>4</sup> This later view has been, and probably continues to be, the minority view. The mold was set, however. Militancy and disregard for public safety was attributed to unions; prudence and responsibility to management. Firing police organizers was the prudent and responsible thing to do.

The Boston strike, and its attendant horror stories of riot and mayhem, shaped the debate about police unions in the United States for decades, demolished the incipient police union movement, and shattered the relationship between organized labor and police associations. The AFL revoked all police charters. All that was left of the early 20th century union movement was local fraternal organizations, often dominated by chiefs or other managers. Even the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) was unable to recruit locals into a national fraternal organization, confronted, as local members were, with threats of firing if they dared to affiliate with any national group. Firefighter, teacher, and other public unions developed into strong national unions; police organizations, even when recognized as unions during the 1970s, remained local, with only weak and under-funded national organizations.

The forces arrayed against police unionism were insuperable until well after WWII. Sporadic attempts to unionize police continued to be quashed by threats of firing and actual firing. During the 1940s, when officers again attempted to associate their locals with unions (AFSCME), the anti-union militancy of chiefs persisted and largely

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<sup>3</sup>. Robert M. Fogelson, *Big City Police*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup>. For a presentation of the two points of view, see Tony Bouza, "Police Unions: Paper Tigers or Roaring Lions," and Robert Kliesmet, "The Chief and the Union: May the Force Be with You," both in *Police*

reigned. The *Police Chiefs' News Letter* (the predecessor to *Police Chief*, the publication of the International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP]) noted in 1947 that 10 police departments were unionized, with only 4 having dues check-offs (pay-roll deduction of union dues): Omaha, Nebraska; Tacoma, Washington; Duluth, Minnesota; and Flint, Michigan.<sup>5</sup> In most cities, when attempts were made to affiliate, members were threatened or fired. For example, those who joined unions were given 30 days in Los Angeles and two weeks in St. Louis to sever all relations with unions. Those few officers who refused to cave in to these threats were fired. Similar scenarios were played out in Detroit, Chicago, and other cities.<sup>6</sup> Detroit Police Department's General Order No. 593, issued on March 27, 1944, summed it up:

The Michigan Supreme Court has declared that a police force is similar to a military force organized under the laws of the United States and equally as important in the functions it is required to perform.

Therefore, the following order is issued and placed in immediate effect: A member of the Department is prohibited from affiliating with a labor union or an organization which will in any way exact prior consideration and prevent him from performing full and complete duty. A member of the department who affiliates with such a labor union or organization will be subject to immediate dismissal.<sup>7</sup>

During the 1960s, circumstances changed. Fogelson noted changes in the attitudes of rank-and-file officers. They realized, as Carl Parsell, then head of the Detroit Police Officers Association put it, "collective begging" had failed to improve salaries, benefits, or working conditions. Additionally, they realized that only a genuine union could mobilize the political and economic "clout" to challenge chiefs and city officials. Street officers recognized that the ideal of police officers as professionals, in the sense of

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*Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*, William A. Geller, ed., Praeger, New York, 1985, pp. 241-285.

<sup>5</sup>. *Police Chiefs' News Letter*, Vol. 13, Number 8, August 1947, p.3.

<sup>6</sup>. Fogelson, p. 195.

<sup>7</sup>. Quoted in *Police Chiefs' Newsletter*, Vol. 11, ;Number 4, April, 1944, pp. 1-2.

lawyers or physicians, that had started to replace the ideal of police as soldiers as an argument against unionization, was hollow rhetoric.<sup>8,9</sup>

Congruent with the attitudes of officers, the political climate regarding public unions was changing. During the 1950s and 1960s firefighters, teachers, and other groups were successfully organizing. Some local police organizations began to break through the organizational and legal barriers to unionization. Wisconsin authorized cities to negotiate with police associations in 1960. More and more cities authorized dues check-off, a requirement if unions were to develop any organizational muscle. The political climate for public unions changed dramatically when President Kennedy signed an executive order in 1962 authorizing collective bargaining with federal employees. In Massachusetts, all municipal employees except police were given the right to bargain in

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<sup>8</sup>. Fogelson, pp. 200-201.

<sup>9</sup>. The discussion of police professionalism is always one that is confused both by the ambiguity that reformers created by the special meaning they ascribed to professionalism and the ideology that frames any discussion of the concept. Bouza, for example, provides a good example of wanting it both ways as he lays the demise of police professionalism at the feet of police unionism:

The movement to unionize in the 1960s had to buck the by then commonly accepted objective of gaining the status of a profession -- a dream that would never come close to being realized but that captured the police imagination for two-thirds of a century. The absence of altruism in union goals also ran counter to the concept of selfless service that at least theoretically guided soldiers, doctors, priests, lawyers, nurses, and cops. While the countervailing pressures were powerful, the movement to unionize nevertheless gained momentum. . . .(Bouza, "Police Unions," p. 253.)

This is a strange comment from a former chief who wrote in 1990: "Police agencies are mainly controlled through terror, and this terror is mostly aimed at the 1 or 2 percent who, if left to their own devices, would set a negative tone." (Bouza, *The Police Mystique*, p. 133.) But of course this has to be understood, not in terms of professionalism as it refers to priests, physicians, etc., but rather the unique view of professionalism that reformers maintained. The contradiction between striving to become *real* professionals and the imposition of Tayloristic structural forms, administrative processes, and work patterns (incongruous though they may have been), and true professionalism seems lost on those imbued with reform ideology. Moreover, managing *through terror* is a rhetorical example of the excesses of Taylorism that have characterized police management.

1965; in 1966, police were included. Court recognition of this right came in 1969 when a federal court struck down a North Carolina statute prohibiting police and firefighters from joining labor organizations for collective bargaining.<sup>10</sup> A federal court in Atlanta reaffirmed this right in 1971.<sup>11</sup> In 1973, the AFL-CIO went full circle, granting a charter to a breakaway group from the International Conference of Police Associations led by Ed Kiernan (former president of the New York Police Benevolent Association). As Fogelson notes:

By the early 1970s the outcome was no longer in doubt. The rank-and-file organizations had in one way or another obtained a dues check-off, a formal grievance procedure, and collective bargaining rights not only in New York, Detroit, and Boston but also in Philadelphia, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Omaha, Oakland, Seattle, and Los Angeles. . . . The consequences were momentous. For years they had pleaded with the municipal authorities to pay attention to their requests; now for the first time they held the legal right to insist that the authorities sit down at the bargaining table.<sup>12</sup>

By 2000, virtually every police officer in the United States belongs to a FOP Lodge, an association linked to the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO), a Police Benevolent Association, a state-wide labor group, or a local union affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Twenty-eight states authorize collective bargaining. Texas, one of the remaining 22, gives cities local option to bargain collectively. Even in those states that do not allow collective bargaining, police organizations have gained considerable influence. Generally, states with collective bargaining laws are in the northeast, Midwest, and west. With the exception of Florida, states in the south and southwest do not allow collective bargaining. Nationally, the movement remains fragmented.

Bargaining in the Public Sector: It is common to draw parallels between public and private collective bargaining. In both sectors, collective bargaining is a means of

<sup>10</sup>. *Atkins, et al. and IAFF v City of Charlotte*, 296F. Supp. 1068 (1969)

<sup>11</sup>. *Melton, et al. v City of Atlanta*, 324F. Supp. 315 (1971)

<sup>12</sup>. Fogelson, pp. 211-212.

determining the terms and conditions of employment in a written contract with the union being the exclusive representative of the employees. In many respects the formal processes appear quite similar: both parties -- employees' representatives and officials who represent the interest of the company or governmental unit -- sit down at the bargaining table; demands are made; negotiations proceed; and with more or less conflict, a solution is arrived at and expressed in a written contract. Whether strike is threatened or not, the formal process remains intact in both sectors.

While superficially similar, the respective processes in the public and private sectors are actually quite dissimilar. Summers draws their distinction succinctly: "(I)n private employment collective bargaining is a process of private decision making shaped primarily by market forces, while in public employment it is a process of governmental decision making shaped ultimately by political forces."<sup>13</sup> This distinction is fundamental to understanding how police unions operate. Market forces may affect governmental decision making -- the availability of labor, for example -- however, the fundamental processes through which collective bargaining proceeds are political.

Police fared especially poorly in this process, as evidenced during the inflationary eras after the two World Wars. During each of those eras, police salaries stagnated as public officials established other priorities. During the first of these two eras, police militancy was aborted early and dramatically by the response to the Boston police strike. It was retarded after WWII by recollection of the Boston situation, threats, and firings. Moreover, absent dues check-off, police unions lacked the wherewithal to compete in the political marketplace with public unions that did. These were the circumstances that Detroit's Parcell referred to as "collective begging." Finally,

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<sup>13</sup> Clyde W. Summers, "Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, *Yale Law Journal*, 83, 1974, p. 1156. See also, authors, "The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 *University of California Los Angeles Law Review*, 867, 1972.

departmental rules and regulations proscribed political activity, even off-duty, by police officers.

Unionization during the 1970s changed these circumstances by creating at least two special procedures for unions to affect these political processes: direct two-party negotiations and grievance proceedings. Moreover, obtaining dues check-offs strengthened the ability of unions to play the traditional political games in the public forum.

Summers identifies the essential ingredients of the first of these special procedures, two-party negotiations.<sup>14</sup> First, the majority union becomes the exclusive voice of unions. Second, answerable public officials are required to negotiate in good faith – face-to-face, seriously, providing detailed information and exposing their positions on each point. Third, it is limited to a two-sided process, and the point of view of other groups that affect the substantive issues on the table must come through the public official representing the governmental unit. Finally, the contract, once signed, binds all parties; it cannot be changed or modified without the consent of the other party. Even lack of money in the budget is no excuse for breaking a contract. Indeed, Wayne County, Michigan commissioners were jailed for refusing to provide funds for negotiated pay increases.<sup>15</sup>

The second special procedure that affects the political processes is arbitration to resolve disputes arising out of impasses and/or different interpretations of the written contract. Again, like two-party negotiations, this mechanism has its origin in the private sector. When disputes occur, both management and union select an arbitrator on a case-by-case basis from a neutral agency such as the American Arbitration Association. The

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<sup>14</sup>. Summers, pp. 1164-1165.

<sup>15</sup>. Summers, footnote 13, p. 1162.

arbitrator conducts an informal hearing, taking both oral and documentary evidence, and submits a decision.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, dues check-off systems helped level the playing field in the public arena. As long as other groups could unionize and police could not, rank-and-file police simply could not command the resources required to participate effectively in the political processes of budget or other political determinations. (This partially explains the historical police penchant for police union fund-raising, some of it quite sleazy.) Dues check-off systems gave police locals funds to underwrite direct traditional union political activities: political education to members and non-members; financial support to candidates; and indirect assistance to candidates (use of telephone banks, canvassing, provision of voting lists, and other such forms of assistance).<sup>17</sup>

While all of these traditional political activities have garnered political "wins" for unions in the private sector, they have special meaning in the public sector. They not only shape the collective bargaining process, they allow both politicians and unions to bypass the collective bargaining process for wins away from the bargaining table. For example during the 1970s, when Boston's Mayor Kevin White decided to run for governor of Massachusetts, he "bought" the support of the Boston police union by granting them a four-two work week (four days on, two days off) without ever "going to the table" or getting any concessions in return.

Thus, from a collective bargaining point of view, negotiations in the public sector are "messy," vulnerable to political "deals" and maneuvering. A consequence of this is

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<sup>16</sup>. An example of the use of this process to resolve a dispute, and an appeal of a resulting decision, is reported in the 28 September 1991, *New York Times* story "Police Officials Contest Ruling on Discipline." In this case an arbitrator ruled that the city must negotiate with the union's demand that the police commissioner's disciplinary action be subject to review by an arbitrator. New York City is challenging this ruling, questioning the intrusion of the arbitrator's ruling into a matter determined by city charter, with Police Commissioner Brown arguing that the decision will erode his authority to discipline the department. Moreover, Brown is reported to have argued that arbitrators have no responsibility for operations and are not accountable to the public.

<sup>17</sup>. John Thomas and Marick F. Masters, "Unions and Political Action," in *The State of Unions*, George Strauss, Daniel G. Gallagher, and John Fiorito, Industrial Relations Research Association, University of Wisconsin, 1991.

that chiefs often believe themselves to be caught between forces outside of their control, nonetheless held accountable for the quality of policing in a community.

Consequently, that police unions were perceived as a grave threat to early police reformers is not surprising. They had good reason to be concerned. Although reformers and Progressives may have exaggerated police corruption and incompetence, their descriptions of situations were close enough to the truth that policing was in need of wholesale overhaul. Unions threatened that agenda both by reopening (or keeping open) the door to political influences in policing and by limiting the administrative control of command staff over officers, especially patrol officers. The very nature of bargaining in the public sector, as described above, made these threats to cities and police management inevitable.

The unions that grew in the context of Taylorism in policing shared management beliefs that the definitional, organizational, and tactical issues of policing had been solved. Police were crime fighters; quasi-military or Tayloristic bureaucracies optimized police functioning; and, preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and criminal investigation were the appropriate means to deliver police services. Given this, the core concerns of police unionism became:

- wages and benefits;
- job security;
- hiring, retention, promotion, and disciplinary processes;
- access to "good" jobs, shifts, assignments, overtime, etc.; and,
- regulation of work practices by rules.

These concerns were virtually the same as those of unions in the private sector.

The parallels between what happened in private sector unions and police unions are important. Without detailing the history, industry moved from production systems

that relied on artisans and craftspersons to alternate systems that rested on unskilled workers and scientific management. Unions ultimately paralleled this shift by moving away from craft unions to adopt industry unions. In this model, workers, stripped of skills as the basis of their value, moved to define their value in other terms. John Hoerr describes this process.

In order to defend workers against the abuses of scientific management, the new industrial unions accepted, even embraced, all that went with it – in particular, the rigid separation of thinking from doing, "managing" from "working." Cut off from decision-making responsibilities, unions focused on protecting workers from exploitation by using Taylorism as a base of shopfloor power. They negotiated multiple job classifications, linked wage rates to the job instead of a worker's skills, and established seniority as the basis for promotion. This "job control unionism" gave unions a negative power to hamstring management but not a positive power to influence operations. Rules bred more rules, eventually straitjacketing the production system and creating unproductive hierarchies in companies and unions.<sup>18</sup>

This model of industry unionism, with its emphasis on seniority, rules and regulations, and "jobs" rather than "skills" is, of course, the model of unionism that has been transposed into policing. In some respects, unions mirrored police departments. Departments developed extensive rules and regulations to manage workers; unions negotiated extensive rules and regulations to protect street officers from excessive arbitrariness by supervisors and managers not only in applying the rules that defined the work of police but also those that impinged on the personal lives of officers. Although the following describes the private sector, it reads much like a description of the police world.

(T)hey (industrial unions) bargained for elaborate seniority procedures to ensure fairness in the distribution of jobs within the system. However, these procedures not only bred an intense loyalty to and a vested interest in scientific management, they also formed the basis for the widespread acceptance of the position that uniformity was a necessary condition for

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<sup>18</sup>. John Hoerr, "What Should Unions Do?" *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1991, pp. 30-45. See also, Tom Rankin, *New Forms of Work Organization: the Challenge for North American Unions*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990.

developing worker solidarity. Workers accepted the dull, deadening jobs in their earlier years with the understanding that later on in their work life they would be entitled to the "good" jobs. "Good" meant not necessarily more challenge or autonomy, but work usually free of heavy labor, on days, or in a warm, dry setting. As a consequence individual worker interests and the interests of scientific management were merged.<sup>19</sup>

The intent of unions was not to preclude change in the workplace. As Weiler points out: "the natural assumption on both sides was that management would continue to run the enterprise and would have the prerogative of initiating changes in the firm's operation and work organization."<sup>20</sup> Thus, if management wanted to change its product line, that was its prerogative. Likewise, management was free to change production processes (tactics) as well. However, as Weiler continues: "The role of the union was to react to these decisions, to challenge them in grievance arbitration, and eventually to regulate by contract the exercise of management authority where it significantly affected employees."<sup>21</sup> Thus this model clearly defines roles: unions are interested in members' salaries and working conditions; issues like the quality of goods and services, or their prices, are ceded to management. During the period of the pre-international economy, this system worked rather well for management and workers. Unskilled workers could find well-paying jobs, especially when financial times were good. The income they received allowed for mass consumption of consumer goods, fueling the economy. Quality might suffer; nonetheless a broad marketplace existed. When corporations were confronted with global competition and new demands for quality products and service, firms found themselves shackled by unwieldy rules, and unwieldy processes to modify those rules.

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<sup>19</sup>. Rankin, p. 27.

<sup>20</sup>. Paul C. Weiler, *Governing the Workplace: the Future of Labor and Employment Law*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p. 197.

The consequences of these circumstances were momentous for policing. The assumption that the only shared interests among police officers, police managers, and city officials were wages, benefits, and working conditions precluded police professionalism. Concerns for the substantive issues of policing, quality policing, and the relationship between police and the community were completely abrogated by line police officers. Management was free to concern itself with such issues but if, when attending to them, rules, regulations, or working conditions were affected, they had to be bargained. If not, officers would simply grieve.

When coupled with the protections of civil service, the unwieldy processes of bargaining and grieving created almost insurmountable obstacles to organizational innovation and change in the view of many chiefs. Many second generation police and academic reformers (those leading the shift to community policing) believed that change in policing would be a very slow and incremental process taking as long as five to ten years, if not decades.

The full impact of police unionism on the shift toward community policing is yet to be fully comprehended. Chiefs have many anecdotes about the resistance of police unions to change but unions, properly concerned about the historical excesses of Taylorism, have many anecdotes about the failure of management to ensure that line personnel are full partners in and beneficiaries of such change. Recently, behind the scenes meetings between union leaders and chiefs in states like Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island to attempt to find common interests among union and police leaders, offers some promise. Maybe *this* union leader or *this* police chief may not, because of local political and organizational realities, be able to position him/herself

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<sup>21</sup>. Weiler, p. 197.

ten to twenty years in the future, but union or police *leaders* may be able to and have a few common goals – say, civil service reform and the enhancement of the understood and acknowledged role of the patrol officer as an emerging semi-professional.

**SECTION V:  
CONVERGENCE IN THINKING AND,  
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN MADISON AND HOUSTON  
1980-1990**

During the late 1970s, two foot patrol experiments were initiated, one in Flint, Michigan and the other in Newark, New Jersey. Robert Trojanowicz, who at that time directed the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, conducted the Flint evaluation. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, based in Flint but with a national agenda, funded the effort and was to continue to fund significant police projects until well into the 1980s, creating both the Michigan State Center for Community Policing and providing substantial funds for the Harvard Executive Sessions on Community Policing. The Police Foundation funded the second foot patrol experiment in Newark – its last major project with its own funds. The Flint and Newark projects were very different kinds of experiments.

The Flint effort was a collaboration among staff at Michigan State, the Mott Foundation, and the Flint Police Department. All were advocates of foot patrol and eager to make it work. The Flint experiment was based on the idea that the focus of foot patrol should be crime prevention and that police and citizens had to cooperate to achieve this goal. The foot patrol officer was to be a “catalyst” for community efforts and a “linkage” between neighborhood groups and other governmental services.<sup>1</sup> Even before the inception of the experiment in 1979, citizens were involved in designing the experiment and in shaping the activities of foot patrol officers. Throughout the experiment, Michigan State University provided feedback to the Flint Police Department

to attempt to ensure that foot patrol was conducted both in accord with the original vision of foot patrol and in light of what was learned during the experiment itself. The Newark effort on the other hand was a more typical attempt at a formal experiment. Foot patrol already existed there and in other New Jersey cities, funded under the New Jersey Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Act. The program that this Act funded was quite simple. It included both foot patrol (“safe” in the Act’s Title) and neighborhood cleanups (“clean”). While most cities appreciated the “clean” money, many resented the limitations of the Act that mandated that “safe” money be used for foot patrol. They believed that foot patrol was a waste of time, and protested to state politicians who, in turn, asked Patrick V. Murphy, the Police Foundation’s President, to help them “kill” foot patrol so that cities could use officers in cars. Murphy provided two consultants who came to no particular conclusions. He then asked Kelling, who Murphy knew was interested in foot patrol, to see if he could find anything of interest there.<sup>2</sup>

Making a long story short, Kelling believed that something was happening in neighborhoods as a result of foot patrol, suggested to Murphy that the Police Foundation conduct an experiment in foot patrol in Newark. Kelling then negotiated the conduct of that experiment with state officials and Newark’s then-Director of Police, Hubert Williams (later the President of the Police Foundation). In contrast to Flint, Newark’s experiment was to be quite formal with Police Foundation staff attempting to be as unintrusive as possible in the actual conduct of foot patrol. Consequently, foot patrol in

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Trojanowicz, *An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan*, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 1982, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Tony Pate and George Kelling, of the Police Foundation, had been impressed by the continuing demand from citizens for foot patrol and had been looking for a site to study it. Originally, Boston seemed to be a likely location; however, while Boston had foot patrol officers, they were not assigned permanently to beats.

Newark continued as it always had, however, locations were adjusted to add foot patrol in some beats and withdraw it in others.

Despite the differences in these two sites, the findings, published within months of each other (Newark in 1981 and Flint in 1982), were remarkably similar: foot patrol affected citizen fear of crime positively and improved citizen perceptions of police and police perceptions of citizens. Crime declined slightly in Flint when foot patrol was present, but not in Newark.

At the time the foot patrol projects were underway, two other developments that were to become important were initiated. First, University of Wisconsin Professor Herman Goldstein began two exercises in Madison that he was to label as "problem solving" efforts. The first studied a rash of sexual assaults and the second, drunk driving. Their results aside, Goldstein was conceptualizing and experimenting with a problem-solving process that was to become an integral part of late 20<sup>th</sup> Century policing. Goldstein, in effect, was extending his view about the complexity of policing into a convincing and practical guide for police. His first point was that police are organized to deal with incidents: respond to them, manage them as quickly as possible, and move on. In fact, Goldstein argued in his now famous 1979 article "Improving Policing: a Problem-oriented Approach" in *Crime and Delinquency*, a good share of police work deals with *problems* that have a *history* and likely will have a *future* unless they are dealt with.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the unit of work for police properly should be the *problem*, not the *incident*.

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<sup>3</sup> Herman Goldstein, "Improving Policing: a Problem-oriented Approach," *Crime and Delinquency*, April, 1979, pp. 236-258.

Moreover, Goldstein put forward a methodology for identifying and solving problems that he later elaborated on in his 1993 book *Problem-Oriented Policing*.<sup>4</sup>

In 1975, Patrick V. Murphy single-handedly created a new institution– the Police Executive Research Forum – and named Gary Hayes to be its director. Hayes, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law School and a protégé of Herman Goldstein, was at the time a civilian aide to Robert DiGrazia, Commissioner of the Boston Police Department. PERF, as its name implies, is a research organization made up of college educated police executives and staffed by a group of professional researchers and consultants. Hayes, and his successor after his untimely death in 1985, Daryl Stephens, adopted problem solving as the core of PERF’s agenda for improving policing. Starting in Baltimore County in 1983, PERF initiated experimentation in problem solving and has advocated for it for almost two decades. Notwithstanding the inherent strength of the idea itself, and the influence that Goldstein has had on policing in his own right, the adoption of problem solving by PERF gave an additional push to a movement that was to spread throughout policing.

Trojanowicz meanwhile, again with funding from the Mott Foundation, initiated the National Center for Foot Patrol in 1982 and used it as a platform to advocate for the implementation of foot patrol. Quickly, however, Trojanowicz realized that he was advocating something more than just having officers conduct foot patrol and he changed the name of the center to the National Center for Community Policing. During the 1980s, this center conducted extensive training throughout the country and published a lengthy series of monographs describing what it called “community policing” and how it could be implemented.

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<sup>4</sup> Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1993.

If the principal outcome of the Flint study in foot patrol was the Center (and the ideas that it promulgated over time), the primary outcome of the Newark study was a single idea. Kelling, having left the Police Foundation in 1980 to finish the foot patrol study at Harvard, argued in the study's final chapter that the fear reduction that was associated with foot patrol was the result of police tending to minor disturbances – illegal disorderly conditions and behavior – while on foot patrol. James Q. Wilson, then a professor at Harvard, picked up on this idea, and offered to co-author an article with Kelling. This article, now widely known as “Broken Windows,” was published in the *Atlantic* in 1982.<sup>5</sup> It extended the original argument, suggesting that not only is fear linked to disorderly behavior and conditions, but to serious crime and urban decay as well. If true, this hypothesis turned conventional thinking on its head: rather than continuing to use their sparse resources to react to serious crime, Broken Windows suggested that police might be able to prevent serious crime by maintaining order.

So, by the middle of the 1980s, a set of ideas and institutions began to congeal. The ideas included the need to improve relations with minorities (indeed, all communities), problem solving, and Broken Windows. The institutions included the Police Foundation, the Michigan State Center for Community Policing, and PERF. With substantial seed money from the Mott Foundation and major funding from the National Institute of Justice, the Program in Criminal Justice in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University convened the Executive Sessions on Community Policing in 1985. Basically, the session convened about 30 persons comprising a few

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<sup>5</sup> James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” *The Atlantic*, March 1982, pp. 29-38.

academics, leading police chiefs, governmental leaders, and other community interests over a five year period.

In retrospect, it would be easy to overemphasize the significance of the Executive Sessions. Many top academics and police chiefs were not included in the discussions. Departments and cities were experimenting with ways to improve policing independent of the Executive Sessions. Yet, with the luxury of meeting over a five year period under relatively sequestered circumstances, the police, political, policy, community, and academic participants in the Sessions had considerable opportunity to reflect on where policing had been, where it seemed to be going, and what was needed to get policing wherever it was going with less difficulty. The influence of the sessions was amplified in at least two ways. First, the National Institute of Justice and Harvard published the xx issues of *Perspectives on Policing*. Generally well written and, given the distribution capability of NIJ, widely distributed, the *Perspective* series grappled with most of the critical issues facing urban leaders and police: values, accountability, mid-management, race, community, police capability, leadership, and a wide variety of management and administrative issues. These issues could be dealt with systematically – that is, the series could be *planned* in response to emerging issues. Moreover, the issues could be dealt with comprehensively – the participants in the sessions became, in effect, an editorial board. Finally, *Perspectives* linked practitioners with academics, adding to their credibility in the field.

Second, as the Sessions extended over time they not only involved persons like Patrick V. Murphy, who had been involved in the first stirrings of change during the 1960s and 1970s, and Lee Brown, who was experimenting with community policing

during the 1980s, but the Sessions included younger police, like William Bratton and Dennis Nowicki, who were to lead New York City and Charlotte (NC) respectively, during the 1990s. Likewise, the sessions included representatives of the most influential police institutions of the era: the Police Foundation, the National Center for Community Policing (Michigan State University), the Police Executive Research Forum, and of course, the National Institute of Justice.

In the field, two chiefs and their departments began to move into leadership roles in policing during the 1980s: Chief Lee Brown in Houston (TX) and Chief David Couper in Madison (WI). Both were outside chiefs (the first for either department) and both were college educated (Brown having a Ph.D.). Both were eager to improve the profession and were innovative in their thinking and also willing to scan broadly for new ideas. Otherwise, they were different types of chiefs. Couper came to Madison out of relative obscurity in Bloomington (MN). He was young, brash, irreverent about policing traditions (at least those in vogue at the time), outspoken, and in a hurry to improve policing. Brown is an African American (the first to hold any high rank in the Houston department) who is thoughtful, soft spoken, quietly powerful and articulate. Originally from the west coast, he arrived in Houston via chief of police positions in Oregon and Atlanta (GA). Even then, he was gaining a reputation as a spokesperson for a new kind of policing – or, as he would put it, a new “philosophy” of policing. Both chiefs inherited deeply troubled police departments. David Couper remained as chief in Madison for 21 years. He retired from Madison and is now an Episcopalian priest serving a small parish not far from Madison. Lee Brown left Houston after – years to become commissioner in New York City but later returned to Houston to become Mayor there in 199\_.

When David Couper became Chief in Madison in 1972, the Madison Police Department had been in the streets, battling anti-war demonstrators for almost six years. Time after time, demonstrators marched, store windows along the street between the University and the State Capitol were repeatedly broken and boarded up, and surrounding neighborhoods were repeatedly drenched in tear gas. Although the city police attempted to distinguish themselves from the more heavy-handed sheriff's department, the community became polarized around the demonstrations and police response. The department developed secret "affinity files" on people who were considered to be activists and the traditional "Us vs. Them" mentality hardened.

The Houston Department was also garnering a great deal of public criticism in the 1970s. There the issues centered on brutal officers who were out of control, especially in their relationships with the minority communities. During early 1977, the HPD was involved in 13 shootings in a three-month period of time. An Hispanic male, arrested for creating a disturbance in a bar, was beaten by officers and thrown into a bayou where he was left to drown. Tension ran high between police and minority communities. At the same time, the crime rate was turning dramatically upward.

When Couper took the job in Madison, he had a strong sense that policing needed to change. He signaled this by walking at the head of one of the first street demonstrations to occur after he took office. He began to plan and strategize with demonstrators to reduce disorder and damage, rather than just having his officers do battle with them. He destroyed the affinity files. Beyond this, although he had a general idea of the direction for long-term change, he had no clear blueprint or plan. For at least the first 12 years of his tenure in Madison, the department experimented with one

programmatically change after another, while Couper began to shift the department culture by hiring and promoting people who were more representative of the community and open to new ideas. By 1984, he was committed to developing a plan for policing Madison in the next century and he established a task force of officers to determine the direction of the department.

When Lee Brown became chief in Houston in 1982, he too wanted to plan for policing in the next century. Decentralized command stations were already planned for the City and Brown wanted the department to think about the kind of policing that should be delivered from these sites that would offer the advantage of closer proximity to the community. Through the vehicle of a series of "executive sessions," the department adopted the philosophy of "neighborhood oriented policing" that focused on the individual needs and characteristics of neighborhoods and incorporated the problem solving approach. A task force was then established to determine how this philosophy would be operationalized in the Westside Station, the first of the new "full service" district stations to be opened in Houston.

### **Experimentation**

Both departments engaged in substantial experimentation (either formal or informal) and internal learning before undertaking major change. David Couper had been trying one new program after another for more than ten years before beginning to move the entire organization in the direction of community policing and, more generally, toward becoming a democratic, "learning" organization. As soon as Lee Brown became chief in Houston, the Department began to be involved in a series of formal evaluations of programs that included the Directed Area Response Team, Project Oasis, and the Fear Reduction Studies, all of which would produce important elements of what the

Department was to adopt as its new approach to policing. In both departments, there was a sense that the changes were produced internally, generated from the agencies' own efforts to explore new ideas.

### **New Philosophies**

Both departments had versions of community policing as their long-term objectives. From the beginning, Houston labeled the new approach "Neighborhood Oriented Policing." Beats were realigned to correspond to areas that were defined by neighborhoods, and patrol officers were to know and feel responsibility for "their" neighborhoods. Madison began with a small, specialized group of Neighborhood Officers who were permanently assigned to seven of the City's more troubled neighborhoods. It was expected that all officers eventually would be engaged in community policing and problem solving, but this was not the Department's first priority.

The motto adopted in Madison in 1986 was "Closer to the people; Quality from the inside, out." Chief Couper and the planning task force believed that external change could occur only after internal change had caused officers to believe they were valued as employee "customers" and that their opinions were important in the decision-making process. The entire Department embarked on a concentrated effort to implement Total Quality Management as a prelude to external change but it was the Experimental Police District that was expected to provide the leadership in how best to bring about the management change.

### **Mission and Value Statements**

Both departments took, as a first step toward change, the development and widespread distribution of mission and value statements that articulated the new approaches.

## Planning

Both departments engaged in structured planning after their respective periods of experimentation. The processes in both cities were similar. Because Chief Brown was new to Houston, he needed a lot of information in a short period of time and he undertook both internal and external assessments to determine the needs for change and the resources available. The internal assessment was the product of many different managers and, therefore, provided some ownership of the changes before they were undertaken.

The assessments were followed by the Department's own series of Executive Sessions in which representatives from all levels and areas of the department, as well as community members, met repeatedly to study and discuss the question of the department's future direction. From these sessions the philosophy of Neighborhood Oriented Policing was developed, as were proposals for restructuring investigations. Houston's Executive Sessions were followed by the establishment of a Westside Command Station task force to work out the details of implementation and develop a strategic plan.

In Madison, the department's Committee on the Future of the Department was established in 1984 and, in 1985, issued a report which stated that any future orientation of the department should be based on:

- (1) getting closer to the people who are served,
- (2) making better use of available technology, and
- (3) developing and improving health and wellness in the workplace.

Madison's mayor at the time was strongly committed to Quality/Productivity, the management philosophy of Edwards Deming. The chief and other department managers participated in the mayor's Q/P workshops in which they were challenged to undertake a Q/P project for their department. The chief wanted to establish one district that would

serve as the department's site for experimentation and he selected the district that would be housed in the first decentralized facility. A task force was formed to design the objectives for the Experimental Police District (EPD) and to plan its implementation, including the acquisition of suitable space.

The charge of the EPD was to promote innovation and experimentation in three areas:

- (1) employee participation in decision-making about the conditions of work and the delivery of police service;
- (2) management and supervisory styles supportive of employee participation and of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing; and
- (3) the implementation of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing.

### **Physical Decentralization**

In Madison and Houston, the first decentralized facilities opened in 1987 and 1988. Each decentralized station housed approximately 1/6 to 1/5 of the operational personnel in each department and served roughly 1/6 of each city's population. Each housed both patrol and investigative personnel. The differences between the two facilities were largely those of scale and architecture. The number of personnel in Houston's Westside Station was roughly equivalent to the total number of personnel in the entire Madison Department (approximately 300); there were only 42 people in Madison's EPD.

### **Physical Space**

The Madison structure was no larger than a small, one or two bedroom house. It consisted of one story and a basement that housed a small gym and equipment storage. The operational space included one briefing room that also housed the office secretary, the copy and fax machines, coffee pot and refrigerator. A small office shared by the

station captain and lieutenant opened off one side of the briefing room; two small offices for sergeants were on the other side, and a door led from the briefing room into an adjoining room that housed six detectives. Everyone used the briefing room. Detectives passed through it to get from the parking lot to their office. Supervisors and managers passed through to get to their offices and back and forth to one another's offices. Officers and detectives briefed there together, took breaks there, ate meals at the briefing table. Everyone used the office equipment in that room. The point is that no one who worked in the EPD went very long without having face-to-face contact with everyone else who worked there. This was even true across shifts. One door led to the parking lot; as one shift left and another was coming on, officers would meet informally and brief each other at shift change. And citizens were just as visible. Any community member who visited the EPD was likely to be seen by any personnel who were in the briefing room at the time.

By sharp contrast, Houston's Westside Station was as large as any police building in a medium-sized city. It occupied three floors within which there were specialized and access-restricted areas. Investigators had one entire floor to themselves that could be entered by only those personnel who had the code for the door. Officers and investigators did not encounter each other casually. Managers did not pass through the workspaces for officers and detectives en route to their offices. They had their own office machines, coffee machines, and bathrooms. No police personnel, except those assigned to the front desk, saw citizens except by appointment.

While, in theory, both the Madison and Houston stations were designed to increase contact between officers and detectives and between police personnel and

citizens, it was the small, cramped space of the Madison station that best served these purposes.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the district stations, each department developed several “storefront” stations located in neighborhood settings. By 2000, Houston had more than 20 and Madison had 13. In Houston, the storefronts might be staffed by a combination of officers and civilian employees and be set up to handle a number of different services for citizens. In Madison, the offices were in smaller facilities intended to give a neighborhood officer a desk and a phone and a small meeting space in the neighborhood. In both cities, the nature of the facilities varies, depending on the space available.

### **Investigations**

In both departments, the patrol and investigations functions were physically decentralized. Investigators were assigned in numbers proportionate to the number of crimes in the district. In Madison, this meant sending six detectives to the EPD. In Houston it meant assigning \_\_\_\_\_ detectives to Westside. In both departments, the decentralized investigators began by working their traditional crime specialties within their districts. In both departments, entirely independent of each other, the decentralized detectives chose to experiment with an area specialist/crime generalist approach in which decentralized investigators would work any case (other than those reserved for centralized specialist units) that occurred in their areas. In both cities, the detectives who

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<sup>6</sup> Make no mistake: Madison EPD personnel would have been very envious of the luxury of space at Houston’s Westside. One of the lessons from the EPD was that the next decentralized stations in Madison should be larger and provide for more specialized spaces. This seems to have been accomplished without sacrificing high levels of contact.

We are seeing this accomplished, perhaps even more effectively, as the Arlington, Texas P.D. designs its next decentralized facility. Rather than having separate work spaces for officers and investigators, work spaces are designated for area teams; the officers and investigators responsible for a geographic area of the city will have desks that are clustered together, next to the office of the area sergeant.

experimented with working in this way preferred the approach to the traditional specialist model.

As discussed above, because of the size and arrangement of space, detectives in Madison developed much closer working relationships with patrol officers than did detectives in Houston.

Over time, with the change of chiefs in Houston, detectives were recentralized. In Madison, all investigations were physically decentralized by 1999. There are no longer any special investigative units other than the regional drug task force.

### **Supervision and Management**

In both departments there was the realization that supervision and management would need to change in support of the new approaches, most notably that supervisors would need to become coaches and coordinators rather than order-givers. In Madison, training in the TQM philosophy gave some supervisors and managers the underpinnings for coaching and taught them the value of listening to employees. Both departments placed more initial emphasis on redirecting officers than on redirecting the behaviors of supervisors and managers. Ultimately (about 1990), all sergeants and lieutenants in Madison would receive training in how to be supervisors for problem solving. Late in the 1980s Houston recognized the need for new role definitions to be formally communicated and began a series of workshops at which each level of command in the Operations Division would devise instruction for the next lower level. The assistant chief instructed deputy chiefs; deputy chiefs instructed captains, etc. Unfortunately, Lee Brown left the Houston Department before the training was implemented for sergeants.

The small size and experimental nature of the Madison EPD made it easier for the managers (1 lieutenant and 1 captain) to adjust their roles to fit their mission. The physical arrangement of space made it easy (unavoidable) to have frequent, face-to-face contact with all employees. The intimate nature of the work group meant that managers were aware of all planned problem solving and community activities, thus making it possible for them to flex schedules (including their own) to support these activities. Their familiarity with all the officers helped them recognize the need for different management approaches for different employees. With respect to community policing and problem solving, they identified basically three types of officers: (1) self-starters who were eager to try the new ideas and were simply waiting for managers to give them permission to tackle problems; (2) believers who accepted the new ideas but did not know how to use them to shape their own work; and (3) highly reliable order-takers who, independent of whether they embraced the new philosophies, would do what they were asked to do. The managers saw the value of pairing officers in the second group with those in the first and of being more directive of those in the third group.

The much greater size and larger number of managers and supervisors in Houston's Westside Station probably made it more difficult for managers to see quickly what needed to be done to manage the intended changes. Being committed to new philosophies of policing and management is one thing; being able to see where and how to apply the philosophies is another. The less direct contact managers have with officers, the harder it is to know their management needs. In Houston, for example, Westside managers became frustrated with the apparent low level of problem solving efforts and felt sure the problem was sergeants who were failing to schedule adequate time for the

officers to engage in these non-call driven activities. Finally, a meeting was scheduled between the managers and a group of sergeants to explore the issue. Three young, very progressive managers—the assistant chief of the operations division, the deputy chief in charge of Westside, and Westside’s operations captain—met with the sergeants. They heard the common complaint that time simply was not available, that officers were run from call to call, in and out of their areas, by dispatchers who were eager to clear calls from their screens, regardless of the seriousness of the calls. The managers stared at the sergeants with incredulity and said, “You mean you don’t know you can intervene and tell the dispatcher to hold the low priority calls?” The sergeants stared back with equal incredulity and said, “You mean we CAN?” The young managers, although all recently promoted, had not been sergeants since the department installed computer-aided dispatch. They did not understand the extent to which sergeants had lost the ability to direct the activities of their officers. The meeting ended, however, with the sergeants agreeing to try.

The Westside patrol captain was driving across the city one day, listening to the radio, when he heard one of his sergeants make the effort, only to be savaged by the dispatcher. The captain obtained a copy of the dispatch tape, took it to the assistant chief in charge of operations, who in turn approached the chief. The result was a meeting of the department’s top managers who were charged by the chief with studying the problem and proposing solutions. All were given specific dates on which to deliver reports on specific aspects of the problem. Westside sergeants were jubilant. Unfortunately, Chief Brown left the HPD before the reports were submitted. Although the problem was not solved, the larger outcome of the experience is the realization that even the best managers

can be out of touch with the work conditions of their employees; you cannot solve a problem if you do not know it exists. The large size of the Houston station made it much more difficult for managers to have this immediate and direct contact with problems than was the case in Madison.

In addition to the advantage of small size, the Madison managers also adopted the practice of occasionally working in the field alongside or, in place of, officers. When the need to flex schedules to facilitate problem solving or to take advantage of a training opportunity arose, the managers and supervisors of Madison's EPD were willing to flex their own schedules to occasionally cover for patrol officers. This not only allowed patrol officers to do other things, but it provided managers with direct knowledge of conditions that would affect the ability of their officers to implement desired changes. This kind of fieldwork by managers is probably much easier to arrange in a small group work setting than in a large one. In addition, Chief Couper began the practice of spending a month each year working in the field—usually at night—returning to the office only when absolutely necessary. He asked his upper level managers to do the same thing.

### **Employee Participation in Decision Making**

Both departments developed mechanisms for employee input into decision-making. In Madison, Chief Couper used task forces for planning department changes, a major one of which was Total Quality Management that encouraged employee participation in organizational decision-making. All managers were strongly encouraged to seek employee input in decision processes. Employee surveys conducted several times over a ten-year period suggested this democratization of the organization had occurred to a considerable degree, although the greatest success was initially achieved in the small setting of the EPD. When the position of the Neighborhood Officer needed to be filled in

the EPD, managers asked officers to write the job description for the position and to help in the selection among applicants. This move went a long way toward helping integrate the Neighborhood Officers into patrol operations and toward convincing officers that they had real input into decision-making.

Chief Couper also established an Officers' Advisory Council that met with him monthly. The council could raise issues it felt needed to be addressed and, with time, was given the authority to make certain kinds of decisions. They, for example, researched and then selected the automobiles and weapons to be used in patrol. In addition, Chief Couper included the union president as a member of the management team.

In Houston, Chief Brown made use of the Executive Sessions and employee task forces. Under Chief Watson, the Houston department developed an Employee Representative Board, consisting of elected employee representatives, who met every six weeks with the chief and the management team. This was primarily a communications mechanism by which the chief would provide members with information about any departmental developments. Following the chief's presentation, participants could ask questions and make suggestions.

### **Unions**

Both departments had significant employee organizations that figured in the change processes. They had this in common but this was about the only common characteristic, beginning with the fact that Madison is largely a pro-union city and Houston is largely an anti-union city.

In Madison, there was one police employee organization: the Madison Professional Police Officers Association (MPPOA). The president of the MPPOA shared a tenure that almost matched that of Chief Couper, the first half of which was characterized by on-going battles between management and the union while the second half was characterized by peaceful collaboration. The change was brought about by Chief Couper's move to Total Quality Management which called for employee involvement in decision-making. And for Madison, the first steps toward Quality Policing (community policing) were to focus on improving working conditions for employees. It made no sense to talk about involving employees and improving their working conditions if their union was not involved in the change effort. Union-management cooperation was simply the logical next step and Chief Couper and Steve Gilfoy, MPPOA president, began to talk about how to accomplish this. Couper's first formal move toward organizational democracy was the creation of the Officer's Advisory Council which included elected representatives of the department who met with him on a monthly basis to discuss organizational issues and developments. Skeptical at first, the union kept a close eye on the work of the Council. Before long, a member of the union's board of directors stood for election to the Council and became an active participant.

In 1986 an employee task force began planning the development of the Experimental Police District, Madison's prototype district for the implementation of Quality Management and community policing. In 1987 the chief appointed a six person steering committee to help the task force carry out its plans. The steering team included the chief, four captains and the president of the union. Since that time the union president

has been a formally recognized member of the department's management team and routinely attends all management team meetings.

A classic way of subverting a union is to coopt its leader through rewards, and there are many examples of police union leaders who have found themselves on a fast track to promotion. But not in Madison. Although there were concerns expressed by employees about this possibility when the union president began to work with management, no one of the three presidents of the union between 1980 and 2000 has ever taken an opportunity to move up the ranks. All have been satisfied to remain in their rank and to continue to function as union president. By 1990 there were no audible expressions of concern about cooptation. Officers were getting more of what they wanted with much less effort.

What you did hear after the union and management began to cooperate was how the number of employee grievances dropped dramatically—from a high number annually to almost none. Both the chief and union president were proud of this accomplishment and both celebrated the fact that more resources were then available for substantive improvements in the department.

The situation in Houston was more difficult. Chief Brown inherited four employee organizations: the Organization of Spanish Speaking Officers (OSSO), the African American Police Officers League (AAPOL) and two organizations that represented white officers—the Houston Police Patrol Union (HPPU) and the Houston Police Officer Association (HPOA). Of the latter two, the HPPU was the more vocal while the HPOA was the more powerful. In Madison, the one union was automatically represented (if informally) whenever the chief included officers in any kind of decision-

making process. To represent the employee organizations in Houston, the chief would have had to consciously pick of member of each group, a process that probably would have had to be formalized, in which case there might have developed arguments over racial representation and proportional representation. It was a much more difficult situation than that in Madison.

Additionally, with the two major groups vying for power, the new chief and his programs constituted a natural arena in which the unions could fight to show which was more effectively representing and defending its members. Even so, Chief Brown's problems with the unions did not really stem from employee objections to the Department's long term plans. The battles were really over compensation with the chief's programs becoming targets only when the groups felt he did not defend them strongly enough on pay and benefit issues.

Chief Brown was in a tough position. He was hired by a mayor who had been the city comptroller. She was determined to keep as lean a budget as possible and she did not have generous tendencies toward police and fire employees. During Brown's tenure in Houston, she even reduced employee benefits in a cost-cutting move that seriously hurt employee morale. When the associations felt the Brown did not fight hard enough for them, they turned against him and tried to outdo each other in their criticism of him and his new ideas. In Houston, a great deal of energy was expended on dealing with grievances that was needed for the change process.

Ironically, after Brown left to become the Commissioner in New York, the mayor immediately assisted the new chief, Elizabeth Watson, by giving pay and benefit

increases to the officers, a development for which the new chief was given credit by the rank and file.

As a footnote, by 2000 the relationship between management and the Houston employee organizations has become substantially more positive, in part because the state legislature passed a “meet and confer” proposition which provides for regular consultation between city management and employee organizations. The current chief now meets regularly with the association presidents to discuss departmental issues in a non-adversarial setting.

### Support Systems

Both departments recognized the need to change support systems to fit the new operational orientation. Houston began with an orientation session for all officers before they embarked on NOP. The first lesson learned was that supervisors needed the orientation as much as officers and just as soon, if not sooner. The second lesson was that much more than orientation was required and, over a period of many months, a fully supportive training curriculum was developed for both cadet training and in-service training. It was an elective-based training menu including multiple curricula and courses to support diverse training needs. A third lesson involved the content of the training. When the new operational elements of the philosophy were presented in isolation (e.g., training on problem solving), officers had a tendency to feel that other police responses were being rejected in favor of a new one. This notion, however incorrect, tended to increase resistance to the new approaches. The department learned to present the police role in its entirety—including reactive, proactive and coactive functions—and to show officers how new approaches expanded their capacity to respond to a variety of

situations. The Neighborhood Oriented officer would need to decide what mix of reactive, proactive and coactive policing was appropriate for his or her neighborhood at any given time.

The department also created a Management Development Unit to address training needs of supervisory, management and executive personnel.

Madison held a week-long orientation and training program for all the personnel (managers, supervisors and officers) who would work in the EPD, and later developed an extensive training program in problem oriented policing for all department personnel, with a special course for supervisors. The EPD, with its small number of employees, provided a very conducive atmosphere for training. Several special training programs were devised that were attended by officers and community members. In addition, the ease of flexing schedule at the EPD made it possible for managers to send for more officers from the EPD to special training programs than was the case for the rest of the department.

Both departments recognized the need to change the disciplinary system to support risk-taking by officers. In both cases, more discretion was given to district managers to handle cases without the involvement of Internal Affairs. District managers could negotiate understandings between citizens and officers in certain kinds of cases.

Houston created a Civilian Review Committee that allowed citizens to become involved in the review process of internal investigations about the use of force, including deadly force.

Madison had given up individual employee evaluations years before the opening of the EPD on the grounds that they did not measure what officers actually did. Rather than measure the wrong things, they would measure nothing. Chief Couper had

developed a survey of citizens (including arrestees) who had received police services. These were aggregated to give an overall sense of department performance, but EPD officers opted to receive those responses that resulted from their own work. As a result, they received direct citizen input (without being able to identify respondents) about their performance. Supervisors counseled officers about their performance and, in the EPD, a process was developed whereby officers gave sergeants and managers feedback about their performance.

Houston revised its formal evaluation process to reflect community policing and problem solving efforts and, with support from the National Institute of Justice, evaluated the new system. It was found to foster the kinds of attitudes and role perceptions that were considered appropriate to the new philosophy. Burglary victims who were served by officers being evaluated under the new system were more satisfied with service than were victims served by officers who were evaluated in the traditional way. The new Houston evaluation also included an evaluation of supervisors by officers. (This latter was not ultimately adopted.)

### **Houston and Madison as Examples of Organizational Strategy**

Houston and Madison are the first two departments in which the application of an organizational strategy became apparent to the profession. While they may not have evinced all criteria of the strategy as outlined previously, they accomplished many of them and, in the process, became both national and international models of leading-edge agencies.

**Identifiability:** In both departments the new direction had a label that identified the major objective of the change. In Houston, it was Neighborhood Oriented Policing,

with the emphasis on service designed to fit the needs of neighborhoods. In Madison, it was Quality Policing, the name underscoring the commitment to a management style that would use data to devise service that responded to needs identified by officers and citizens. The Total Quality Management approach also emphasizes continual improvement in response to changing needs.

**Internal Coherence:** In both departments, the strategies were internally coherent. At the organizational level, decisions were being made to align the organization to meet the objective of involving the community in identifying and solving problems at the local level. Complete alignment was not accomplished during the tenure of either of the change leaders, but the need for alignment was recognized and the processes, if incomplete, were underway.

**Exploits Current Opportunities:** Chief Brown seized current opportunities in Houston that included a community that was demanding change, a new city administration that supported change, an embarrassed department, existing budgetary provisions for physically decentralized facilities, and the existing implementation and evaluation of Directed Area Response Teams. In Madison, Chief Couper's initial changes took advantage of community concern about the police and, later changes took advantage of the mayor's initiative with Total Quality Management.

**Consistency with Competence and Resources:** Both departments had the competence, in terms of the abilities of personnel, to move in the directions they adopted, as evidenced by the fact that the directions were determined by work groups of personnel. Houston probably was richer in resources; the budget already provided for the

decentralized facilities. Madison squeezed and “made do” with the small EPD space until the city commission could be persuaded to fund larger decentralized facilities.

**Consistency with Personal Values of Key Managers:** It probably is fair to say the change was consistent with the values of a critical number of key managers in each department. There were high-level individuals in each agency who did not embrace the changes; it is not as easy to reassign personnel in government agencies as it is in private enterprise. However, each agency was able to progress despite the lack of support by some managers.

**Effectiveness:** There was no evaluation of NOP in Houston. An evaluation, funded by the National Institute of Justice, of Madison’s EPD found that it was effective in better meeting citizens’ expectations for service and was effective in meeting officers’ work related needs.

**Contributes to Society All it Can:** There is no measure of whether either strategy contributed to society “all that it could.” Each strategy was theoretically capable of contributing more to society than the traditional approaches in either city had, and the evaluation of the EPD in Madison indicated that the effort there was contributing more than Madison’s traditional approach. These strategies certainly had the potential to contribute greatly to the quality of life in the neighborhoods in which they were implemented.

**Stimulates Ongoing Productivity and Creativity:** Observers of these departments during the years of active change can attest to high levels of productivity and creativity in each organization. Insofar as this has changed in either organization, it is likely due to a change of administrations (Houston has had three chiefs since Lee Brown

left) rather than to the original organizational strategies adopted by the change chiefs.

Although these chiefs were not, at the time, measuring their efforts against the criteria of an organizational strategy, there is abundant evidence that this is what they accomplished as they incorporated community and employee input to reshape the missions and methods of their agencies.

In sum, by the end of the 1980s, the basic configuration of community policing is fairly clear. It is a strategy that at minimum seeks to structure a new relationship with neighborhoods and communities, it understands that neighborhood priorities vary, it looks for new organizational structures that accommodate diverse neighborhood priorities and administrative processes that fully exploit the capabilities of officers and supervisors, and it seeks new measures of performance for departments, units, and officers. The Houston and Madison experiences suggest that that implementation is feasible and identify some of the problems associated with change: 911; the role of special units, especially detectives; the roles and skills of supervisors and mid-managers; other such issues; and, the speed at which organizational change can take place.

**SECTION VI:  
THE LATE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s:  
READY, FIRE, AIM**

Prior to 1990, the New Haven Department of Police Service (NHPD) looked like most mid-20th century police departments. A "classical" organization designed consistent with extant police organizational and management principles, the NHPD was organized into four functional areas, each headed by a major: Administration, Community Affairs, Operations, and Support and Emergency Services. For the most part, majors directed commanders, commanders directed captains, captains lieutenants, and so on down the line to patrol officers -- a "rational" organization.

Commanders headed operations, Patrol Services and Investigative Services. Investigative Services included Criminal Investigation, Street Crime, Narcotics, Special Investigation, Identification, Arson/Fraud, School Security, Juvenile Services, and Juvenile Screener. These special units represented the "cream" of the department.

The academy was staffed by 7 sworn officers and reflected the paramilitary philosophy and structure of the organization, concentrating on penal code, firearms, law, rigorous physical training, and obedience in both pre-and in-service training. Academy staff, police officers under the guidance of a state-mandated curriculum, did all training in-house.

The operating philosophy of the NHPD was reflected in the NHPD's physical facilities. Limited access areas characterized the one central facility. Bulletproof glass separated police from citizens. The building was cold; authoritative; with no ground floor windows and only narrow horizontal rows of windows at upper levels. From street level, citizens could not see in and officers could not see out. The third floor executive

offices housed the chief and most of his key staff: 4 majors, 6 commanders, 1 chief investigator, and 1 superintendent. The vision of the department was memorialized on the third-floor by a large wall mural that depicted a variety of policing activities but concentrated on special units.

On 1 March 1990, newly elected Mayor John Daniels named Nicolas Pastore chief of police. Pastore had been a member of the NHPD from 1962 to 1980, becoming Chief of Detectives in 1971 and, later, Director of Operations under Chief Edward Morrone. In 1980, after the election of a new city administration, Pastore was busted to the rank of lieutenant. Viewing this as political action, he left the department and was self-employed until his appointment as chief.

As one of his first acts, Chief Pastore had the third-floor mural painted over. The bulletproof glass at the entranceway was removed, as was the trophy-case that contained medals, awards, and other time-honored symbols of police prowess. More substantively, the 6 sworn officers in the planning and crime prevention units were transferred to patrol. The 11 civilians were reduced to 4 with the unit headed by a civilian. The 8 officers in the academy were reduced to 1, and a female, civilian, community gay activist/artist, Kay Codish, was hired to develop the department's educational functions. The 46 officers in communications and records division were reduced to 16; civilians were increased from 23 to 69. A recent Yale College graduate, Andrew Michaelson, was hired in a special planning position and reported directly to Chief Pastore. Most dramatically, the positions of 4 majors, 6 commanders, 1 chief investigator, and 1 superintendent were eliminated. Offered early retirements, all but one of the incumbents in those positions left the department. The sole holdout reverted to his civil service rank of captain and was

assigned to head the local dog pound. The administrative floor of the department, once densely populated was largely vacated. Personnel savings were used to increase the patrol staff.

Nine substations were opened in quick succession, at first in storefronts or donated trailers, but as rapidly as possible. The city replaced them with newly constructed community offices with half of their space allocated for public use and the other half for police use. Two additional substations have opened since.

The organization was structured into 6 operating units: Administration, headed by a lieutenant; Information Services, by a lieutenant; Investigative Services, first headed by a captain but later by a sergeant; Supportive Services, by a lieutenant, and Family Services Unit headed by a captain. Operationally, however, the key to the department's service delivery became the 11 community substations. Of the original nine stations, eight were headed by sergeants and 1 by a lieutenant. Now sergeants head all 11 substations. A position for an assistant chief of police was created. It was filled by Dean Esserman who moved to New Haven from his position as the legal counsel for the New York City Transit Police. He was a civilian native New Yorker who graduated from Dartmouth College and New York University Law School. After his appointment, to meet a state requirement, he attended the police academy. (Esserman is now Chief of Police in Stamford, Connecticut.)

For many in the department, Chief Pastore's draconian moves were seen as efforts to settle old political scores, e.g., getting "busted" to lieutenant in 1980. Pastore, however, saw the city and the New Haven Department of Police Service as being in serious crisis when he was appointed in 1990. Drug dealing was rampant; the murder

rate was skyrocketing; gangs were intimidating neighborhoods and residents; the murder of a Yale student during a mugging exacerbated a deteriorating town-gown relationship; abandoned buildings became crack houses overnight. New Haven, one of the country's poorest cities -- and Pastore's home -- was in a steep spiral of urban decline.

From Pastore's point of view, New Haven's police were part of the problem -- militaristic, remote, "warriors," who were alienating not only the problem citizens but law abiding citizens as well, especially minorities who accounted for a large portion of the population. The police department was not only remote from neighborhoods, it was isolated from other police departments (e.g., the Yale Police Department) and governmental and social agencies. Pastore was outspoken: racism and militarism in policing were worsening New Haven's crisis. Drastic action was called for. Pastore was not only prepared to take it, he was prepared to announce his views about policing loud and clear, including his views of his own department.

The results were dramatic. Patrol officers reported that prior to developing a substation in one public housing development they could not leave their patrol cars untended when responding to a call lest they be vandalized. By 1993, they could regularly park their cars and patrol the area by foot with little worry. Currently, all officers are on the street patrolling outside their cars, on foot, on mountain bikes or on horses. Close collaboration between the Yale Police Department and the NHPD became routine. Moreover, close collaborations developed between New Haven's Service sector, including the Yale Child Study Center, and the NHPD. Murders declined from 34 in 1991 to 20 in 1993, a remarkable 41% that contrasted at that time with rises in murder in

virtually every other Connecticut city and predated the dramatic and well-known changes in New York City and elsewhere.

The changes had their down side. Substation managers, especially sergeants, as well as others in the department, reported evidence of considerable role ambiguity and confusion. Were they social workers or law enforcers? Key staff persons gave evidence of “burnout.” A significant number of officers were hostile both to the changes and to Pastore. Many left the force. Citizens wanted more: “You’ve got police out of cars, now get them busy;” or, “The substations don’t work the way they should because they’re not staffed.” After seeing many programs come and go that had little effect on their quality of life, the citizens were cynical and skeptical of this new policing method.

As viewed retrospectively by an outsider, Pastore moved simultaneously on two fronts. First, he moved, largely personally, to stabilize the relationship between the minority community and the police. Second, and again largely personally, he moved to *destabilize* the NHPD internally and thereby force the department to change radically.

Pastore’s rejection of the icons of policing went beyond murals, bulletproof glass, trophies, and rigid rank structure. It included his personal professional style: he was never armed or in uniform; he went into the community without jacket or tie to make that apparent, and as chief “worked” the community in ways rarely seen in policing. From his first day, Pastore worked the community believing, again, that the circumstances in New Haven were so bad, and that the police department strategy was so alien to the community that both his neighborhood interventions and radical organizational changes were required to pull the community and police back from the verge of tragic confrontations.

Pastore routinely “hit the streets,” unarmed, tie loosened, without jacket, and approached every citizen he could. For anyone observing him on the streets, and Kelling did on several occasions, one was struck by how many people he knew and his willingness to approach even youth who would give him cold stares. To those he didn’t know his line was almost always the same: “Hi, I’m Nick Pastore, chief of police. How ya doing?” More often than not he would get a response, albeit often monosyllabic and not very friendly. To those he did know, Pastore would give some message: “I know you’re still dealing. Don’t come crying when we put you away,” or, “You know you’re not supposed to be drinking in front of the building, get around back.” When he saw offenses, like the drinking event noted immediately above, Pastore would get on the radio: “Where’s officer so-and-so? There’s drinking in front of this building again.” Other times he might seek the building manager: “There’s drinking in front of the building again. You know the rules. We’ll close this place down if it happens again.” In respects, Pastore was a cop with the whole city as his beat.

To use his term, Pastore and citizens, and ultimately police officers and citizens, have to “connect.” They have to know each other, come to common understandings, and ultimately become partners. Trust must be established. There are no exceptions to this: no one is so demonic or evil that they are beyond the pale of humanity. Pastore dealt with anyone: prostitute, drug dealer, serious criminal, gang member, as well as “decent” citizens. If he knew everyone by name, so much the better. To the extent that Pastore shaped New Haven’s police street practices, no thin blue line dichotomized “good” and “bad;” there were no “scumbags, low-life, or vermin.”

It would be easy to caricature Pastore's approach. Certainly, he is a political liberal who is deeply concerned about poverty, racism, sexism, and homophobia, and his conversation is laced with typical liberal concepts (e.g., "root cause" theory of crime and crime control). His language and behavior, unless carefully analyzed, lend themselves to misinterpretation as "soft,"-- "soft on crime," or "soft on criminals." He used the terms "racism" and "sexism" easily and was not hesitant to condemn them, especially in his own department.

Likewise, some of Pastore's behavior could have been interpreted as undermining his own police. And, from one set of values it appears that it did: there were times when Pastore intervened in street situations in ways that, at least from the point of view of officers, undermined them at the scene. Yet, the circumstances were far more complicated than such quick judgments and impressions would warrant. Pastore had a consistent view of police and policing that was congruent with some of the most rigorous thinking about policing, use of police authority, and police use of force.

Pastore's "connecting" approach attempted to overcome barriers between police and citizens. This was done architecturally by, to the extent possible, eliminating barriers between citizens and police (the removal of bulletproof dividers admittedly was largely a symbolic move, but a powerful one for what it said to officers). It was done tactically through use of foot patrol, substations, conflict mediation and other methods that increase the intimacy between police and citizens. Moreover, all officers have been provided "beepers." They were required to provide the numbers upon request and were free to make the numbers available to whomever they please so that they can be of direct access. But there are four other ways in which "connecting" was done that are of special note.

The first, the “connecting” that was done personally by Pastore already has been described. Second, a set of linkages was established with community resources, especially the Yale Child Study Center, that have received national note. The Yale Child Center affiliation, for example, has become a national model for dealing with young children who are victims of violence, whether directly or by observation. Pastore implemented other distinctive programs. To mention just one: a Youth Police Board that met with him regularly to discuss and review police policies and practices. Third, management teams were created in the community substations. Their purpose was to establish neighborhood policing priorities and attempt to establish mutual accountability between police and citizens. And, finally, a unique educational program was initiated. Militarism was dropped from the academy; recruits worked in the community; art and drama became common means of teaching and learning.

Although met with considerable hostility by the “troops” – officers who had been in the department for some time – these four ‘connecting’ methods ultimately shaped new police roles that have progressed and permeated all sectors of law enforcement in New Haven.

Chief Pastore resigned after a personal scandal in 199-, and was replaced by his deputy chief, Melvin Wearing. The controversy over Pastore, his changes, and their legacy continues. Nonetheless, Chief Wearing has continued to lead the department in the direction established by Pastore.

### **The New York City Transit Police**

New York's Transit Police Department no longer exists.<sup>1</sup> On dd/mm/yr, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) absorbed the New York City Transit Police Department (TPD). Yet the story of the TPD during the late 1980s and early 1990s is important.

The TPD was the site of first full-fledged trial run of extensive police order maintenance in recent history. In reflection, it was an opportune setting for such an experiment. In comparison to most public spaces, it is a relatively simple setting, consisting of walkways, entrance and exit areas, platforms, and the trains themselves. Although other transit employees work in the subways, the level of crime and disorder had reached such levels in the subway that any roles they might have had as "caretakers" had been neutralized by extensive security arrangements – for example, securing toll takers in virtual vaults to prevent youths from breaking in or forcing toll takers to open the doors. (Even special high-speed fire extinguishing equipment was put into the booths to protect toll takers from youths who would pour gasoline into the payment slots and ignite it if toll takers would not open the doors.) No neighborhood "watch" groups, business improvement districts, merchants, or other potential caretakers were present in the subway to lay claim to spaces. Police action to restore order and the impact of order maintenance activities on serious crime would not be diluted by other forms of social action to control crime

Second, the subway became the pretest for what later would become the NYPD's strategy – a strategy that achieved record crime reductions, a national spotlight, and precipitated a rancorous debate in criminal justice and criminological circles. William Bratton was recruited as Chief of the TPD (April 1990) during the period this case covers and was the architect of the TPD's strategy for restoring order and reducing crime. Later,

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<sup>1</sup> At least three partial documentations of the changes in the TPD exist: George L. Kelling, "Reclaiming the Subway," *City Journal*, Volume 1, Number 2, Winter 1991, pp. 17-28; George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*, Free Press, New York, 1996; and William Bratton, *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*, Random House, New York, 1998.

of course, he was recruited by Mayor Rudi Giuliani to become the NYPD's commissioner. Without knowing it at the time, Bratton was developing a leadership style and a set of anti-crime tactics that he would carry with him into the NYPD. Moreover, he was creating the nucleus of a team that would not only implement his philosophy in New York City with great success, but later would assist other departments implement a similar approach, especially in New Orleans under the leadership of John Linder and Jack Maple.

Finally, the New York City subway system was under grave threat. Passenger fear of crime was out of control:

- 97% of riders took some sort of defensive initiative before entering the subway;
- 75% of passengers indicated they did not wear expensive jewelry or clothing;
- 69% avoided "certain people," 68% avoided certain platform locations, and 61% avoided the last train car;
- 27% of New Yorkers surveyed indicated they had avoided the subway at least once in the previous two weeks because of fear of crime or aversion to homeless and panhandlers in the subway; and
- focus group respondents estimated that subway crime accounted for 20 to 50% of the city's total (the reality is 3% of felony crime; 9% of robberies).<sup>2</sup>

Disorder and serious crime were soaring:

- in April of 1988 there were 1,041 reported felonies; in April 1989, 1,276; and in April 1990, 1,472;
- farebeating and token scams were costing the subway approximately \$100 million a year; and
- "homeless" were turning the subway into a gigantic surrogate shelter.

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<sup>2</sup> The source of these data was the Metropolitan Transportation Authority which, like most product or service-producing organizations, routinely sought feedback about consumers' and potential consumers' perceptions of the quality of its services.

The TPD's infrastructure was in shambles:

- a 1989 survey of officers indicated that 65% wanted the TPD to merge with the New York City Police Department;
- district facilities were a disgrace -- old, too small, in remote and inaccessible subway locations, many without adequate air conditioning, and inadequately maintained;
- the communications system was old and notoriously unreliable, having many "dead spots" where officers were out of touch;
- officers' appearance was often unprofessional;
- management was out of touch with how police were performing; and
- few police cars were available so officers could respond to emergencies or back up officers in trouble, and those that were available were poorly kept.

In sum, in 1990 the TPD was an organization adrift with little sense of mission, alienated from its stakeholders in the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), unable to capture the loyalty or zeal of its members, and held in low esteem by the media and the general public. By 1992, the TPD had come to behave like an organization that had found its values and sense of mission and was moving forward on many fronts. What happened?

In early 1989, Robert Kiley, Chairman of the Board of the New York Transportation Authority recruited Kelling to deal with the "homeless" problem in the New York subway. This story has been told elsewhere and need not be repeated here in detail.<sup>3</sup> The department conducted a problem solving exercise; redefined the problem from "homelessness" to disorderly conditions and behavior; devised tactics to deal with these problems and successfully defended them in court; and, trained every officer in the

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<sup>3</sup> See, George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*, The Free Press, 1996.

conduct of order maintenance. Departmental leadership, however, either remained passive or attempted to undermine the effort – their job was serious crime and they could not be bothered with minor offenses. Consequently William Bratton was recruited as chief and began in April of 1990.

For all the chronic problems and overhanging crises Bratton inherited, the TPD nonetheless had considerable potential.

- The TPD was in a crisis and important political figures and policy makers knew it -- an advantage for new executives given a mandate to implement sweeping change.
- As in the NYPD, all positions above the rank of captain were exempt from civil service, giving any incoming chief considerable latitude to create his/her team.
- The makings of a strong planning unit were in place. Previous Chief Del Castillo, deeply committed to research, planning, and evaluation developed a strong planning and research capacity under Dr. Phyllis McDonald.
- Consultants, both of whom (along with Kelling, Robert Wasserman had been consulting about managerial issues in the TPD) were familiar with Bratton and with TPD operations and infrastructure and who had worked with many TPD managers of considerable ability and dedication, were on board when Bratton arrived.
- Although somewhat dwindling and with the outcome uncertain, the TPD was already involved in the process of accreditation.
- Neither corruption nor abusive behavior was a serious problem in the TPD when Bratton took over. The TPD had had a serious scandal regarding abuse in 1987 and its decoy unit had been accused of over zealousness, but Del Castillo had put into place a competent complaint monitoring system.<sup>4</sup>
- Bratton inherited a newly forged alliance among selected staff in the TPD, MTA, NYCTA, and the consultants that had developed during the planning and implementation of earlier efforts.

Bratton moved quickly to set in place a plan to energize the TPD. He met with officers, created a tightly-knit management team, reorganized the department, published a plan of action, fashioned a marketing plan, implemented administrative changes, and devised new subway tactics, while simultaneously seeming to be everywhere throughout the subway. Some actions were conducted in sequence: reorganization followed creating a tight management team, for example. But, for the most part, Bratton moved concurrently on a wide number of fronts. Central to all his actions, Bratton developed a pervasive theme to his administration. Whether meeting with officers, speaking on a radio talk show, meeting with his command staff, or planning tactics, a simple repetitious theme permeated everything Bratton did and said.

The theme had two elements. The first argued that the three problems that plagued the subway – farebeating, disorder, and robbery -- were in reality one problem, linked conceptually and sequentially. To deal with one problem, say farebeating, was to deal with all three problems. The second element of the theme was that the mission of the TPD was "Taking Back the Subway for the People of New York." This motif was communicated in person, through media, in the publications of the TPD, whenever and wherever possible. Implicit in the motif were both an admission of serious problems -- the subway had to be taken *back* -- and a promise of action -- the subway had to be *taken* back.

While developing an overall sense of strategy was urgent and publishing a plan of action important, there was no sense of waiting for a "grand design" before action was initiated. The changes came so swiftly that Kiley suggested that the plan of action be

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<sup>4</sup> The Stewart case stemmed from the death of a young man while in the custody of police. This tragedy gave rise to a series of investigations, reports, and organizational moves to improve both handling of arrestees and the quality of supervision and direction when arrests required use of physical force.

viewed as a "cascading plan:" report on what has been accomplished, what is being accomplished, and what will be accomplished."

We have mentioned above two of Bratton's first moves: creating a closely-knit core management group and reorganizing the department. Additionally and simultaneously, Bratton:

- built morale and professional competence;
- sought greater resources;
- re-equipped the department and laid plans for improving its infrastructure; and,
- decentralized authority.

Each of these areas will be briefly discussed.

*Morale and Professional Competence:* A task force comprised of department commanders and a standing committee of officers, sergeants, and lieutenants produced a mission statement, a set of values, and standards by which the performance of the department as a whole could be judged.

Improved transit training moved forward on four fronts: reclaiming training from the NYPD; implementing a field training program; improving in-service training; and providing executive training. National accreditation was "kick started" by moving it into the center of the organization and the department was accredited in March of 1991. Additional efforts went into assuring reliable career paths and equal opportunities for all employees.

*Developing Resources:* Even before Bratton came to the TPD he was aware of the desperate need for new equipment and facilities. Management of the MTA and NYCTA had acknowledged the need to invest in the TPD's infrastructure, facilities, and equipment. Bratton moved to exploit this awareness quickly. Shortly after he was hired,

over \$300,000 in funds and 20 construction personnel were assigned to make temporary improvements to district stations.

Moreover, a "jump start" was made possible when New York's Governor Mario M. Cuomo provided \$40 million to the TPD after a Utah tourist was stabbed and killed while trying to protect his mother during a robbery attempt in the subway. These funds were allocated to make temporary improvements in the radio system and to design and install a state-of-the-art computer-aided dispatch system. Moreover, it was agreed by MTA and NYCTA management that police infrastructure would be a high priority in future capital programs.

*Re-equip the Department and Improve its Infrastructure:* Bratton steadfastly believes that a proud organization will look sharp, will be properly equipped (and then properly maintain the equipment), will maintain appropriate two-way respect between ranks, and will behave in a dignified professional manner at all times. Bratton sees proper equipment as a precursor to proper performance: the momentum gained from one set of achievements -- looking right and having good equipment -- gives momentum to the primary purpose of police departments -- performing right. As noted above, temporary improvements were made to the district stations and the first of a two-stage program of improving the radio communication system was implemented, with new radios purchased and temporary improvements made to the communications infrastructure. Moreover, new cars were added to the fleet and distributed to the districts and new uniforms were designed and ordered.

Among all the changes Bratton oversaw, the change from .38- caliber revolvers to 9 millimeter semi-automatic weapons was of singular significance. Bratton's proposal to adopt the 9mm immediately encountered strong opposition from the NYPD commissioner and New York's mayor. Even many of those who were avid supporters of Bratton thought that he may have gone too far on the weapons issue. Despite external objections, he pushed forward. For many, the mere fact that Bratton was willing to stand

up and fight for a controversial issue important to line personnel -- win or lose -- was unique in the history of the TPD. Ultimately, Bratton, supported by the TPD PBA, convinced the MTA's Board of Directors of the value of the 9mm's and they were adopted as the TPD's weapon.

*Decentralized Authority:* Within the overall priorities established by central administration, the locus of decision-making was shifted to district commanders. In turn, each district commander established problem-solving teams representing all ranks as well as the collective bargaining units. To ensure maximum participation, membership on these teams was rotated. The teams were charged with identifying and analyzing problems, selecting tactics, and measuring the success of the tactics used.

Bratton recounts his approach to the district commanders in his book *Turnaround*:

My instructions to each of the ten district commanders were purposefully vague. I wanted to test their creativity and presentation skills. I told them I was bringing the transit command staff and the other nine district commanders along [to visit them in their district facilities] so everyone could see what their peers were doing. I also told them, 'When we get there I want my of the Bureau of Administrative Services to see the conditions you're working under. I want a briefing on the conditions of your system and also on operations, what you're doing about fare evasion, what you're doing about disorder, and what you're doing about crime'<sup>5</sup>

Districts began to develop their own special activities. One district, in an attempt to increase the sense of police presence, developed a program of entering trains, having the conductor announce that police were making a special inspection, and then quickly inspect each car -- a move that took less than a minute, but caught public attention. Another district developed a special order maintenance effort and dubbed it "Operation Glazier," a take-off on the "broken windows" argument that implied fixing broken windows. One district captain even developed his own communications program

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<sup>5</sup> *Turnaround*, p. 158.

including videos, one of which was a clever and playful takeoff on one of Bratton's videos. There were many other examples of district-level innovation.<sup>6</sup>

But we see here already Bratton's orientation: bring his key people – district commanders – together and focus their attention on substantive problems. This, of course, was the precursor to what later came to be known as “Compstat” during Bratton's administration of the NYPD – a managerial and tactical innovation that remains the keystone of the NYPD and has been implemented in various forms in police departments throughout the world.

In sum, the change processes in the New Haven and Transit police departments were each significant in their own right. The changes toward community policing in New Haven were perhaps the most abrupt and radical change of any department with which we are familiar. Pastore not only changed the police department's organizational structure overnight, he systematically set out to destroy the symbols of the previous strategy. One wonders if it wasn't for New Haven's manageable size, Chief Pastore's unusual familiarity with the city, and his willingness to work the streets himself, whether such radical change might have destabilized the department to such an extent that it would have interfered with its basic functioning. Yet, it is to be recalled that Pastore's efforts to reduce violence in New Haven, both organizationally and personally, appear to be so successful that Boston's now famous Operation Ceasefire, for which New Haven was considered as a site, could not be implemented and evaluated there because the levels of violence had been so drastically reduced (way ahead of New York City and Boston, by the way).

The changes in the Transit police, while immediate and rapid by any standard, nonetheless were orderly in comparison to the changes in New Haven. Part of the difference was that Bratton largely left the organizational *structure* unchanged, but

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<sup>6</sup> For a more detailed list of ongoing district activities, see the TPD's current *Patrol Strategies Catalogue* noted in footnote 13 below.

radically changed the *administrative processes*. Pastore, in one stroke, wiped out three levels of the organization and the police academy and worried later about picking up the pieces. Bratton, on the other hand, focused on identifying capable persons to be district commanders, devolving authority to them, and ensuring their accountability. Both, however, were everywhere to be seen in their respective communities – each exerting leadership in his own way.

Another striking difference in the approaches of these two reformers was their approach to line personnel. At least during the early days of his administration, Pastore viewed most line personnel as part of the problem and cared little how they felt about the changes that he was making. In fact, it is not too strong to say that the fact that his actions irritated, nay often enraged them, almost seemed to give him personal satisfaction. Appointing a gay rights activist as head of the new police education and training unit, was a “rub in” that many officers never forgave him for. Bratton, on the other hand, was extraordinarily conscious of the views of line personnel and sought out ways both to understand them and to transform them. This does not mean that Bratton was not deeply concerned about the capacity of line personnel for mischief: indeed, he was as fully skeptical of their ability to manage discretion appropriately as was Pastore. But Bratton carefully tailored his language to start out where officers were: that is, he struggled to put his vision of policing in language that officers could understand and learn to appreciate. Put another way, Pastore tried to “shock” line personnel into line by creating a world in which there were no options for officers to get on board or quit; Bratton tried to sway officers by starting where they were and reinterpreting their experiences as he moved on.

Another difference between New Haven and the Transit departments was their mandate. Both Pastore and Bratton were clearly appointed as reformers. The crises that they faced were significantly different, however. From Pastore's point of view, while crime was a problem, it was terribly exacerbated by the corrosive nature of the relationship between police and citizens. The driving force behind Pastore was the need to fundamentally change the relationship between police and citizens and other private and public institutions. In this respect, Pastore stood in the tradition of most attempts at police reform: crime may or may not be an issue, however, the relationship between police and citizens, especially minorities, drove change.

Bratton's circumstances were considerably different. The record of Transit Police in dealing with minorities was really quite good. The Transit Police exceeded the New York City Police Department in recruiting and maintaining minority personnel by a long way. Bratton's predecessor had given high priority to reducing abuse and complaints and was largely successful. Moreover, although robberies were increasing, felonies and/or violence were not that much of a problem: the victimization rates were relatively low given the size of the system and the volume of users (although this was not the general perception). The driving force behind Bratton's recruitment was the level of disorder in the subway and the need to restore order. In this respect, he had a relatively straightforward, although not simple, task: restore order, reduce fear of crime, and re-establish passenger confidence in the safety of the subway.

But in both departments, change proceeded at a breakneck pace. Bratton's articulation and development of a "plan of action" had to accommodate to the fact that he changed things so rapidly, that the plan of action was conceptualized as a "cascading"

plan of action: the writing of it would often follow implementation of changes. Pastore's tempo of change was such that into his second year he had to pause to "re-rationalize" the department: that is, redefine the relationships among ranks and staff. The Transit Police were, of course, absorbed into the NYPD. Consequently, the permanence of change there cannot be documented. Evidence exists, however, that the New Haven Department of Police Service, remains a radically different organization than it was in the past. There remain, however, bitter feelings by many in the department about how change was accomplished. Both the New Haven and the Transit Police experiences, however, belie the idea that organizational change in police departments is essentially a gradual process taking, perhaps, as long as a decade. In each case, basic change took place in a matter of months.

In a final note, however, it will be noted that the Transit Police experience can be seen as a pretest for what happened later in the NYPD. One of the most dramatic, highly touted, and controversial reformations of a police department occurred there under Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani – a reformation that has affected police departments throughout the world.

## SECTION VII: Community Policing: Into the New Millennium

By the middle of the 1990s, the ideas that gave rise to community policing came together into a coherent and congruent policing paradigm. While emphases varied, the elements of this strategy were broadly agreed on.

- Police sought *authority* not only in law and professionalism, but politically and through their relationship with neighborhoods and communities.
- The *function* of police, while including law enforcement, was broadened to include proactive problem solving and crime prevention.
- *Organizational structures* were (to be) flattened and authority was (to be) decentralized. *Administrative processes* emphasized accountability and increased levels of collegiality.
- *Demand* for police service was to be received at lower levels of the organization (neighborhoods and precincts). They were to be given priority in consultation with citizens and local groups and organizations.
- Police were to have an intimate *relationship with their environments*, seeking consent, cooperation, and collaboration with citizens and private and public sector groups and organizations.
- Police *tactics* were to emphasize problem solving and collaboration.
- The *outcomes* police sought were crime prevention, citizen satisfaction, problems solved, and justice and legality in their methods.

To be sure, police departments adopted these elements with considerable variation and with different emphases. Even within police departments, precincts in New York City for example, the emphasis put on particular elements of the strategy might vary considerably. Nonetheless, people were certain enough about what constituted community policing that a federal program, COPS, could be implemented that had as a goal the addition of 100,000 new police officers on US streets and that these officers would serve to leverage continued movement towards community policing in cities that applied for funding.

COPS: During the 1990s, President Clinton's administration provided federal funding to add up to 100,000 police to America's streets.<sup>1</sup> Up to 1,600 communities received funds under this program. The program was not just designed to increase the number of police; "... the federal program was also designed (at least in part) to change the predominant strategy and operations of American policing from a strategy that emphasized reactive law enforcement, to one that emphasized proactive community problem-solving."<sup>2</sup> As part of the evaluation of this program, the Urban Institute contracted with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University to conduct ten intensive case studies of the organizational change that resulted from COPS funding. These ten cases (Albany, NY, Colorado Springs, CO, Fremont, CA, Knoxville, TN, Lowell, MA, Portland, OR, Riverside, CA, St. Paul, MN, Savannah, GA, Spokane, WA), and the cross-site analysis, are undoubtedly the most comprehensive study of organizational change conducted in policing or criminal justice agencies.<sup>3</sup>

The significance of the COPS program went beyond funding additional officers in cities. As noted in the cross-site analysis, "the mere existence of a federal grants program that not only provides a funding opportunity to police organizations, but also throws the

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<sup>1</sup> Mark H. Moore, David Thatcher, Francis X. Hartmann, Catherine Coles, and Peter Sheingold, "Case Studies of the Transformation of Police Departments: A Cross-Site Analysis," Program in Criminal Justice and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, March 1999, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> The Kennedy School study of organizational change directly influenced this study (Kelling and Wycoff). Originally, this study was to be of organizational change as well. As the shape and dimension of the KSG study became apparent, we decided to focus instead on the *evolving strategic changes over time*, rather than a more narrow study of organizational change. To be sure, the KSG study does contain information about strategic change (as well as organizational change) and our study contains information about organizational change (as well as strategic change), however, the overlap is minimal – at least relative to our original plans.

weight and prestige of the federal government behind a particular set of changes to be produced in police organizations.”<sup>4</sup>

The cross-site analysis drew five basic conclusions:

- COPS grants contributed to organizational change;
- Effective management can overcome obstacles to implementing community policing;
- Important managerial interventions included building political support, creating a management team, planning reform, redesigning the organizational structure, building a supportive informational infrastructure, altering personnel systems, and instilling new cultural ideals;
- Additional resources (both COPS and other grants) were required to implement and maintain some of these managerial interventions;
- The spike in hiring created pressure for changes in administrative processes (e.g., training).<sup>5</sup>

As important and significant as these findings were, perhaps the most significant contribution of the study was the ability of the researchers to specify and measure the shift to community policing. In other words, by the mid-1990s, policing had not only entered into a new paradigm, a broad enough consensus existed among police and scholars about the shape of that paradigm, that researchers were able to specify measures of adherence to the new paradigm.

Moore et al. adopt Eck and Stern’s definition of community policing as consisting of two broad shifts: first, towards problem-solving methodologies and, second, to the establishment of working partnerships with governmental and community groups.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 90-91.

<sup>6</sup> John E. Eck and Daniel Stern, “Revisiting Community Policing: a New Typology,” paper presented to National Institute of Justice, 1992.

Based on this, Moore and his colleagues then specify measures for each. For “problem-solving” the indicators include:

- A shift from generic “directed patrol” to more sophisticated understanding of specific problems and an “uninhibited” search for solutions;
- The extent to which administrative systems “recognize” problem-solving;
- The extent to which the authorization to initiate and engage in problem-solving is distributed across the organization;
- The capability of the organization to define and act on problems of varying sizes;
- The capability of the organization to assess the impact of its problem-solving efforts and learn from them; and,
- The capability of the organization to enlist other agencies in defining and solving problems.<sup>7</sup>

Likewise, the measurements of the capacity of the organization to establish community partnerships included:

- The extent to which police extended their existent relationships with neighborhood and other groups;
- The extent to which police articulated a philosophy of service;
- The extent to which police structured itself to ensure easy access and continuing connections to citizens, especially with patrol;
- The extent to which police formed more effective relations to other governmental functions;
- The extent to which police embraced forms of community accountability; and,
- The extent to which police made efforts to connect to minority communities.<sup>8</sup>

So, by the middle of the 1990s, policing had pretty well recreated itself. The elements of a new paradigm were widely agreed upon and researchers were able to

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<sup>7</sup> Moore, et al., pp. 22-23.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, pp. 26-27.

identify measures of adherence to the new paradigm. To be sure, few, if any, departments could have been said to have fully implemented community policing, but this reflected problems of leadership, implementation, and management rather than on the viability of the concepts of community policing.

Completing the story of the evolution of community policing would be incomplete without at least a brief discussion of two of the most influential departments during the 1990s: New York City and Boston. Each had profound influence on policing: New York for internal management, Boston for its capacity to collaborate with citizens and private and public agencies.

**New York City:** The New York City 1990s policing story has been widely told, variously represented and misrepresented, and often misunderstood. At least six books and innumerable articles have been written about it.<sup>9</sup> Understanding what happened in New York City is clouded by political and criminological ideology – political ideology as a result of the crime reduction claims of an outspoken center right politician (Mayor Rudolph Giuliani) in a democratic city; and, criminological ideology as a result of the challenge New York City’s crime reduction presents to “root cause” criminological thinking. Moreover, whether or not New York City has moved towards community policing and whether some of its achievements have been the result of “true” problem-solving (e.g., elimination of “squeegeeing” – the unsolicited washing of car windows by youths) has also been the subject of considerable debate. These disputes are likely to continue for a long time: political, social science, and professional ideologies run deep. It is not, however, our intent to attempt to resolve them here. We note these debates and leave it at that. There is no denying, however, that profound organizational change

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<sup>9</sup> Kelling and Coles, Bratton, Maple, Repetto, Karman, Silverman,

occurred in New York City under Bratton and that the central features of this change have been maintained since Bratton's departure from the NYPD in April of 1996.

Leaders of the NYPD, especially Benjamin Ward (1984-1989) and Lee Brown (1990-1992), struggled to implement community policing in the city since the mid 1980s. Under Ward, the Community Police Officer Program (CPOP) was implemented largely as an add-on program outside of the mainstream of the department. Brown had a vision of implementing community policing citywide, however, began by implementing it in a pilot precinct and it never moved much beyond that. In both cases community policing was unpopular with officers and largely demeaned by them.

Giuliani, known as a tough federal prosecutor, made the wave of violence and murder in New York City during the late 1980s and early 1990s the central theme of his 1993 mayoral campaign. But also, deeply steeped in the ideas of Broken Windows, he ran against the disorder and mayhem that had come to typify many areas of the city. "Squeegeemen" came to symbolize for him all that was wrong with the city. He was so successful in defining the crime issues in these metaphorical terms that during the final months of the campaign the incumbent mayor, David Dinkins, was running in opposition to squeegeemen as well. It was very clear that disorder and crime would be Giuliani's principle concerns.

Impressed by Bratton's successes in New York's subways – by 1994, when Giuliani took office, felonies had declined 75 per cent and robberies 63 per cent since their peak in 1990 – Giuliani recruited Bratton as his first Commissioner. His mandate to Bratton was clear: restore order and reduce crime, quickly.

The problems of the NYPD have been documented elsewhere and there is no need to repeat them in detail here. Preoccupation with corruption and abuse had led the department into a "stay out of trouble" mentality. Out of fear of corruption, line officers couldn't make drug arrests even if drug dealing went on right under their noses. Yet, corruption and abuse remained major problems in the department.

Bratton went into the NYPD with many of the convictions he brought to the Transit Police but, given his experience there, he was more convinced than ever that, first, restoring order was an important means of reducing crime and, second, that the key to getting control of the department was to concentrate on the role and functioning of mid-managers. In contrast to the Transit Police with 12 district commanders, the NYPD had 76 precinct commanders. With 12 captains, Bratton could almost personally direct them. Moreover, even though the Transit Police had 4000 officers, it was still a simple organization when compared to the labyrinthine NYPD. And even beyond such organizational responsibilities the social and political obligations of the NYPD Commissioner far exceeds that of any other head of a police agency in the US. Consequently, the idea that Bratton could provide the same direct oversight of mid managers in the NYPD that he did in the Transit Police was simply out of the question. The problem that he faced was that of communicating a centralized vision of the "business" of the NYPD to a huge number of mid managers who were geographically dispersed in ways that they both understood and were motivated to implement.

This issue is, of course, virtually identical to what large corporations that have many branches, often dispersed globally, face: how to ensure that a centralized strategy drives decentralized facilities with empowered managers. While Bratton had a lot of advice about how

to proceed, one of his principal advisors was Robert Johnson, then President of First Security – a top shelf, Boston-based private security firm with many regional offices. Johnson emphasized that precinct commanders be held accountable to achieve measurable objectives. But more than that he offered an administrative process – a model of *control* – that had been developed in the private sector and which Johnson had implemented in his own corporation.

This process, memorialized by Robin Simons in his *Harvard Business Review* article “Control in an Age of Empowerment,” was the model for what later came to be known in the NYPD as Compstat.<sup>10</sup> Simons identifies four characteristics of what he calls “interactive control systems:”

First, they focus on constantly changing information that top-level managers have identified as potentially strategic. Second, the information is significant enough to demand frequent and regular attention from operating managers at all levels of the organization. Third, the data generated by the interactive system are best interpreted and discussed in face-to-face meetings of superiors, subordinates, and peers. Fourth, the interactive control system is a catalyst for an ongoing debate about underlying data, assumptions, and action plans.<sup>11</sup>

These characteristics – focusing on constantly changing information, keeping information in front of operating managers, regular face to face meetings, and ongoing strategic debate – are the central characteristics of Compstat.

Compstat – implemented as weekly meetings in which top managers met with precinct commanders on a rotating basis in the manner noted above – revolutionized the NYPD’s organization and administrative processes in a matter of months. Heretofore, the preoccupation of precinct captains was One Police Plaza – the central headquarters of the NYPD. Now, their focus was on information from and data about their precincts – information and data that defined the nature of the problems confronting their geographical areas. In this organizational world,

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<sup>10</sup> Robert Simons, “Control in an Age of Empowerment,” *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1995, pp 80-88.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p.

woe be the precinct commander who was not familiar with the nature of her/his precinct problems and at who was not at least trying to do something about them. As time went on, the standards shifted from trying to do something about them to succeeding.

Again, the details of Compstat have been described in considerable detail: in academic terms by John Jay's Professor Eli Silverman and in more typical police terms by both Bratton and Jack Maple, Bratton's colorful deputy commissioner. Moreover, Compstat has been adopted in more or less similar terms in cities like Newark, NJ, Philadelphia, PA, New Orleans, LA, Boston, MA. and other cities.

What is not as well understood, and is not detailed by either Bratton or Maple, are the scope of organizational and administrative changes that were required to "fit" the NYPD with Compstat. Both Simons and we have used the term "empowered" when referring to precinct commanders – to discuss just one example of supportive changes. Part of the reason why precinct commanders had been focused on One Police Plaza prior to Bratton was because that is where they got their "marching orders" – their priorities, resources, and methods. Moreover, precincts were filled with special units, from detectives to drug units, over which precinct commanders had no control. Information was shared with them on a "need to know" basis and that included any problems of abuse or corruption that came to the attention of Internal Affairs. Precinct commanders did not talk with or to chiefs, they listened.

If they were to be held truly accountable, they had to be empowered. They needed more control over resources that were already available, needed additional resources, and needed to be able to communicate to their superiors and peers in new terms. To prepare precinct captains for their "empowerment," Bratton asked Frank Hartmann, Executive Director of the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard, to meet with precinct captains, first, to help them understand their

needs in a newly accountable world and, second, to communicate those needs to top management in a clear and forceful fashion. Also, Bratton had to teach his top managers to *listen* – a skill heretofore not high on the list required of chiefs. Finally, Bratton brought chiefs and precinct commanders together, with Hartmann helping a select and articulate group of captains to say their piece, so that they could have the same kind of face to face contact that characterized Compstat – only now it was captains putting their demands on chiefs.

In other words, there remains an untold story about New York – a story too long and detailed for this account. This story is about the hundreds of organizational and administrative changes that accompanied and supported Compstat. The ability of the organization to look at itself was enhanced, its belief systems were altered and enhanced, and new boundaries of acceptable practice were established. When combined with Compstat, an interactive control system, these four “levers of control” as Simons calls them, revolutionized the NYPD. Arguably, Compstat and the other levers of control are among the major police innovations of the century. Compstat wedded crime/problem analysis (information and data) with accountability and control.

**Boston:** Three historical forces shaped the Boston Police Department during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. First, Boston is a city of legendary neighborhoods. Bostonians do not just live in Boston; they live in the South End, Dorchester, Roxbury, Back Bay, Mattapan, Southie, Charlestown, Rosindale, Hyde Park, East Boston, West Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and Beacon Hill. To this day, Boston remains one of the most decentralized American cities. For example, Boston, unlike most cities never centralized its courts – it still has district courts that operate out of neighborhoods.

Second, the Boston police strike of 1919 largely forged the relationship between labor and management. Without going into the details of the strike, the rioting that

followed, or the firing of the strikers, the consequences for Boston were staggering. Labor/management relations were soured in Boston for generations of police. Beginning with the hiring of (number) of new officers in (date), cycles of vast cohorts moved through the BPD creating "age lumps" and either feast or famine for officers hoping for promotion. Most ominously, a department comprised almost totally of new recruits, was confronted immediately with what was to become perhaps the most corrupting influence on American policing to that time: Prohibition.

The struggles with corruption became the third force shaping the BPD during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Until the strike, the Boston Police Department was noted as one of the most corruption-free police departments in the US. Now, decimated by firings, its culture destroyed, and staffed by inexperienced rookies hired in haste, the BPD became no exception. The BPD, once able to keep corruption at a minimum, soon suffered from the same level of corruption that afflicted most other major police departments.

In response to the problems of corruption, Harvard Law School Professor Leonard Harrison, conducted the *Harvard Law School Survey of Crime in Boston* between 1927 and 1934 and published *Police Administration in Boston*. Without going into detail, Harrison's recommendations emphasized geographical and functional centralization and ending foot patrol in favor of automobile patrol.

Harrison's two key goals were to remove political influences from policing -- in Boston, a residue of the long struggle in Boston between the Yankee Republicans and Irish Democrats -- and to control line police officers -- an issue that became critical in Boston given the systemic corruption that developed during the post strike and Prohibition era. Harrison's report and the political debate notwithstanding, the BPD remained a decentralized neighborhood oriented police department into the 1960s.

In 1961, corruption exploded again with the Columbia Broadcasting System's nationally televised "Biography of a Bookie Joint." It alleged that a dozen-or-so Boston police officers, shown going into a Back Bay bookie-joint, were betting and collecting

pay-offs. A new Commissioner, Edward McNamara, was appointed and he commissioned another survey of the BPD by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), of which Quinn Tamm was executive director.

The IACP report excoriated the city and its police department: "... a mobile criminal element . . . is grateful to police agencies that persist in the antiquated procedure of assigning a large portion of the members to foot patrol." It admonished the city: the department was too large; officers were assigned to non-law enforcement functions; records were inadequate; supervision and inspection needed to be improved; and the department was ill equipped.

Yet, the BPD was able to retain its traditional shape and ways until 1972 when bookie sheets discovered in a gambling raid implicated several top departmental officials. Mayor Kevin White named Robert Di Grazia commissioner.

Di Grazia, formerly the chief of East St. Louis, IL, was the quintessential reform administrator: anti-union, a firm believer in patrol by automobile and rapid response to calls for service, committed to centralization of function and command and control, and part of a professional network of "police progressives" that extended into the Police Foundation, a Washington-based police think-tank headed by Patrick V. Murphy (New York City's police commissioner under the Lindsey administration). Supported by a young group of civilian "whiz kids," Di Grazia closed stations, ended foot patrol, abandoned services such as the harbor patrol, transferred top commanders, transferred lieutenants and sergeants, threatened to transfer virtually every patrol officer (although it never came to that), civilianized administrative positions, and centralized special units. By these means the BPD was wrenched into adherence with the model of policing first advocated by Harrison and later by the IACP. The business of the BPD would be "fighting crime" by riding around in cars and rapidly responding to calls for service. Demand for police services was centralized when 911 and computer aided dispatch

(CAD) was installed; if citizens preferred to call their remaining area stations, their calls were routed to centralized dispatch.

To be sure, important improvements were made in many of the BPD's systems. The police academy became as innovative and creative as any in the country. Supervision and command and control improved. Corruption was greatly reduced. Important experiments in team policing were conducted in the Fenway and other areas; however, these ultimately ended as calls for service escalated and, for reasons noted below, the number of officers in the department declined. But a shift away from a neighborhood orientation to a "professional" orientation was clearly a dominant feature of the change.

But these were tough times for the BPD. Regardless of the merits or goals of bussing, the bussing conflicts in Boston pitted police against citizens in neighborhood after neighborhood. Moreover, many in the BPD believed that policing bussing had at least two other troublesome consequences. First, the prolonged and heavy use of overtime to ensure sufficient personnel created circumstances in which officers became accustomed to, and reliant on, the money accruing from overtime. Second, for reasons that are not immediately apparent, the distinctions among ranks broke down over time as police managed the bussing conflict. Many believe that this administrative breakdown crept into routine policing in the BPD as well. Other changes also had dramatic consequences. First, the Boston police union emerged as a potent political force during the 1970s, discovering that it could gain benefits through political action that it could not gain at the bargaining table – most notably a 4/3 schedule (4 days on, 3 days off) in trade for political support – further worsening an extraordinarily bad management/line relationship while reducing substantially the level of policing. Second, the department came under court order regarding affirmative action that stalled promotions for years, further complicating the administrative problems noted above and ultimately creating a sense among personnel that politics, not merit, controlled what opportunities for

promotion existed in the department. Finally, Proposition 2 1/2, a tax limiting bill, ultimately resulted in a forced layoff, the first in the history of the department, with the number of officers declining from 2,028 in 1980 to 1,555 in 1981.

Consequently, the BPD was viewed throughout most of the 1980s and into the 1990s as an extremely troubled organization. Line/management relations were as bitter and hostile as any in the country; police relations with communities deteriorated, especially with minority communities where charges of brutality and racism were rife; a pervasive sense of futility seemed to be the BPD's dominant mood; and "starts" – innovations such as proposed implementation of foot patrol in 1983 – merely "fizzled." Finally, after a rash of media exposes, especially by the *Boston Globe*, of alleged bungled investigations, racism, and brutality, Mayor Raymond Flynn created the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee – known popularly as the St. Clair Commission (after its chairman, James D. St. Clair, a prestigious Boston attorney) – in May of 1991. The St. Clair Commission had two basic charges: to review "the recent *Boston Globe* series on police procedures" and to "review the basic management and supervision systems and practices of the Boston Police Department."<sup>12</sup>

The St. Clair report tore into the BPD and its leadership: the BPD was found deficient in virtually every dimension. Most dramatically, the Commission pushed for new top leadership and the implementation of community policing, including decentralization and the use of foot patrols.

In respects, the MRC survey brought the BPD full circle: a police department that, within the memory of many current police officers and managers, had been ridiculed for being antiquated and out of touch for attempting to maintain neighborhood stations, foot patrol, and other close linkages to neighborhoods – and had struggled for three

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<sup>12</sup> Letter from Mayor Raymond L. Flynn to James St. Clair, Appendix A. "Report of the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee," January 14 1992.

generations of police to abandon or substantially modify such linkages – was now being taken to task for its inability to implement and return to a neighborhood strategy.

Mayor Flynn, while rejecting the idea of firing his commissioner, nonetheless sought a compromise position: that is, he recruited William Bratton, then chief of New York City's Transit Police, to return to Boston and become Superintendent-in-Chief, the highest ranking sworn position in the BPD (16 January 1992). His specific charge was to implement the bulk of the other recommendations of the St. Clair Commission.

Typically, Bratton moved swiftly to reorient the department and to respond to the St. Clair Commission. Within a month, he published the "30 Day St. Clair Implementation Report" that delineated point-by-point responses to the Commission's recommendations. Most importantly, he committed the department to move forward in its shift to community policing. To this end, Bratton promised that a strategic plan would be produced in 6 months. "Neighborhood Policing: A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department" was published in September 1992 – as scheduled. Most important to this report, the section entitled "Level Three: Implementing Neighborhood Policing" contained section "A. Local Strategies." Task 1 sets forth the "Development of District Neighborhood Policing Plans": "Each strategy must be developed in concert with the residents of each district and include: [selected] a proposed schedule of meetings to solicit community input (especially through existing organizations) on local problems within each beat where an officer has volunteered; and a process for marshaling resources inside and outside the BPD to attack the first problem selected for resolution within the beat." While the document contained many more specific plans, recommendations, and implementation timetables, for our purposes, this was the heart of the BPD's strategic plan. A planning process would be established that would shift the BPD to community policing.

The strategic plan laid out by Bratton and his staff was a pretty big mouthful. It would be a big mouthful for any police department and, frankly, many long time

observers of the BPD ( including Kelling, one of the authors of this document) were skeptical about its chances for implementation. For many, the chances were increased when Mayor Flynn announced his planned resignation to become the United States Ambassador to the Vatican, the then-commissioner resigned to run for Mayor (23 June 1993), and Flynn, in one of his last official acts, named Bratton as commissioner (29 June 1993). But, of course, shortly after Bratton was appointed commissioner, newly elected Mayor Rudolph Giuliani recruited Bratton to head the New York City Police Department (DATE).

Mayor Thomas Menino appointed Paul Evans, a close colleague and friend of Bratton, commissioner. Although as thoughtful as Bratton, Commissioner Evans was in many respects a stark contrast to Bratton. "Laid back" in style, Evans seemed prepared to "let good things happen." The complicated decentralized planning process was maintained and, with guidance from outside consultants, laid the groundwork for organizational decentralization and active collaboration with residents and neighborhood groups. Evans was helped as well by the fact that Mayor Menino, in contrast to his predecessors Kevin White and ---- Flynn, was not only supportive, but he kept his "political hands" off of the BPD. Ideas began to "perc up" from all areas of the organization. "Operation Nightlight," a collaboration between probation and police officers to visit probationers at home during the night, was initiated informally by a few officers and evolved into a formal program. Confronted with extraordinary increases in gang violence, a special unit collaborated with researchers from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and created "Operation Ceasefire" – and interorganizational program that stopped gang violence in its tracks. Both efforts have become national models. Influenced by Bratton's success with Compstat in NYC, Evans created his own variation on the model, albeit a far less confrontational and much more collegial model than New York's .. By the end of the century the BPD was widely acknowledged to be one of the most innovative police departments in the country.

The most important change from the point of view of this monograph was the decentralization of authority and resources to districts.

Briefly, in April 1994, sixteen planning and implementation teams initiated a planning process that involved over 400 participants. Each district had its own team. This process, funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Comprehensive Communities Program, was designed by Jim Jordan, Director, Strategic Planning and Resource Development and Maria Schneiderman, a staffperson in the planning department. The teams represented 10 geographical districts, 5 BPD functions (investigative services, administrative services, internal investigations, special operations, and operations/911), and 1 citywide effort. Their purpose was to implement community policing – district-by-district and function-by-function. Supported by the Boston Management Consortium (BMC – a consulting group formally linked to the City of Boston) and Northeastern University/Center for Applied Social Research (CASR), teams met on the average of twice a month. Although not originally planned as such, the planning was divided into two phases. Phase I concentrated on neighborhood problems that needed to be dealt with to improve the quality of neighborhood life. Phase II commenced 21 September 1995 and concentrated on developing the strategies, tactics, and resources to manage these problems.

The planning teams had their origin in Commissioner Evans idea of “same cop same neighborhood.” The issues raised by “same cop same neighborhood” include: If district commanders are involved, how much ownership should they have? If they are to have ownership, how can this be achieved? Should citizens be involved? Which citizens and where? What role should special units play? Internal affairs? Each planning unit was to deal with these issues on their own terms.

The BPD's 1999 annual report exemplifies the outcome of this process. The report is structured around districts with each district putting forth a summary version of its goals – goals largely derived from the district planning teams. After a description of

the neighborhoods that comprise each district, it delineates 1999 goals, officers who make a difference in the neighborhoods, the community in action (with citizens named), and an "outstanding neighborhood partner." Moreover, it symbolizes what has occurred in the BPD. The Boston Police Department, by every indicator evaluators can think of, has strategically realigned itself with Boston's neighborhoods. As Captain Robert Dunford has put it again and again, "the genie is out, there is no putting him back." Centralized administration allowed, and in some cases forced, district commanders, police officers, and citizens to assume responsibility for what was happening in neighborhoods. Even the Boston police union – for so long estranged from the management – was involved in the planning process and could now feel shared ownership of the changes. (This does not imply that conflict between management and union was over – just that the union did agree to play a role, a substantial departure from the past.)

Conclusion:

We have omitted the contributions of many important departments in our discussion of the evolution of policing towards community policing during the 1990s. This is certainly the result of what has been, in many respects, a very personal discussion by two police researchers each of whom have been in the business for around 30 years. Inevitably in a document of this sort we have tended to concentrate on those departments with which we are most familiar. We don't write this apologetically. We acknowledge it; it was part of our original plan. During the early days of change in policing, cities like Santa Anna (CA), Detroit (MI), Newark, (NJ) and Flint (MI) played important roles. We have discussed Newark and Flint within the context of foot patrol experiments, but each played additional important roles: Flint's model of foot patrol was much more akin to community policing, before we even had the term community policing; and, Newark contributed to the intellectual underpinnings of community a second time, when it

participated in the fear reduction experiments of the early 1980s.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Portland (OR) and Newport News (VA) were important departments during the late 1980s and early 1990s: Portland for its community policing developments and Newport News for its problem solving milestones.<sup>14</sup>

While we have documented some of the early work in San Diego (CA), we have not updated San Diego's contribution to American policing. Part of the reason is that neither of us has worked systematically in San Diego, although each of us has had considerable contact with it. Another reason is that no one has, as yet, memorialized San Diego's contribution in case history or other form. Yet, probably no other department has been as consistently innovative (St. Paul might be an exception, but until the COPS case was written in 199-, St. Paul was not understood to have been in the mainstream of leading innovative departments) and exerting leadership as has been San Diego. Starting with its one-person, two person patrol car experiment, through its beat profiling, and up to its innovations in problem solving and community policing, San Diego has over and over again been in the forefront of police innovation.

Contemporaneously, Chicago (IL) and Charlotte (NC) have become important milestones in the evolution of community policing. Happily, Wes Skogan and his colleagues are documenting Chicago in what will probably be the most thorough study of any city's attempt to innovate in policing to date – an evaluation of both the process and outcomes of change over many years.<sup>15</sup> The developments in Charlotte have yet to be documented. Given the smooth transition of leadership there from Dennis Nowicki to Daryl Stephens, who during his administration in Newport, News (VA) made so many contributions to the evolution of the problem solving methodology, we are certain that

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much will be heard from Charlotte in the future. But, that the whole story of change in policing cannot be told here is not surprising; it remains a story in the making.

## Conclusion

This is a monograph about strategic change over time. Essentially, we have argued that there have been three periods of change since the late 1960s. The first period lasted roughly from 1970 through the early 1980s. The important cities and movements included community relations (that in a few communities provided an infrastructure for relating to communities in new ways), team policing, efforts at "beat profiling" in San Diego, the attempt in Dallas to strategically reposition the police department (well before we understood strategic repositioning), and the beginning of serious research into police practices in Kansas City. In respects, many of these efforts appeared to be "dead ends" that went nowhere, either in specific departments or in the field. In reality, however, virtually all of them were the beginnings of the unraveling of the reform movement in policing. They were the first stirrings of the end of Progressivism in American policing.

The second generation of change was characterized by the attempts at "experimental" or demonstration efforts in limited geographical areas (precincts) of Houston and Madison and was initiated during the early 1980s. With the exception of Dallas, these two cities had no roadmaps, or histories, of attempts at strategic change. Moreover, the supportive institutions like the Michigan State Center and the Community Policing Consortium (a partnership between PERF and the Police Foundation that grew out of the Harvard Executive Sessions on Community Policing and was funded by NIJ to offer consultation to police departments contemplating change), were only getting started. In fact, the Center and Consortium were actually learning from the experiences in Madison and Houston, as they provided considerable material for the Harvard discussions.

Nonetheless, Chiefs Lee Brown and David Couper instituted their efforts in ways that established certain basic principles. First, each involved a broad base of officers. Because of its size, Houston could not involve as large of a percentage of officers as Madison was able to, nonetheless, the principle of officer involvement was basic to Houston's efforts. Indeed, in Madison, Couper strongly believed that before he could really change the department, he had to get total "buy in" from his officers. Consequently, officer participation was one of Couper's primary preoccupations. Secondly, Brown and Couper understood that they had to respond to community needs. Already then, they understood that citizen priorities were often quite different than those of police departments. Moreover, they understood that the change that they were contemplating was not a mere "program;" they were implementing a whole new "philosophy" as Lee Brown referred to his view of the change. As a result, they knew that the internal workings of the department needed to change; not a little, but a whole lot. These internal workings included performance measurement for officers, how demand got into the organization and how it was responded to (e.g., 911), measures of organizational performance, models of supervision and management, recruitment of officers, the role of special units and detectives, and other internal matters. In other words, Houston and Madison developed their own roadmaps for change out of their own experiences and made those roadmaps available to the policing community. In each case, these departments were highly self reflective, encouraging evaluation, case studies, and other various modes of communication with the broader field of policing.

By the mid to late 1980s, a model of community policing was pretty much in place. Moreover, supportive institutions such as the Michigan State center, PERF, the

Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard, the Police Foundation, and the Community Policing Consortium, were in place as well – all prepared to work with police departments in the process of change. Individuals, as well, were available to assist in police departments: (in no particular order) Herman Goldstein, Robert Wasserman, Robert Trojanowicz, Mark H. Moore, Timothy Oettmeier, Gary Cordner, John Eck, William Spelman, Frank Hartmann, Tony Pate, Wesley Skogan, Stephen Mastrofski, William Geller, David Bayley, Lawrence Sherman, Dennis Rosenbaum, Jack Greene, the authors, as well as many other consultants and academics. Moreover, the policing field was “seeded” by chiefs moving to different sites (Lee Brown’s move to New York City was the prime example, however, there were many others) and by the recruitment of chiefs by other cities from locations like Santa Anna, Houston, and San Diego where a new generation of young leaders carried community policing ideas with them.

By the early 1990s, the question no longer seemed to be whether or not to shift to community policing, but rather how to manage the shift. The creation of the COPS program added an additional source of leverage towards change, as well as a capacity in the federal government to provide technical assistance in planning and implementation. Also, COPS funded additional capacities in universities throughout the U.S., the purpose of which was to provide training and technical assistance to police departments. While some police leaders continued to view change in departments as incremental (Lee Brown in New York City and the CAPS effort in Chicago, for example), other chiefs such as “Nick” Pastore in New Haven and William Bratton, both in New York’s transit police and latter in the NYPD itself, saw change as a much more rapid process – major changes often taking place within a matter of months. But, no single process of change seemed

to emerge or dominate. Some police leaders, like Paul Evans in Boston and Dennis Nowicki in Charlotte, were able to move their departments methodically and systematically towards community policing, in each case working without flourish to integrate police both within city government and within neighborhoods and communities. By the end of the 1990s, a new generation of police leaders was emerging, represented by Chiefs like Ed Davis in Lowell (MA), Tom Koby in Boulder, (CO), Elizabeth Watson in Houston and Austin (TX), Dean Esserman in Stamford (CT), and Ed Flynn in Arlington (VA) – all of whom were reared in policing during the era when the reform strategy was unraveling, but were well educated, articulate, and committed to community policing.

In sum, by the end of the 1970s, police were in serious trouble. They had been badly shaken by the Supreme Court, the 1960s riots and demonstrations, and by the research into their core competencies during the 1970s. Yet, by the end of the millennium, police were not only pulling all of urban government towards community/neighborhood and problem-oriented models of practice, they were pulling other criminal justice agencies, especially prosecution and probation and parole, towards community and problem-oriented models as well. The ideas that drove community policing – police cannot manage without community consent and collaboration, problems are the proper unit of work, minor offenses and disorder are high priorities for citizens, serious offenders can only be managed by broad criminal justice and community collaborations (“pulling levers”), and police must talk with each other about substantive problems (e.g., Compstat) – are driving reform in these other sectors as well.

As far as police have come, however, problems remain, especially in policing minority communities. Yet few departments are not conscious of these difficulties and

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working to address them. In many respects, contemporary American police are the true inheritors of Sir Robert Peel's admonition that "the police are the public and the public are the police." While most police departments have a way to go before this principle is fully implemented, it is the driving vision now for a good share of America's police leaders.