The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title:	**Evaluation of SACSI in Winston-Salem: Engaging the Community in a Strategic Analysis of Youth Violence**
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Document No.:	**202977**
Date Received:	**11/21/2003**
Award Number:	**2000-IJ-CX-0048**

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Evaluation of SACSI in Winston-Salem: Engaging the Community in a Strategic Analysis of Youth Violence

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Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice

July 15, 2002

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ABSTRACT

Winston-Salem was one of five communities funded under the first round of Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI), an effort by the National Institute of Justice to bring together local partners in a strategic planning process that would address the community's most pressing violence issues. In Winston-Salem, SACSI focused on *youth violence* and involved partners from the U.S. Attorney's Office, law enforcement, social services, clergy, public housing, community-based organizations, and local universities.

The evaluation of Winston-Salem's SACSI was formative in nature, focusing on the partnerships and the problem-solving process that the Core Team and Working Group used to develop interventions to address youth violence, as well as the early outcomes associated with those interventions.

Based on interviews and questionnaires, the vast majority of SACSI partners believed that the collaborative process had led to important new partnerships that allowed agencies and organizations to work together toward a common purpose. Through this process, SACSI was also able to remedy much of the mistrust that historically characterized relations between law enforcement and some segments of the community.

The two primary strategies implemented under SACSI were 1) "Notification" sessions that warned offenders against committing violent acts, while also offering support from community agencies; and 2) "Operation Reach" sessions where teams of SACSI representatives visited offenders in their homes. These interventions provided a clear benefit in terms of strengthening relationships among the various SACSI partners. On the other hand, the interventions had an equivocal effect on the behavior of the targeted youth. Rates of re-offending among notified youth were largely equivalent to the rates observed in a comparison group. In addition, interviews with notified individuals indicated that at least some juveniles did not believe that they would be subject to harsh punishment if they committed further violence – at least as long as they were juveniles. It also appeared that the Notification model placed too much faith in the assumption that a one-time awareness-raising session could change behavior.

Despite the fact that there was limited evidence of behavior change among the youth who heard the SACSI message in Notification and Operation Reach, the five neighborhoods targeted by SACSI saw reductions in the rate of violent offending, particularly robbery. This apparent paradox suggests that SACSI's primary benefits occurred at the systems level – introducing new norms into the community and improving coordination among the various players who can influence violent behavior on the part of young persons.

I. Introduction

In the fall of 1998, the Department of Justice (DOJ) awarded two-year grants to Winston-Salem and four other communities under the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI). The "heart" of SACSI was a collaborative strategic-planning model designed to help communities find and implement effective strategies to address their most pressing crime problems.

Winston-Salem chose to focus efforts on reduction of serious juvenile violence. Using data collected by a research team from Wake Forest University (WFU) and Winston-Salem State University (WSSU) as a basis for decision-making, SACSI-initiated partnerships developed and implemented strategies that focused on specific individuals, sites and neighborhoods that had the highest rates of criminal violence. Gun-related violence received special emphasis, and the strategies aimed at changing behaviors of both juvenile offenders and adults who were recruiting juveniles into criminal activity. Implementation of major program activities began in September 1999.

During the summer of 2000 (approximately three-fourths of the way through the two-year SACSI grant), the U.S. Attorney's Office in Winston-Salem engaged a team of researchers from Winston-Salem State University and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro to conduct a preliminary evaluation of SACSI (in keeping with NIJ's grant requirements). Results of that evaluation are reported here.

The evaluation builds directly from the logic model that was developed by the Project Director with guidance from the research team. Under this design, the researchers employed various data collection methods (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, document review, observation of meetings and program sessions, focus groups) to assess whether SACSI was achieving the outcomes expected by the project team. The research activities, funded under the original NIJ grant and reported here, examine the process through which SACSI has been implemented in Winston-Salem, as well as the outcomes that occurred early in the change process. The overarching intent of this phase of the evaluation was to provide the various SACSI stakeholders with information on what the initiative has achieved over its first two years of operation. At the same time, we hope that the data reported here will establish a baseline for tracking the longer term, more systemic changes in violence-related norms and behavior that the initiative is ultimately designed to effect.

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II. Background

The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative

The Department of Justice developed SACSI to increase the capacity of U.S. Attorneys, working in partnership with federal, state and local criminal justice agencies and a research entity, to collaborate on data collection and analysis and to design targeted strategies and interventions to prevent and reduce crime. The department found that cities that had experienced the greatest reductions in crime had made a genuine effort to collect, share, combine, and analyze crime and other data, then used the results of the analysis to help describe and clarify the problem, suggest strategic opportunities for interventions, and illuminate efficient ways to employ limited resources. Thus, SACSI aimed to bolster the use of a collaborative, data-driven, problem-solving process that would allow working groups to identify and analyze their local crime problems, and devise and implement strategies likely to reduce the problems.

The SACSI model placed the local U.S. Attorney in a strong leadership role, although many other community partners were also expected to participate in the problem-solving process (e.g., local, state and federal law-enforcement agencies; district attorney; elected officials; probation and parole services; judges; schools; social services; nonprofit programs; faith community; businesses). In addition, SACSI called for a local research partner to be actively engaged in the process. The researcher was responsible for collecting and sharing empirical data on the nature of the violence problem in the community. By bringing together the data and the theoretical knowledge of researchers with the field experience of a variety of practitioners, SACSI was intended to foster informed, effective strategies. Because the planning and problem solving took place within a coalition representing powerful institutions and diverse perspectives, there would presumably be a broad commitment to implement the resultant strategies.

Winston-Salem's Response to the SACSI Request for Proposals

Well before SACSI was announced by DOJ, agencies from throughout Forsyth County had come together to develop comprehensive approaches to meet the needs of young persons at risk of committing violence. In September 1995, Walter Holton, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina began a series of meetings in Winston-Salem with the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Director of the Juvenile Justice Council to address an escalation in youth violence. They agreed that addressing this crisis would require confronting the root causes of problems facing youth in a countywide, comprehensive manner. A decision was made to bring together a leadership team to develop a coordinated, shared strategy to meet the challenge. This led to the creation of Forsyth Futures, a 20-member group of institutional leaders with goals of (1) advocating community priorities for children and youth which are family-focused and promote positive development; (2) seeking the effective allocation of community resources to better meet the needs of families and children; (3) identifying and removing system barriers that reduce effectiveness in serving children and youth; and (4) evaluating improved outcomes for children, youth and families.

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Forsyth Futures, with funding from the Governor's Crime Commission, spearheaded the creation of Communities That Care (CTC). CTC was comprised of front-line workers from agencies represented by Forsyth Futures, as well as a number of private, non-profit and community representatives. The CTC model aims at preventing juvenile crime by reducing risks while developing protective mechanisms for youth. A CTC planning team underwent a six-day training, analysis, and planning process involving data collection, community assessment, and the development of a risk and resiliency profile of the community. The planning team identified three risk factors in Winston-Salem: (1) community laws and norms favorable toward drug use, firearms, and crime; (2) family conflict; and (3) early and persistent antisocial behavior and academic failure. They went on to suggest desired objectives with regard to each risk factor, identify resources available to address each factor, and note modifications of those resources that would facilitate the development of protective mechanisms for youth through families, schools and communities.

Forsyth Futures also initiated a study that found a critical lack of agency coordination and information sharing among schools, service providers, and law enforcement agencies within the county. This led to the development of a computerized database and ISDN network, designed to enhance inter-agency coordination and sharing of juvenile and family information and related reports in standardized formats. Named Jason Network and sometimes referred to as JasonNet, this system includes information on children and youth involved with the juvenile justice system because of a chronic, serious, or first-time violent offense.

Further anticipating the SACSI approach, the U.S. Attorney's office and Wake Forest University hosted a Best Practices Conference, January 12-13, 1998, to discuss how to "build a bridge between the practitioner and the university that will allow the partners to develop, implement, and evaluate strategic solutions to targeted problems" ("Building the Bridge" Summary Document, 1998). Participants represented a diverse array of academic institutions, research-based organizations, and practitioners in the field of criminal and juvenile justice policy and practice. The conference resulted in a proposed model for building linkages between law enforcement, the community, and the university. The model, seen as transferable to any federal district, was composed of two key parts: an oversight Advisory Group and Issue-Specific Task Forces that would confront specific problems facing the community and seek funding to solve them.

When DOJ requested SACSI proposals, the U.S. Attorney assembled a Strategic Planning Core Team, including representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Schools, the Winston-Salem Police Department, the Juvenile Justice Council, Forsyth Juvenile Services, the Forsyth County Department of Social Services, Communities That Care, and Wake Forest University. The Core Team proposed that the Winston-Salem version of SACSI would focus on the issue of *youth violence* -- defined in terms of the following offenses: homicide, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping and weapons violations. This focus area emerged because of the extent of

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youth violence in Winston-Salem and the community's pre-existing commitment to solving the problem. The violent arrest rate for juveniles was 2.85 per 1000 in Forsyth County, compared to 1.82 per 1000 for North Carolina and 1.34 per 1000 for the United States as a whole. Thus the Core Team proposed a goal of reducing violent and assaultive crime rates in Forsyth County below the rates at state and national levels.

Winston-Salem submitted its SACSI proposal in November 1998 and received funding for two years, beginning in January 1999. (Also chosen as SACSI sites were Indianapolis, Indiana; Memphis, Tennessee; New Haven, Connecticut; and Portland, Oregon.) The award to Winston-Salem included $250,000 for research, a funded project coordinator position, and a $50,000 planning grant.

Overview of the Strategy-Development Process

In accord with DOJ's guidelines for SACSI, the Winston-Salem initiative was implemented according to a five-step process. The first step called for the formation of an inter-agency working group committed to addressing the issue of youth violence. Such a group already existed in Winston-Salem in the form of Forsyth Futures.

With this network already established, the initiative moved into the second stage, gathering information about the local crime problem. A team of researchers from Wake Forest University and Winston Salem State University did the analysis. This research included incident reviews, analysis of agency data, focus groups, and individual interviews of field workers, parents, and juveniles.

The third step in the five-step process was to design a strategic intervention to tackle the problem. The U.S. Attorney's Office from the Middle District of North Carolina took the lead role in this effort. A program manager was assigned to the initiative whose initial role was to "bring the key players to the table" to decide on the appropriate strategy for Winston Salem. A diverse "working group" consisting of various law-enforcement, criminal-justice and social-service agencies explored the research data and developed a multi-pronged strategy that focused on identifying, notifying and providing follow-up services to those individuals who were most responsible for violent juvenile crime in Winston-Salem. This strategy explicitly focused on the most serious offenders who were deemed as being "responsible" for the violence in four high-crime neighborhoods.

The fourth step was to implement this intervention, a still-evolving process. The fifth and final step is to assess and modify the strategy as the data reveal effects. This has been accomplished through ongoing action-research activities of researchers from Winston Salem State University and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Through interviews, focus groups, surveys, document reviews, observation of activities, and participation in all types of SACSI meetings, data have been collected, analyzed, and fed back to decision-making teams that continue to modify the strategy as needed.

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Preliminary Research to Develop the SACSI Strategy

Upon receiving funds from DOJ, the Winston-Salem SACSI undertook a concerted research effort to identify strategic leverage points that would allow the community to have a significant impact on the local youth-violence problem. A team of researchers from Wake Forest University (WFU) designed a study that would:

1) determine the prevailing characteristics of violent incidents (e.g., locations, time of day, incident type);
2) determine the prevailing characteristics of offenders and their victims (e.g., family history, place of residence, relationship between victim and offender); and
3) define the specific population of individuals who should be "targeted" by the initiative.

Initial questions that guided the analysis of the compilation of demographic profiles and of the incident reviews included the following:

- Are the incidents clustered geographically around particular schools, street corners, theaters, shopping malls, etc.?
- Are the offenders and/or victims under court supervision at the time of the incident?
- Are the incidents committed by a single individual or by a group?
- Are there ethnic, gender, social and economic variations?
- Is there a core group of offenders who are responsible for most incidents?
- To what degree are gangs or specific groups of juveniles responsible for most of in-school and out-of-school violence?

Research Design

In order to develop both short-term enforcement and prevention, and long-term intervention strategies, the WFU research team developed a research design that explicitly controlled for age. For practical and theoretical reasons, youth were divided into three age cohorts: 0-11 years, 12-15 years, and 16-17 years. These three cohorts parallel Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Schools' classifications of elementary, middle, and high schools, as well as being used in much of the research literature that analyzes problem behavior among juvenile offenders.

Two researchers from Winston-Salem State University (WSSU) joined the WFU research team in implementing the three major strategies employed in the design:

1) Identification of violent offenders;
2) Examination of violent incidents;
3) Exploration of offender and incident backgrounds and connections.

Identification of Violent Offenders

The initial data-collection strategy called for the identification of the most violent and at-risk juveniles in each of the three age cohorts. This process was carried out from both a law-enforcement perspective and a social-services perspective.

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On the law-enforcement side, the Winston-Salem Police Department identified juveniles in each cohort whom they deemed to be most violent or at the greatest risk of displaying violent behavior. This was determined by frequency of contact and/or arrest in those crime categories identified as constituting the most serious violent and assaultive behavior (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, kidnapping, weapons violations, communicating threats, sex offenses).

On the social-services side, the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County School System, Forsyth Juvenile Services, the Department of Social Services, and CenterPoint Human Services (mental health) generated similar lists. To do this, front-line service workers from each agency identified juveniles whom they considered to be the most violent or at the greatest risk of displaying violent behavior. Each worker was asked to provide a profile of each youth, including demographic data and reasons for selection.

Once these separate lists were compiled, the researchers developed a composite list of violent offenders. Youths were selected based on both the frequency of their cross-listing and the level of violence involved. Individuals whose names appeared on all lists were noted as "high at-risk" juveniles and placed in the semi-final subject pool.

The list of violent youths was finalized using a focus group of front-line workers from the various agencies involved in the process. For a youth to be included in the final list, he or she needed to be "approved" by this group. In addition, the group could add any other individual whom they believed to be a significant "high at-risk" individual.

Once the final offender subject pool was defined, descriptions were developed of their demographic and residential characteristics. Focus groups with front-line workers as well as other youth-service providers provided additional insight into criminal histories of offenders as well as victims. Drawing on these quantitative and qualitative data sources, general statistical patterns were identified and demographic profiles of offenders were developed.

Examination of Violent Incidents

In addition compiling a list of offenders, the research team identified the most violent crimes committed during 1998 and 1999 by reviewing incident reports and case reports maintained by law-enforcement agencies. These violent incidents were presented to a review team comprised of front-line workers. The reports were examined individually to probe for a deeper understanding of the specifics of the incidents (including precipitating event, prior conflicts, etc.). This intense examination yielded qualitative information to guide intervention strategies and helped ensure a focus on the most at-risk juveniles in each cohort.

This same group of front-line personnel also examined drug incident reports from 1998 and 1999. This was intended to provide the group with a deeper understanding of the role that drugs play in juvenile violent and assaultive behavior.

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Exploration of Offender and Incident Backgrounds and Connections
Based on the results of the focus groups with front-line workers as well as previous studies, questions were developed for interview protocols. These protocols were used to conduct interviews with a variety of individuals, including juvenile offenders and individual front-line service workers. The analytic focus extended beyond the individual offender to include parents as well, allowing the analysis to address the issue of learning of violence within families. Because violent individuals are typically products of violent systems and structures, the research team considered it essential to use interviews to cast a wider net around the problem. Insights from these individuals were used in understanding the implications of the data; i.e., these interviews helped put the quantitative data "into the practitioner's context." These focus group sessions and interviews helped sharpen and deepen the discussions of potential intervention and prevention strategies.

Results of the Research
The first important finding from the SACSI research process was that Winston-Salem's youth-violence problem was confined to a relatively small proportion of the community's young persons. In 1998, there were 68,298 persons under age 18 residing in Forsyth County, of whom 2,816 (4.1%) had been charged with some type of criminal offense. Of the 2,816 juveniles who had been arrested, only 243 had been charged for *violent* offenses (0.4% of the total juvenile population) and a much smaller number (36, or 0.05% of the population) were regarded as "serious violent offenders."

A similar analysis of offenders involved in 1998 offenses affirms that a small number of juveniles is responsible for Winston-Salem's juvenile violence. In 1998, 140 juveniles (less than one-fourth of one percent of the city's juvenile population) accounted for the city's juvenile violence. Of these, 32 were repeat violent offenders during 1998. Over half of the 140 youth were under probation supervision, and the other half had had frequent contacts with the police. Slightly more than half (52%) had had one or more contacts with CenterPoint Human Services for mental health issues. Of these, about half had been involved in firearm violations.

This analysis suggested to the Core Team that the most efficient method of preventing youth violence was to focus on the relatively few individuals who commit a disproportionate amount of the crime. These serious offenders were assumed to be the persons most likely to commit violent crime in the future. In addition, these offenders tend to be embedded in larger social networks containing young persons who have not yet committed a violent offense. As a result, the Core Team concluded that intervening with serious offenders would break up the pattern of peer influence that draws more youth into violence.

The research also showed that youth violence was concentrated not just among specific individuals, but also in specific neighborhoods of Winston-Salem. A disproportionate proportion of the violent incidents involving youth occurred in four neighborhoods:

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Southside, Cleveland Avenue, Kimberly Park/North Cherry, and Happy Hill Gardens. In order to gain the greatest "return on investment," SACSI focused its violence-prevention activities in these four neighborhoods.

The research process produced a number of additional findings regarding the pattern of violent offending in Winston-Salem:

- **Older/Younger co-offenders**. Juveniles were often brought into a life of violence by adults. One-fourth of juvenile crimes involved someone older than 18 as well.
- **Pathway crimes**. Many of the juveniles arrested for violent crimes had a prior history of lesser offenses, specifically simple assault, drug trafficking, auto theft, sexual offenses, and communicating threats.
- **Mental health needs**. The research team gathered anecdotal reports from law-enforcement agencies and social-service providers that many violent offenders (both first-time and repeat offenders) had psychological and/or emotional disabilities. The vast majority of these conditions remained untreated.
- **Location.** Much juvenile violence occurred in a limited number of identifiable "hot spots," including specific convenience stores, poorly lighted streets, abandoned houses and dead-end streets.

In addition to these findings on the nature of offending, the researchers also gained an expanded understanding of how adequately or inadequately the existing "system" prevented youth violence:

- **Limited consequences.** Because of the inherent "laxness" of the juvenile-justice system, offenders did not hear a strong, consistent message that violent offending is a serious matter. In particular, juveniles convicted of violent offenses were often sentenced to either probation or training school.
- **Lack of social support.** Many of the juveniles convicted of violence came from single-parent households and had few positive role models in their lives.
- **Education and job training.** Many serious offenders had dropped out of school or been expelled. Without a diploma and job skills, they had little chance of gainful employment.
- **Lack of coordination of services.** Although Forsyth County had many programs and services that could support positive development on the part of juveniles at risk for violent offending, these intervention and prevention programs tended to be widely scattered across different agencies that did not coordinate their work.

Development of a Strategic Approach

At about the same time that the research process was generating its first set of results, the U.S. Attorney's Office convened representatives from various agencies to develop an appropriate strategy. Initially this Working Group included the following partner agencies:

- Winston Salem Police Department

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- Winston Salem/Forsyth County School System
- Office of Juvenile Justice
- Forsyth County Sheriff's Department
- CenterPoint Human Services
- Department of Social Services
- Department of Community Corrections
- Forsyth County District Attorney's Office
- Winston Salem Urban League
- Clergy and community advocates

On May 5, 1999, a SACSI planning conference, attended by approximately 100 people from the Winston-Salem area, was held at Wake Forest University. The morning session focused on results of the research conducted by the team from Wake Forest and Winston-Salem State universities, followed by a discussion of how SACSI might fit within the context of ongoing community initiatives. Conference participants also heard details of a program in High Point, North Carolina, based on the model developed in Boston and Minneapolis and aimed at reducing adult violence. The afternoon session was devoted to developing an action plan based on the research findings. Breakout groups worked on devising strategies in three areas: (1) environmental factors and chronic offenders, (2) coordination of responses, monitoring, and mental health, and (3) targeted intervention and prevention strategies.

Research findings and strategies proposed at the planning conference served as the basis for developing an implementation action plan. Key findings guiding the plan included the clustering of juvenile violence; co-offending of older and younger individuals; identification of key individuals; and the need for greater coordination of services, more after-school activities, expanded mentoring programs, and some way of identifying and dealing with mental health needs.

Based on the fact that the data showed juvenile violence was the city's main concern, a four-pronged intervention strategy was implemented. This included:

- Notifying older offenders to stop involving juveniles in criminal activity, and responding quickly to violations through federal and state prosecution.
- Expanding the notification process to include repeat juvenile offenders and their parents and more extensive monitoring by police and probation officers.
- Ensuring that community groups designate repeat offenders as a top priority for intervention services and treatment needs, and developing a case management system based on the Forsyth Futures electronic network (Jason Network).
- Developing the appropriate resources (such as mentors, job skills training, and after school activities) to provide services for repeat offenders and others identified through SACSI analysis as emerging offenders.

Action teams for implementation, building on the collaborative partnerships already established, were created in three areas: community enforcement, intervention, and

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prevention. Specific action steps, consistent with the strategies outlined above, were pursued by each team.

The fundamental strategy of the Community Enforcement Action Team involved focusing efforts on those repeat offenders -- adult and older youth -- who were primarily responsible for violent acts in specific neighborhoods identified by SACSI research. The team communicated directly with these offenders that they must stop the violence or face serious consequences. The team also offered supportive resources to those youth who indicated a willingness to change their behavior. The Community Enforcement Action Team coordinated its activities with city efforts to impact locations that were magnets for criminal activity.

The Intervention Action Team employed a fundamental strategy of more intensely monitoring violent offenders and emerging violent offenders identified through SACSI research. It developed a case-management process to ensure priority treatment and consistent follow-through, aided by enhanced mentoring programs. It also explored prospects for more intensive monitoring through special police/probation teams and new avenues available through juvenile justice reform measures.

The Prevention Action Team's fundamental strategy was to develop an inventory of effective, culturally specific prevention and intervention services for SACSI-identified youth and their families. The services were intended to provide support for service delivery needs that were identified during notification sessions and the case-management process. Priority was placed on research-identified areas such as mentoring, job-skills training and after-school programs needed by these youth in high-crime neighborhoods.

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III. Winston-Salem's Strategy to Reduce Youth Violence

Overview

In order to reach its goal of reducing Winston Salem's juvenile-violence rate below state and national levels, the SACSI Core Team and the various partner agencies from throughout the community developed a comprehensive yet focused strategy for addressing the major underlying factors identified by the research process. Beginning with the group of youth that is most directly involved in violence (i.e., repeat offenders), the project delivers a strong message regarding the community's unwillingness to tolerate violent behavior, tempered by a reaching out with supportive services.

The Community Enforcement Action Team decided to deliver the "stop-the-violence" message to juvenile offenders, as well as to adult offenders who were known to be involving juveniles in their crimes. The message is delivered during **Notification** sessions, where the offenders are "called in" to the Winston-Salem Police Department. The "stop-the-violence" message is delivered not only by law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors (local, state and federal), but also by community representatives, including clergy from the SACSI neighborhoods. The Action Team presents a united front in proclaiming that "violence will not be tolerated within Winston-Salem." At the same time, the Action Team tempers the enforcement message with an offering of supportive resources to those youth who indicate a willingness to change their behavior.

Operation Reach was created as a follow-up to Notification sessions. On specific pre-designated dates, teams of police officers, probation officers, clergy, and community advocates visit the homes of youth who have previously been notified. Team members reinforce the notification message and reiterate the offer of support and assistance. A packet provided to families on these visits includes information on available counseling/family support, substance abuse treatment, mentoring programs, after-school activities/tutoring, educational opportunities, and job skills training. In some cases, Operation Reach teams have also walked neighborhood streets and visited "hot spots" where there are high concentrations of juvenile violence, distributing flyers with the same messages to any youth they encounter.

Notification and Operation Reach were hypothesized to prevent youth violence according to the mechanisms shown in the SACSI Logic Model (Figure 1). This diagram includes a number of distinct "tracks" for the different sub-populations that SACSI sought to influence.

The initial SACSI strategy also included the following proposed activities designed to help notified youth take advantage of critical supportive services:

- **Case staffings** in which the young person, family members and agency workers would develop a coordinated plan to assist the young person in accessing needed services. A "case services coordinator" would monitor the plans and ensure that the services were being delivered.
- A **mentoring** program operated by the Winston-Salem Urban League.

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- A **job training** program that would link SACSI youth to existing and new job-training and workforce-development resources.

In addition to these primary approaches that emerged from the planning process, SACSI also maintained the "incident-review" process that played a key role in identifying the individuals and hot spots on which Notification and Operation Reach initially focused. This review was institutionalized as the **Violent Incident Review Team (VIRT)**, wherein representatives from the Winston-Salem Police Department, the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the District Attorney and selected service-provider agencies meet every other week to review violent incidents and to plan a coordinated law-enforcement/legal response.

A number of other programs have become part of SACSI since the strategy was initially implemented. Some of these were developed as "official" SACSI activities as new funding was obtained: Streetworkers, JasonNet, Project Fresh Start, and the Cross-Agency Team. Other programs have become "affiliated" with SACSI as their staff members have joined the SACSI Working Group (e.g., the Truancy Team, Parenting A+, Weed and Seed, Project Fresh Start).

Management of the SACSI Process

To a large extent, the "SACSI process" of community-based problem solving is carried out in three distinct venues:

1. **Meetings of the Core Team**. The 14-member Core Team is a group of institutional leaders (e.g., U.S. Attorney, Superintendent of Schools, Police Chief, Director of CenterPoint Human Services, Director of the district office of the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) who established the strategic focus and programmatic direction for SACSI during the initial planning phase of the initiative. This group has continued to meet approximately every 2-3 months to review progress, revisit the initial decisions, and explore new opportunities.
2. **Meetings of the Working Group and other teams**. The Working Group consists of about 25 individuals who are "on the ground" carrying out the programs and activities of SACSI. These individuals represent the same agencies involved in the Core Team, plus a number of community-based organizations that have become invested in SACSI over the course of the first two years of operation (e.g., Parks and Recreation, Urban League, VisionsWork Youth Services). The Working Group meets on a bi-weekly basis to identify and work through operational issues that affect SACSI's effectiveness. Also meeting biweekly is the Violent Incident Review Team, which discusses all serious violent incidents in the community that have come to the attention of the police in the previous two weeks. Possible coordinated responses to some of those events are considered. (The Community Action Team, which is no longer active, listed 39 members and met monthly through early 2001 to address issues related to coordinated delivery of services. Such activities are now incorporated into the work of other teams.) Some of these teams have overlapping memberships.

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3. **Project Management**. A full-time project manager coordinates the day-to-day operations of SACSI (e.g., Notification, Operation Reach, VIRT, meetings of the Core Team and Working Group, grant-writing, relationship-building, public relations, political navigation). This position was initially supported by DOJ funds and housed in the U.S. Attorney's Office. With the expiration of the SACSI grant, the position was moved to the new Center for Community Safety at Winston-Salem State University, funded by the Kate B. Reynolds Charitable Trust. At the same time, the original SACSI Project Manager, Sylvia Oberle, assumed responsibility for directing the Center. Rick Pender became the new SACSI Project Manager in the spring of 2001.

Target Populations

The Core Team "stratified" its strategy by age groups so that interventions would address age-specific situations and needs. The first age group consists of children 11 years of age or younger. The purpose of targeting this age group is prevention, because youth at this level are at the beginning stages of delinquency, and many exhibit strong warning signals of future violent offenses. The second age group is adolescents ages 12-15. During this period there is a noticeable shift in status from victim to offender among a significant number of individuals. This also seems to be the age when juveniles are most likely to start committing violent offenses. The third age group consists of youth 16-17 years old. This age group was singled out for two reasons: of the three juvenile cohorts they exhibit the largest number of incidents of violent crime, and North Carolina law allows for these individuals to be tried as adults. The fourth and final group of interest is young adults 18 and older. This age group is important because 1998 figures showed that one-fourth of all juvenile crimes committed involved someone older than 18. Thus, it is clear that offenders in this age group may be "recruiting" juveniles to commit violent crime.

As noted above, specific neighborhoods as well as specific age groups are being targeted. In 1998, these neighborhoods accounted for 60% of the city's overall juvenile violence. They include the Cleveland Avenue, Happy Hill Gardens, Southside, and Kimberly Park/North Cherry Street communities. Violence in these areas tends to be related to a number of factors, such as the drug trade, access to handguns, and the physical features of the neighborhood (dead-end streets, and convenience stores).

Program activities have centered around one message, that violence will not be tolerated. Law enforcement, clergy, probation/parole, and community service agencies collaborate in trying to communicate with the community and to show offenders that they are working together to end juvenile violence.

Specific Programmatic Components in Winston-Salem's SACSI

This mix of "hard" and "soft" messages is expressed primarily through the Notification program, then followed up with Operation Reach. A number of other program elements

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(e.g., the Violent Incident Review Team, the mentoring program, Streetworkers, Jason Net) reinforce these messages either with specific action or close monitoring.

Notification

Notification sessions serve as the central element to Winston-Salem's SACSI approach. Under Notification, the Winston-Salem Police Department "calls in" a group of individuals that the initiative is attempting to reach (e.g., juveniles with a history of violent offending, juveniles who have exhibited behavior that suggests they are on the path to violent crime, adult offenders who have involved juveniles in their crime). Typically, those being notified are on probation. Over the course of a 1-2 hour session, the participants are repeatedly "notified" that the community will not tolerate any more instances of violent behavior on their part. The message for older offenders is "No guns, no violence, and do not involve kids in criminal activity". For juveniles the message of "No guns, no violence" is the same. However, their parents are encouraged to attend the Notification session, and more resources are offered to them from community service agencies.

Each session involves federal, state and local law enforcement as well as federal and state prosecutors, community members, clergy, and Streetworkers who try to make offenders aware of the potential consequences of their actions. The purpose of bringing all of the above people together is to demonstrate a collaborative effort between the community and government officials and to give offenders a strong warning that if they continue to be involved in criminal activity, serious consequences will be enforced.

Operation Reach

Operation Reach was created as a follow-up to the notification session. The activity involves several four-to-six-person teams, comprised of police officers, probation officers, clergy, and community advocates. A team visits the homes of youth who have been notified to reinforce the notification message and to reiterate the offer of support and assistance. Team members observe the conditions of the home environment and try to determine whether appropriate resources have been utilized and whether additional resources may be needed. Team leaders are expected to record relevant information and deliver it to the SACSI program manager, who is responsible for managing the information. A packet provided to families on these visits includes information on available counseling/family support, substance abuse treatment, mentoring programs, after-school activities/tutoring, educational opportunities, and job skills training. In some cases, Operation Reach teams have also walked neighborhood streets and visited "hot spots" where there are high concentrations of juvenile violence, distributing flyers with the same messages to any youth they encounter.

Violent Incident Review Team

The Violent Incident Review Team (VIRT) is responsible for addressing acts of violence in Winston Salem. The team is composed of police officers, federal agents, representatives from the U.S. Attorney's and District Attorney's offices, streetworkers, and a representative from the housing authority. Cases that have occurred within the

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previous two weeks are reviewed and discussed until a consensus is reached regarding the appropriate law enforcement and legal actions to be taken.

Targeted law-enforcement response
The Targeted Law Enforcement Response is designed to respond to acts of violence, such as homicides, shootings, or armed robberies, in the community. Depending on the situation, law enforcement officers from all levels of government may participate. License checks are done, and if there is no one being adjudicated for the crime, door-to-door correspondence with neighborhood residents may be implemented for the purpose of gaining leads in the case. In addition to this, flyers are given to motorists and passers-by explaining the purpose of the response and listing a number for anyone to call if they are aware of any information pertaining to the case.

Mentoring program
The Prevention Action Team used the findings of both local SACSI research and national research to develop a mentoring program for SACSI youth. That program is now administered by the Urban League, which has hired a mentoring coordinator with funds from the federal Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative. The program identifies and trains mentors to work with SACSI youth, their siblings, and other youth beginning to become involved in more serious crimes. Sessions are held daily from 3-5 p.m., in which youth are able to discuss with mentors and each other issues that are pertinent to them. They are also required to follow a curriculum that is designed to teach them the importance of respect, responsibility, and good decision-making skills.

Streetworkers
VisonsWork Youth Services received funding from the Governor's Crime Commission to launch a Streetworker Program July 1, 2000. The program is patterned after a street-level outreach program in Boston, recently visited by the three-person Winston-Salem team. The Streetworker Program puts outreach workers directly in touch with SACSI-identified youth in their own neighborhoods, providing a link between the young people and needed community resources. A major focus of the Streetworker effort has been the identification of job training and employment opportunities for the youth.

Project Fresh Start
The motivation underlying Project Fresh Start was to increase the ability of offenders to find a decent job. Rev. Ray Watlington, one of the clergy who speaks to offenders during Notifcation, took the initiative to identify employers who would be willing to take a chance with the youth who contacted him looking for work. From there, the program began to emphasize the development of job skills among offenders. As a joint project of Streetworkers, the Urban League, Workforce Development, SACSI and Weed and Seed, Project Fresh Start provides up to 40 hours of initial job preparation and up to 90 days of on-the-job training for qualified individuals. An employment specialist provides on-site job coaching and consultation for clients who are placed with employers. In addition, Streetworkers provide a number of supportive services designed to enhance the client’s

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ability to maintain a job. Clients of Project Fresh Start have found work with employers such as the Winston-Salem Housing Authority and Dairy Fresh.

Cross-Agency Team

The purpose of the Cross-Agency Team is to eliminate gaps in service delivery by combining the efforts of multiple service agencies. The partners, each of whom employs one team member, include Winston Salem/Forsyth County Schools, Forsyth County Department of Social Services, CenterPoint Human Services, and the Department of Juvenile Justice. Team members work together with youth and their families to reduce the rates of juvenile crime by:

- Strengthening families
- Increasing positive peer relationships and social skills
- Fostering personal accountability and respect for family and community
- Removing barriers to academic progress
- Improving coordination between agencies and other community resources.

Jason Network

Jason Network (JasonNet) is a computerized database and ISDN network designed to link children and family service providers with law enforcement agencies in Forsyth County. It is intended to enhance interagency coordination by the sharing of juvenile and family information and related reports in standardized formats as permitted by law. Currently it connects six child-serving agencies that include: CenterPoint Human Services, North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (21st Judicial District), Forsyth County Department of Social Services, Forsyth County Sheriff's Office, Winston Salem/Forsyth County Schools, and the Winston Salem Police Department.

Public information provided by WS/FC Schools under the Family Education and Privacy Rights Act serves as the initial database. Information about youth who are involved with the juvenile justice system on a chronic, serious, or first-time violent offense is included in the system. Its purpose is to help agencies become better aware of which children and families may be in desperate need of services.

Weed and Seed

The Weed and Seed Initiative is a federal program designed to "weed" a community of drugs and crime using law enforcement and then to "seed" the area with community-building resources. Thus, the initiative brings extra law enforcement resources to drug and other criminal activity, while helping designated neighborhoods build their capacity for intervention and prevention.

In addition to the initial Salem Gardens site in Winston-Salem, the city has received approval to expand its Weed & Seed sites to include those areas identified through SACSI research with high concentrations of juvenile violence: Cleveland Avenue, Happy Hill Gardens, Southside, and Kimberly Park/North Cherry Street.

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Since the objectives of SACSI and Weed and Seed are very similar, the approach has been for the initiatives to work together to address juvenile violent crime. At this point both programs are housed at the Center for Community Safety at Winston-Salem State University, and the Weed and Seed coordinator is part of all of SACSI's community efforts to reduce violent crime. The coordinator participates in Notification, Operation Reach, VIRT, Targeted Law Enforcement Responses, and the SACSI Working Group.

Additional Programs Linked to SACSI

During the same time period as the planning conference at Wake Forest University, SACSI research served as the basis for a Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative grant application. As a result, approximately $6 million was received from the U. S. Departments of Justice, Education, and Health and Human Services in September 1999, for the pursuit of comprehensive school- and community-based efforts. Supported by the grant are truancy teams of social workers and school resource officers; classroom training in violence prevention and aggressive behavior; and special after-school programs in high-crime neighborhoods. The comprehensive program, managed by Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Schools, also involves a number of other agencies, including CenterPoint Human Services, the Urban League, the Police Department, and the Juvenile Justice Council. As noted above, Safe Schools/Healthy Student Initiative funds have also been used to hire a mentoring coordinator.

As the SACSI strategy developed and the second federal initiative brought together many of the same partners, SACSI collaboration with other programs and the creation of new programs came to be seen as essential. Two of those programs are the Truancy Team, and Parenting A+.

Truancy program

The Office of Truancy Prevention is a collaboration between the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office and Winston Salem/Forsyth County Schools. The goal of the office is to reduce the number of unexcused absences and to promote good habits of school attendance. The team is composed of deputy sheriffs and school social workers, who work with students and their families to solve problems that interfere with good attendance. Resources in the school and the community are utilized to support and build bridges for families, so that they may participate and support their children's education. Team members educate parents and students on the importance of good attendance, make suggestions on how to improve attendance, explain when it is appropriate to be absent, and enforce the law when necessary.

Parenting A+

Through another collaborative arrangement, the Forsyth County Department of Public Health and the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County School System administer the Parenting A+ program. Under Parenting A+, a registered nurse and a licensed social worker provide intensive home visitation services to help young women and men develop more effective parenting skills. Clients include pregnant teens, low-income parents, parents

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planning the birth of their first child, and pregnant/parenting youth who have been involved with the law enforcement system. The program is designed to:

- Enhance parent-child attachment
- Increase parenting skills
- Increase positive health practices
- Increase school attendance and achievement
- Decrease involvement with law enforcement
- Increase economic self-reliance

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IV. Evaluation Strategy

Background

One of the critical features that distinguishes SACSI among violence-prevention strategies is the direct involvement of researchers in the operation of the initiative. In designing SACSI, the Department of Justice envisioned a collaborative process whereby researchers would collect empirical data on the nature of the violence problem in the community (e.g., comparative statistics, geographic patterns, temporal trends, demographic predictors) and share that information with the other partners in the local initiative. According to an article written by the U.S. Attorneys in the five communities funded under SACSI, "unlike traditional research involving neutral observation, [SACSI] expects research partners to be fully engaged in problem solving" (p. 11).

As noted earlier, a team of researchers from Wake Forest University was included in the initial group that launched SACSI in Winston-Salem. That research team focused its data-gathering efforts on issues that would help set the strategic direction for the local initiative. By exploring crime statistics and arrest records, the team helped the planning group to focus on youth violence, to select four critical neighborhoods and to recognize how much of the violence problem stemmed from the actions of repeat offenders.

In addition to using research to set strategic direction, SACSI also called for researchers to support the local partnerships through program evaluation activities. A team of researchers from Winston-Salem State University and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro entered the Winston-Salem SACSI project in August 2000 with the express purpose of carrying out an initial evaluation of key aspects of the local initiative.

The evaluation contained both *formative* and *summative* elements. The formative aspect of the evaluation addressed the SACSI requirement for ongoing learning and refinement of anti-violence strategies. Namely, by feeding back interim findings on an ongoing basis, the managers of the SACSI process (i.e., the individuals who were staffing the initiative, along with the community partners involved in the Core Team and Working Group) had access to information and outside perspectives that could support the refinement of activities such as Notification and Operation Reach, as well as the identification of new strategies to address unmet needs. From the summative side, the evaluation was expected to yield enough outcome information to provide a sense of how much effect the initiative was having on the target populations. These data would obviously be useful to the local initiative, in terms of documenting successes and attracting additional support from funders, new partner agencies and community members. Summative data also assist other communities in understanding the potential benefits of the SACSI approach, as well as researchers who are exploring alternative approaches to addressing violence issues and developing new theoretical models.

In addition to preparing this final report, the evaluation team also summarized the findings-to-date at various points during the evaluation process. Interim reports were presented to the Working Group and the Core Team at many of their regular meetings. More detailed information was provided to SACSI staff in less formal settings. This

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feedback process was designed to provide the SACSI project team with timely data and recommendations that could be used to understand the effects of their work and to make that work more effective going forward. This emphasis on client-driven evaluation questions and active, ongoing learning reflects the research team's philosophy of "participatory evaluation." Throughout the year-long evaluation process, the research team maintained close connection with those persons who were directly involved in managing and carrying out the various programs under SACSI. These relationships allowed for the free exchange of ideas, data, recommendations and concerns, all of which are essential if the evaluation is to fulfill its potential as a tool for organizational learning and program development.

The evaluation was designed during August and September of 2000. The data-collection process was carried out between September 2000 and March 2001. As such, this report reflects the status of SACSI as of March 31, 2001. It is important to note that many changes have been made to the initiative since the end of the data-collection phase (many of them in response to recommendations that emerged from the early evaluation findings). Future evaluation work will be required to capture those refinements and to provide a long-term assessment of SACSI's impact on the safety of the Winston-Salem community.

Development of the Evaluation Design

The evaluation design presented here emerged from a 2½-month planning process that directly involved the project team in specifying the evaluation questions.

Clarifying the Assumptions and Expectations Underlying SACSI

The first phase of the process involved the identification of the various intentions and expectations that surround SACSI - both within the local community and at the national level (i.e., within NIJ). The research team met with the project director and other key staff members from the US Attorney's Office in Winston-Salem in order to learn about the process through which the community developed its approach to addressing youth violence (beginning with Forsyth Futures and then extending that work through the SACSI grant).

The second phase of the evaluation-planning effort involved a more focused investigation of the specific expectations that program staff have for the different components of SACSI. This stage consisted of a series of steps that allowed the project to be mapped out, both in terms of how the specific program elements relate to one another and in describing the presumed process through which "success" will be obtained. In particular, a *logic model* was constructed indicating the chain of events that link the different program elements of SACSI to the desired reductions in youth violence.

After receiving general direction from the research team, the SACSI project director took the lead in creating the initiative's logic model. The model was then presented to the other key players in SACSI (e.g., staff members of the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Core

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Team, the Working Group) for their review and input. Over the course of this process of drafting and redrafting, the model was refined to reflect the collective thinking of the entire project team, while at the same time bringing these individuals together around a common "picture" of what SACSI was trying to accomplish and how those objectives would be achieved.

The Logic Model

The resultant logic model is shown in Figure 1. This figure organizes the key SACSI interventions around "tracks" of offenders:

> **Track 1A**: Juvenile offenders who had committed 2 or more SACSI-defined crimes (i.e., aggravated assault, homicide, rape, kidnapping, robbery, sexual offenses, weapons violations)
> **Track 1B**: Adult offenders with a history of involving juveniles in violent crime
> **Track 2**: Juvenile offenders who had been arrested once for a SACSI-defined crime
> **Track 3**: Juvenile offenders arrested for a gun-related crime, but had no history of violent offenses
> **Track 4**: Juveniles identified as being at risk for violent offending, but who were not under court supervision.

The more specific "precipitating conditions" for each track are shown in the top row of Figure 1.

The third row ("message") outlines the specific message that SACSI attempted to communicate to the offenders in each track. For Tracks 1 and 2 (where the targeted individuals had already committed a violent act), the message was "stop violent behavior," while for Tracks 3 and 4 (youth who had not yet moved to the stage of committing violent offenses), the message was more preventive in orientation ("stop being involved with people who might lead you to violence"). The message varied across the different tracks in a number of other ways, particularly with regard to the degree of emphasis on punishment for violent crimes versus the community's desire to provide supportive services.

The fourth row of the logic model ("notification/communication") indicates how and where the SACSI message was communicated to the individuals in each track. For Tracks 1A, 1B and 2, the message was delivered at the Police Department. Track 3 offenders were delivered the SACSI message during home visits conducted as part of Operation Reach. Track 4 youth were notified in school settings.

The last row ("follow-up activities") puts the notification intervention in a larger context. SACSI called for a large complement of activities to identify the youth to be notified, to deliver the "no-violence" message, to offer support, and to track criminal activities following notification. The extent of follow-up and monitoring varied significantly across the different tracks.

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Finally, the logic model specified what was expected to result from all these interventions. The second row of Figure 1 ("Desired Outcomes") indicates the attitudes, behaviors and beliefs that offenders were expected to adopt or to change following their involvement with Notification, Operation Reach, mentoring, etc. Many of these desired outcomes directly mirror the message delivered during notification: stopping further violence, putting down guns, not involving youth in violent crime, choosing a more positive lifestyle. In addition, the individuals involved in designing and implementing SACSI hoped that notified individuals would disseminate the "no more violence" message to others in their neighborhood.

Admittedly, Figure 1 is not a "fully developed" logic model, in the sense of depicting how each of the desired outcomes is hypothesized to result from the activities. For example, it is unclear from the figure exactly how notification and the follow-up activities will cause violent offenders to "stop violence." One possible mechanism would be that offenders: a) hear the message; b) recognize that more violence will result in conviction and incarceration; c) weigh the costs and benefits of a violent life course versus a "positive" life course; d) make a rational choice to give up violence; and e) carry out that choice by substituting a socially responsible lifestyle (e.g., finding and holding a job) for their existing, violence-laden lifestyle.

Because of time constraints, the complexity of the SACSI approach and the number of individuals involved in designing the various components of the initiative, a fully mapped-out logic model was not prepared prior to carrying out the evaluation. However, Figure 1 constituted a "complete" enough picture to provide the research team with guidance as to what to measure with regard to the process and outcomes of notification and operation reach. It should also be noted that over the course of the evaluation period, the SACSI project team continued to probe into the logic of the initiative, and in particular, to elucidate and test assumptions as to what it takes for violent offenders to change their behavior.

Deciding What to Evaluate

In the third phase of this process, the evaluation plan was actually developed using the logic model developed by the SACSI Project Director. The logic model provided general direction as to the shorter term outcomes that were critical to assess with the evaluation. For example, a recurring theme in the logic model is the importance of disseminating the message that "violence will not be tolerated," both to individuals who have already been convicted of a violent offense and to the community as a whole; the evaluation will thus assess the strength of this message (both as it is sent by SACSI and as it is received by the target audience).

This phase of the evaluation-design process also included the collection of preliminary interview data in order to establish clearer direction for measuring client-level outcomes. In particular, the research team interviewed eight individuals from law enforcement, the courts and community-based organizations who deliver the Notification and Operation Reach programs to offenders. These interviewees reported their beliefs as to how the

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SACSI strategies would "work" in preventing youth violence in Winston-Salem. The findings from these interviews were used to design specific data-collection instruments to test whether or not the individuals who have been notified under SACSI respond according to the logic model.

Scope of Evaluation

The evaluation design was intended to assess how the Winston-Salem initiative operated with regard to both the overall SACSI process and two key program strategies (Notification and Operation Reach). As such, there were two quite distinct "levels" of evaluation, as shown in Table 1. Each level has its own set of evaluation questions and its own evaluation methods. In general, the evaluation of the SACSI process is more macro in orientation than is the evaluation of the two program strategies.

The evaluation of the SACSI process was essentially an assessment of managerial processes such as strategic planning, collaboration, gathering political support and coordinating the various administrative responsibilities and programmatic strategies. For this level of evaluation, the research team relied on interviews with SACSI team members, direct observation of meetings and review of documents to understand what the SACSI problem-solving process looks like in practice. These methods explored topics such as the choice of strategic issues, collaboration among key players, decision-making procedures, management of the initiative and organizational culture.

The **program-level** evaluation was designed to answer questions related to the operation of SACSI's key program strategies. Namely, were Notification and Operation Reach effective in communicating the message that "violence will not be tolerated in Winston-Salem" and providing youthful offenders with opportunities and support for a more positive life course? This question was answered using four distinct methods:

1. observation of Notification and Operation Reach sessions;
2. structured interviews with SACSI representatives (e.g., police chief, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, probation officers, clergy) who carried out Notification and Operation Reach sessions;
3. structured interviews with offenders who "received" the Notification and Operation Reach messages; and
4. a focus group with parents of offenders.

In addition to these process-evaluation methods, the evaluation team also examined the criminal records of individuals who were notified to assess whether Notification prevented subsequent offending. Police data were also used to track changes in overall violent offending within the SACSI-designated neighborhoods.

Specific Methods

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Table 1 indicates which evaluation methods were employed to answer the various evaluation questions that defined the design. In sum, the following methods were employed:

1. Survey of the Working Group and Core Team on the SACSI process
2. Interviews with the Core Team
3. Interviews with the Project Director
4. Observation of Notification
5. Observation of Operation Reach
6. Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Notification
7. Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Operation Reach
8. Interviews with Offenders who Participated in SACSI
9. Focus Group with Parents
10. Analysis of Reoffending among SACSI Offenders
11. Analysis of Violence Trends in Winston-Salem

This section of the report provides detail on each of these methods. The actual questionnaires and interview guides are included in the Appendix.

It should be noted that all individuals who provided data for the evaluation (through interviews, written surveys or focus groups) completed an informed-consent form approved by the Winston-Salem State University (WSSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB). Before conducting interviews with minors, the researchers ensured that a parent or guardian had signed the consent form.

SACSI Process Questionnaire

The survey covered a broad range of issues related to the way in which the SACSI process was unfolding from the perspective of the Core Team and the Working Group. All members of the Core Team and the Working Group were provided with questionnaires to complete at the beginning of one of their respective meetings. The questionnaires were essentially equivalent except that Core Team members were asked to rate a number of issues with regard to the Core Team, while Working Group members were asked to rate those same issues with regard to the Working Group.

The survey questions were divided into five sections:

I. Perceived functioning of the Core Team/ Working Group: clarity of the goals, objectives and mission of SACSI to group/team members; group/team members' understanding and ownership of roles and responsibilities.

II. Personal experience of the group/team member: clarity of goals and objectives to the individual; individual sense of ownership of the SACSI program; perceptions of availability of resources to carry out the SACSI program; personal satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the SACSI program.

III. Perceived effectiveness or ineffectiveness of various elements of the SACSI program (e.g., Notification, Operation Reach, Streetworker program, Violent Incident Review Team).

IV. Reactions to suggestions for increasing the scope of the SACSI program.

V. Additional comments that the respondent might have which would help the researchers to evaluate the SACSI program.

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A total of 28 members of the Working Group and/or Core Team completed the questionnaires during the fall of 2000. Individuals who were members of both the Working Group and the Core Team completed the survey only once.

Interviews with Core Team

As a supplement to the information gathered on the questionnaires, the research team interviewed four members of the Core Team to obtain a more complete sense of how SACSI was performing relative to expectations. The four Core Team members occupied high-profile leadership positions within the community.

The first category of questions had to do with the Core Team's involvement with SACSI. The second category dealt with the individual's stake (that is, gains and/or losses) for being with SACSI. The third category pertained to the interviewee's perceptions of some critical outcomes related to SACSI and the final category of questions dealt with what that Core Team member perceived to be the critical activities or concerns for SACSI. Interviews were conducted at the interviewee's place of work between January 12 and January 26, 2001. The interviewer took written notes of the conversation. The two researchers who conducted these interviews met to discuss the themes that emerged and prepared a set of summary findings.

Interviews with Project Director

One of the researchers held bi-weekly meetings with the SACSI Project Director. During those meetings the researcher asked wide-ranging questions to obtain a fuller sense of the work being carried out under SACSI and the Project Director's evolving expectations for the initiative. The Project Director also queried the researcher on his observations of the SACSI process, as well as ideas for carrying out the initiative. The researcher took notes of relevant points and important issues. Rather than conducting a formal analysis of these notes, the material is incorporated throughout this report in ways that provide context, supplemental information and a fuller interpretation of the other data.

Observation of Notification

At least one member of the research team observed each of the Notification sessions carried out during the evaluation period. In most cases, two or three research team members were present. During these sessions, the researchers made note of who was in attendance, how the various messages were delivered, the body language of the offenders throughout the session, and how coordinated the different elements of the program appeared to be. Following these sessions, the research team held meetings to compare observations and to develop a running list of strengths, weaknesses, recommendations and questions for further study.

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Observation of Operation Reach
The research team also observed Operation Reach sessions. Each Operation Reach session conducted between October 2000 and March 2001 was observed by at least one researcher, and all four members of the team observed at least two sessions.

The researchers acted as "participant observers" on the Operation Reach visits. They rode in vehicles with other members of the OR teams to offenders' homes and other locations where the OR message was delivered. The researchers typically refrained from participating in the delivery of the message, but did converse freely with members of the OR team while driving from site to site. The researchers also attended the briefing and debriefing sessions at the Police Department before and after the tours through the neighborhoods.

The research team discussed their respective observations during follow-up meetings and generated lists of strengths, weaknesses and recommendations.

Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Notification
In order to understand the process of Notification from the perspective of the SACSI Project Team, interviews were conducted with nine of the individuals most involved in designing and carrying out the program. The nine interviewees included six representatives of the criminal justice system (law enforcement, prosecutors, adult probation, juvenile court counselors) and three representatives of community-based organizations (clergy, service-delivery).
The interview guide was designed to elicit information regarding the perceived importance of Notification, strengths and weaknesses, and what would allow for improvements to the program. The questions focused specifically on the quality of the relationship between the law-enforcement representatives and the community representatives who together deliver the Notification message.
The interviews were carried out in one-on-one settings, usually in the office of the interviewee. Three members of the research team served as interviewers (ranging from 2 to 4 interviews per researcher). All but one interview were conducted during August and September of 2000. The last interview was conducted in March 2001.
The interviewers each took written notes of their sessions. At the end of the process, these notes were compiled and shared among all members of the research team. The analysis identified recurrent themes and tested for consensus among the interviewees in their opinion regarding the value, strengths and weaknesses of Notification.

Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Operation Reach
Three distinct sets of interviews were conducted in order to understand the origins and design of Operation Reach, as well as the various expectations and perceptions that OR team members brought to the program.

The first step in this process was an exploratory interview with the Winston-Salem Police Department's point person for SACSI activities. This meeting (held on August 16, 2000)

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was attended by all four members of the research team. The wide-ranging discussion provided extensive background information on organizational and operational aspects of Operation Reach, including the partnerships guiding the decision-making process, the composition of Operation Reach teams, the neighborhoods on which activities were focused, the messages to be delivered, and issues facing the activity's leaders.

Following this initial interview and some direct experience observing Operation Reach, two members of the research team conducted formal interviews with the two co-leaders of Operation Reach: a representative from the Police Department (different than the initial interviewee) and the coordinator of the Winston-Salem Weed and Seed initiative.

The interview protocol addressed topics such as: the target population that Operation Reach is designed to reach, the optimum timing for the contact, the messages that are delivered, the anticipated outcomes, the follow-up activities that are needed, strengths and weaknesses.

The two interviewers took handwritten notes of their sessions and then met to compare their conversations. This analysis resulted in the identification of areas of agreement and disagreement between the two leaders on each major element of the model, as well as on other related issues. The two researchers met with both co-leaders on November 15, 2000, to report these findings and to provide recommendations related to each model element and four additional issues.

Based on interviews with leaders and observation of activities, a protocol was developed for interviews with individuals who had helped deliver Operation Reach. Planned to take about 45 minutes, the interview sought a wide range of perceptions and opinions: perceptions of the activity's goals, ideas about the composition of Operation Reach teams, judgments about who the target audiences should be and how they should be approached, perceptions of responses from Operation Reach audiences, evaluations of the way the activity is organized and how the teams work, and suggestions about how Operation Reach might be improved.

Nine Operation Reach participants were interviewed between November 29, 2000, and January 31, 2001. These individuals represented both the law-enforcement and service/community sectors. Five of the interviews were conducted by one researcher and four by another. Each was conducted in the respondent's office, except for one interview that took place in the researcher’s office. (With one exception, respondents were interviewed separately. In the exceptional case, the researcher had scheduled an interview with one person, but the respondent shared an office with another Operation Reach participant. The second individual, who was working in the office at the time of the interview, joined the conversation.)

The two researchers who conducted these interviews (the same two who earlier interviewed Operation Reach co-leaders) compiled their findings and developed tentative conclusions and recommendations. Discussion of those with the rest of the research

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team, re-examination of background documents relevant to Operation Reach, and a final conversation with current Operation Reach leaders contributed to the analysis and to the conclusions of this report.

Interviews with Offenders who Participated in SACSI

In order to determine how offenders responded to the activities carried out under Notification and Operation Reach, the evaluation design included interviews with SACSI-notified offenders. These interviews were intended to provide process-level information on the strengths and weaknesses of Notification and Operation Reach, as well as an indication of how much change had occurred in offenders following their exposure to these programs. Correspondingly, the interview guide included questions regarding the most memorable and impactful aspects of the programs, as well as a set of questions that asked the offender to reflect on how his/her life had changed following exposure to the SACSI message.

Initially, the research team had hoped to conduct interviews with a random sample of the notified offenders. However, for a number of reasons, it proved much more difficult than anticipated to gain access to most of the individuals who had been through Notification:

- Only a few of the probation officers and court counselors were willing to take the extra time to coordinate research interviews with the individuals under their supervision.
- Even though notified individuals were, by definition, under court supervision, many of them were difficult to locate.
- Many of the notified offenders were resistant to being interviewed. Court counselors and probation officers did little to reinforce the importance of the interview process.
- The majority of the individuals targeted for interviews were under 18 years of age, indicating that their parent or guardian needed to provide written consent before the youth could be interviewed. This necessitated a three-stage process for interviewing: a) the interviewer contacted the young person to gauge his/her interest and to provide consent form to take home; b) the young person would take the form home and gain the requisite signature; c) the interviewer would try to re-contact the youth at a later point in time, hoping that he/she returned with a signed consent form. This process often deteriorated in practice, with the offender either failing to ask his/her parent to sign the consent form, the parent refusing to sign the consent form, or the youth "forgetting" to bring back the consent form when re-contacted by the interviewer.

Because of these complications, the sampling procedure became much more opportunistic, leading to a convenience sample, rather than a random sample. The interviewer sought out notified offenders by going to places where it was anticipated that the individuals would show up. In particular, interviewees were "found" at the Urban League, VisionsWork and schools.

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A total of 11 notified offenders were interviewed over a 5-month period. Of these, 7 were juveniles and 4 were adults. The interview protocol included 21 questions regarding Notification and the SACSI approach more generally.

Focus Group with Parents

The evaluation design also called for the collection of data that would represent the perspective of parents of offenders. Notification and Operation Reach were both designed to bring parents and family members more directly into the offender's "system" of supports and accountability. Operation Reach deliberately went into the home to convey the twin SACSI message of "no more violence" and "the community is here to support its young people." Moreover, parents and family members were invited to attend Notification in order to hear the SACSI message and to understand better why their sons and daughters were being "singled out" for intervention.

For the sake of efficiency, the research team chose to use a focus group design in order to elicit the perspective of parents and family members. Community partners on the Working Group recruited parents and family members with whom they had some relationship. As with the recruitment process for offenders, it proved difficult to find parents and family members who were willing to speak to researchers. Although six individuals agreed to participate in the focus group, only three actually showed up.

The focus group was held at VisionsWork in Winston-Salem on February 13, 2001. One researcher and another individual associated with SASCI (but not a researcher) facilitated the session. The other three researchers participated occasionally in the discussion. The focus group was tape-recorded. In addition, the three researchers not facilitating the session took hand-written notes. These notes were analyzed for themes and exemplars.

Re-Offending Among SACSI Offenders

In order to assess whether criminal behavior changed following Notification, the research team obtained arrest records from the Winston-Salem Police Department of those individuals who had been notified between September 1999 and January 2000 (excluding individuals who participated in the "special" Notification sessions for non-violent offenders). These records listed all arrests for SACSI-defined crimes (i.e., homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping, rape, robbery, weapons violation), as well as arrests for "simple assault" between January 1998 and January 2001.

The analysis of these data examined whether notified offenders had been arrested for SACSI-defined "violent" crimes following their Notification. In particular, the dependent measure for the analysis was defined by assigning each individual one of the following four levels of re-offending:

a) arrested for a SACSI-defined "violent" crime
b) not arrested for a "violent" crime, but listed as a suspect in a "violent" crime
c) not involved in a "violent" crime, but arrested or a suspect in an assault
d) not involved in either a "violent" crime or an assault

The analysis then computed the rate at which notified offenders:

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a) were arrested for a “violent” crime
b) were arrested or listed as a suspect in a “violent” crime
c) were involved in either a “violent” crime or an assault

These rates were calculated separately for four different sub-groups of notified offenders:

1) Juveniles who had a violent record prior to Notification
2) Juveniles whose record prior to Notification did not include a violent offense
3) Adults who had a violent record prior to Notification
4) Adults whose record prior to Notification did not include a violent offense

In addition to these four groups of notified offenders, the Police Department made available the arrest records of SACSI-identified youth who had not been to a Notification session. These individuals each had a record of violent offending and had been identified by either the initial SACSI review process or the Violent Incident Review Team as being candidates for Notification. However, for various reasons (e.g., not under court supervision, whereabouts not known, scheduling conflicts, lack of cooperation for individual court counselors), these individuals had not yet been notified by January 2001. This group was similar in many ways to the juveniles who had a violent record prior to Notification, and thus served as a comparison group for the analysis. For this group, “re-offending” was defined in terms of offenses committed during the same period of time that most of the Notified youth were followed (i.e., October 1999 - January 2001).

Tracking of Community-Level Violence Rates

In order to assess whether SACSI might be having an impact on overall crime rates within the targeted neighborhoods, the research team analyzed summary crime statistics compiled by the Winston-Salem Police Department. This analysis looked primarily at violent crime committed by juveniles (under 18 years of age).

The Police Department compiles, on a monthly basis, the number of individuals who are arrested for each of a number specific types of crime (e.g., aggravated assault, robbery), as well as the number of individuals who listed as a suspect for each of these types of crime. These figures can be classified by age of the offender/suspect and neighborhood.

Using these data, the research team created trend lines for a period of time that included seven quarters prior to the implementation of Notification (January 1998 through September 1999) and six quarters following implementation (October 1999 through March 2001). The dependent measures for these trend lines included: number of juveniles involved in any violent crime, number of juveniles involved in robbery, and total number of violent offenses (by juveniles and adults). Separate trend lines were constructed for the four SACSI-defined neighborhoods (Cleveland Avenue, Happy Hill, Kimberly Park, Southside) and for the rest of the city.

The analysis then considered whether there was a drop in violent offending within the SACSI neighborhoods following the introduction of Notification, and if so, whether this decline was more pronounced than what occurred in the rest of Winston-Salem.

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Other Sources of Information

In addition to these formal evaluation methods, the researchers also collected information about the SACSI process and programs by participating in the regular meetings of the Working Group and Core Team. The Working Group meetings were particularly useful for understanding how the individuals involved in carrying out Notification and Operation Reach perceived the different sessions they conducted over time.

On occasions, the research team made presentations to the Working Group and the Core Team respectively and on one occasion the research team made a presentation to a joint session of the Working Group and the Core Team. The responses and comments received from members of the Core Team and the Working Group during these presentations are likewise integrated in this report.

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V. Evaluation Results

This section of the report presents the specific findings from the various evaluation methods described in the previous section. To the extent possible, the results have been organized in a way that moves from process to outcome, so that the reader first gains an understanding of what SACSI "looked like" in Winston-Salem (in terms of planning, collaboration, programming, etc.) before moving to the an assessment of the level of change that occurred as a result of these various activities.

More specifically, the methods employed here support evaluation at five different levels:

1. Process evaluation of the "overall SACSI process"
2. Process evaluation of the Notification program
3. Process evaluation of the Operation Reach program
4. Outcome evaluation at the *individual* level (i.e., change among participants in Notification and Operation Reach)
5. Outcome evaluation at the *community* level (i.e., change in violent crime within SACSI neighborhoods and/or Winston-Salem as a whole)

Although the evaluation methods were generally intended to gain information for one of these five levels of evaluation, there was also some overlap. Particularly with the interviews of SACSI partners, it was difficult (and not necessarily desirable) to focus the data-collection on only one aspect of SACSI (either Notification, Operation Reach or the overall SACSI process). For example, in interviewing those SACSI partners involved in Notification, the evaluation team gathered information that provided a better sense of how the SACSI partners interacted with one another in forums beyond Notification (e.g., Working Group meetings, Operation Reach outings, informal interactions).

Table 2 provides a "key" for mapping the various methods onto the level of evaluation. Each method (listed down the side) is focused primarily on one of the five levels of evaluation, as denoted by a bold '**X**.' If the method also provides supplemental information that supports additional levels of evaluation, an unbolded 'x' is used. This table is presented to help the reader find more quickly those results that speak to the level of evaluation in which he or she is most interested.

Following the Results section of the report, the findings are synthesized and interpreted to yield more complete pictures of the SACSI process, Notification and Operation Reach, as well as any changes that might be occurring (or beginning to occur) as a result of these activities.

SACSI Process Questionnaire

The SACSI problem-solving process was carried out within two distinct groups of community partners: a) the Core Team, consisting of agency heads who met quarterly to examine policy-level issues, and b) the Working Group, consisting of individuals from many of these same agencies who were engaged more directly in carrying out SACSI-

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related activities on a day-to-day basis. A questionnaire was developed in October 2000 to allow the members of these two groups to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the SACSI process. The questionnaires distributed to the two groups were identical, with the exception of Questions 1-12, 16 and 18; in the Core Team questionnaire, those questions referenced the workings of the Core Team, whereas in the Working Group questionnaire, those questions referenced the workings of the Working Group.

Ten members of the SACSI Core Team and 18 members of the Working Group filled out the questionnaires. Their data are presented in tabular form in Tables 3-9. In the sections that follow, we present major highlights from those tables.

Buy-in to SACSI from Core Team and Working Group Members

The members of the Core Team and Working Group reported, by and large, that they were quite committed to the SACSI process. This result emerged through four questions related to the respondent's "ownership" over SACSI, as well as congruence between SACSI and the respondent's respective organization:

> I feel a strong sense of ownership over the results of the SACSI program.
> I feel a strong sense of ownership over the way that the Core Team/Working Group works.
> The SACSI mission is consistent with the mission of the organization I represent.
> Working with the [Core Team/Working Group] fits well within the guidelines of what my organization expects me to do.

With each of these questions, the respondent indicated how much he/she agreed or disagreed with the statement.

As shown in Table 3, only one of the 28 individuals surveyed (a member of the Working Group) indicated that he/she did not feel a sense of "ownership" in the SACSI process - defined in terms of both the "results" of SACSI and "the way that the Working Group works." Although both groups showed a high degree of ownership, the Core Team members more consistently marked "strongly agree" than did the Working Group members.

All respondents believed that SACSI was consistent with the mission and expectations of their own organization. This result is not surprising. Organizations that do not "believe in" SACSI are unlikely to grant release time to their employees to attend Core Team or Working Group meetings.

Effectiveness of the Core Team and Working Group

Overall, members of both the Core Team and the Working Group characterized their collaborative processes in positive ways. This was defined first in terms of an overall "effectiveness" question and then a series of questions that looked at specific aspects of collaboration.

With regard to the overall effectiveness question, Core Team members rated themselves as either "somewhat effective" or "very effective." The 10 Core Team members were

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evenly split between these two responses (see Table 4). The Working Group members actually gave higher marks to the Core Team: of the 14 who responded, 11 rated the Core Team as “very effective,” although one Working Group member also rated the Core Team as “somewhat ineffective.”

The Working Group came out with a slightly higher rating of overall effectiveness than did the Core Team, with the majority of both groups assigning this group a rating of “very effective.” Working Group members were quite complimentary of their work, with 14 of 18 rating themselves as “very effective” and the remaining four saying “somewhat effective” (see Table 5).

In addition to the overall “effectiveness” questions, the questionnaire asked a series of more specific questions that corresponded to the factors that were hypothesized to produce effective collaboration:

the collaborative is representative of the larger community;
the group develops shared vision and works toward consensus;
meetings are productive;
the group is flexible and able to adapt to changing events and conditions;
group members understand their roles and responsibilities;
members respect, understand and trust one another;
members communicate with one another through formal and informal channels.

Respondents were presented with 12 items and asked to what extent -- on a five-point scale from "not at all" to "a great deal" -- each statement was characteristic of the team/group (see Tables 4 and 5 for specific wording).

For both groups, respondents were most positive in their response to the statement that members of the team/group "have respect for one another," followed by ratings on "are able to achieve consensus on important issues" and "share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish" (although Working Group members were somewhat more positive than the Core Team on the last of these). About half of all respondents checked "a great deal" when asked about the team/group's flexibility, trust of one another, adaptability in the face of changing events or conditions, and engagement in open and frequent formal communication with one another.

Core Team members were more positive than Working Group members about formal communication. In contrast, Working Group respondents were more positive in response to the statement that members "are an appropriate cross-section of the community," another item to which half of all respondents checked "a great deal."

About 40% of all respondents marked "a great deal" in response to statements about the group/team having very productive meetings and understanding one another, and about members of the team/group understanding "their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out." However, the two groups differed in their patterns of responses to each of these items. Overall, respondents were least positive in their rating of members' engagement "in open and frequent informal communication with one

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another," but the Core Team's responses to this item were the same as their response to the statement about the members having "very productive meetings."

Assessment of the Overall SACSI Process

Within both the Core Team and the Working Group, there was a strong consensus that SACSI has effective leadership, as well as clear and realistic objectives (see Table 6). Coordination between the Core Team and Working Group was also viewed in positive terms, but attitudes were more mixed when it came to questions about resources and communication with the wider community.

As shown in Table 6, 27 of 28 respondents rated leadership of the program as very effective; one Working Group member had the opposite perspective, seeing the leadership as very ineffective. All members of each group agreed that SACSI goals and objectives are both “clear” and “realistic.” In fact, a majority “strongly agreed” that the goals and objectives are “clear,” with somewhat less consensus as to whether or not they are “realistic.”

Only five respondents strongly agreed that "the financial resources needed for SACSI are readily available." While 14 others agreed with the statement, five disagreed. Five also strongly agreed that "other resources needed for SACSI are readily available," and three disagreed. A majority of each group (five Core Team members and 10 Working Group members) disagreed that "enough has been done to inform the entire community about SACSI programs."

Assessment of Various SACSI Program Strategies

Core Team and Working Group members are generally very positive in their evaluation of different elements of the SACSI program. In looking across the various SACSI programs, Notification, Operation Reach, VIRT and Streetworkers were each rated as either “Very Effective” or “Somewhat Effective” by every member of the Core Team and Working Group. Respondents were less confident of the effectiveness of the service-delivery component, particularly as it related to resources that would benefit the families of offenders.

At least two thirds of the overall sample gave a "very effective" rating to Notification, the Violent Incident Review Team, and the Community Action Team (although one Core Team member rated the Community Action Team as “somewhat ineffective”). About 60% of respondents saw Operation Reach and the Streetworker Program as “very effective,” with no one calling either program “ineffective.”

Responses to SACSI's provision of services to offenders and their families were clearly different from those regarding the other program elements. While large majorities rated these elements as effective, only three of 20 individuals responding to the item about offenders marked "very effective," and only one of 17 who responded to the statement about offenders' families chose the "very effective" response. One Core Team member

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rated the provision of services to offenders as "somewhat ineffective." One Core Team member evaluated the provision of services to offenders' families as “very ineffective;” one member of each group saw such service provision as “somewhat ineffective.”

Overall Assessment of SACSI

Question 23 of the questionnaire asked for an overall assessment of SACSI’s accomplishments. The entire sample either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they were “pleased with SACSI’s accomplishments so far” (see Table 8). Agreement was somewhat stronger among the Working Group than among the Core Team.

This overall favorable impression was reinforced by some of the open-ended comments that respondents provided at the end of the questionnaire. These comments came in response to the last question, which asked for any other advice that might help the research team evaluate the SACSI program or understand the individual's experience with it. Two Core Team members and 10 Working Group members provided written responses. Comments varied widely: some clarified responses to, or raised questions about, specific items on the questionnaire, but several addressed SACSI process issues. Two Working Group members commented on improved communications among SACSI partners; another wrote that SACSI efforts had provided a strong foundation for success and that he/she expected his/her organization to continue to contribute to, and learn from, involvement in the initiative. One Working Group member used the opportunity to comment on a specific program not addressed elsewhere in the questionnaire. This individual commented that the Urban League's summer mentoring program was very effective (see Table 8).

Recommendations for Improving SACSI

Near the end of the questionnaire, respondents were presented with four suggestions for changes in the SACSI process and asked whether they approved or disapproved of each (Table 9). Large majorities approved of three of the suggestions, and a large majority disapproved of the other. All 28 respondents approved of "increasing efforts to inform the entire Winston-Salem/Forsyth County community of the SACSI program." A seven-to-one majority of those who responded in each group expressed support for "inviting parents of offenders to some working group meetings." All nine Core Team members who expressed an opinion about "involving other community members (such as the business community) in the Working Group" approved of the idea; the same sentiment was expressed by 16 of 17 responding Working Group members.

No one on the Core Team approved of increasing the frequency of Working Group meetings (currently held every two weeks), although five checked "no opinion" and one did not respond at all. Four Working Group members approved of this suggestion, while 13 expressed disapproval.

In response to the open-ended question at the very end of the questionnaire, one Core Team member expressed the concern that clearer linkages needed to be created between SACSI’s activities and the desired outcomes. Two Working Group members suggested

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the need "to reach more segments of the population" and to increase the representation of community members. One said there should be more group discussion on issues and concerns, while another called for regular meetings to increase communication among the several SACSI teams/groups.

Comments from two members of the Working Group addressed "bigger picture" issues. One suggested the necessity of a holistic approach to working with SACSI-identified youth that would involve family members supporting the young offenders, as well as actions to prevent the involvement of siblings in criminal activity. The other commented on the need to continuously attend to the balance of the "negative" law enforcement pressure with the "positive carrot" offered by the clergy, social service agencies, and streetworkers. This individual also expressed that help with finding jobs is a crucial element of the program, as is the understanding of the connections among race, class, culture, and gender.

Core Team Interviews

Five Core Team members were interviewed between January 12 and March 8, 2001. The interview focused primarily on the individual's experience with the SACSI process. Following are major findings from those interviews.

Core Team members interviewed said they had been involved in SACSI since its inception, most having participated in Forsyth Futures prior to the federal initiative. They reported involvement in a variety of SACSI activities (e.g., attendance at Notification sessions), but their primary role had been to participate in the initial learning and planning workshops, followed by regularly scheduled Core Team meetings that focused on strategic planning.

Involvement in SACSI has remained a personal and professional priority for these Core Team members. They referred to the data-driven, problem-solving, collaborative approach as appealing to themselves and as valuable to their agencies and to the community. Some said that they devote less time to SACSI than they did earlier in the initiative.

When asked about the most important SACSI accomplishments to date, one Core Team member cited the process itself -- research-driven selection of a problem, followed by continuous monitoring of and feedback about the interventions developed to address the problem. The development of partnerships in planning, implementing and revising strategies was explicitly noted by this and other respondents as another major accomplishment. One commented that SACSI gave Winston-Salem and partnering agencies greater ability to leverage additional resources from multiple sources for related initiatives. Other outcomes mentioned as important include the Streetworker program, Notification, enhancement of lifestyle through support programs such as Urban League mentoring, the dissemination of information about juvenile justice in Winston-Salem, evidence of crime reduction in targeted areas, and the establishment of the Center for

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Community Safety at Winston-Salem State University to institutionalize the SACSI process.

Core Team members had several responses when asked about the most important activities or programs that SACSI brings to the problem of youth violence. Among them were the Violent Incident Review Team's routine review of violent incidents, Notification sessions, and the development of the cross-agency team. Some respondents said that some programs and activities appear to have potential but need to be assessed. The suggestion was that some changes are probably needed to increase effectiveness.

Regarding the process itself, some also said that the links and collaboration among SACSI agencies need to be tightened and that the participation of some agencies needs to be more consistent and more thorough. The other major concern expressed by these Core Team members was the need for greater attention to prevention and early intervention. One approach would require working with families to prevent younger children from becoming involved in criminal activity. Another would suggest intervention strategies with youth who have begun to commit crimes that are less serious than those currently targeted by SACSI programs.

Asked whether there were missing pieces to the SACSI strategy, one Core Team member suggested a close look at how SACSI initiatives interface with other community initiatives to determine whether it is filling an important gap, overlapping what already exists, or displacing what already exists. Another reiterated the need to move toward prevention and early intervention with lesser offenders. A third focused on the need to provide more marketable skills and training to offenders. Another respondent suggested the need for a day-to-day manager for the overall initiative, given the move of the SACSI coordinator into the position of executive director of the Center for Community Safety.

Among continuing concerns named by Core Team members was the need for additional data to determine the effectiveness of various SACSI activities in reducing youth violence. Another not-yet-available measure of success cited by one respondent was whether people in the community feel they have been helped. Noting the need for additional data, another respondent commented that much of what SACSI has done has been about process.

The findings of these interviews with members of the SACSI Core Team can be summarized as follows:

- SACSI is seen as a positive, worthwhile activity that has been worth the effort, has enhanced Winston-Salem's ability to secure funding for many other activities, and is a source of optimism.
- There is a consensus that one of the most important accomplishments is the creation of community/social-service/law-enforcement partnerships. Creation of the cross-agency team is a specific example of a very promising development within the partnership context. Many other SACSI programs and activities are

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seen as valuable, but they are also viewed as needing continuous evaluation and possible revision.

- There is strong support for the data-based, problem-solving approach that has been central to the SACSI strategy from the beginning. There is a sense that the process is clear and well-established for dealing with serious violent offenders, but there is also concern that the process needs to address issues of prevention as well as intervention.
- There is concern about sustaining the initiative as leadership undergoes restructuring.
- Team members perceive a need to understand the relationship of SACSI to other community initiatives, programs, and activities. This involves determining whether SACSI is filling a gap or overlapping/displacing other initiatives, and how various programs can be best coordinated.

Process Description of Key Programs

This section of the results provides process descriptions of the two major program strategies that served as the focus of the evaluation: Notification and Operation Reach.

Notification

Offenders attending a Notification session convene in the first-floor lobby of the Winston-Salem Police Department. At the same time, the individuals who will talk to offenders convene in an informal meeting room on the second floor and the auditorium on the third floor. The initial segment of a Notification session takes place in the informal meeting room (with chairs arranged classroom style). The offenders are escorted by police officers into the room and then are seated in rows facing the front of the room. If offenders' family members are present, they are seated about 20 feet behind the offenders, at the rear of the room. Once everyone is settled into their seats, a law-enforcement representative introduces the Notification process to the offenders, followed by a number of individuals representing community-based organizations (e.g., churches, nonprofits). Speakers typically include a Streetworker, one or more ministers, a community organizer, and a juvenile court counselor (in juvenile Notifications). They convey the central SACSI messages: the community is tired of violence; guns and violence will no longer be tolerated; and adults (if involved in the Notification) must stop involving juveniles in criminal activities. They implore the offenders to heed the words of the officials who will speak to them in the next segment and offer their personal willingness to help the offenders avoid future criminal involvement.

The second segment of Notification takes place in a larger, more formal "auditorium" on the third floor. Offenders are escorted into the room by police officers and again seated in rows facing the front of the room. A U-shaped configuration of tables surrounds them on three sides. Seated at the tables, facing the offenders, are law enforcement officers representing the city, county and state, as well as numerous federal agencies; local and federal prosecutors; security officials from the Housing Authority of Winston-Salem; juvenile court counselors; probation and parole officers; and a federal public defender.

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Speakers from the earlier community session join them at the tables. On a large screen at the front of the room appear the words, "No Violence, No Guns" and "You have been notified." Names of the individual offenders then appear one-by-one, throughout the session.

Taking turns as they go around the table, each speaker makes a series of points that reiterate the central SACSI message. In addition, the speakers communicate the following messages:

- all the agencies represented around the table are sharing information;
- each of the offenders in the room is being closely monitored (some speakers provide examples of specific knowledge they have of individual offender situations/histories);
- there are major differences between **state** law enforcement/court/corrections systems and the more severe **federal** systems with regard to investigative sophistication, conviction rates, lengths of sentences, and locations of prisons.

In addition, the public defender tells them that, once they are charged in federal court, there is little he can do for them. Prosecutors name previously notified youth who "did not listen to us," and who were subsequently the victims of lethal violence or who are now serving lengthy sentences in federal prisons in other parts of the country.

At the end of the second segment, offenders are escorted back to the second-floor meeting room, where clergy and community representatives again urge them to remember the messages they have just heard. At the same time, these individuals offer assistance to the offenders in avoiding future criminal involvement. They also ask offenders (and family members, if present) to fill out forms regarding needed services. Information is provided on how to access various services. Offenders who have already changed their patterns of behavior in a positive direction are praised.

Notification began September 9, 1999, with two sessions: one for 23 juveniles and one for 30 adults. The size of groups being notified has decreased since those initial sessions, and now there is usually only one group on any given date. As of April 2001, 86 adults and 73 juveniles have been notified in twelve sessions conducted on nine different nights. These sessions are summarized in Table 10.

Operation Reach

Originally structured as a follow-up home visit with individuals who had been notified, Operation Reach has also been used as a response to specific violent incidents in SACSI neighborhoods, to reach individuals recently released from detention, and as an opportunity to spread the SACSI messages through contact with youth at neighborhood “hot spots” and at other places where young people gather.

As noted previously, an Operation Reach team is conceived as consisting of one law enforcement officer, one court counselor or probation officer, one minister, and one community representative. In fact, team composition varies, due to participant availability on a given date. Due to multiple responsibilities that sometimes involve

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emergencies, for example, individuals who had planned to participate sometimes cannot do so. In addition, teams often exceed four members for a variety of reasons. For example, individuals who have not previously participated learn about a scheduled Operation Reach and take the opportunity to learn from participation. Coordinators, who spend much time recruiting participants, are reluctant to exclude anyone who wants to be involved.

Operation Reach is usually scheduled to begin in a police department meeting room at 3:30 on a weekday afternoon, but it is common for numerous participants to arrive after that time. The activity commences with a briefing session, expected to last about 30 minutes. Operation Reach coordinators divide participants into three or four teams, provide an overview of procedures to any new participants, set a time for all to return to the room for a debriefing session after the field period, and distribute to each team background information on each individual/family to be visited. The team leader, usually a juvenile court counselor, discusses each case briefly with the team, seeking input from any other team member who has insights regarding the home situation.

As each team completes its preparation, a decision is made about how to transport the team to the neighborhood where visits will take place. In early Operation Reach activities, a law enforcement patrol car was typically one of the vehicles used by each team, but in more recent months, teams have tried to limit the number of vehicles and reduce the use of patrol cars. The court counselor usually takes the lead in approaching the home and in speaking with the residents, unless another member of the team knows the family better. The team tries to speak with both parents/guardians and youth at the home, reiterating the SACSI messages but focusing on offers of support and assistance in increasing "positive" activities and avoiding future criminal involvement. Visits vary in length from a few minutes to a half hour. The team leaves each client with an informational packet regarding whom to call for specific types of services. Following each visit, the team leader fills out a form indicating the nature of the interaction.

When time permits, especially in warm weather, the teams also stop at neighborhood locations where criminal activity has been concentrated. Flyers bearing the SACSI message are distributed to individuals at the location. Visiting these “hot spots” is a secondary priority, performed only if the team has completed its assigned home visits and has time remaining on the Operation Reach.

After about two hours in the field, teams return to the police department meeting room for a debriefing session. Contact forms are returned to the Operation Reach coordinators, who lead a discussion of the day's activities and any information or issues that team members may feel the need to share. The debriefing is expected to last about 20 minutes. Given the variation in the number of contacts and the lengths of visits, teams may arrive for the debriefing at different times (or not at all). In addition, some individuals do not return to the police department because of other commitments. Thus, the debriefing sessions tend to involve only a subset of the entire group that embarked on the Operation Reach.

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The first Operation Reach occurred on December 2, 1999. Three additional Operation Reach sessions were held during 2000 (see Table 11). Typically these operations attempted to reach 8-10 individuals who had been notified previously, along with their families. Records of the number of individuals actually contacted were not consistently maintained during this period of time.

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Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Key Programs

Notification

Interviews were conducted with nine individuals who were involved in designing and carrying out Notification. Participants in both community and law enforcement portions of the Notification session were interviewed. All had participated in numerous Notifications, and some were instrumental in designing them.

Notification sessions were generally seen as well organized, with partners working together well to deliver a clear and consistent message to offenders whose selection was guided by clear criteria. However, some respondents suggested the sessions could be made more efficient by reducing the number of speakers. Initial guidelines for speakers were seen as important for clarity and consistency, but variations in personal styles were valued, and individuals needed the freedom to vary their remarks to keep the presentation from becoming stale. Still, that kind of freedom was seen as encouraging some speakers to hold the floor for too long.

Team members saw the desired outcomes among both juveniles and adults as reduced recidivism, particularly with regard to violence and gun possession. Some referred to broader goals of community safety or community awareness regarding the consequences of crime and the range of intervention programs. Other outcomes mentioned included the provision of services to young people, the strengthening of family and other support systems, keeping youth in school, and reducing less serious offenses along with violence. Prevention, rather than intervention, was identified as the ultimate goal by some respondents.

These participants in Notification saw various strengths in the program. Explicitly named were the organization of the sessions, the partnerships that Notification has built, the engagement of the community, and the delivery of a clear message to "the right people."

Concerns were expressed about institutional barriers that operate outside the sessions themselves, potentially reducing the effectiveness of Notification. Those included the limited range of institutions involved in setting up Notification, probation officers' lack of understanding of the potential value of Notification and the agency's lack of incentives for officers' participation (complicated by large numbers of officers and supervisors in different locations). Prominently cited as a weakness was the lack of follow-through in areas such as prosecution, sentencing and provision of services. Other weaknesses mentioned ranged from the lack of preventive measures to inadequate numbers of clergy involved in Notification sessions.

Notification was seen by most as working well to identify and deliver a message to a target audience and to encourage sharing of information among agencies. There were questions about whether it works as well with juveniles as with adults and whether it is individualized enough to provide recognition of offenders who are doing well. Concerns

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also surfaced about lack of attention to lesser offenses and about lack of follow-through, in both enforcement and service provision.

To make Notification more effective, respondents suggested greater certainty in imposing punishment for future offenses by working more closely with prosecutors and judges, then making sure the community knows that re-offending is resulting in punishment. Other suggestions included increasing visibility in the community to demonstrate that behavior is being monitored, bringing in former offenders to speak to the youth, involving more segments of the community in the sessions, and finding additional financial & technological support.

Most respondents suggested limiting the number of offenders present at a Notification session to no more than 12, especially with juveniles, although two suggested a group of adults as large as 20 could work well. Suggestions were based on balancing concerns about devoting resources to very small groups versus potential loss of control and individual impact with larger groups.

Participants generally felt that offenders heard a consistent message at Notification, but were unsure whether the message would "stick" when the offenders - particularly juveniles - returned to their day-to-day environments. At the least, repeated follow-up was seen as necessary. The juvenile court counselor, the probation officer, and the Streetworker had seen or talked with individual offenders after they had been through Notification.

Respondents had numerous and varied ideas about the kinds of data they would find helpful. Among those were scrutiny of the entire design and practice of the initiative, frequent updates on the program's impact, tracking of the post-Notification process, an examination of the need for staffing to link the clergy to other participants, school data, data on recidivism by probationers, and data on the intergenerational transition of criminal behavior.

Operation Reach

In-depth interviews were carried out with nine individuals who took part in Operation Reach. These individuals represented all segments of the Operation Reach teams: law enforcement, probation/court counselors, clergy, and community advocates.

According to these individuals, the major goals of Operation Reach were:

- multi-agency and community cooperation to reinforce SACSI messages;
- keeping the community safe;
- shifting the thoughts of youth from crime to positive things;
- providing services, especially for notified youth; and
- educating the community about criminal activity of youth.

Most saw the purpose of Operation Reach as clear, but some were concerned whether prevention was emphasized enough, relative to enforcement.

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According to the respondents, the Operation Reach sessions had been met with a variety of responses from those who were visited and from neighborhood residents. Some "clients" were surprised at such a diverse team working together. Some appreciated the team's concern and were happy to meet with the team. However, others were apprehensive about the purpose of the visit, suspicious, resentful and/or irritated to have outsiders intrude.

In response to a question about what was working well, respondents noted how many agencies interfaced with one another in order to carry out an Operation Reach. Respondents also commented on the visibility and overall image of the activity; the delivery of the message; and the demonstration of willingness to meet people in their own neighborhoods. All respondents saw Operation Reach teams as generally working well together, although one noted that newly composed teams presented some difficulty in clearly defining working relationships. While some thought there was too much law-enforcement presence on the teams (especially when officers were in uniform), others felt the number of law enforcement officers was appropriate. Some thought the number of community representatives on the teams was about right, but many observed that more clergy were needed, and some suggested that schools should be better represented and that community associations should also participate.

The respondents offered numerous suggestions for improving Operation Reach. Many noted the need to increase participation, particularly among clergy and community leaders. To increase the number of clergy, the respondents suggested:

- getting church members involved in SACSI to recruit their ministers;
- greater effort on the part of SACSI leaders to raise awareness among the clergy;
- getting church members to "adopt" an offender or a neighborhood;
- going directly to churches of juveniles who have been notified;
- going to colleges and schools in the area to recruit individuals who are considering entering the ministry.

There were fewer ideas for increasing probation officer involvement, due to the realities of the department's organization and the caseloads managed by individual officers. The general notion was that SACSI must get the support of the general administration of the probation office to make Operation Reach a priority and to provide recognition to individual officers involved in the program.

Several respondents also emphasized the need for greater coordinated follow-up with juveniles and their families. This could be done by having at least one member of the team re-visit the home shortly after the initial visit to show continuing interest in the family. Follow-up telephone calls and cards were also recommended.

There was some disagreement over how to prioritize various potential client groups for Operation Reach. Some respondents named juveniles who had been notified as a first priority, but others thought that residents of neighborhoods where recent violence had

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occurred should rank first. Regardless of their judgment about the highest priority group, respondents tended to agree that juveniles coming out of detention were a second priority.

Respondents also suggested numerous other avenues for getting the Operation Reach message across to the target population:

- community meetings in churches, schools, community and recreation centers;
- involvement in community activities that would build trust;
- provide information to school resource officers about siblings of SACSI-identified youth, so they can reach out to younger siblings before they get into trouble;
- place Operation Reach pamphlets at strategic sites, such as recreation centers;
- use television and of newspaper columns; and
- focus efforts on juveniles coming out of detention.

In making contacts on the street and in neighborhood hot spots, respondents suggested that the team member best acquainted with the individuals and/or the neighborhood should take the lead. If no one on the team knew the individuals being encountered, the community representative was seen as the appropriate leader. There was some disagreement regarding the appropriate balance between the law-enforcement message and offers of help, particularly for encounters that occurred on the street or in "hot spots." Most respondents suggested beginning with the offer of help, backed up by the law enforcement message. However, some said the community and law-enforcement team members should make individual decisions for each case. Others thought that two separate operations should be developed for the two different messages, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

Regarding specific Operation Reach procedures, respondents saw the briefing session as useful, but as providing inadequate time for participants to get to know one another and to understand the situations of individuals and families to be visited. Time in the field was seen as difficult to manage and sometimes too short, especially for visiting hot spots. The debriefing session brought mixed reactions. Some said it provided good information sharing, others said participants were too tired to take full advantage of its potential, while one noted that it was less useful than each team having its own debriefing session in the neighborhood. Concern was also expressed about the composition of teams and about the time of day at which Operation Reach takes place. First, the importance and the difficulty of composing teams of individuals familiar with the neighborhoods to which they were assigned were noted. Second, some thought Operation Reach would be more effective if carried out at later hours, but noted the difficulty of staffing the teams who could go into the field hours after the workday is supposed to end. Notifying families of intended visits was also suggested as a way to improve efficiency.

Interviews with Offenders

As mentioned above, in-person interviews were conducted with 11 offenders who had taken part in Notification. The interview guide consisted of 21 questions.

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The first series of questions was about SACSI and the Notification program itself. Most of the offenders interviewed had heard of the SACSI program and had a good understanding of its purpose. Juveniles came away with the message that the people at the Notification sessions were there to help them better their lives and stay away from crime. This message was a bit toned down, compared with the message the adults received. Although it was a forceful message, the youth seemed to sense that there was a lot of concern for their well-being. However, most adults came away from the sessions with a stronger message, that they will be given no more chances, and that they should to stop involving youth in violent crime.

Reactions to the sessions themselves varied. Some of the offenders said that they felt "threatened" and that the message was "aggressive." However, most of them felt that it was a good session and said such things as "it was something that I needed to hear," "it let me know that I was under the microscope," and "the people there just wanted to help." Asked whether or not the message that violence will not be tolerated was believable to them, all who chose to answer the question believed that it was a serious message. For example, one of the adults responded that he believed the message "100% because they did a 24-hour sweep" of his neighborhood as they said they would, and he felt that was very effective. This individual seemed to be the most affected and animate about the whole process, because he saw the strong law enforcement message in action, and that shocked him. He even said that he warned some of his friends that it was going to happen and that they had better watch out.

It was very clear that it was the federal agents, specifically the FBI agent, who had the greatest impact on Notification attendees. Offenders seemed to feel that whenever the FBI is involved in something, it must be very serious and should not be taken lightly. Offenders made two points that reinforced the impression of the FBI's effectiveness: the agent seemed to know their record, and he gave examples of people that they knew whom the FBI had arrested. Others who were mentioned as being effective were Judge Loretta Biggs and Mr. James Blackburn, because they had a caring attitude; the U.S. Marshall, because he talked about serving warrants; and Rob Lang from the U.S. Attorney's office, because they viewed him as being very powerful and because he gave examples of people he had sent to federal prison.

The major weakness of Notification to which interviewees alluded was the lack of contact after the sessions. Initially, Notification has a very strong effect on offenders, but after a while that effect starts to stale. Seven of the eleven offenders interviewed did not contact anyone for help after Notification. When they did contact someone, it was typically VisionsWork (Mr. Blackburn or another streetworker). One offender said that he did not know how to contact anyone except Mr. Blackburn. Responses were similar when they were asked if anyone had tried to contact them. Most offenders said no one had; if someone had contacted them, it was a representative from VisionsWork, specifically the streetworkers.

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As for prevention, all but two of the offenders said that they were concerned about what would happen to them if they committed more crimes. Their biggest concerns were going to prison or being away from home in a detention center or training school. When they were asked to rate the Notification program's effectiveness in helping to keep them from committing more crimes (on a scale of 1-10), there was a substantial difference between how adults rated the program and how juveniles rated it. All of the adults ranked the session a 10 with comments such as, "they got me right were they want me," and "it would be my third strike if I get into more trouble." Half of the juveniles ranked the session a 5 or below. When they were asked why, some of their comments were "I didn't like the way I was treated," or "I got into trouble again."

One of the last questions asked was this: "What can be done in the community to keep kids out of trouble?" The most common response was the creation of more recreational and after-school programs. Most offenders seemed to feel that part of the reason that kids get into trouble is the lack of things to keep them occupied. Other suggestions were for more programs like the Urban League Mentoring Program and Notification. However, offenders suggested that programs need to try to reach people before they get involved in crime, not just when they are in the middle of it. One youth responded that he felt that one of the community's problems is that a lot of kids are allowed to hang out late. He said they can sometimes go to clubs and find kids as young as 11 or 12. An offender also mentioned that Notification needs to include a speaker who is around their age that can speak to them. He said that Mr. Blackburn from the Streetworkers program was the only one to whom he could truly relate, but that he is much older than the offenders are. Offenders also asked for more job and educational opportunities. Some appeared to really want to learn some marketable skills but said that they do not have the opportunity to improve themselves, because they are felons or because they lack sufficient resources.

To summarize, these interviews did not reach as much of the target population as intended, but those that were reached offered some valuable information about their views of the Notification program. It was clear that offenders understood the message, and most were concerned about what would happen to them if they committed more crimes. However, there was general agreement that there is a need for more preventive programs and more post-Notification contact between offenders and those offering services, support, and recreational and educational opportunities. Overall, adults rated Notification as much more effective than did juveniles.

Focus Group with Parents

Although many contacts were made with parents of SACSI youth, only three individuals actually attended and participated in the session. When these individuals were asked why so few parents showed up for the focus group, they replied that previous contacts with SACSI had not fulfilled the expectations of parents. It is possible that those three parents who did attend were more likely than their peers to have a critical attitude toward SACSI, believing that the focus group offered them an opportunity to lodge complaints in a high-profile setting. Because of the small size and the possibility that the participants are not

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representative of the population of SACSI parents, the focus group findings should be treated with caution. The results may or may not be generalizable beyond the group of three parents who actually attended.

Four subject matters were addressed at the focus group, and those were questions about Notification, Operation Reach, Service Delivery, and the SACSI program in general.

Notification
The three participants expressed serious concern about the way that notification was being implemented. One parent responded that she thought that the session was threatening, inappropriate, and unproductive. The participants seemed to feel that the juvenile notification should include more dialogue with the youth to encourage them to ask questions and to participate in the program. They also believed that their children may not have had a clear understanding of Notification or SACSI. Also, it was felt that the message lost some of its strength because of a lack of follow through.

Operation Reach
The lack of follow through after Operation Reach and the frequency of Operation Reach seemed to be of greatest concern to participants. They felt that after the initial home visit was made, there seemed to be no additional contact with them or their children. Participants also suggested that organizers of Operation Reach need to do a better job to ensure that the child in question will be at home.

Service Delivery
The topic of "service delivery" seemed to be of most concern to focus group participants and it generated the longest discussion. Simply put, participants felt that not enough services had been offered to their kids. When services had been offered, they were deemed insufficient. Some examples of a lack of services are recreational activities, apprenticeship programs to teach youth some marketable skills, services for girls, involvement of DSS, family oriented activities and help, and tutoring.

One positive aspect of service delivery was the Mentoring Program. Two of the parents responded that the program had helped their children and that they wanted to see more programs like it, such as a mentoring program for girls.

SACSI in General
None of the three parents that participated in the focus group had a clear understanding of what the SACSI program is and what it is trying to accomplish. They didn't believe that their children did either. This lack of clarity was ascribed to a lack of visibility of SACSI among the general community. Suggestions for improving this could involve SACSI sponsored sporting events such as basketball tournaments in the summer or community gatherings like barbecues or picnics.

Probably the greatest concern expressed by the three parents was a lack of coordination among the agencies that serve their youth. This was of particular concern because so

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many of the SACSI-identified youth have multiple problems that no single agency can solve. In addition, the participants contended that people in the community don't know where to go for help. Finally, parents agreed that there is not enough being done by the system to make parents responsible for their youth.

Re-Offending Among SACSI Participants

Criminal records from the Winston-Salem Police Department (WSPD) were examined in order to determine whether offenders who had been notified committed more violent offenses subsequent to their exposure to the SACSI message. The sample for this analysis consisted of all those Track 1A, Track 1B or Track 2 offenders who had been notified between September 1999 and January 2000 and who had criminal records within the WSPD database. A total of 99 offenders, including 35 juveniles and 64 adults, met these criteria. The analysis examined re-offending through January 31, 2001, which meant that any given individual in the sample was followed for at least one year subsequent to Notification.

Rates of re-offending were calculated first using a strict criterion - **arrest** for a SACSI-defined crime (i.e., homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping, rape, robbery, weapons violation). Then a second, more liberal rate was calculated based on the criterion that the individual was either **arrested for** or **identified as a suspect in** a SACSI-defined crime.

The results of this analysis are shown in Table 12. Of the 99 offenders who were notified between September 1999 and January 2000, 10 (10%) were arrested for a subsequent SACSI-defined crime prior to January 31, 2001. Of these 10 individuals, 8 had had a prior violent offense. As a consequence, we see higher rates of re-offending among the two sub-samples with a violent history:

1 of the 40 adults with no prior violent offense (2%)
5 of the 24 adults who had a prior violent offense (21%)
1 of the 16 juveniles with no prior violent offense (6%)
3 of the 19 juveniles who had a prior violent offense (16%)

If we relax the criteria for re-offending to include "being identified as a suspect in a SACSI-defined crime," the rate of re-offending doubles to 20% (20 out of the 99). Most of these additional re-offenders are individuals who had not committed a violent crime prior to Notification. Thus, with the more liberal definition of re-offending, there is very little difference between the four sub-samples:

6 of the 40 adults with no prior violent offense (15%)
7 of the 24 adults who had a prior violent offense (29%)
4 of the 16 juveniles with no prior violent offense (25%)
3 of the 19 juveniles who had a prior violent offense (16%)

This analysis indicates that Notification did not *eliminate* violent behavior on the part of the offenders who attended: 10 percent of the sample were arrested for a SACSI-defined offense subsequent to being notified, and another 10 percent were identified as a suspect

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in such an offense. On the other hand, it is possible that Notification might have reduced the incidence of violent offending. In other words, we don't know whether a 20% rate is any lower than what would have occurred in the absence of Notification.

From a research-design perspective, the ideal approach for assessing whether Notification had any effect in lowering rates of re-offending would be to randomly assign violent offenders either to receive or not to receive Notification. However, SACSI was not carried out as a pure experiment; the major priority was quick and effective action to reduce violence. Within this constraint, it was possible to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis that compared re-offending among violent juvenile offenders who were notified against "comparable" violent juvenile offenders who were not notified. The comparison group for this analysis consisted of 32 youth who were identified as candidates for Notification, but for various reasons (e.g., not under court supervision, whereabouts not known, scheduling conflicts, lack of cooperation for individual court counselors) had not been notified. These individuals were designated Track 1A according to the classification criteria adopted by the SACSI Core Team.

The relevant comparison here is between the 19 notified youth who had a violent record prior to Notification and the 32 non-notified Track 1A youth. Within each of these groups, 16% were arrested by WSPD for a SACSI-defined crime during the period October 1999 - January 2001. No additional cases emerged if the criteria were relaxed to include "identified as a suspect in a SACSI-defined crime."

Although the rate of re-offending was found to be equivalent for these two groups, it is important to point out a couple of caveats that might have come into play, potentially masking an actual difference between the groups. Namely, it is possible that some of the 32 non-notified individuals were no longer living in the Winston-Salem community, either because they had moved or because they were incarcerated. In fact, either of these two factors would account for why a Track 1A youth had not been brought in for Notification. If the offender was no longer living in the community, it is unlikely that he or she would have a subsequent criminal record in the WSPD database, even if that person was still committing violent offenses. As a result, it is quite possible that the 16% figure is an underestimate of how much re-offending was actually occurring among the group of non-notified Track 1A offenders. Moreover, the Track 1A offenders who had been incarcerated were not in a position to commit another SACSI-defined crime, even if they had the inclination. Again, this suggests that the comparison group provides a very conservative estimate of how much violent offending would have occurred among the notified group of youth if they had not been notified (which is what makes for a good comparison group). Thus, the lack of an observed difference should not be taken as a definitive indication that Notification has no effect on violent behavior.

As part of this analysis of re-offending, we also considered a much more relaxed definition that included simple assault in addition to the SACSI-defined crimes. SACSI was intended primarily to deter violent behavior and gun use, which suggests that the analyses shown in Table 12 are the appropriate ones. However, simple assault provides

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an indication that an offender is still engaged in aggressive activity against other persons. Ideally, one would hope that this behavior would also be prevented as part of Notification.

Table 13 shows what happens to the rates of re-offending when simple assault is considered along with SACSI-defined crimes. Namely, 52% of the notified adults and 34% of the notified juveniles were either arrested for or identified as a suspect in a case involving violence or assault. Although these numbers are arguably higher than one would like, they do indicate that half of notified adults and two-thirds of notified juveniles abstained from violent or assaultive behavior for at least a year following Notification (or at least they were not identified by the police department as being involved in such behavior). Again, the critical unanswered question is what those rates would have been in the absence of Notification.

Trends in Violence Rates

The bottom line for judging the effectiveness of SACSI (at least in the long run) is the reduction of violent crime in the targeted neighborhoods. Figure 2 shows, on a quarterly basis, the number of juveniles involved in violent crime (either arrested or identified as suspects) for the SACSI neighborhoods and for the rest of Winston-Salem. The most apparent result from Figure 2 is the degree of quarter-to-quarter fluctuation that defines these two time series. Some weak seasonal patterns are evident (i.e., higher rates during the summer months), but one can also find contradictions to these patterns. Because of the "noisiness" of the two trend lines, it is difficult to detect meaningful differences between the SACSI neighborhoods and the rest of the city.

On the other hand, there is some indication that the SACSI neighborhoods have experienced a decline in juvenile violence relative to the rest of the city. If we look at the 18 months following the "unveiling of SACSI" (i.e., the first set of Notification sessions in September 1999), we find a total of 104 incidents where a juvenile was either arrested or identified as a suspect in a violent crime within a SACSI neighborhood. In contrast, for the 18 months prior to the introduction of SACSI (i.e., the six quarters to the left of the vertical line in Figure 2), there were 128 such instances. The reduction following the introduction of SACSI is 18.8%.

One might argue that different seasons are represented in the pre- and post- time periods, which makes them non-comparable. However, we can "control" for this seasonality effect by conducting the same comparison for the rest of Winston-Salem (the top curve). There, the relevant numbers are 351 incidents following the introduction of SACSI compared to 356 for the 18 months prior to SACSI (a 1.4% decline). In other words, the decline in youth violence was 17.4 percentage points greater in the SACSI neighborhoods.

The data seem even more suggestive of a SACSI effect if we restrict the analysis to robberies (Figure 3). Robbery has remained steady at about 2 robberies per quarter in

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SACSI neighborhoods since September 1999, compared to an average of 4 robberies per quarter prior to SACSI. In contrast, robbery has recently increased substantially for the rest of the city (after falling precipitously just before SACSI was introduced). If we perform the same pre-post comparison as above, we find that robbery has gone from 26 instances in the 18 months prior to SACSI to 11 in the 18 months post SACSI within the SACSI neighborhoods (57.7% decline). In the rest of the city, by contrast, the number of juveniles involved in robbery was 81 in the 18 months prior to SACSI and still 81 in the 18 months following SACSI.

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VI. Accomplishments, Strengths and Weaknesses

The previous chapter of the report presented specific evaluation results on a method-by-method basis. In this section, we synthesize those findings into an overall evaluation of how SACSI was carried out in Winston-Salem. Separate sections are devoted to: the SACSI process, Notification, Operation Reach and the cumulative impact of SACSI activities.

The SACSI Process

Even before the actual award of the SACSI grant by the Department of Justice, Winston-Salem convened a broad cross-section of community representatives around the issue of reducing youth violence. Forsyth Futures had already attracted key leaders from agencies in the law-enforcement and social-service sectors, including the Winston-Salem Police Department, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Forsyth County Schools, Department of Social Services, Centerpoint (mental health), the Juvenile Justice Council and the Winston-Salem Foundation. These individuals served as the Core Team that launched the collaborative problem-solving process that eventually became SACSI. Thus, from the beginning, SACSI had the buy-in of many of the organizations and institutions with a stake in the issue of youth violence.

As SACSI evolved, the level of community involvement expanded in terms of both breadth and depth. The SACSI process was initially broadened by including researchers from Wake Forest University and Winston-Salem State University who carried out the initial research that narrowed down the youth violence issue to a core group of serious offenders. As the data were interpreted and strategies were developed, SACSI reached out to more grass-roots groups that were more closely connected to the four target neighborhoods, particularly the clergy from local churches.

As SACSI shifted from analysis and planning to the implementation of strategies, more and more people found a place at the table. Nonprofit organizations such as the Urban League, VisionsWork and churches became central players in carrying out the SACSI strategies, particularly with regard to mentoring and informal social support. A number of state and federal agencies (ATF, FBI, SBI) also joined SACSI by participating in the Notification sessions.

On the one hand, SACSI was broadening itself to include new agencies. At the same time, those agencies that had been involved in SACSI from the outset began to commit more and more of their staff to the process. Whereas agency directors and managers had been involved in establishing the initiative and carrying out the planning process, many more layers of these agencies were represented when it came to actually carrying out strategies such as Notification, Operation Reach and VIRT. This was particularly true for the Winston-Salem Police Department, which committed significant personnel in support of SACSI.

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As more and more agencies became engaged in SACSI, the absence of certain other agencies became more apparent. In particular, a number of the SACSI partners interviewed over the course of the evaluation pointed out that there seemed to be only limited commitment on the part of the Forsyth County District Attorney's Office and the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Both these agencies were critical to reinforcing the SACSI message, particularly with regard to the enforcement of sanctions. In addition, the court counselors within DJJDP provided the primary means of ensuring that offenders would be scheduled for a Notification and that they would actually show up. Without a strong commitment throughout DJJDP, SACSI sometimes struggled to reach its intended audience.

Widespread community involvement was a critical feature of NIJ's program model for SACSI. Winston-Salem achieved that objective, but went further by actually engaging these individuals as partners in the problem-solving process. This occurred at two levels: strategy and policy were formulated by the Core Team, while the Working Group paid attention to the operational aspects of SACSI. Each group, with the skillful facilitation of the SACSI project director, played a substantive role in developing and refining the program strategies, with the Core Team operating with more of a macro perspective and the Working Group operating with more of a micro perspective.

In terms of the specific problem-solving features that SACSI is designed to promote, the Core Team and Working Group agreed that the Winston-Salem initiative has succeeded in:

- Achieving consensus on important issues
- Developing a shared vision of success
- Having productive meetings
- Promoting extensive communication between agencies and sectors
- Being flexible in finding the best approach to accomplish the work

According to questionnaires filled out by members of the Core Team and Working Group, SACSI succeeded in bringing together a diverse set of agency representatives and community members who have conducted a cohesive, focused process of problem solving around the issue of youth violence. Within both the Core Team and the Working Group, members appreciated one another's perspective and regarded themselves as being able to work together toward common goals. Group members had particularly positive attitudes concerning the degree to which members **respect** one another, even if they don't always identify with the perspective being presented. In addition, the vast majority of individuals in each group indicated that members **trust** one another either "a substantial amount" or "a great deal."

One of the most important legacies from SACSI is the strengthening of relationships across different organizations and different sectors. Community members who historically have interacted with each other in competitive or confrontational ways have found a common purpose and are beginning to trust one another, which has lasting implications in terms of communication, coordination and defusing potentially incendiary

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incidents. Trust-building has been particularly notable with regard to the Winston-Salem Police Department and many of the leading African-American clergy in the community. The Working Group and the Core Team provided venues for sharing perspectives and for engaging in constructive problem-solving.

SACSI Strategies

Through a data-driven planning process, the Core Team developed a comprehensive set of strategies to reach the target population of youthful violent offenders. Some of these strategies were based primarily on an enforcement model (e.g., targeted law-enforcement response), while others employed a prevention approach (e.g., mentoring, job training). Two of the "primary" strategies (Notification and Operation Reach) contained elements of both enforcement and prevention. Notification targets juveniles and young adults who have engaged in violent crimes; Operation Reach follows up with the same targets and adds SACSI "hotspots" to its list of contacts. VIRT appears to be more of an "identification" strategy - one that allows SACSI to target both enforcement and prevention on those individuals who are either instigating violence or showing signs of being at risk of violent offending.

In the interest of cost-effectiveness, the evaluation focused primarily on two of the program strategies: Notification and Operation Reach. In the following two sections, we distill the findings from the various data sources to present a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of these two programs, along with a set of recommendations.

Notification

Strengths

Notification serves as the most direct mechanism for communicating the SACSI message (i.e., violence will not be tolerated by the community.") The message is clearly and consistently transmitted to those individuals who most need to change their behavior - juveniles who have demonstrated violent behavior or committed pathway crimes, along with adults who are known to be influencing youth toward violence.

The setting for Notification has been well thought out and seems designed to achieve maximum effect. Holding the session at the police station reinforces the fact that the community regards violent crime as a serious matter. The physical configuration used for the law-enforcement portion of Notification "surrounds" the offenders with a vivid image of how many agencies and individuals make up this system; law enforcement is a formidable force that will track down and prosecute individuals who commit violent acts. Interspersing community representatives among law-enforcement personnel demonstrates a unified force.

When the law-enforcement representatives cite specific incidents, the offenders learn (possibly for the first time) that they are not anonymous to the system; police, prosecutors and others know them on a "personal" level and are tracking their activities.

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At the same time, the group setting for Notification makes it clear to offenders that they are not being singled out unfairly. Everyone brought into Notification has committed criminal offenses that justify this action. By comparing notes with one another, offenders know why they have been identified.

The enforcement message is coupled with encouragement to change behavior and to become a positive part of the community. In other words, offenders are not backed into a corner.

Representatives from a wide variety of organizations and perspectives communicate the same message according to a consistent, coherent script. There is a strong level of cooperation (apparent to offenders) between the law enforcement community and individuals from the SACSI neighborhoods. Loretta Biggs served as a critical linkage between the two perspectives given her unique role as judge, prosecutor and advocate for the African American community.

The majority of individuals who go through Notification understand the message and recognize that there are consequences to committing further violence or involving others in violence. The message especially "gets through" to the adults who are notified, in part because they know that the stakes are higher (given their eligibility for *federal* prosecution) and in part because they are mature enough to understand the meaning of what is being presented.

Inviting parents to Notification sessions emphasizes the importance that SACSI places on family involvement and support. To the extent that parents actually attend Notification and become more involved in their children's lives, it is possible to connect offenders into a larger system of supportive services.

Notification proved to be critical in facilitating the cross-sector partnerships described earlier. The individuals involved in SACSI are diverse in every respect - professional orientation, educational background, political ideology, race, age, gender, etc. Notification was the real starting point for these players coming together around a common purpose. The individuals involved in putting on Notification understand one another's values, orientation and motivation. They have formed authentic relationships with one another and share ideas and information freely. The Notification program has been crucial in fostering these relationships because it is a joint production, evolving over time with the input of each of the participants.

<u>Weaknesses</u>

A significant proportion of offenders targeted for Notification do not attend a session. This break-down occurs both in scheduling offenders to come to a session, and then making sure that they actually attend the session that they are scheduled for.

The sessions are not as tight as they might be. The sheer number of "contributors" to SACSI leads to long (and sometimes long-winded) messages. Everyone who

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contributes to Notification seems to feel a need to add their own message. However, having so many "lead actors" seems to dilute the impact of the basic SACSI message. Youth have a limited attention span, particularly when they are simply being talked at, and thus sometimes become "bored." They may even have trouble processing and internalizing all the information that is presented to them (particularly given the stressful environment in which "learning" is expected to take place).

Individuals with different offense histories are sometimes included in the same Notification session. This makes it difficult to provide messages that are specific and hard-hitting, while at the same time being appropriate to everyone in the audience. If the session is geared toward the hard-core offenders (e.g., by telling them, "you have no more chances"), those persons who have a less serious criminal history are able to disregard much of the message as irrelevant to them personally. If however, the message is toned down so that it applies to everyone, the session may not have much impact on those persons who most need to change their behavior.

The Notification message is based in large part on fear -- fear of the consequences of being caught again for a violent offense. Whether the message actually changes behavior depends on how well the message is internalized, which requires follow-up and reinforcement. However, the promised consequences of subsequent violence have not always been enforced. This is particularly true in the case of juveniles; for all but the most serious cases, judges are often either unable or reluctant to impose harsh penalties (i.e., incarceration), which in turn lowers the impetus of the District Attorney's Office to prosecute.

Notification is designed to present a stark choice to offenders: continue committing violence, which will lead to an almost certain prospect of prosecution and prison, versus seek out support to lead a positive life. For offenders to choose the positive option, they must believe that they have access to available and personally relevant forms of support. However, offenders often leave Notification not knowing where to turn for support. The community representatives are an important start, but they are limited in terms of the type of service they provide, the type of "client" they work with, and the geographic area they serve.

Although SACSI is designed to reduce youth violence in four distinct neighborhoods, the clergy and service providers who are represented in the community portion of Notification do not cover the entire target area. Thus, some offenders do not come away from Notification with a "local" point of contact.

The promise of support delivered during Notification is not always substantiated once the offender returns to his/her neighborhood. A number of obstacles hinder the delivery of supportive services to offenders:

a. Lack of a centralized point of contact to follow-through with each person individually (beyond what court counselors, probation and program-specific case managers can accomplish).

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Many of the most critical services are not available, particularly with regard to job training.

The services that offenders need (e.g., job training) may not be appropriate given their lack of basic education (e.g., literacy)

Most service providers are not equipped to work with offenders who have mental health issues, which seems to apply to a significant fraction of SACSI offenders.

Some offenders (particularly juveniles) lack motivation or commitment to stick with programs designed to promote positive behavior.

c. Offenders may be discouraged by parents and/or other family members from participating in programs. In some cases, family members may actually promote criminal behavior on the part of youth.

9. Notification assumes that offenders are "rational:" they will understand the negative consequences of continued offending, they will appreciate the positive consequences associated with pro-social behavior such as succeeding in school, and then they will make a choice that maximizes their own personal welfare ("expected utility"). However, many offenders act more impulsively than logically. There are many other influences (e.g., peer pressure, boredom, lack of future orientation, lack of opportunity, mental illness) that contribute to negative behavior. Notification only barely acknowledges these other factors, and thus needs to be used in combination with other behavior-change tools.

Recommendations

1. Take more deliberate measures to ensure that juvenile offenders attend their scheduled Notification sessions. Much of the leverage appears to rest with the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (DJJDP). Although court counselors cannot "force" their clients to attend Notification (for example, by revoking probation and/or incarcerating offenders), court counselors can make attendance at Notification a "required condition" of probation, and then can reinforce the importance of Notification prior to the scheduled session. To the extent possible, court counselors should also attend sessions where their clients are being notified. This shows not only that DJJDP is committed to SACSI, but also that DJJDP is part of a much larger law-enforcement system where the players communicate with one another about particular individuals.

2. Speakers should meet prior to each Notification session to coordinate their messages (to eliminate redundancy, craft messages that build off one another, and map out how much time each person will talk). The community representatives will probably need to tailor what they say depending on which mix of clergy and agency staff show up on that particular night. The law-enforcement representatives need to be coached on how they can achieve the greatest impact with the shortest possible message. Some might speak about the legal consequences of continued offending, while others focus on the specific circumstances of individual offenders. Some players might be more effective

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toward the overall message if they say less, focusing on the basic SACSI message and indicating that they are united in their intolerance of violence. Community representatives should provide a brief (even nonverbal) affirmation of the SACSI message during the law-enforcement session. A designated person (e.g., the SACSI Program Manager) should take responsibility for directing the actors and choreographing the production.

3. Take every opportunity to bring up person-specific information that speaks directly to the offenders in the room. Notification seems to work best when the message is tailored to suit the individual situation of the offenders. This may require additional information-gathering prior to Notification, as well as coordination among the law-enforcement representatives who will talk about different offenders.

4. Convene offenders who are similar in terms of age and criminal records. This will allow focused messages that are relevant to everyone in the room.

5. Balance the strong law-enforcement message with equally strong invitations of support. Both sets of messages must be concrete, so that offenders have clear direction when they walk out of Notification. At the very least, every offender should be given a list of available resources and services.

6. Especially during the community sessions, include as many individuals as possible who can serve as role models to offenders. In addition to the "older" African-American men who currently provide a reality check on prison and encouragement to go straight, Notification should also include one or two young men who have "been there" and turned their lives around.

7. All law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors need to be united in enforcing the consequences of continued offending that are promised during Notification. To some extent, juveniles will always escape severe consequences simply as a function of their status. However, where the system does have the ability, authority and discretion to enforce consequences, local, state and federal agencies need to be united in their resolve and to assign a high priority.

8. Court counselors can play a key role in reinforcing the SACSI message after Notification -- so that the perception of consequences "stays alive" in the minds of juvenile offenders.

9. Notification needs to bring in and engage clergy and other community representatives who are based in all four SACSI neighborhoods.

10. Notification is but one component in a larger anti-violence prevention effort. For offenders to turn their lives around, Notification must be nested within a system in which (a) law-enforcement agencies stay atop the identified youth and vigorously

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prosecute repeat offending, (b) support agencies make critical services available to the target population, (c) court counselors or case managers assure that there is ongoing follow-through in accessing services, (d) offenders are motivated to take advantage of those services, (e) parents of offenders support positive life choices, and (f) the community as a whole makes opportunities (e.g., employment, education) accessible to young persons who have made poor choices in the past. Thus, improving the effectiveness of Notification hinges on the ability of SACSI to foster a concerted, comprehensive approach to changing behavior.

Operation Reach

Strengths

1. Operation Reach is organized and carried out by dedicated, hard-working people who want the program to be successful.

2. Each Operation Reach has a set of clearly articulated objectives indicating what message will be delivered on each of the scheduled visits.

3. Compared to Notification, Operation Reach provides a better opportunity to provide offenders with a tailored message regarding the support services that are available.

4. The law-enforcement personnel, community members, and clergy who participate in Operation Reach communicate, cooperate and respect one another. Team members work well together and complement one another in delivering the Operation Reach message.

5. Operation Reach provides SACSI neighborhoods with visible evidence that community agencies are indeed cooperating with one another.

Weaknesses

1. Operation Reach offers only one-time contact with offenders. In order to achieve behavior change, it is important to ensure that the requested services are actually provided and that ongoing monitoring occurs. This follow-up is outside the purview of Operation Reach.

2. Because Operation Reach relies on individualized home visits, the process is time-intensive. A team can only reach 3 or 4 offenders during any given session (and then only if the offender is actually at home when the team calls). Operation Reach has many more potential clients than it has available time slots. This is more problematic during warmer months, when criminal activity is likely to increase.

3. Clients are identified using a variety of sources (e.g., Notification, VIRT, Streetworkers, court counselors, community residents). Given the different

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information provided by each source, it is sometimes difficult to know how to prioritize the list of names and visit the most appropriate clients.

4. Operation Reach teams do not always include someone who knows the family, which makes the home contact awkward and reduces the possibility that someone in the family will actually take the initiative to seek services. The court counselor is the most obvious person to initiate the visit, but it is not always possible to involve the court counselor on the team making the visit.

5. The large size of the team occasionally induces a fearful, hostile, or other negative response on the part of people being visited. Unusually large teams sometimes result when more people than needed arrive to participate in Operation Reach on a particular day.

6. Families are more likely to be at home during hours that are well beyond most team members' workday; teams are often unable to contact clients on their lists.

7. Team members have demanding jobs that sometimes make it hard for them to arrive on time for the Operation Reach briefing session.

8. Due to varying circumstances encountered during Operation Reach, different teams need different amounts of time to complete their work in the field. This may cause teams to miss neighborhood hot spots or to miss the debriefing session.

9. It is difficult to engage adult probation/parole officers in Operation Reach because of their department's organizational structure and policies. This makes it difficult to coordinate Operation Reaches that are aimed at adults.

Recommendations

Clearly articulate the criteria for selection of Operation Reach clients. Use Operation Reach primarily as a follow-up to Notification, and make sure those individuals are contacted. Once that is working well and teams are fully staffed and not over-burdened, consider expanding the operation to include visits with individuals who are reentering the community from detention facilities. Then prioritize other potential categories of clients.

Establish a schedule for Notification and for Operation Reach. Recruit participants and on-call back-up personnel well in advance.

Attempt to effect organizational change in the probation/parole department to allow for better recruitment and coordination of officer participation.

Limit the size of Operation Reach teams and further limit the number of team members who enter a house.

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Create a document that can provide new Operation Reach participants with an explanation of the activity's goals and procedures.

Ensure that the briefing session allows enough time for teams to get acquainted and to share information about the homes to be visited; provide as much information as possible in advance, given confidentiality concerns.

Establish a mechanism by which teams that miss the debriefing session provide information to Operation Reach coordinators. Inform the Working Group of any significant comments or problems.

Establish a mechanism for reporting services needed by SACSI-identified individuals and their families. Ensure consistent use of the mechanism by Operation Reach teams and by the other teams whose establishment is recommended below.

Establish a separate activity, similar to Operation Reach, which is more flexible and can be organized quickly to visit homes of individuals who have not been through a recent Notification and Operation Reach homes where no contact was made. Teams could consist of one law enforcement officer or one court counselor and one community representative. Streetworkers may be able to organize this activity.

Establish a separate activity, primarily using law enforcement personnel, as a follow-up to violent incidents in particular neighborhoods. Officers on those teams who discover service-delivery needs should employ the reporting mechanism noted above.

Establish a service delivery review mechanism to monitor follow-up activities.

Summary

The evaluation found that Notification and Operation Reach each had definite strengths, particularly with regard to the active participation of multiple agencies. However, each of these two programs also had room to grow (with regard to clarifying the purpose and underlying mechanism for the program, as well as in implementing the program in a way that delivers the most potent intervention and follow-up to offenders and their families). The individuals who manage and carry out these two programs have made significant strides in addressing the issues brought up by the evaluators (in keeping with the philosophy underlying *formative evaluation*).

Cumulative Impact on the Community

The analysis of re-offending and the neighborhood crime statistics paint a mixed picture of whether or not SACSI is beginning to have a discernible impact on patterns of violent offending in Winston-Salem. At least one fifth of the persons who have been notified subsequently committed at least one violent act. This does not connote *prevention* in an absolute sense, but it might correspond to a reduction in the rate of re-offending. Without

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a control group, we don't know what the rate would have been without Notification and Operation Reach.

On the other hand, the neighborhood-level statistics suggest that violence is somewhat lower in the targeted neighborhoods, particularly for robbery. Robbery is precisely the sort of "planned" violent crime that a deterrent message might have the potential to affect (as opposed to more impulsive assaults). It is possible that the SACSI message did get out to the right people (offenders brought into notification, plus other juveniles who might have otherwise committed violent acts) and that the message caused them to think twice. On the other hand, it is also possible that violence was displaced from the SACSI neighborhoods to other (less "targeted") areas of the city. Or we may simply be seeing normal fluctuations in neighborhood-level offending patterns. It is certainly too early to determine whether or not SACSI has had a "real" effect on the level of violent crime in Winston-Salem, and even more premature for understanding the nature of such an effect.

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VII. Conclusions and Next Steps

The evaluation found that the Winston-Salem SACSI effort has made significant progress on a number of important fronts in addressing the youth-violence problem:

The major players in the community were mobilized around the issue of youth violence. Law-enforcement agencies, the courts, social-service agencies, churches, neighborhood associations and universities devoted attention and resources to the problem-solving effort.

The problem-solving process has been carried out on multiple levels (strategic and operational) on an ongoing basis.

True collaboration has occurred in planning and implementing the SACSI strategies. In particular, individuals from diverse perspectives have put aside their own parochial agendas to address a common concern. In the process, the partners have come to know, understand and respect one another.

A number of complex, multi-agency strategies (e.g., Notification, Operation Reach, VIRT, Cross-Agency Team, JasonNet) have been planned and carried out in a relatively cooperative manner.

Individual agencies have carried out additional strategies (e.g., Safe Schools/ Healthy Students, Job Link) in a coordinated fashion. In other words, there is a relatively coherent community-wide strategy to prevent youth violence.

The SACSI strategies continue to evolve based on what the Working Group and Core Team learn about process and outcomes.

Although SACSI has achieved a number of noteworthy "successes" in Winston-Salem, there is still room for improvement. This is particularly true with regard to "reaching" SACSI-identified youth with interventions that have the potential to induce long-lasting improvements in behavior and life circumstances (e.g., reduced risk of violent offending and other criminal behavior, increased probability of finishing school and finding meaningful employment, greater connectedness to the community). Toward that end, the evaluation team generated a set of recommendations designed to improve the overall effectiveness of the initiative. In general terms, these recommendations call for the individuals involved in SACSI to:

1) adopt a reasonable model of behavior change to guide the development of strategies;
2) be more strategic in the choice of leverage points that could produce behavior change; and
3) maintain the culture of strategic thinking that distinguishes SACSI from more traditional collaborative problem-solving efforts.

A More Comprehensive Model of Behavior Change

One of the most important findings with regard to Notification and Operation Reach is the recognition that these two programs are inherently only a beginning point to behavior change. Violent offenders will not automatically turn their lives around once they have been advised that they will suffer dire consequences if they continue to commit violent

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acts and been provided with information about "available resources." Knowledge and awareness, by themselves, will not produce sustained effects on criminal behavior. For a prevention strategy or intervention to be effective, it must pay attention to the context in which the young person is growing up, which often includes factors such as poverty, drugs and alcohol, mental illness, fragmented families, "deviant" peers, schools that don't seem to care and a limited set of positive role models. A Notification session followed by one or two Operation Reach visits cannot hope to undo this context and to create a true sense of opportunity.

What strategy would result in the sort of behavior change that SACSI is hoping to achieve among its target population? This is **the** defining question for SACSI. Many of the agencies that are participating in SACSI have been grappling with this question for years or even decades. Different organizations have arrived at different answers, as evidenced by approaches as varied as mentoring, group counseling, Streetworkers, recreational activities, psychotropic drugs, prayer and threats of incarceration.

It may be useful to invite representatives from these different organizations to sit down and explicate their assumptions about how their programs work. What beliefs, attitudes, behavior, relationships, etc. is the program trying to affect, and why does the organization think that those changes will lead to outcomes such as reduced violence? This is essentially a process of articulating each program's "theory of change."

Once those different theories are out in the open for examination and comparison, it may be possible for the SACSI Working Group and/or Core Team to develop an overarching theory of what it will take to prevent violent offending over the long haul. Again, the basic approach is to come up with well-founded answers to the question, "What needs to change in a SACSI offender's life if he/she is to avoid violence in the future?" This exercise might consider possibilities such as the following:

Do they need to change their peer group?
What new beliefs do they need to adopt?
Do they need more support in school?
Do they need a positive male figure in their life?
Do they need to deal with a mental illness?
Do they need job skills?
Do they need to change their attitude about authority?
Does the community need to be more open-minded in offering them another chance (e.g., by hiring them even though they have a criminal record)?

Answering these questions identifies a set of conditions that SACSI needs to help create within the target population (and the community as a whole) if the initiative is to be successful in achieving its mission.

This process of developing a theory of change is likely to be complicated by the diversity of offenders that SACSI has "targeted." For example, consider how differently one would answer the questions above for each of the following types of offender:

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Youth with no criminal record, but who are "at risk" because of affiliation with a violent peer group or gang,
Youth who have a criminal record that involves only non-violent offenses (e.g., drug trafficking, car theft)
Youth with a single violent offense on their record, but who were involved only as an "accessory"
Youth with a single violent offense that is serious and indicative of future violent behavior
Youth who have multiple violent offenses on their record (Track IA)
Violent adults who are attempting to involve youth in their actions

As the Core Team recognized when coming up with its initial logic model, these groups are differentially likely to commit a violent offense. They are at different stages of "involvement" with the court system and DJJDP. And they probably will have different levels of "support" within their home, school and neighborhood environments.

If SACSI is to achieve behavior change with its programming, those programs will need to be tailored to fit with the predisposition and the context of each target audience. Some audiences will be easier to "reach" than others. For some hard-core offenders, it may be quite difficult for the partners involved in SACSI to effect a significant change in attitude or belief, let alone behavior. SACSI will need to tailor its programming to the different target audiences based on how behavior change occurs.

Look for Strategic Leverage Points Open to the SACSI Partners

The first recommendation called for SACSI (some combination of the Project Manager, the Core Team and the Working Group) to become more deliberate in developing a sound theory as to what it will take for the initiative's target population to change their behavior and life circumstances. The next step is to look for specific opportunities to activate that change process. In particular, given who sits around the SACSI table, what are the possibilities for creating the conditions that need to occur if Winston-Salem is to see meaningful, lasting changes in youth violence? This task is essentially an exercise in mapping out each SACSI partner's influence over the conditions that emerged from the first step.

SACSI represents an incredible pooling of institutions and organizations that have the potential to influence youthful offenders:

Law Enforcement agencies (WSPD, Forsyth County Sheriffs Department, FBI, ATF)
Prosecutors (District Attorney's Office, U.S. Attorney's Office)
Probation (DJJDP, Adult Corrections)
Social-service agencies (Centerpoint, DSS)
Youth-serving agencies (e.g., YMCA, Parks and Recreation)
Community-based organizations (e.g., Urban League, VisionsWork)
Churches

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Winston-Salem Housing Authority
Schools (counselors, case managers, School Resource Officers, Truancy Team, teachers)

Each of these partners is already involved in the lives of the target population through programming, services or interactions falling within the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system. As such, each partner has influence over a particular issue or aspect of the offender's life. Some partners adopt a more comprehensive perspective than others in dealing with their clients, and thus have even greater influence over the conditions facing the SACSI target population.

The next question is whether the SACSI partners have more potential influence than they have been achieving to date. To determine this, each organization can ask itself the following questions:

1. Which youth within the SACSI target population can this organization potentially influence? (e.g., at-risk youth who have not yet committed a violent act, SACSI-identified youth with one violent offense, hard-care SACSI offenders with an extensive history of violent behavior)
2. How much influence could this organization conceivably have on the attitudes, behavior or life conditions of these groups?
3. *if "quite a bit,"* What would it take for this organization to achieve those effects?
4. Which programs/activities/services would the organization need to add?
5. How would the organization need to change the way it does business?

These questions lay the groundwork for identifying new programs or strategies that could have a stronger effect in achieving the outcomes that SACSI has committed itself to. Once a potential strategy has been identified, it is useful to raise the four questions that David Kennedy offered as a guide for strategic analysis (i.e., "Kennedy's Rules"):

6. How big of an impact can we anticipate?
7. How long will it take?
8. Can we do it?
9. Do we want to do it?

In essence, these nine questions call for each SACSI partner to be more deliberate in effecting positive changes within the individuals that SACSI is hoping to benefit. However, this should not be an isolated exercise for each SACSI partner. Ideally, the different partners would develop approaches that complement one another. Some agencies might address the issues of a broad at-risk group, while other agencies might concentrate their energies on a smaller group of individuals who have already committed violent acts and/or who have a whole panoply of complex personal and social needs. Correspondingly, some agencies would focus on aspects such as mental health, others would build a strong social-support network and others would provide instruction or mentoring that would lead to stronger skills (e.g., academic skills, decision-making skills, job skills). The general idea is to help the existing "system" of service providers put in place a more coherent, comprehensive set of programs and services that has a better chance of achieving significant, lasting impacts on SACSI's target population.

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In addition to cultivating a more coordinated system of services among autonomous providers, SACSI also has the opportunity to create a limited number of inter-organizational strategies. Under this framework, different agencies bring their own unique competencies and experience to a common activity. Rather than piecing together distinct services into a comprehensive overarching system, the idea is to bring comprehensiveness down to the strategy level. To date, Winston-Salem has implemented three good examples of this approach: Notification, Operation Reach and Cross-Agency Teams. With each of these strategies, representatives from a wide array of agencies and organizations come together to address a whole host of issues within a specific group of offenders.

Although these inter-organizational strategies are attractive in many respects (e.g., everyone working together toward a common purpose), they are also complicated and costly to implement. As the evaluation of Operation Reach demonstrated, it is very difficult to coordinate the schedules of all the players who need to be in the home to deliver the OR message (e.g., court counselors, police officers, clergy, service providers, community residents).

Because these strategies are so costly to carry out, it is important to make the most of them. As such, the same questions posed above for each agency should also be raised with regard to Notification, Operation Reach and the Cross-Agency Teams:

1. Which youth within the SACSI target population can this strategy potentially influence?
2. How much influence could this strategy conceivably have on the attitudes, behavior or life conditions of these groups?
3. *if "quite a bit,"* What would it take for this strategy to achieve those effects?
4. Which activities, services, etc. need to be added?
5. What other changes need to be made in how the strategy is carried out?
6. If we make these changes or additions, how big of an impact can we anticipate?
7. How long will it take?
8. Can we do it?
9. Do we want to do it?

The general recommendation here, whether it pertains to organizations or inter-organizational strategies like Notification, is for SACSI to be more strategic in how it uses the many resources and opportunities that are offered through the partners sitting around the table.

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Keep Strategic Thinking Alive within SACSI

Although we are recommending that SACSI play an active role in helping to create a more comprehensive system for meeting the needs of Winston-Salem's youth (particularly those who are either violent offenders or at risk of becoming violent offenders), this raises the question of who would manage such a system and hold the various players accountable to their individual and joint responsibilities. And if this longer-term management of the system turns out to be a role for SACSI, what are the opportunity costs for Winston-Salem?

It is unlikely that any entity other than SACSI can carry out coordination and oversight tasks that are required to achieve the "comprehensive systems reform" recommended above. However, it is important that this more operational style of functioning not displace the other critical functions that SACSI delivered during the earlier stages of the initiative: research on the nature of the problem, strategic planning and analysis, collaborative problem-solving and evaluation.

At the outset of SACSI, the Core Team served as the primary forum for strategic analysis and planning. As the initiative shifted into implementation mode, the Working Group became the focal point for reviewing progress to date, coordinating activities and identifying additional issues to be addressed. Whereas the Core Team's orientation was primarily conceptual and analytic, the Working Group is focused on practicalities and concrete activities. The Working Group's orientation is precisely what is needed for the management task, but it does not create a climate for strategic analysis. This is a problem because the need for strategic analysis has not evaporated with the implementation of the initially designed strategies. For SACSI to be successful, learning, analysis and planning will need to be kept alive over time. It may be possible for the Working Group to adopt the more strategic role that the Core Team played initially, but this will require a drastic refocusing of the Working Group meetings. Alternatively, it may be useful to reactivate the Core Team so that they meet more frequently and stay abreast of SACSI developments. In addition, there seems to be some benefit in having a few members of the Working Group join the Core Team so that they can bring firsthand accounts of the issues that have arisen during the implementation process.

Keep Strategic Thinking Alive within Winston-Salem

As SACSI takes its next steps forward, it is important to remember what SACSI is and what it is not. SACSI is not a management organization, nor a specific activity (e.g., Notification), nor even a particular strategy for preventing violence (e.g., establishing clear and certain consequences for carrying a gun). Rather, SACSI is a *process* for finding effective solutions that various actors in the community can implement. At the core of SACSI is strategic analysis. This is what distinguishes SACSI from the more generic or single-pronged violence-prevention strategies that have traditionally been promoted by funders or government agencies.

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It is critically important that SACSI - as a process - be sustained in Winston-Salem. The youth-violence problem has not been "solved" in any absolute sense. Rather, the process of solving the problem has been initiated. Significant steps have been taken, from both a programmatic and collaborative standpoint, and these steps are beginning to pay off in developing effective strategies. Individuals from law enforcement, social services, schools, nonprofits, churches, etc. are now more committed to making a real difference in preventing youth violence. Just as importantly, these individuals now understand the nature of the violence issue from a deeper, more systems-level perspective - through social-science data, practice wisdom and experimentation with promising interventions. By sustaining this learning process and continuing to bring together a diversity of "experts" around a shared vision of a "healthy community," SACSI can honor its charter and have its greatest impact on violence reduction.

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Figure 1: Logic Model for SACSI

	Track 1A	Track 1B	Track 2	Track 3	Track 4 (sch-based)
Precipitating Conditions	1.) Juvenile repeat offenders (> 2 arrests for SACSI crimes). 2.) Youth with clear ties to violent groups as identified by VIRT. 3.) On probation. 4) Phase I upon return from training school, etc.	1.) Adults identified as involving juveniles. a.) VIRT review b.) Probation surveys 2.) Adults setting climate on street. a.) VIRT review b.) Police/Prob. surveys 3.) On probation.	1.) 1st adjudication for F-I felony; A1-Misd. 2) Adjudication for weapons-related offense. 2.) Project Impact or DCC intensive w/ violent history. 3.) Any illegal gun offense w/ prior felony conviction.	1.) 1st time arrest for gun offense 2) Referral from JROU, OJJ 3) Jason Network monitoring of at-risk indicators	1.) Special circumstances (Damarion Brown) 2.) Students who can't otherwise be reached. ID by SACSI/Sch./SRO
Desired Outcomes	1.) Stop further violence. 2.) Put down guns. 3.) Choose positive alternatives. 4.) Take "stop violence" message out to broader group.	1.) Stop violence. 2.) Put down guns. 3.) Don't involve juveniles. 4.) Take "stop violence/no kids" message out to broader group.	1.) No further escalation. 2.) Successfully complete probation. 3.) Don't become repeat offender - Phase I. 4.) Take msg. out to broader group.	1.) No further gun use. 2.) Reduce other offenses. 3.) Awareness of seriousness of gun use. 4.) Greater awareness of community's concern. 5.) Take msg. out to broader group.	1.) Stop further violent offending. 2.) Maintain order/ prevent retaliation/ "beefs." 3.) Changing norms of behavior. 4.) Msg. spreads to others in school.
Message	- Stop violence! - Put down guns. - Offer services.	- Stop violence. - Put down guns. - Don't involve kids.	- Stop violence. - Stop using guns. - What is done to repeat offender (explain process). - Don't get there.	- Concerned about gun use. - No further involvement in violence. - Community cares. - What are your needs?	- Community system in place to deal with violence. - Tailored to specific case.
Notification/ Communication	- At police dept. - Strong law enforcement. - Community mtg. (pre and post) - Parents invited	- At police dept. - Strong law enforcement. - Community mtg. (pre and post).	- At police dept. - Reduced law enforcement (only ATF). - Strong community. - Parents invited	- Operation reach home visit by police, probation, clergy, community.	- School-based. - Small groups or 1-on-1. - Outreach (less law enforcement). - Rotating schedule to schools.
Follow-up Activities	1.) Flagged in pd/sd. 2.) VIRT review. 3.) Ongoing police/ probation follow-up. 4.) Prosecutorial response. a.) violent - priority, no deals b.) non-violent - review for appro. action c.) minor - reinforce SACSI 5.) Operation Reach. 6.) Staffings/Cross-agency Teams. 7.) Mentoring Prog. 8.) St. wrk. Outreach. 9.) Entered into the Jason Network. 10.) Assist w/ jobs.	1.) X 2.) X 3.) X 4.) X 5.) X 6.) 7.) 8.) X 9.) 10.)	1.) Periodic monitoring by OJJ/PD. 2.) X 3.) X 4.) Respond to Re-offending. a.) violent - move to track 1 b.) non-violent - police/probation visit 5.) X 6.) Select staffings 7.) X 8.) X 9.) X 10.) X	1.) Periodic monitoring by OJJ/JROU/SRO. 5) X 7) 8)	- Reinforced by school staff -Connections to school-based services

Figure 2


YOUTH VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER SACSI
Number of Juveniles Involved in Violent Crime
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
53
63
50
43
62
73
65
63
42
69
56
54
67
15
22
26
15
24
22
19
10
17
17
32
15
13
SACSI intervention began
Rest of City
SACSI Neighborhoods
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
1998
1999
2000
2001
Years in Quarters

Figure 3

ROBBERIES BY JUVENILES BEFORE AND AFTER SACSI



Table 1
Scope of Evaluation

LEVEL OF EVALUATION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS	MEASURES
A. The SACSI Process, as carried out in Winston-Salem Staff level -project director -other US Attorney's Office staff -Street workers -other program staff	What roles do different staff members play? What is the value added, especially of project director? What other staff-level supports are needed? How can the work be institutionalized?	*Interviews with project staff* *Interviews with other SACSI team members* *Observation of meetings and sessions*
Other Individuals directly involved in carrying out SACSI program, including: -Winston-Salem Police Department -Forsyth County Sheriff's Department -Probation/Parole -District Attorney -Public Defender -Community based organizations (e.g. Urban League) -Clergy -Social Service Agencies	How strongly do key individuals within the critical "partner" institutions and organizations support SACSI? Which types of self interest are served by SACSI? How well does SACSI fit with the partner organizations' mission and approach? How might SACSI's structure, program or staffing be changed to increase buy-in from these key partners?	*Interviews with project director* *Interviews with members of the various project teams* *Observation of meetings and sessions*
Overall Management and Coordination of SACSI -Core Team -other community collaborators	How well do the various players actually collaborate with one another? - Do the different players share a common purpose with SACSI? - How much trust between partners, particularly between law enforcement and community organizations? Do the various SACSI teams (e.g., Core Team) work as true teams? - Do they have a clear mission commonly shared by members? - Do team members communicate openly and respectfully? - Is there a good mix between planning, action and reflection?	*Interviews with project director* *Interviews with members of the various project teams* *Observation of meetings and sessions*

Table 1 (*continued*)

LEVEL OF EVALUATION **B. Program Level**	EVALUATION QUESTIONS	METHODS
Desired Outcomes of Notification and Operation Reach	What do the project team leaders expect to happen as a result of each program strategy?	*Interviews with project team*
Description of Notification, Operation Reach	What do the program strategies look like: -in theory? -in practice?	*Review of documents* *Observation of meetings and sessions* *Interviews with project team* *Interviews with offenders*
Process evaluation of Notification, Operation Reach	How well is program operating relative to intentions and designs? How well is the intended message being received by participants? Which pieces of the program seem most potent? Which are misfiring? What other strategies are needed to make SACSI more effective (e.g., more macros analysis of violent incidents)? How might the strategies be coordinated better?	*Review of documents* *Observation of meetings and sessions* *Interviews with project team* *Interviews with offenders*
Evaluation of short term outcomes	What are the immediate takeaways from sessions (intentions, knowledge)? What is the change in attitude re: violence, crime, school, anti-social behavior? What is the change in behavior (conduct, arrests for violent offenses, arrests for non-violent offenses, pro-social behavior? Is message is conveyed to peers? Is the SACSI message being heard on the streets? -in SACSI neighborhoods? -in Winston-Salem overall?	*Interviews with offenders* *Focus group with parents* *Analysis of police records of offenses (pre and post-intervention)*

Table 2
Mapping of Evaluation Methods onto Evaluation Purpose

LEVEL AND FOCUS OF EVALUATION

	Process Evaluation			**Outcome Evaluation**	
	Overall SACSI Process	Notification Program	Operation Reach	Individual-Level Outcomes	Community-Level Outcomes
METHOD					
SACSI Process Questionnaire	**X**	x	x		
Interviews with Core Team Members	**X**				
Observation of Notification	x	**X**	x		
Observation of Operation Reach	x	x	**X**		
Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Notification	x	**X**	x		
Interviews with SACSI Partners Involved in Operation Reach	x	x	**X**		
Interviews with Offenders	x	**X**	x	x	
Focus Group with Parents	x	**X**	**X**		
Analysis of re-offending among SACSI-notified offenders				**X**	
Analysis of trends in violent offending					**X**

Table 3
Buy-in to the SACSI Model by Members of the Core Team and Working Group

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
17. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the results of the SACSI program.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			3	7
Ratings by Working Group Members		1	8	9
18. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the way the Core Team/Working Group works.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			2	7
Ratings by Working Group Members		1	11	6
15. The SACSI mission is consistent with the mission of the organization I represent.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			5	5
Ratings by Working Group Members			11	7
16. Working with this team fits well within the guidelines of what my organization expects me to do.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			3	7
Ratings by Working Group Members			9	9

*(**NOTE:** The table presents the number of members providing each response. Excludes "Don't Know.")*

Table 4
Perceived Effectiveness of the Core Team

25. How effective is the Core Team?

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
Ratings by Core Team Members			5	5
Ratings by Working Group Members		1	2	11

To what extent are each of the following statements true of the Core Team members?

	Not At All	Only a Little	To Some Extent	A Substantial Amount	A Great Deal
1. Have respect for one another.				2	8
2. Understand one another.			2	4	4
3. Trust one another.			1	4	5
4. Are an appropriate cross-section of the community.		1	3	3	3
5. Share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish.			2	3	5
6. Have very productive meetings.			1	6	3
7. Are able to achieve consensus on important issues.				4	6
8. Are flexible in their approach to organizing and accomplishing their work			1	4	5
9. Are able to adapt to changing events or conditions.			4	2	4
10. Engage in open and frequent *formal* communication with one another.		1	1	2	6
11. Engage in open and frequent *informal* communication with one another.			1	6	3
12. Understand their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out.			4	2	4

*(**NOTE:** This section shows the ratings of Core Team members describing their own group.)*

Table 5
Perceived Effectiveness of the Working Group

26. How effective is the Working Group?

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
Ratings by Working Group Members			4	14
Ratings by Core Team Members			3	6

To what extent are each of the following statements true of the Working Group members?

	Not At All	Only a Little	To Some Extent	A Substantial Amount	A Great Deal
1. Have respect for one another.				3	14
2. Understand one another.			1	10	7
3. Trust one another.			2	6	9
4. Are an appropriate cross-section of the community.			1	6	11
5. Share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish.			1	6	11
6. Have very productive meetings.			1	8	9
7. Are able to achieve consensus on important issues.				7	11
8. Are flexible in their approach to organizing and accomplishing their work			1	7	10
9. Are able to adapt to changing events or conditions.				8	10
10. Engage in open and frequent *formal* communication with one another.			4	7	7
11. Engage in open and frequent *informal* communication with one another.			3	10	5
12. Understand their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out.			2	9	7

*(**NOTE:** This section shows the ratings of Working Group members describing their own group.)*

Table 6
Assessment of the Overall SACSI Process
By Members of the Core Team and Working Group

24. How effective is the Leadership of SACSI

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
Ratings by Core Team Members				10
Ratings by Working Group Members	1			17

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
13. SACSI goals and objectives are very clear to me.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			4	6
Ratings by Working Group Members			5	13
14. SACSI goals and objectives are realistic.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			5	4
Ratings by Working Group Members			9	9
19. The financial resources needed for SACSI are readily available.				
Ratings by Core Team Members		3	5	2
Ratings by Working Group Members		2	9	3
20. Other resources needed for SACSI are readily available.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			8	2
Ratings by Working Group Members		3	8	3
21. There is good communication and coordination between the core team and the working group.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			6	4
Ratings by Working Group Members		1	10	6
22. Enough has been done to inform the entire community about SACSI programs.				
Ratings by Core Team Members		5	2	2
Ratings by Working Group Members		10	4	3

*(**NOTE:** The table presents the number of members providing each response. Excludes "Don't Know.")*

Table 7
Perceived Effectiveness of Various SACSI Strategies
Among Members of the Core Team and Working Group

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
25. Violent Incident Review Team				
Ratings by Core Team Members			4	2
Ratings by Working Group Members			2	10
26. Community Action Team				
Ratings by Core Team Members		1	4	2
Ratings by Working Group Members			1	12
27. Notification				
Ratings by Core Team Members			5	4
Ratings by Working Group Members			4	14
28. Operation Reach				
Ratings by Core Team Members			3	3
Ratings by Working Group Members			5	11
29. Streetworker program				
Ratings by Core Team Members			3	1
Ratings by Working Group Members			3	8
30. Provision of services to offenders				
Ratings by Core Team Members		1	5	1
Ratings by Working Group Members			11	2
31. Provision of services to offenders' families				
Ratings by Core Team Members	1	1	5	
Ratings by Working Group Members		1	8	1

*(**NOTE:** The table presents the number of members providing each response. Excludes "Don't Know.")*

Table 8
Overall Satisfaction with SACSI
Among Members of the Core Team and Working Group

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
23. I am pleased with SACSI accomplishments so far.				
Ratings by Core Team Members			7	3
Ratings by Working Group Members			9	9

Open-ended Comments Regarding Perceived Effectiveness

- I have observed a better line of communication with all agencies involved. A very good by-product of SACSI.
- I enjoy working with the SACSI program.
- I feel that our efforts with SACSI in the Forsyth Co. community have provided a very strong foundation for the program to thrive. There will be need for more tweaking for the various concepts that have been formulated. I am confident that (my organization) will continue to be a strong contributor for this effort.
- I am proud of our community involvement across agencies with SACSI. The partnerships have increased communication across law enforcement, school and mental health, counseling, and community.
- "Mentor-Summer Program" very effective.

Table 9
Recommendations for Improving SACSI

Would you approve or disapprove of the following suggestions:

	Approve	Disapprove	No Opinion
34. Inviting parents of offenders to some Working Group meetings.			
Ratings by Core Team Members	7	1	2
Ratings by Working Group Members	14	2	1
35. Involving other community members (such as the business community) in the Working Group			
Ratings by Core Team Members	9	0	1
Ratings by Working Group Members	16	1	1
36. Increasing the frequency of Working Group meetings			
Ratings by Core Team Members	0	4	5
Ratings by Working Group Members	4	13	1
37. Increasing efforts to inform the entire Winston-Salem/Forsyth County community of the SACSI program			
Ratings by Core Team Members	10	0	0
Ratings by Working Group Members	18	0	0

Open-Ended Comments Regarding Recommendations:

- Need to create clear outcome linkages between the variety of "program activities" and major goals or objectives.
- Need for a monthly/bimonthly cross group meeting (working, core, community action, VIRT) so folks can hear all sides of SACSI input.
- I feel that there should be more group discussion on issues and concerns.
- More representation of community members need to be involved in the working group process.
- The clergy/agency/streetworker "positive carrot" needs to be a continual balance to the law enforcement "negative carrot." Jobs are crucial, as is understanding the interconnection of race, class, culture and gender.
- I believe a holistic approach is necessary to the success of the SACSI program and would like to see what is being done with the families and/or significant others of SACSI subjects to prevent involvement by siblings and to ensure support of SACSI subjects from their families while they participate in SACSI programs.

Table 10
Participation in Notification Sessions
September 1999 – February 2001

DATE	TYPE OF NOTIFICATION	# PARTICIPANTS
September 9, 1999		
Session I	Juvenile (Tracks 1A and 2)	23
Session II:	Adult (Track 1B)	30
September 21, 1999		
Session I:	Juvenile (Tracks 1A and 2)	16
Session II:	Adult (Track 1B)	15 (including 2 who were notified previously)
December 6, 1999	Adult (Track 1B)	18
February 4, 2000	Special session for a group of individuals (aged 16-20) who were involved in a large fight between two neighborhoods. he offending behavior did not meet the SACSI criteria for violence. Instead, this Notification was ordered by a judge as part of deferred prosecution.	13 (7 juveniles and 6 adults)
April 4, 2000	Adult (Track 1B)	2
June 13, 2000	Special Notification for youth involved in auto thefts, which is seen as a "pathway" crime	10 (including 2 who were notified previously)
August 24, 2000	Adult (Track 1B)	6
September 7, 2000	Juvenile (Tracks 1A and 2)	14
February 26, 2001		
Session I:	Adult (Track 1B)	12 (including 2 who were notified previously)
Session II:	Juvenile (Tracks 1A and 2)	5

Table 11
Participation in Operation Reach Sessions
September 1999 – February 2001

DATE	SCHEDULED VISITS
December 2, 1999	4 juveniles 4 adults
September 19, 2000	7 juveniles 9 adults
November 14, 2000	7 adults
December 12, 2000	1 juvenile 4 adults

Table 12:
Follow-up Offending Among Notified Offenders:
Violent Offenses (through 1/31/01)

Group	# with F/up WSPD data	Percentage who were subsequently: Arrested for SACSI crime	Arrested or Suspect in SACSI crime
1. Notified Adults			
a. without violent record	40	2%	15%
b. with violent record	24	21%	29%
Total Adults	**64**	**9%**	**20%**
2. Notified Youth			
a. without violent record	16	6%	25%
b. Total Youth with violent record	19	16%	16%
i. Phase I	*13*	*8%*	*8%*
ii. Others with violent record	*6*	*33%*	*33%*
Total Youth	**35**	**11%**	**20%**
ALL NOTIFIED OFFENDERS	**99**	**10%**	**20%**
Track IA Youth Not Notified	**32**	**16%**	**16%**

Table 13:
Follow-up Offending Among Notified Offenders:
Violent Offenses or Simple Assault (through 1/31/01)

Group	# with F/up WSPD data	Percentage who were subsequently Involved in SACSI crime or simple assault
1. Notified Adults		
a. without violent record	40	50%
b. with violent record	24	54%
Total Adults	**64**	**52%**
2. Notified Youth		
a. without violent record	16	38%
b. Total Youth with violent record	19	32%
i. Phase I	*13*	*31%*
ii. Others with violent record	*6*	*33%*
Total Youth	**35**	**34%**
ALL NOTIFIED OFFENDERS	**99**	**45%**
Track 1A Youth – NOT Notified	**32**	**34%**

APPENDIX

Questionnaires and Interview Guides

SACSI Core Team Questionnaire

Please rate the following aspects of the SACSI Core Team by indicating to what extent, if at all, the item is characteristic of the team. (Check one box for each item.)

Members of the core team . . .	Not At All	Only a Little	To Some Extent	A Substantial Amount	A Great Deal	Don't Know
1. Have respect for one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Understand one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Trust one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Are an appropriate cross-section of the community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Have very productive meetings.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Are able to achieve consensus on important issues.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Are flexible in their approach to organizing and accomplishing their work.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Are able to adapt to changing events or conditions.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Engage in open and frequent *formal* communication with one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Engage in open and frequent *informal* communication with one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Understand their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please rate your own personal experience with being a member of the core team by indicating the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. (Check one box for each statement.)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
13. SACSI goals and objectives are very clear to me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. SACSI goals and objectives are realistic.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. The SACSI mission is consistent with the mission of the organization I represent.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. Working with this team fits well within the guidelines of what my organization expects me to do.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the results of the SACSI program.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the way the core team works.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. The financial resources needed for SACSI are readily available.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. Other resources needed for SACSI are readily available.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. There is good communication and coordination between the core team and the working group.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. Enough has been done to inform the entire community about SACSI programs.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. I am pleased with SACSI accomplishments so far.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please rate the overall effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the following elements of the SACSI program. (Check one box for each item.)

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective	Don't Know
24. Leadership of the program	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25. Core Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26. Working Group	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27. Violent Incident Review Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28. Community Action Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29. Notification	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30. Operation Reach	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
31. Streetworker program	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
32. Provision of services to offenders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
33. Provision of services to offenders' families	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please indicate whether you would approve or disapprove of each of the following suggestions. (Check one box for each suggestion.)

	Approve	Disapprove	No Opinion
34. Inviting parents of offenders to some Working Group meetings.	☐	☐	☐
35. Involving other community members (such as the business community) in the Working Group	☐	☐	☐
36. Increasing the frequency of Working Group meetings	☐	☐	☐
37. Increasing efforts to inform the entire Winston-Salem/Forsyth County community of the SACSI program	☐	☐	☐

38. Please provide any other comments that may help the research team evaluate the SACSI program or understand your experience with it.

SACSI Working Group Questionnaire

Please rate the following aspects of the SACSI Working Group by indicating to what extent, if at all, the item is characteristic of the group. (Check one box for each item.)

Members of the Working Group . . .	Not At All	Only a Little	To Some Extent	A Substantial Amount	A Great Deal	Don't Know
1. Have respect for one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Understand one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Trust one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Are an appropriate cross-section of the community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Have very productive meetings.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Are able to achieve consensus on important issues.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Are flexible in their approach to organizing and accomplishing their work.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Are able to adapt to changing events or conditions.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Engage in open and frequent *formal* communication with one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Engage in open and frequent *informal* communication with one another.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Understand their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please rate your own personal experience with being a member of the Working Group by indicating the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. (Check one box for each statement.)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
13. SACSI goals and objectives are very clear to me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. SACSI goals and objectives are realistic.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. The SACSI mission is consistent with the mission of the organization I represent.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. Working with this group fits well within the guidelines of what my organization expects me to do.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the results of the SACSI program.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. I feel a strong sense of ownership over the way the working group works.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. The financial resources needed for SACSI are readily available.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. Other resources needed for SACSI are readily available.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. There is good communication and coordination between the core team and the working group.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. Enough has been done to inform the entire community about SACSI programs.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. I am pleased with SACSI accomplishments so far.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please rate the overall effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the following elements of the SACSI program. (Check one box for each item.)

	Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective	Don't Know
24. Leadership of the program	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25. Core Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26. Working Group	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27. Violent Incident Review Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28. Community Action Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29. Notification	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30. Operation Reach	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
31. Streetworker program	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
32. Provision of services to offenders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
33. Provision of services to offenders' families	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please indicate whether you would approve or disapprove of each of the following suggestions. (Check one box for each suggestion.)

	Approve	Disapprove	No Opinion
34. Inviting parents of offenders to some Working Group meetings.	☐	☐	☐
35. Involving other community members (such as the business community) in the Working Group	☐	☐	☐
36. Increasing the frequency of Working Group meetings	☐	☐	☐
37. Increasing efforts to inform the entire Winston-Salem/Forsyth County community of the SACSI program	☐	☐	☐

38. Please provide any other comments that may help the research team evaluate the SACSI program or understand your experience with it.

Interview Guide
Key Officials in *Community* Notification Sessions

Note: Throughout the interview, prompt for any differences between the respondent's evaluation of the community portion and the law enforcement portion of the session.

1. How many notification sessions have you attended?

2. What was your role in designing the notification procedure?

3. How well do you think the notification team works together?

4. Is it clear to you how offenders are selected for notification?

5. How clearly defined or well-organized is the notification program?

6. How specific are the guidelines for what each team member must say during the community portion of the notification session?

7. How specific do you think those guidelines should be?

8. What does the team expect notification to accomplish? (Prompt for specifics, especially regarding the community portion.)

9. Which of those outcomes are especially important to you?

10. Are there other outcomes you personally would like to see?

11. What do you think are the major strengths of the notification process? (If no major, prompt for minor.)

12. What do you think are the major weaknesses of the notification process? (If no major, prompt for minor.)

13. Is any particular resource needed to make the community portion of the notification sessions more effective?

14. Overall, how well do you think the notification process is working?

15. Are there any specific changes that need to be made in the process?

16. Are there specific groups or types of individuals with whom it seems to be especially effective or especially ineffective? Why?

(continued on next page)

17. What do you think would be the optimum number of offenders to be present at a notification session?

18. What messages do you think most of the youth take away from the community portion of the notification session?

19. How do you think they respond to the sessions and the messages they receive? (Prompts: what they are thinking or feeling, what they tell their friends about the session, whether their behavior changes in any way)

20. Have you had any contact with any of the youth since their notification session?
    IF YES:
    How many have you seen or talked to? Have you seen any of them more than once?
    Typically, how long was this after the notification session?
    What kind of contact was it? Who initiated it? What happened?
    What did you do as a result of the contact?
    Do you know what the young person did as a result?

21. What suggestions or advice do you have for the research team?

Interview Guide
Key Officials in *Law Enforcement* Notification Sessions

1. How many notification sessions have you attended?
2. What was your role in designing the notification procedure?
3. How well do you think the notification team works together?
4. Is it clear to you how offenders are selected for notification?
5. How clearly defined or well-organized is the notification program?
6. How specific are the guidelines for what each team member must say during a notification session?
7. How specific do you think those guidelines should be?
8. What does the team expect notification to accomplish? (Prompt for specifics.)
9. Which of those outcomes are especially important to you?
10. Are there other outcomes you personally would like to see?
11. What do you think are the major strengths of the notification process? (If no major, prompt for minor.)
12. What do you think are the major weaknesses of the notification process? (If no major, prompt for minor.)
13. Is any particular resource needed to make the notification sessions more effective?
14. Overall, how well do you think the notification process is working?
15. Are there any specific changes that need to be made in the process?
16. Are there specific groups or types of individuals with whom it seems to be especially effective or especially ineffective? Why?
17. What do you think would be the optimum number of offenders to be present at a notification session?
18. What messages do you think most of the youth take away from these sessions?

(continued on next page)

19. How do you think they respond to the sessions and the messages they receive? (Prompts: what they are thinking or feeling, what they tell their friends about the session, whether their behavior changes in any way)

20. Have you had any contact with any of the youth since their notification session?
    IF YES:
    How many have you seen or talked to? Have you seen any of them more than once?
    Typically, how long was this after the notification session?
    What kind of contact was it? Who initiated it? What happened?
    What did you do as a result of the contact?
    Do you know what the young person did as a result?

21. What suggestions or advice do you have for the research team?

Interview Guide
Officials in the Operation Reach Program

1. What has been your involvement in Operation Reach?

2. How clear is the purpose of Operation Reach?

3. From your perspective, what are the major goals of Operation Reach?

4. What do you think is working well about Operation Reach?

5. What kind of response do you get when you are out on Operation Reach?

6. How well do you think the team members work together?

7. Does the team include the right number of law enforcement officials?

8. Does the team include the right number of community people?

9. Who should take the lead in Operation Reach contacts on the streets and hot spots?

10. In those hot spot contacts and in the flyers, what should be the balance between a law enforcement message and offers of help?

11. In terms of who is most important to reach, how would you rank the following target groups:
    - Juveniles who have been notified;
    - People in neighborhoods where violence has recently occurred;
    - Juveniles coming out of detention;
    - Some other group?

12. What suggestion do you have for including more clergy and more probation officers in the Operation Reach program?

13. What resources do you think are needed to make Operation Reach work better?

14. What other avenues do you think are available to get the message across to the target population?

15. What should we realistically expect juveniles and their families to do in response to Operation Reach?

16. What suggestions do you have about some form of recognition for juveniles who are making progress?

17. What does SACSI need to do to follow-up with individuals and families who were contacted through Operation Reach?

(continued on next page)

18. What do you think about how Operation Reach is organized or carried out on the day of the program itself? Please comment on:
    - The briefing and debriefing sessions;
    - The time management in the field.

19. Do you have any suggestions about how to improve on the effectiveness of the Operation Reach program?

Interview Guide
Notified Offenders

1. Have you heard of SACSI? If so, what have you heard?

2. What was your overall reaction to the notification?

3. How much did you believe the message that violent crime will not be tolerated?

4. Of al the people who spoke, who had the greatest impact on you? Why?

5. Did you contact any of the people who spoke at notification? Yes/No. If yes, what happened?

6. Did any of these people try to contact you? Yes/No. If yes, do you remember who? How helpful were they?

7. Did you feel bored during the notification session?

8. Did you feel tense or uncomfortable during the notification session?

9. Did you feel that the people who spoke to you actually cared about you as a person? What made you feel that way?

10. Based on what you heard, are you concerned about what could happen to you if you continue to commit more crimes? Yes/No. If yes, what are you concerned about?

11. On a scale of 1-10, 10 being most effective, how effective has this notification program been for helping you to commit fewer crimes?

12. Do you have any thoughts on what's good or bad about the notification program?

13. a. Before notification how many days a week did you miss school?
    b. What type of grades were you making?
    c. Has any of this changed since notification? If yes, what has changed?

14. Before notification, how many of the people that you hung out with were involved in crime? How has this changed since notification?

15. Before notification, how much time did you spend with your family on a weekly basis? How has this changed since notification?

16. Before notification, how much time did you spend involved in activities, such as church, sports, and community programs on a weekly basis? How has this changed since notification?

(continued on next page)

17. Who in your life influences you most?

18. If you have a problem in your life, is there somewhere or someone you can go to for help? Who or where?

19. What do you feel can be done within your community to keep kids out of trouble?

20. What are some things that you want to accomplish in your life? What would help make that happen?

21. Is there anything else that you think the people who conduct notification should know?

Parent Focus Group Discussion Guide

I. Introduce yourselves and provide an overview of what we will be doing.

II. Explain the Informed Consent Form and get signatures.

III. Explain the importance of having an open, honest expression of ideas during this discussion and how that makes it necessary for everyone to keep the discussion confidential. Have participants sign the statement:

"I, _____, understand that members of this group may reveal personal information about themselves, their families, or others during this discussion. I further understand that everything talked about in this group is considered private and confidential. I promise not to reveal to anyone outside this group any information I learn during this discussion."

_____
Signature

IV. Discussion

1. I'd like to start by having each of you tell us your first name, let us know who in your family has been through notification and when, and what contact you, yourself, have had with the SACSI program.

   (5 minutes)

2. For those of you who have **not** attended a SACSI Notification session, what did you hear about it from your children or from anyone else?

   For those of you who **have** attended a SACSI Notification session, tell us a little bit about what Notification was like, what you thought was good about it, and what you thought was not so good about it.

   (10 minutes)

3. Did someone from SACSI's Operation Reach visit any of your homes, or have you had any other contact with people in the SACSI program? (If YES), how did that happen and what was it like?

   Do you think the people working with SASCI really care about you and your kids?

   (15 minutes)

4. Have you noticed any changes in your child's attitudes or behaviors since notification? If so, what do you think caused that change (be as specific as possible)?
   - Things he/she says; anything specific about SACSI or criminal activity?
   - Attitude about doing things you ask him/her to do
   - How much time he/she spends with you or other family members
   - School attendance
   - Participation in after-school, recreation center, church, or other activities
   - Participation in formal programs (Urban League Mentoring, Fresh Start, etc.)
   - Who he/she hangs out with or where he/she and friends go
   - Participation in criminal activity

   Has the program had any effect on your own life or on family relationships?

   (30 minutes)

5. Have you seen the kind of follow-up you expected from people involved in the SACSI program? What has it been like?

   What are the most important things your kids are dealing with in their everyday lives that a program like SACSI should be doing something about?

   What else needs to be done for children and their families to help the kids stay out of trouble?

   (20 minutes)

6. Seek any final comments and thank the participants.

Winston-Salem SACSI
Follow-up Data on Offending
Among Notified and Non-Notified SACSI Offenders

Variable	Col	Coding
ID	1-3	
NOTIFIED (attended Notification)	5	0=no, 1=yes
AGE GROUP	6	1=youth, 2=adult
PRIOR RECORD (violent offending prior to Notification - or 9/9/1999 if not notified)	7	1=Level I Violent 2=Violent, not Lvl 1 3=No Violent Offense
NOTIFICATION DATE	13-20	MMDDYYYY (set to 09091999 if not Notified)
MURDER_AR_PRE (arrests for Murder prior to Notification date)	22	# of incidents with an arrest
RAPE_AR_PRE	23	"
ROBBERY_AR_PRE	24	"
AGG_ASSAULT_AR_PRE	25	"
WEAPONS_AR_PRE	26	"
SEX_OFF_AR_PRE	27	"
KIDNAPPING_AR_PRE	28	"
TOTAL_VIOL_AR_PRE (total # incidents with arrest for violent offense prior to Notification date)	29	"
SIMP_ASLT_AR_PRE (arrests for Simple Assault prior to Notif date)	30	"
MURDER_SUS_PRE (arrests or Suspect for Murder prior to Notification date)	32	# of incidents with either an arrest or ID'd as suspect
RAPE_SUS_PRE	33	"
ROBBERY_SUS_PRE	34	"
AGG_ASSAULT_SUS_PRE	35	"
WEAPONS_SUS_PRE	36	"
SEX_OFF_SUS_PRE	37	"
KIDNAPPING_SUS_PRE	38	"
TOTAL_VIOL_SUS_PRE (total # incidents with arrest or suspect for violent offense prior to Notification date)	39	"
SIMP_ASLT_SUS_PRE (arrests or suspect for Simple Assault prior to Notif date)	40	"
MURDER_AR_POST	42	# of incidents with

(arrests for Murder after Notification date)		an arrest
RAPE_AR_POST	43	"
ROBBERY_AR_POST	44	"
AGG_ASSAULT_AR_POST	45	"
WEAPONS_AR_POST	46	"
SEX_OFF_AR_POST	47	"
KIDNAPPING_AR_POST	48	"
TOTAL_VIOL_AR_POST (total # incidents with arrest for violent offense following Notification date)	49	"
SIMP_ASLT_AR_POST (arrests for Simple Assault following Notif date)	50	"
MURDER_SUS_POST (arrests or Suspect for Murder following Notification date)	52	# of incidents with either an arrest or ID'd as suspect
RAPE_SUS_POST	53	"
ROBBERY_SUS_POST	54	"
AGG_ASSAULT_SUS_POST	55	"
WEAPONS_SUS_POST	56	"
SEX_OFF_SUS_POST	57	"
KIDNAPPING_SUS_PSOT	58	"
TOTAL_VIOL_SUS_POST (total # incidents with arrest or suspect for violent offense following Notification date)	59	"
SIMP_ASLT_SUS_PRE (arrests or suspect for Simple Assault following Notif date)	60	"

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001 111 AJ1 09091999 001000010 000010010 000000000 000000000
002 111 AR1 09091999 000100010 000000001 000000000 000000000
003 111 BR1 09072000 001000010 000000000 000000000 000000001
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005 111 HS1 09211999 001000011 000100010 000000000 000000000
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027	011	FC1	09091999	001000010	000000000	000000000	000000000
028	011	FW1	09091999	001000010	001101032	000000000	000000000
029	011	FT1	09091999	000000000	000300030	000000000	000000003
030	011	GC1	09091999	000000001	000000002	000000000	000000000
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032	011	HD1	09091999	001000011	001000010	001100020	000000000
033	011	HK1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
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035	011	HT1	09091999	000000000	000100010	000000000	000000000
036	011	IE1	09091999	001100020	000000000	000000000	000000000
037	011	MM1	09091999	000000000	000100015	000000000	000000001
038	011	MJ1	09091999	001010020	000000000	000000000	000000000
039	011	MJ2	09091999	000000000	000110020	000000000	000000000
040	011	OR1	09091999	002100030	000000001	000000000	000000000
041	011	PC1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
042	011	RK1	09091999	000000000	000100010	000000000	000000001
043	011	RD1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
044	011	RD2	09091999	001000010	000000001	000000000	000000000
045	011	SR1	09091999	001000010	000100012	000000000	000000000
046	011	SB1	09091999	000000000	000100015	000110020	000000001
047	011	SJ1	09091999	000000000	000100012	000210030	000000000
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050	011	WD1	09091999	001000010	000010011	000000000	000000000
051	113	AJ2	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
052	113	AR2	09211999	000000001	000000001	000000000	000000000
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061	113	JM1	09211999	000000000	000000000	000000000	001010022
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066	112	RD3	09211999	000000002	001000011	000000000	000000000
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068	112	SV1	09091999	001000010	000000001	000000000	000000000
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071	113	WJ1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
072	112	WD2	09091999	000000001	000100010	000010010	000010010
073	122	AK1	12061999	000010010	000000000	001100020	000000000
074	123	BJ1	12061999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000001
075	122	BD1	12061999	000100010	000000000	000000000	000000000
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077	123	BM1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000001	000000000
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085	123	CA1	09091999	000000001	000000001	000000000	000000000
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092	123	FK1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
093	123	FS1	08242000	000000000	000000000	000000000	001000011
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115	123	NJ1	12061999	000000001	000000001	000000000	000000000
116	123	OA1	09211999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
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118	123	PC2	12061999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
119	123	PM2	08242000	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
120	123	PS1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000001
121	123	PW1	09211999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
122	122	RJ1	09091999	000100010	000000000	000000000	001000121
123	123	RJ2	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
124	122	RD4	09091999	000000001	000100014	000000000	000100010
125	123	RM1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000001	000100011
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133	123	WM1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000002	000000000
134	123	WD3	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
135	123	WL1	09091999	000000000	000000001	000000000	000000000
136	123	WA1	09091999	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
137	123	WD2	09091999	000000000	000000001	000000001	000100010
138	122	WL3	12061999	000000001	001000010	000000000	000000003

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139 123 WE1 09091999 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000
140 123 YJ1 12061999 000000000 000000000 000000000 000100011
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$FL2@(#) SPSS DATA FILE MS Windows Release 10.0.5 spssio32.dll
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@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP2 □□□□Understand one another □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP3 □□□□Trust one another □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP4 1□□□Are an appropriate cross-section of the community □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP5 4□□□Share a vision of what they are trying to accomplish□□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP6 □□□□Have very productive meetings □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP7 1□□□Are able to acheive consensus on important issues □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP8 I□□□Are flexible in their approach to organizing and accomplishing their work □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP9 2□□□Are able to adapt to changing events or conditions □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP10A□□□Engage in open and frequent formal communication with one another □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP11C□□□Engage in open and frequent informal communication with one another □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFGRP12Z□□□Understand their roles and responsibilities in the SACSI program and how to carry them out □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER1 /□□□SACSI goals and objectives are very clear to me □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER2 (□□□SACSI goals and objectives are realistic□□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER3 U□□□The SACSI mission is consistent with the mission of the organization that I represent □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER4 `□□□Working with this group fits well within the guidelines of what my organization expects me to do□□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER5 H□□□I feel a strong sense of ownership over the results of the SACSI program□□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER6 Q□□□I feel a strong sense of ownership over the way the working group/core team works □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER7 ?□□□The financial resources needed for SACSI are readily available □□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER8 6□□□Other resources needed for SACSI are readily available □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER9 X□□□There is good communication and coordination between the core team and the working group□□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER10 H□□□Enough has been done to inform the entire community about SACSI programs□□□□□□ @□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EXPER11 .□□□I am pleased with SACSI accomplishments so far □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFSAC1 □□□□Leadership of the program □□□□□□
@□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□EFFSAC2 □□□Core Team □□□□□□
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Not at all □□□□□□□□@□Only a little □□□□□□□□@

To some extent □□□□□□□□@□A substantial amount □□□□□□□□@

A great deal □□□□□□ @
Don't know □□□□

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Don't Know □□□□
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Disapprove □□□□□□□□@
No opinion □□□□□□□□$□□□%□□□&□□□'□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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