Title: The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools: A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies Series: Research Report Author: Mary W. Green Published: National Institute of Justice, September 1999 Subject(s): Crime in schools, crime prevention, crime prevention through environmental design, and juvenile justice deliquency 111 pages 254,000 bytes ------------------------------- Figures, charts, forms, and tables are not included in this ASCII plain-text file. To view this document in its entirety, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file available from this Web site or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851-3420 (877-712-9279 for TTY users). ------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice U.S. Department of Education Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program U.S. Department of Energy Sandia National Laboratories National Institute of Justice Research Report The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies ------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Janet Reno Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher Associate Attorney General Laurie Robinson Assistant Attorney General Noel Brennan Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jeremy Travis Director, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij ------------------------------- The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies Mary W. Green Sandia National Laboratories September 1999 NCJ 178265 National Institute of Justice Jeremy Travis Director Raymond Downs Program Monitor This project was supported under award number 97-IJ-R-072 from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. ------------------------------- The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. ------------------------------- Foreword Creating safe schools is the responsibility of the entire community in which a school or school system resides, but responsibility for maintaining them on a day-to-day basis lies principally with school administrators and, to a lesser extent, the local law enforcement agency. To assist schools in this task, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice have sponsored, often jointly, both research and demonstration programs to collect data and test useful new ideas that will expand understanding of school violence and disorder and lead to new programs to reduce these problems. This document provides basic guidelines to law enforcement agencies and school administrators and encourages their collaboration as they decide what, if any, security technologies should be considered as they develop safe school strategies. In the wake of recent high-profile school tragedies with multiple homicides, many of this Nation's communities have urged their school districts to incorporate security technology into their safety programs. This guide should help schools, in concert with their law enforcement partners, analyze their vulnerability to violence, theft, and vandalism, and suggest possible technologies to address these problems in an effective manner. This guide describes existing commercially available technologies and urges thoughtful consideration of not only the potential safety benefits that may accrue from their use but also the costs that schools may incur for capital investments, site modifications, additional staffing, training, and equipment maintenance and repair. Topic areas included in this guide are: security concepts and operational issues, video surveillance, weapons detection devices (walk-through and hand-held metal detectors and x-ray baggage scanners), entry controls, and duress alarms. Though this document does not replace the use of appropriate expert advice or provide detailed instructions on installing equipment or making cost estimates, it does offer practical guidance that should enable schools and law enforcement agencies to make better informed decisions on security technology. Safety and security technology can only be one tool in a comprehensive program that each school must develop to create a safe learning environment that is perceived to be safe by all students and staff. Jeremy Travis Director, National Institute of Justice U.S. Department of Justice Bill Modzeleski Director, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program U. S. Department of Education Preface A team of security specialists from the Security Systems and Technologies Center at Sandia National Laboratories first talked with local schools in 1991. It was our intent to share what we had learned about the strengths and weaknesses of security technologies through our work with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in many public schools. After visiting some 120-plus schools across the country, completing our DOE-funded work to improve security at Belen High School in New Mexico and performing additional school security work for the National Institutes of Justice (NIJ), we have learned that school security, like security for other applications, is not simple and straightforward. We have learned a lot about the unique aspects of school security from the many students, parents, and school and law enforcement personnel we met during the course of our work. At any particular school, security is the product of funding, facilities, building age, building layout, administrators, teachers, parents, kids, personalities, campus order, security personnel, procedures, the neighborhood, policies, the school board, local law enforcement, fire codes, local government, politics, and reputation. No two schools will have identical and successful security programs--hence, a security solution for one school cannot just be replicated at other schools with complete success. What did become clear after working with more than 100 schools during the past 7 years is that school administrators need a good information resource on technologies for physical security problems. This guidebook, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, is anticipated to be the first in a series of manuals designed and written for use by school administrators and law enforcement agencies. The goals of these documents are to provide nontechnical, nonvendor-specific information on: o The kinds of security products available on the market. o The strengths and weaknesses of these products and their expected effectiveness in a school environment. o The costs of these products, including installation, long-term operational and maintenance expenses, manpower, and training. o Requirements to include in Requests For Quotes (RFQs) to get a good product for an application. o Legal issues that may need to be addressed. Although security products can certainly have many different applications, this document covers products that can be applicable to some of the issues of violence in schools: video surveillance, weapon detection, entry control, and duress alarms. Future volumes are expected to cover issues and products such as bomb threats and explosives detection; drug residue and drug vapor detection; drug use detection; alcohol use detection; interior and exterior intrusion detection sensors; alarm communications; antigraffiti sealers; false fire alarm pulls; glass-break sensors; two-way radios; fencing; antitheft property marking; doors, locks, and key control; Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles; and parking lot safety. Most of the issues and philosophies covered in these manuals are geared toward middle schools and high schools, but elementary schools will likely find several of the technologies to have possible applications at their facilities. Although this document addresses nontechnology measures that we felt were important for the completeness of the topic, there are many good resources and references available that address these people/policy/procedure/program issues much better. See the Resources section at the back of this book. Feedback from law enforcement agencies, schools, and product manufacturers/vendors is welcome, especially regarding any oversights or errors on our part. This guidebook is intended to provide an overview of security technology product areas that might be appropriate and affordable for school applications. Appropriate corrections or additions will be included in future updates. (We apologize if our cost estimates for hardware do not reflect current pricing; this document was written more than a year before actual publication.) I would like to extend our deep appreciation to the many schools who have allowed us to visit them and to assess the security vulnerabilities of their facilities and operations (and to take photos of the good things on their campuses, as well as the bad). I never failed to learn something new at every school we have visited. I found there to be many great schools in this country, with very motivated and hard-working administrators giving 110 percent of their energies to keep their students safe. I was humbled by the intense and stressful hours they worked and the ultimate importance of their jobs. My thanks to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for providing the funding to conduct the research that allowed me to prepare this guidebook. I hope that we have met the high standards NIJ has set for providing the best that science and technologies have to offer in fighting crime in the United States. I owe special gratitude to Dennis Miyoshi, Director of Sandia's Security Systems and Technologies Center; Dennis has always been an advocate for schools and was the greatest ally in accomplishing Sandia's school security work. Information regarding the availability and ordering process for these manuals and any updates may be obtained at the NIJ Web site: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij; the Justice Technology Information Network (Justnet): www.nlectc.org; or by calling 1-800-248-2742. I would be interested in hearing from readers regarding their successes, as well as their failures, in dealing with school security technology issues. Mary W. Green mgreen@sandia.gov Sandia National Laboratories Mail Stop 0782 P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque, NM 87185 Since 1941, Sandia National Laboratories has been a U.S. Department of Energy facility whose primary mission is providing engineering support for the U.S. nuclear weapons program. For the past 30 years, the Security Technologies and Research Division at Sandia has been the principal provider of research, design, development, and testing of leading-edge technologies to solve physical security problems at high-risk U.S. facilities. Today, the Sandia facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico, employs more than 8,000 scientists, engineers, mathematicians, technicians, and support personnel to provide service in the national interest. More than 150 of these personnel are dedicated solely to research and development of security technologies. Acknowledgments Written by: Mary W. Green, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico Original art work by: Steven Scatliffe, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico Photos by: George Wagner, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Steven Scatliffe, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico Document preparation: Rosanne C. Rohac, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico, Elaine Perea, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico Additional contributors: Janet Ahrens, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Tim Malone, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Dale Murray, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Charles Ringler, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, George Wagner, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Fred Wolfenbarger, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico Library research: Kay Kelly, BEI, Albuquerque, New Mexico Reviewers: Raymond Downs, Program Manager, National Institute of Justice; William Modzeleski, Director, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program, U.S. Department of Education; Joe N. Anderson, Director of School Safety and Security, Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools; Michael S. Ganio, Sr. Manager, Security Services, Orange County Public Schools; John J. McLees, Executive Director, Philadelphia Office for School Safety; Tom Hall, School Police Chief, San Diego Unified School District; Kenneth Trump, President and CEO, National School Safety and Security Services; Gary Underwood, Chief, San Bernardino Police, School Safety Department; Paul Schultz, Chief of Police, LaVista Police, LaVista, Nebraska; Ronald Sloan, Chief of Police, Arvada Police Department, Arvada, Colorado; John C. Martinez, Deputy Chief, Dallas Police Department; J.M. Hutt, Sergeant Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office, Englewood, Colorado; Tod Schneider, Crime Prevention Specialist, Police Services Division, Eugene, Oregon; Ed Hardy, Chief, Special Investigative Unit, Broward County School District, Sunrise, Florida; Donovon Collins, Chief, Dallas Independent School District Police; Mel Seo, Auxiliary Service Specialist, Hawaii Department of Education; Jack Lazzarotto, Director, Police Services, Clark County School District, Las Vegas, Nevada; Charles Clark, Director, Security Emergency Preparedness, Long Beach Unified School District; Wesley Mitchell, Chief, Los Angeles School Police; Sharon O'Connor, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico Contents Foreword--iii Preface--v Acknowledgments--vii Chapter I The Big Picture: Security Concepts and Operational Issues Chapter II Video Surveillance A. Video cameras 1. Why video cameras? 2. Why not video cameras? 3. Good applications versus poor applications 4. To monitor or not to monitor 5. Color versus black-and-white cameras 6. Fixed versus pan-tilt-zoom cameras 7. Hardwired versus wireless systems 8. A more technical discussion of formats, resolution, pixels, lenses, and field of view 9. Camera housings 10. Placement and mounting 11. Lighting requirements and nighttime applications 12. Covert cameras 13. Maintenance and expected lifespan 14. Price ranges 15. Going out on bid for equipment and system maintenance contracts 16. Signage for use of cameras on school grounds 17. Legal aspects of the use of video cameras in schools B. Video recording equipment 1. VCRs: the weak link 2. Multiplexers 3. Time-lapse recorders 4. Event recorders 5. Digital recorders Chapter III Metal Detection A. Walk-through metal detectors for personnel 1. Do metal detectors really work?--The basics 2. Space requirements and layout 3. Throughput 4. Hardware costs and manpower costs 5. Procedures for the operator 6. Instructions for the scannee 7. False alarms 8. Sources of interference 9. Acceptance testing and performance testing 10. Maintenance and expected lifespan 11. Working with the vendor B. Hand-held scanners for personnel 1. The name of the game: Policies and procedures 2. Space requirements 3. Throughput 4. Hardware costs and manpower costs 5. Procedures for the operator 6. Instructions for the scannee 7. Maintenance and expected lifespan 8. Working with the vendor C. X-ray baggage scanners 1. Safety concerns 2. Setup and space requirements 3. Throughput 4. Hardware costs and manpower costs 5. Procedures for the operator 6.Instructions for the scannee 7. Acceptance testing and performance testing 8. Maintenance and expected lifespan 9. Working with the vendor Chapter IV Entry-Control Technologies A. Limiting entry/exit points B. Entry-control approaches 1. WHO lets you in 2.What you HAVE 3. What you KNOW 4. Who you ARE Chapter V Duress Alarm Devices and Their Role in Crisis Management Resources: Books, Publications, Web Sites, and Conferences Chapter I The Big Picture: Security Concepts and Operational Issues Most schools in the United States are safe institutions, with disciplinary issues creating most disruptions. However, because of the 1998 campus slayings involving students, firearms, and multiple victims, schools and school programs are working harder to reach out to students, to teach them to be good citizens, to identify potentially dangerous personalities, and to develop appropriate intervention strategies. There are many excellent programs around the country that address the issues of bullying, anger, hate, abuse, drugs, alcohol, gangs, lack of role models, vandalism, and so forth. It is of great importance to the United States that these programs be pursued expeditiously. Unfortunately, these programs cannot be successful overnight (indeed, many must be initiated early in a child's life in order to be most effective) and do not yet exist in all schools. Meanwhile, security incidents are occurring in schools that must be dealt with now-- perpetrators must be caught and consequences must be administered. School administrators would like to discourage security infractions by means of any deterrent available to them. One such approach sought more often today involves security technologies. Security technologies are not the answer to all school security problems. However, many security products (e.g., cameras, sensors, and so forth) can be excellent tools if applied appropriately. They can provide school administrators or security officials with information that would not otherwise be available, free up manpower for more appropriate work, or be used to perform mundane tasks. Sometimes they can save a school money (compared to the long-term cost of personnel or the cost impact of not preventing a particular incident). Too often, though, these technologies are not applied appropriately in schools, are expected to do more than they are capable of, or are not well maintained after initial installation. In these cases, technologies are certainly not cost effective. Why security technologies? To reduce problems of crime or violence in schools: (1) the opportunities for security infractions should be eliminated or made more difficult to accomplish, (2) the likelihood of being caught must be greatly increased, and (3) consequences must be established and enforced. Item 3 is a social and political issue and needs to be addressed head on by school boards and communities across the country. This guide addresses only items 1 and 2. Simply providing more adults, especially parents, in schools will reduce the opportunities for security infractions and increase the likelihood of being caught. However, adding dedicated professional security staff to perform very routine security functions has many limitations: o Locating qualified people may be difficult. o Humans do not do mundane tasks well. o Manpower costs are always increasing. o Turnover of security personnel can be detrimental to a security program. o As in other security environments, more repetitious tasks become boring. Hence, the possible role of security technologies expands. Through technology, a school can introduce ways to collect information or enforce procedures and rules that it would not be able to afford or rely on security personnel to do. Why security technologies have not been embraced by schools in the past Anyone working in the security field is aware that there are thousands of security products on the market. Some of them are excellent, but many claim to be "the very best of its kind." And, unfortunately, there are a significant number of customers in the country who have been less than pleased with the ultimate cost, maintenance requirements, and effectiveness of security technologies they have purchased. Schools have been no exception to this and have a few inherent problems of their own: o Schools do not usually have the funding for aggressive and complete security programs. o Schools generally lack the ability to procure effective security technology products and services at the lowest bid. o Many school security programs cannot afford to hire well-trained security personnel. o School administrators and their staff rarely have training or experience in security technologies. o Schools have no infrastructures in place for maintaining or upgrading security devices--when something breaks, it is often difficult to have it repaired or replaced. o Issues of privacy and potential civil rights lawsuits may prohibit or complicate the use of some technologies. The issues come down to applying security technologies in schools that are effective, affordable, and politically acceptable but still useful within these difficult constraints. Effectiveness versus affordability versus acceptability Effectiveness, affordability, and acceptability are difficult tradeoffs and, occasionally, a seemingly ineffective solution to a security problem is chosen because of a lack of funding or pressure from the community to do something. Although many effective security measures are too expensive for schools, cost alone is not often the ultimate driver. Most major changes to security policies, including the introduction of technologies, are often brought on not by foresight but as a response to some undesirable incident. This is not to say that a good argument should be made for applying every physical security approach in every school. "Appropriate" preparation is, by far, the greater "art" in security system design, and it includes an evolving plan, beginning with defining a particular school's risks. A systematic approach to identifying the security risks at a school Note: The following discussion considers all security risks to schools--violence, drugs, theft, and vandalism--not just those that may be addressed by the technologies covered in this volume. Depending on the acceptance and demand for this guide, future additional volumes will address the remaining technologies in greater detail. In the past, schools have rarely understood the need or had the time or resources to consider their security plans from a systems perspective--looking at the big picture of what they are trying to achieve in order to arrive at the optimal security strategy. A school's security staff must understand what it is trying to protect (people and/or high-value assets), who it is trying to protect against (the threats), and the general environment and constraints that it must work within--the characterization of the facility. This understanding will allow a school to define its greatest and/or most likely risks so that its security strategy consciously addresses those risks. This strategy will likely include some combination of technologies, personnel, and procedures that do the best possible job of solving the school's problems within its financial, logistical, and political constraints. Why is this careful identification of risk important? Because few facilities, especially schools, can afford a security program that protects against all possible incidents. No two schools are alike and, therefore, there is no single approach to security that will work ideally for all schools. From year to year, even, a school's security strategy will need revision because the world around it and the people inside it will always be changing. Defining a school's assets. For this school year, what is most at risk? The protection of the students and staff is always at the top of this list, but the measures taken to protect them will usually be driven by the defined threats. Are the instruments in the band hall very attractive targets for theft or vandalism? Is the new computer lab full of the best and most easily resold computers? Though desirable, a school cannot possibly afford to protect everything to the same level of confidence. Defining a school's threats. For this school year, who or what is your school threatened by? Gang rivalries? Fights behind the gym? Drugs hidden in lockers? Guns brought to school? Outsiders on campus? Drinking at lunchtime? Vehicle breakins? Graffiti in the bathrooms? Accidents in the parking lot? How sophisticated (knowledgeable of their task of malevolence) or motivated (willing to risk being caught or injured) do the perpetrators seem to be? Measures taken to protect against these threats are driven by the characterization of the facility and its surroundings as mentioned earlier. Characterizing a school's environment. Any security strategy must incorporate the constraints of the facility so that all strengths, weaknesses, and idiosyncrasies are realized and provided for. How risks are approached will largely be driven by facility constraints. If theft and vandalism are primary risks for your school, answers to questions regarding the physical plant will determine the optimal security measures. Is the school new or old? Are the windows particularly vulnerable? Does everyone who ever worked at the school still have keys? What is the nighttime lighting like? Does the interior intrusion sensor system work well, or do the local police ignore the alarms due to a high false-alarm rate? Are visitors forced or merely requested to go through the front office before accessing the rest of the school? If outsiders on campus are a primary concern, it will be necessary to recognize the facility's ability to control unauthorized access. How many entry points are there into the buildings? Are gangs present in the area? Are the school grounds open and accessible to anyone, or do fences or buildings restrict access (exhibit 1.2)? Is there easy access to the school roof? Where are hiding places within the building or on the premises? Is the student population small enough so that most of the staff would recognize most of the students and parents? If issues of violence are a major concern, a thorough understanding of employees, student profiles, and neighborhood characteristics will be necessary. What is the crime rate in the neighborhood? Is the school administration well liked by the students? Are teachers allowed access to the school at night? Are students allowed off campus at lunch time? How much spending money do students generally have? Are popular hangouts for young people close by and, for business establishments, does management collaborate with the school? Are expelled or suspended students sent home or to an alternative school? How many incidents of violence have occurred at the school over the past 4 years? What is the general reputation of the school, and how does it appear to an outsider? Are your most vocal parents prosecurity or proprivacy? Do your students like and respect your security personnel well enough to pass them pieces of information regarding security concerns? Once the school's threats, assets, and environmental constraints are understood, the security needs can be prioritized such that the school's security goals are understood by all those involved. Identifying security needs and then securing the funding to pay for them are usually unrelated at most schools. Schools have to have a "Plan B," for program design which may be the perfect "Plan A"--but spread out over several years of implementation. If the desirable strategies (e.g., fencing, sensors, locker searches, speed bumps) are too costly or unpalatable to the community, a school may then need to modify the facility constraints (e.g., back entrances locked from the outside, no open campus for students, no teacher access after 10 p.m., all computer equipment bolted down, no lockers for students, and so forth). Most school districts or school boards will be more supportive of security measures and the requested funding if they are well educated about the most likely risks faced each year and the options available. A security staff should not have the wide-open charter to "keep everything and everybody safe." A school board should be briefed as often as once a month as to what the current security goals are and what strategies are recommended, realizing that these will and must continue to evolve. If a school board member is clearly aware of a school's most important concerns and what is required to achieve them, then he or she is less likely to be swayed by an irate parent into making a decision that will handicap reasonable security efforts. Designing the school security system After identifying the risks or concerns at a noneducational facility, a methodical approach to the security plan would then examine possible solutions to each area of vulnerability from the perspective of: Detection--Delay--Response For any problem, it is necessary first to detect that an incident or problem is occurring. For example, when someone is breaking into a building, it is necessary that this act be detected and that information be supplied to the authorities as soon as possible. Next, this adversary must be delayed as long as possible so that the response force may arrive. A simple example of delay would be firmly bolting computer components onto large heavy desks, so that a thief is forced to use more time removing the bolts. Finally, someone, such as the police, must respond to the incident to catch the thief redhanded. For a school environment, it is probably more appropriate to expand this model: Deterrence--Detection--Delay--Response/Investigation--Consequences See exhibit 1.3 for more detail. The most appealing step in any school security system should be to convince the perpetrator that he or she should not do whatever it is he or she is considering, whether the action is perceived as too difficult, not worthwhile, or the chances of being caught are quite high. Clearly, most security measures employed in facilities are intended for the precise purpose of deterrence, whether it be to discourage a thief, a drug dealer, or an errant employee. (Note: Deterrence is not generally considered part of the security strategy for most high-risk government facilities; this is due in part to the fact that quite a bit of deterrence comes "free" with other security measures, and it would be difficult to attribute a lack of security problems to any particular deterrence effort.) Unlike other facilities, where a perpetrator would be handed over to the authorities, and the consequences determined by law, a school often has the authority and/or opportunity to establish the consequences for incidents that occur on their campus. It is imperative, however, that schools do not assume authority that they do not have. Issues governed by law must be reported to the appropriate authority. To illustrate the application of this model, consider the problem of nighttime breakins and theft in a school building. A model for the security strategy to address this might be: Deterrence--Close off the parking lot or driveways to vehicle traffic at night. Post signs that video cameras are in use on the campus (but only if you actually do have cameras). Use fencing strategically, but where fencing would be unacceptable, consider a barrier of thorny pyracantha bushes (exhibit 1.4). Allow a law enforcement officer to live on campus. Detection--Install an intrusion detection system in all school hallways, administrative offices, and rooms with high-value assets. Use motion sensors, magnetic switches on doors, heat sensors, and/or glass-break sensors as appropriate. Send alarm signals to the police, the officer on campus, and the school principal. Delay--Bolt computers and TVs to desks and walls so that removing them is difficult and time consuming. Response/Investigation--Police and/or campus security arrives on the scene, makes arrests. Consequences--Enforce consequences where possible and the school has the authority to do so. (This becomes an additional deterrent for the future, especially if nonsensitive pieces of information regarding the incident are released to staff, students, and the community.) Schools do not normally have the opportunity for real-time detection and real-time response to security incidents; after-the-fact investigation is normally the best a school can hope for. Although this model may not be appropriate for all aspects of security at a school, it can serve as a methodology for consideration. Its use can prevent some less-thought-out strategies. A true example of this is a large urban high school that was planning to purchase $100,000 worth of exterior cameras to combat nighttime vandalism being inflicted on the exterior of the building. This plan was halted abruptly when the school was asked who would be available to watch the monitors from the 40-plus cameras (detection) and who would be able to respond quickly enough to these sporadic and relatively small incidents (response). A better and cheaper alternate plan was devised that included using antigraffiti sealer on all brick surfaces, some strategically located wrought iron fencing that could not easily be climbed, and the replacement of a few particularly vulnerable windows with glass block. A spectrum of physical security approaches It will be assumed that consequences for undesirable actions have been put into place at a school; otherwise, there is little or no deterrence to be gained from any physical security measures designed to detect, delay, and respond to an incident. A wide array of security measures involving people, campus modifications, and/or technologies can be considered for most concerns, keeping in mind the unique characteristics of each school. A recurring message from school administrators is that the majority of their problems are brought onto campus by outsiders or expelled/ suspended students so measures to keep outsiders off campus will generally be of global benefit. (Although this is not the case in all incidents, school administrators quite often find it more palatable to parents if security measures are justified based on the exterior threat rather than the suspicion of their children.) The following is a partial list of possible security measures to address various security issues: (Most of the following suggested security measures are in use in one or more U.S. schools, but a few may not yet have been attempted. In any case, there is no comprehensive body of knowledge regarding their effectiveness. More research is needed to get a national picture on particular technologies. Also keep in mind that a school should always contact its legal counsel before participating in any new security program that involves searching or testing of people or property.) Outsiders on campus o Posted signs regarding penalties for trespassing. o Enclosed campus (fencing). o Guard at main entry gate to campus. o Greeters in strategic locations. o Student I.D.s or badges. o Vehicle parking stickers. o Uniforms or dress codes. o Exterior doors locked from the outside. o A challenge procedure for anyone out of class. o Cameras in remote locations. o School laid out so all visitors must pass through front office. o Temporary "fading" badges issued to all visitors. Fights on campus o Cameras. o Duress alarms. o Whistles. Vandalism o Graffiti-resistant sealers. o Glass-break sensors. o Aesthetically pleasing wall murals (these usually are not hit by graffiti). o Law enforcement officers living on campus. o 8-foot fencing. o Well-lit campus at night. Theft o Interior intrusion detection sensors. o Property marking (including microdots) to deter theft. o Bars on windows. o Reinforced doors. o Elimination of access points up to rooftops (exhibit 1.5). o Cameras. o Doors with hingepins on secure side. o Bolting down computers and TVs. o Locating high-value assets in interior rooms. o Key control. o Biometric entry into rooms with high-value assets. o Law enforcement officer living on campus. Drugs o Drug detection swipes. o Hair analysis kits for drug use detection (intended for parental application). o Drug dogs. o Removal of lockers. o Random searches. o Vapor detection of drugs. Alcohol o No open campus at lunch. o Breathalyzer¨ test equipment. o No access to vehicles. o No lockers. o Clear or open mesh backpacks. o Saliva test kits. Weapons o Walk-through metal detectors. o Hand-held metal detectors. o Vapor detection of gun powder. o Crimestopper hotline with rewards for information. o Gunpowder detection swipes. o Random locker, backpack, and vehicle searches. o X-ray inspection of bookbags and purses. Malicious acts o Setback of all school buildings from vehicle areas (exhibit 1.6). o Inaccessibility of air intake and water source. o All adults on campus required to have a badge. o Vehicle barriers near main entries and student gathering areas. Parking lot problems o Cameras. o Parking decals. o Fencing. o Card I.D. systems for parking lot entry. o Parking lots sectioned off for different student schedules. o Sensors in parking areas that should have no access during schoolday. o Roving guards. o Bike patrol. False fire alarms o Sophisticated alarm systems that allow assessment of alarms (and cancellation if false) before they become audible. o Boxes installed over alarm pulls that alarm locally (screamer boxes). Bomb threats o Caller I.D. on phone system. o Crimestopper program with big rewards for information. o Recording all phone calls, with a message regarding this at the beginning of each incoming call. o All incoming calls routed through a district office. o Phone company support. o No pay phones on campus. o Policy to extend the school year when plagued with bomb threats and subsequent evacuations. Bus problems o Video cameras and recorders within enclosures on buses. o I.D.s required to get on school buses. o Security aides on buses. o Smaller buses. o Duress alarm system or radios for bus drivers. Teacher safety o Duress alarms. o Roving patrols. o Classroom doors left open during class. o Cameras in black boxes in classrooms. o Controlled access to classroom areas. Legal issues Within each section of this manual, some legal issues have been noted regarding the use of various technologies. A reasonable approach to using any new security device would include checking with your legal organization, talking to schools in the area that have already implemented the measure, and inviting local law enforcement to come in to discuss the device's possible use. Although every possible ramification cannot be foreseen, it does help to be aware of issues that might be raised and to be aware of current thinking about ways to address each of these. Evaluating a school's security system design The staff assigned to handle security concerns should plan to meet on a regular basis for collaboration on new problems, needed changes to existing approaches, and the exchange of information and intelligence. New problems and proposed solutions may sometimes be presented (where appropriate) to school employees, the student council, the parent advisory group, the local police, or other schools in the area. Although including more people may lengthen the decisionmaking process, making representatives of these groups a part of the security upgrade team for issues that would involve them will ensure buy-in. A side benefit will be that word will spread throughout the community that the school is taking active security measures, which will act as a deterrent. New school design Many school buildings in the United States have been constructed to achieve an inviting and open-to-the-community feeling, with multiple buildings, big windows, multiple entrances and exits, and many opportunities for privacy. Needless to say, these layouts are not conducive to many current requirements to address security needs. To combat broken windows and nighttime thefts, the country also went through a brief period of designing schools with almost no windows; the cavelike results these designs produced were soon found to be objectionable to many people. Incorporating the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) in the design or remodeling of a school can contribute greatly to the control and security of the campus. There are several good sources of CPTED literature available through the Web; CPTED as applied specifically to schools will be covered in a subsequent volume. If a district has the luxury of looking forward to a new school in the future, it is imperative that trained security personnel, who are familiar with the area and the community, and who will be responsible for day-to-day security operations in the new facility, are involved in every step of the new design. This is critical to ensuring that the design of the new school minimizes vulnerabilities. There are architectural firms specializing in schools that incorporate good security principles; a security-conscious design can actually help compensate in the long term for tight security budgets, fewer security personnel, and less sophisticated security gadgets. The following are some suggestions to keep in mind for a new facility; the funding, location, geography, streets, and neighborhood will usually drive which ideas are feasible for each new school. Although this list includes only a few basic security technologies (such as cameras, sensors, and so forth), the facility design should not preclude their straightforward installation in the future. o Limit the number of buildings--one building is best--to limit outsiders on the campus. o Minimize the entrances to the school building--having one or two main entrances/exits will support efforts to keep outsiders off campus. Allow enough room at the main entry in the event that a screening area (i.e., for weapon or drug detection) needs to be incorporated later on. Alarm other exits for emergency use only. o Minimize the line of sight from secluded off-campus sites onto student gathering areas, the main entry doors, playgrounds, patios, and so forth (exhibit 1.7). (This suggestion must be tempered against the benefits gained from the natural, desirable surveillance by neighbors, passers-by, officers on patrol, and so forth) o Allow for a security person to be posted at a single entrance onto campus to challenge each vehicle for identification of all occupants. Buses and school employees should have a separate (and controlled) entrance. o Provide a dropoff/pickup lane for buses only. o Minimize the number of driveways or parking lots that students will have to walk across to get to the school building. o Build single-stall bathrooms to mitigate bathroom confrontations and problems. o Enclose the campus. (This is more a measure to keep outsiders out rather than to keep insiders in.) Beside defining property boundaries, a robust fence forces a perpetrator to consciously trespass, rather than allowing casual entry. o Make certain that the school building and classroom areas can be closed and locked off from the gym and other facilities used during off hours. o Minimize secluded hiding places for unauthorized persons, both inside and outside buildings. o Do not eliminate windows, but use them strategically. Consider incorporating clerestories or secure skylights that allow light in but that are less vulnerable than typical windows. o Maximize the line of sight within buildings. o Large wide spaces, like hallways or commons, should have sufficient vertical dimension so space does not feel restrictive to students. o Consider installing student lockers in classrooms or other areas easy to monitor so that there is no single locker area that becomes a bottleneck, and there is always the deterrence of an adult nearby (exhibit 1.8). o Do not cut corners on communications, especially those required for security. Make certain that your facility has built in the necessary receivers and transmitters throughout the structure to allow for dependable two-way radio and cellular phone use. (Sometimes radio frequency communication is not possible deep within a large, structurally dense facility.) o Where possible, have buildings and other student gathering areas set back from the streets, driveways, or parking areas by at least 50 feet. o Install a basic security alarm system throughout all hallways, administrative offices, and rooms containing high-value property, such as computers, VCRs, shop equipment, laboratory supplies, and musical instruments. o Allow a law enforcement officer to live on campus. (In some school districts, an officer is allowed to move his or her own trailer to a strategic location on campus and receive free utilities in exchange for prenegotiated and formally contracted responsibilities.) The deterrent effect of a police vehicle parked on campus all night and weekend can be great. Such an arrangement can also provide both detection and response in situations where damage is being inflicted upon the facility, but no alarm system would normally detect it (exhibit 1.9). o Provide a separate parking area for work-study students or those who will be leaving during the school day. (This allows the main student parking lot to be closed off during the school day.) o Make certain that exterior lighting is sufficient for safety. Lights mounted on the exterior of buildings often are inadequate for adjoining driveways or parking lots. o Do not underestimate the value of trees and landscaping on a school campus. An attractive, well-maintained school is generally less attractive to thieves. Exhibit 1.10 shows a school with several of these ideas incorporated. (Note: This is not an actual architectural drawing, does not incorporate basic facility requirements, and is not drawn to scale.) The role of order maintenance One additional consideration that cannot be overlooked is the perception of a lack of order on a school campus. If a school is perceived as unsafe (i.e., it appears that no adult authority prevails on a campus), then "undesirables" will come in, and the school will actually become unsafe. This is an embodiment of the broken window theory: one broken window left unrepaired will encourage additional windows to be broken. Seemingly small incidents or issues such as litter on a school campus can provide the groundwork for (or even just the reputation of) a problem school. Issues of vandalism and theft can be almost as harmful to a school as actual violence because they can create a fertile environment for loss of control and community confidence. Issues contributing to a school's overall order maintenance must therefore be taken seriously, not unlike any other public facility. Reducing theft, deterring vandalism and graffiti, keeping outsiders off campus, keeping the facility in good repair, improving poor lighting, maintaining attractive landscaping, and getting rid of trash are all important to school security (exhibit 1.11). Technologies such as cameras, sensors, microdots (for identifying ownership), and antigraffiti sealers can contribute significantly in many (but not all) situations and are possible approaches to further support a school's order maintenance. Too often school districts undervalue the ultimate importance of reliable and conscientious maintenance, janitorial, and groundskeeping staff. Their ultimate contribution to the order maintenance of a school can be enormous. Additionally, the janitorial staff needs to be selected with almost the same care as the teaching staff because they have great access to and knowledge of a school facility. Contracting out this work without complete background checks of all workers can lead to many problems in the long run. Chapter II Video Surveillance A. Video cameras 1. Why video cameras? The peace of mind of both students and faculty at a school can often be quickly enhanced by the installation of video cameras as part of a closed circuit television (CCTV) system. This change of attitude may result in even further-reaching effects on a campus than would be expected by the use of cameras alone. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this guide, a sense of safety and authority will directly influence people's opinions and impressions, which will ultimately contribute to the overall order maintenance of a facility and how that facility is treated by occupants and outsiders. To the school's security personnel who must handle day-to-day security issues, the best thing about cameras is the deterrence factor they introduce to outsiders who do not belong on campus and to students and employees who do. Information regarding security measures, such as cameras at the local school, will generally spread through a community. This type of reputation can make outsiders reconsider an unwelcome visit to the historically easy mark of the neighborhood--the school. It can be assumed that most kids are not going to step way out of bounds if they believe they will likely be caught, which is often possible through the appropriate application of cameras. In a school security system, the ideal goal should be to convince kids not to even attempt to do something that is unacceptable. Addressing an incident after it occurs is good, but not as good as if it had never happened. Once a perpetrator is caught, there is a chain of events involving confrontation, denial, parental involvement, consequences, and perhaps even the involvement of law enforcement and the legal system. School administrators will be forced to spend a great deal of time on the matter, and all participants will find the process distasteful. Another strength of cameras is the strong evidence they can preserve on tape. Even if law enforcement is not brought in regarding an incident, the recorded tape can be invaluable to a school administration. Many schools report that when students are brought into the school office after an incident and shown a tape of themselves in an illegal or unacceptable act--even if the tape might not have been of sufficient resolution and detail to use for prosecution purposes in a court of law--the student will usually admit to the incident. The ultimate usability of a video recording is dependent on many variables. It is possible for a camera system to produce tapes on which individuals are unidentifiable or their actions are indiscernible. Be certain that a camera system provides the kind of information you need before you pay for it. These requirements should be clearly spelled out in the purchase agreement, along with a specified time period during which the school can adequately test it. Video recordings are also beneficial for use with parents. Although nearly all parents want to believe their children are innocent of wrongdoing, some parents will deny their child's guilt despite the credible testimony of others to the contrary. However, as many school administrators and teachers have discovered, parents quickly accept their child's role in an incident when shown a videotape of the incident. Most parents want to do the right thing, but hard evidence is often required for some to concede over a matter involving their own child. From a cost standpoint, the use of CCTV in public areas on school grounds can free up manpower. If cameras are covering a large patio area where students congregate during breaks, adults who normally would be assigned to oversee that area can instead be made available to monitor other areas of concern. Finally, the solid documentation that a video recording provides can be invaluable in situations involving liability claims. Although it is possible that this may occasionally work against a school, most schools welcome this concrete evidence so that testimony regarding an incident does not consist solely of hearsay. 2. Why NOT video cameras? o CCTV systems are expensive. Installation can also be expensive, as well as logistically difficult. o Choosing the correct camera equipment requires some technical knowledge (exhibit 2.2). o A single camera can effectively view a smaller area than would be intuitively expected, hence many applications can require more cameras, equipment, and expense than was originally expected. o Cameras can be stolen or vandalized. o Ongoing maintenance and operational support are required. o Some applications or areas do not warrant camera use. o Some communities or individuals will challenge the legality of using cameras. o Insiders with full knowledge of the installed video system's capabilities can possibly circumvent the system to their advantage. o If it becomes well known where cameras are being used at a school, students may simply move their misbehaviors to a different part of campus. 3. Good applications versus poor applications An effective use of cameras in schools is viewing the recorded tape after an incident has occurred. Examples of reasonable goals for a school video system are capturing scenes indicating who started a fight in the hallway, who is smoking marijuana in the parking lot, who stole all the blank computer disks out of the computer laboratory, or if a particular person did indeed try to run down someone with his or her truck in the school driveway. Less reasonable goals, or at least more difficult or manpower intensive, are trying to use camera scenes to stop a student fight in its early stages, prevent someone from bringing weapons into the facility, or catch a thief before he makes his escape. A visible camera may not help if a school's goal is to identify a nighttime thief in the band hall or computer lab if the thief simply covered his or her face or disguised himself or herself. However, it may still add substantially to deterrence; a would-be thief may never be sure if there will be some type of immediate response to the video recording or exactly where all the cameras are located. Depending upon each situation, video cameras can support security initiatives in the following applications: o Parking lots and driveways. o Cafeterias. o Patio and entry areas. o Hallways. o Gymnasiums. o Main administrative offices (exhibit 2.3). o Band halls. o School stores. o Computer rooms. o Science laboratories. o Supply closets. Schools may want to consider classroom installation of the cameras and recorder enclosures that are currently so popular for use on school buses. For buses, a camera is placed in the black box only when requested by a bus driver, thereby reducing the number of camera systems that must be purchased. Usually, the deterrence factor derived from students never knowing when a camera is actually present can discourage much of the misbehavior. (This is not to be confused with the use of a dummy camera, where a potential victim is under the illusion that he or she is being monitored and, therefore, help will be forthcoming in the event of an attack; this can create extensive liability concerns for a facility.) In an application with a camera looking in an easterly or westerly direction, extreme glare may occur during sunrise or sunset. If this type of placement cannot be avoided, the camera should be mounted as high as possible and then angled downward to view below the horizon. If sunrise and/or sunset are not critical time periods for a particular application, then it may be acceptable to simply have an unusable picture during these times. Similarly, vehicle headlights and other sources of glaring light, particularly during night operations, should be considered. A system that is designed with the potential problem sources recognized can be compensated for. After initial installation is complete, it is much more difficult to compensate for these problems. Oftentimes, funding is no longer available to make needed adjustments. Viewing a scene such as a dark doorway that contains a significant shadow can be quite difficult (exhibit 2.4). Newer cameras with better electronics help compensate for these types of applications, but they are more expensive. Seasonal problems should be anticipated and addressed before purchasing an exterior camera system. Conditions to be aware of are blowing snow, built-up ice on a camera housing, dust storms, trees that block the scene in summer, temperature extremes, or north sides of buildings with shadows that may affect scene assessment during winter months. 4. To monitor or not to monitor Each year, a great number of camera systems are bought in the United States with the objective of assigning a security person to constantly monitor the scenes from the video cameras in real time. The objective of such installations is that some sort of response may then be dispatched immediately and an undesirable incident prevented or stopped, basically using the live person watching the monitor as a detector. This is quite often an unrealistic approach to security, particularly in school applications. Experiments were run at Sandia National Laboratories 20 years ago for the U.S. Department of Energy to test the effectiveness of an individual whose task was to sit in front of a video monitor(s) for several hours a day and watch for particular events. These studies demonstrated that such a task, even when assigned to a person who is dedicated and well-intentioned, will not support an effective security system. After only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing. There is no intellectually engaging stimuli, such as when watching a television program. This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors, with scenes of teenagers milling about in various hallways, in an attempt to watch for security incidents (exhibit 2.5). A practical security application of real-time viewing of a video monitor might be the intent to actively allow or disallow individuals to enter a particular locked door. In this case, the security person at or near the video monitors receives an alarm or other announcement that a person desires entry into that facility or area. The security person would then focus his or her attention directly on the screen and make a decision (according to procedures) as to whether to release the remote lock on a door to allow the person access. Most schools have a security staff, whether it be an assistant principal assigned security as one of his or her duties, a few security aides equipped with two-way radios, or an impressive number of sworn police officers. Few schools, however, find themselves with surplus security-staff time. Because of the ineffectiveness of people monitoring video scenes in real time, it would seem to be a very poor use of school security staff. One possible exception is when a certain incident is expected at a school during a finite time period. For example, if cars in a parking lot are frequently broken into during the noon hour, security staff may want to actively monitor their cameras' outputs during this period so that they may immediately assess an incident in progress and apprehend the suspect. This would be particularly appropriate if the suspect is not known and not a member of the school. The use of cameras and a real-time display unit without the benefit of a recorder is not recommended. It is true that a video camera and monitor alone are much cheaper than a complete video system with recording and multiplexing capabilities. However, the hard evidence made available in the form of a video recording can more than make up for the cost of a recording system. Ease of prosecution and the likely prevention of future incidents by this individual are additional benefits. 5. Color versus black-and-white cameras In a high-security application, when an alarm has been generated signaling a presence in an off-limits area, it is likely to be sufficient to be able to assess the alarm condition with a black-and-white camera. The objective here is merely to determine that it is a person intruding (any person) and that a response should be prepared or dispatched. In a school application, the security objective of recording video scenes would generally be to determine who the perpetrator of an incident was. In this type of after-the-fact assessment, it is most important to identify, not just detect, the intruder. Because of this, color cameras are probably more helpful for most school applications than black-and-white cameras. Color recordings will contain much more information about the scene that was viewed, i.e., the boy who broke the window had red hair, a dark yellow jacket, and drove away in a light blue car. This can be critical for school applications; the school principal can match the characteristics of the recorded suspect with those of students or outsiders known to frequent the area. Quite often, when a suspected student is brought in and shown a recording of himself or herself in an incident, he or she will admit to a role in it, even though there may not have been quite enough detail on tape for a positive identification. Color cameras usually have lower resolution than black-and-white cameras. However, for the school application, the ability to recognize the color of clothing, color of vehicle, and so forth is often more important than a more detailed image. The amount of information on a video recording that is required to prosecute a suspect in a court of law may be much greater in many instances than what a school video system will normally collect. The cost of color cameras is slowly approaching the cost of black-and-white cameras. Currently, the cost of a color camera as compared to an equivalent black-and-white camera is anywhere from 30 percent to 70 percent greater. Most school applications will find the higher priced color cameras necessary for their goals. An exception to this would be a camera applied in a small interior room or area where any potential perpetrators will be close enough so that their faces will be easily identifiable in black and white. When using either black-and-white or color cameras under low light level conditions (such as at night with artificial lighting) it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing lighting. Generally, security applications of cameras require higher light levels and more evenly distributed lighting than is found in parking lots with typical safety lighting. Also, if school officials plan to use their cameras for nighttime applications, color cameras will require a higher lighting level than black and white cameras. (See the section on lighting requirements and nighttime applications.) 6. Fixed versus pan-tilt-zoom cameras Two types of camera configurations are available on the market: the fixed camera and the pan-tilt-zoom camera. Fixed cameras are mounted in a stationary position (although what the camera is mounted on may actually move, such as on a police vehicle). These cameras will view the same scene until physically relocated. The scene is typically recorded and, less often, the scene is also viewed simultaneously on a monitor by security personnel. Pan-tilt-zoom cameras can operate in either of two modes. The mode for which these cameras are most useful allows the scene that is viewed to be controlled by an operator sitting at a video monitor. This operator can control the direction and angle of the camera as necessary. These cameras typically have a zoom option that will allow the operator to focus on parts of a scene, such as zooming in on a suspected perpetrator. The second mode for pan-tilt-zoom cameras is an automatic mode, in which the camera automatically scans back and forth over a certain portion of its range. Normally a pan-tilt-zoom camera should be protected and shielded from view by an opaque enclosure (domes are quite common) so that it is difficult for a would-be perpetrator to tell where the camera is actually aimed. Most applications in schools are better served by fixed cameras. One consideration is that the pan-tilt-zoom camera can cost around three to five times as much as an equal quality fixed camera. More important, though, is the fact that pan-tilt-zoom cameras, when run by an operator, consume the time of a security staff member. When run in automatic mode, the chance of the pan-tilt-zoom camera looking (and recording) in the direction where an incident is occurring is much less likely than the chance that it will be looking in the wrong direction (exhibit 2.6). Pan-tilt-zoom cameras also introduce a mechanical component to the system that will require more regular maintenance (e.g., oiling gears, replacing motors, and so forth) and that will be one of the more likely fail points. Pan-tilt-zoom cameras may be employed during a fixed portion of the day, such as the lunch period, if an operator is available to watch and track suspects with this camera. Gateway High School in Denver, Colorado, has a dozen fixed cameras located throughout the campus but also successfully uses one pan-tilt-zoom camera overseeing the parking lot that allows an operator to watch suspected perpetrators before and after classes. Gateway's goal is to record a suspected individual while he or she is involved in a regularly occurring incident of which the school is already quite aware. With these considerations, it would usually be more cost-effective and more reliable to capture incidents using multiple fixed cameras looking in different areas from a single point than to use a single pan-tilt-zoom camera. (This does not take into account installation costs.) 7. Hardwired versus wireless systems Traditionally, camera systems have cabling that runs directly between the camera and the recording mechanism (or viewing monitor). These hardwired runs are usually recommended by manufacturers to not exceed 500-1,000 feet, using RG-59 coaxial cable. Signal equalizers/amplifiers will be required to compensate for signal loss if distances become much greater than 1,000 feet. See exhibit 2.7 for typical transmitting distances. For exterior applications, cabling for camera systems should be placed within a watertight conduit. Underground cabling should be buried below the frostline or a minimum of 24 inches deep. Direct buried cables (without conduit) are subject to damage by rodents (if no rodent shield is provided), accidental digging, and intentional tampering. Above-ground cabling that is not in a conduit is very susceptible to tampering, as well as environmental degradation. With coaxial cable runs, ground loops (in video applications, this is a current flowing along the shield of the coaxial cable due to a voltage difference in the ground between the ends of the cable) and interference from radio frequencies (RF) or other signals must be considered. Coaxial cables should not be run next to, or parallel with, power lines over long distances. Equipment, such as hum transformers and electronic video clamps, is available in instances where interference is a problem. With exterior coaxial cable runs, close lightning strikes can induce voltage surges on the cable that can damage equipment on both ends. To protect equipment, surge protectors are installed at both ends of the cable run. Fiber optic cabling is an excellent alternative to coaxial cable. With fiber optics, there are no concerns with noise, RF interference, ground loops, or voltage surges. Fiber optic systems require a transmitter at the camera end and a receiver at the monitoring end. Fiber optic systems are more costly than coaxial cable systems for short runs but become more cost effective with longer cable runs (greater than 3,000 feet). Installation of fiber optics is also more expensive, requiring trained and experienced installers and specialized tools for handling and connecting. For interior applications, cabling for hardwired camera systems should be placed within a metal conduit if it is exposed or accessible by building occupants, including maintenance staff. A good example of this is cabling run above loose/replaceable ceiling tiles. Short-distance, low-power RF wireless camera systems for video signal transmission are becoming more popular. (Wiring is still required for power.) A transmitter is required at the camera, as well as a receiver at the recording end. This will add an estimated $1,000 or more to the price of the system for each distinct camera location (multiple cameras can be at one location, as in exhibit 2.8). In many cases, however, wireless may be cheaper (and certainly easier) than running cabling. Acceptable distances between a transmitter and receiver may range up to about 1,500 feet if the camera transmitter is in direct line-of-sight of the receiver. If equipment is located such that data transmissions must go through walls, fences, and so forth, the detail of the transmission can quickly degrade if the transmitter/receiver distance is already close to the manufacturer's recommended maximum distance. Installation distances to be implemented for camera transmissions should be much less than manufacturer recommendations if the transmitter and receiver are not within each other's line of sight. The advantage of wireless camera systems is, of course, that cabling does not have to be run underground, through the air, or behind walls and ceilings. Therefore, the chance of tampering is much less. However, wireless applications where distances are close to manufacturer limitations may experience interference from very unusual sources, e.g., a nearby parked truck. Previous installation experience is usually required to set up such a system, due to the different antennas available that can perform differently in unique setups. Short-distance, low-power RF transmission systems, such as a school's wireless camera system, usually do not require licensing by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Higher power systems will require an FCC license. 8. A more technical discussion of formats, resolution, pixels, lenses, and field of view A basic familiarity with camera terminology is probably adequate for most school administrators who plan to go out on bid for a CCTV system. However, for the benefit of those who might be responsible for choosing or upgrading camera equipment, the following discussion presents these technical specifications in more depth. Formats. Camera format relates to the size of the camera imaging device. Most solid-state cameras used in security applications today are 1/2 -inch or 1/3 -inch format. There are some 2/3 -inch cameras still in use, and some 1/4 -inch format cameras are beginning to appear on the market. The trend has been to make camera formats smaller as picture element densities have increased, giving the manufacturer more imaging devices per production run, reducing costs, and allowing for smaller cameras. Resolution. Resolution is the ability to resolve or see small details in an image. Resolution for CCTV cameras (as well as for TV monitors and recorders) is usually specified in terms of horizontal lines of resolution. Horizontal lines of resolution relates to the number of independently resolvable elements (small details) in three-fourths of the picture width. CCTV cameras range from 200 to more than 1,000 lines of horizontal resolution. Higher resolution cameras generally cost more than lower resolution cameras. For a typical color security camera system (system includes camera, cabling, recorder, and TV monitor) that uses a standard National Television Systems Committee (NTSC) color video signal format, 300 to 400 lines of horizontal resolution are common. Black-and-white systems for tighter security applications typically range from 500 to 700 lines of resolution. Cameras with more than 800 lines of resolution are commonly used in broadcast TV, medical, or industrial applications. Pixels. Active picture elements, sometimes referred to as pixels, is a term used specifically with cameras and is directly related to horizontal lines of resolution. Active picture elements are the actual number of light-sensitive elements that are within the camera imaging device. Active picture elements are expressed with a horizontal number (the number of elements horizontally across the imager device) and a vertical number (the number of elements vertically on the imager). A camera specified with 768H by 494V picture elements has 494 rows of picture elements vertically, with each row having 768 elements horizontally. For black-and-white cameras, horizontal lines of resolution relate to picture elements by a three-fourths factor (by definition of horizontal lines of resolution) so a black-and-white camera with 768 active picture elements will have 576 horizontal lines of resolution. This would hold true for color cameras as well, except that the NTSC format limits signal bandwidth which reduces resolution. Lines of resolution, camera format, and lens focal length (discussed later) are the camera-specific part of what determines if a camera scene will be useful for a particular application. Other items to consider include lighting, shadowing, camera aiming, and camera sensitivity. Before selecting a camera and lens combination for an application, one must determine what is desired to be seen in the image. Just being able to see a person in a specific area, such as a parking lot, will require one set of minimum criteria for camera and lens selection. Being able to identify a person by facial features (if the person faces the camera) will require a different set of criteria. For identification purposes, a person must be much larger in a scene than for the purpose of just determining if a human is present. Because a camera scene is observed on the TV monitor, the entire CCTV system resolution must be considered. This includes the camera and lens combination, the camera signal transmission equipment (such as coaxial cable and amplifiers), the TV monitor, and the recorder. All components of the system must have adequate resolution for the application desired. For observation of a camera scene to determine only if a human is in the scene (or to be able to distinguish between a person and an animal), a minimum criteria of 6 horizontal TV lines across a 1-foot-wide object within the scene is used. (In terms of active picture elements, this means that a 1-foot-wide object would cover 8 horizontal active picture elements for each row of picture elements for the height of the object on the camera imager.) For identification of a person by facial features, 16 horizontal lines (21 pixels) of resolution subtending a 1-foot-wide object is needed. The lens focal length (discussed in the next section), camera format, and how far an object is from the camera will determine how large an object is within the scene, as well as how many active picture elements the object covers on the camera imaging device. Higher resolution cameras (for example, 576 horizontal lines or higher) can be used to distinguish objects farther away (smaller in the scene) than a lower resolution camera (approximately 250 horizontal lines) allows. In other words, an object can be smaller in the scene for higher resolution cameras and still meet the minimum horizontal resolution criteria. The significance of this is that fewer higher resolution cameras will be needed than low-resolution cameras in some interior and many exterior applications. Lenses. A camera lens focuses light reflected from objects within a scene onto the imaging device of the camera. The imaging device converts light to an electrical signal. Lens focal length and aperture are two important parameters to consider. Lens focal length describes the relative magnification of the lens. The camera field of view (defined below) will be dependent on the lens focal length, along with the camera imager format size. Similar to the camera imager format, there is a format size for lenses. For most cases, the lens format size should be matched to the camera imager format size. Mismatched format sizes can result in the focused image being too large or too small for the camera imaging device. Different camera and lens formats can be used satisfactorily in a few instances. Except for the most uncommon sizes, there usually is not a large price difference between various lens sizes. The most common sizes are 4.8mm, 5.6mm, 8mm, 12mm, 16mm, 25mm, and 35mm. A 35mm lens has the longest range with the narrowest field of view. The 4.8mm lens can see much shorter distances, but it will have a much wider field of view. Most lens sizes can be used in exterior applications, depending on the view desired. Shorter focal length lenses, such as 4.8mm or 5.6mm, are typical for interior applications, due to the shorter distances involved. The important thing to consider is that the camera field of view depends on the focal length and format size. Camera field of view is expressed in horizontal and vertical angular fields of view. Most camera manufacturers or manufacturers' representatives who sell lenses with their cameras can provide charts that list the angular fields of view for common lens sizes. Exhibit 2.10 shows the difference between two different lens focal lengths. The lens aperture, or speed of a lens, is a relative measure of the ability of the lens to gather light. Aperture is expressed as the F-number. The F-number is the ratio of lens focal length to its clear aperture. Clear aperture is the diameter of the inside of the lens where light passes through when the lens iris is fully open. A lens that is designated as an F/2 will have a clear aperture size that is one-half its focal length, meaning that a 16mm focal length lens will have a clear aperture of 8mm. The lower the F-number of a lens, the more light the lens can gather. This becomes important when operating a camera at low light levels, such as at night with artificial lighting. Most security camera lenses today have F-numbers of 1.8 to 1.4. These are usually adequate for night applications given that the minimum light levels for CCTV are provided. Not all lenses are the same, however. Two different lenses with the same F-number can have different light-gathering capabilities. This is particularly true when it comes to fixed focal length lenses versus variable focal length (zoom) lenses. Zoom lenses have more glass elements than fixed focal length lenses. Because of the additional glass elements, an F/1.8 zoom lens will not be able to pass as much light as an F/1.8 fixed lens with fewer glass elements. An amount of light transmission is lost in each glass element. This is important to consider during night operation under artificial lighting. A zoom lens will require higher lighting levels than a fixed focal length lens if an equivalent picture quality is desired. Most lenses for security cameras will have an adjustable iris to control the amount of light that is received at the camera imager. The iris is either manually adjustable or electronically controlled. The electronic iris (or auto-iris) monitors the camera video signal output and will open the iris for decreasing light levels and close it for increasing light levels. This keeps the video level (brightness and contrast) fairly constant under varying lighting conditions. In the case of a manual iris lens, the user or installer adjusts the iris opening for the proper video signal level for the expected operational lighting level. If light levels change, an adjustment to the iris will be required in order to maintain a proper video signal level. Manual iris lenses are used mostly in interior applications where no outside light comes in and the light levels remain constant. For all exterior and many interior applications, an auto-iris lens will be necessary. A relatively new feature in many cameras is the electronic shutter. The electronic shutter is part of the imaging device and can perform close to the same function as an electronic iris. It controls the amount of light that the light-sensitive elements within the camera imager receives. Electronic shutters have limitations, however. They may not have as much range as auto-iris lenses. This is an important consideration for exterior applications. If light control is totally dependent on a shutter (a manual iris lens is used instead of an auto-iris) in an exterior application, the shutter may not be able to reduce light enough on bright, sunny days, resulting in portions of the picture washing out. If the manual iris lens is partially closed to compensate for bright sunshine, low-light conditions may produce a dark, noisy picture. Many shuttered cameras intended for exterior use will also come with an auto-iris lens. Field of view. Field of view (FOV) relates to the size of the area that a camera will see at a specific distance from the camera. The field of view is dependent on lens focal length and camera format size. The FOV width and height can be calculated using the following formulas: FOV Width = Format (horizontal in mm) x Distance in feet from camera divided by Focal length FOV Height = 0.75 x FOV width Manipulating the FOV formula allows a calculation of the distance in feet from the camera for a required FOV width. The formula becomes: Distance (in feet from camera) = FOV width x Focal length divided by Format (horizontal in mm) Before the FOV for a camera is selected, the minimum desired resolution for an intruder or object to be viewed must be determined (i.e., whether it is desired to identify a person or to just determine if a person is within the scene). This will limit the maximum FOV width and is referred to as the resolution-limited FOV (exhibit 2.11). The resolution-limited FOV width can be determined by using camera resolution in horizontal lines per foot and the number of lines of resolution per foot required to identify an intruder. The following formula is used to calculate the resolution-limited FOV width: Resolution-limited FOV width = Camera resolution divided by Number of lines of resolution A resolution of 16 lines per foot is considered acceptable for identifying most people. If a camera with 350 horizontal lines of resolution is utilized, the resolution-limited FOV width for a resolution of 16 lines per foot can be calculated as follows: Resolution-limited FOV width = 350 divided by 16 = 22 The following table presents the horizontal camera format sizes of the imager for various size imagers: Example: Calculate the maximum distance from a 350-line, horizontal resolution, 1/2-inch format camera with a 75mm lens to the resolution-limited FOV width at 16 lines per foot resolution. Distance = 22 x 75 divided by 6.4 = 258 Exhibit 2.11 illustrates that there is camera coverage beyond the resolution-limited area but the resolution will decrease as the distance from the camera increases. People may be seen but not identified beyond the resolution-limited FOV area. The figure also demonstrates that, as people walk toward the camera and into the blind area, they disappear from view starting with their feet. Another method of calculating the field of view is to use a lens selection wheel. These are mechanical computing wheels that are available from many lens manufacturers and CCTV manufacturers. They will give a good approximation of FOV parameters. A viewfinder can also be used to determine the field of view of a lens. This is a specially designed lens through which one can view the scene of interest. The scene is masked through the lens in such a way as to represent the picture that will be seen on the monitor. The scene desired can be dialed up on the viewfinder and the focal length of the lens required for the particular imager format size of the camera read from the side of the viewfinder. A viewfinder only determines a lens focal length value; other parameters must still be calculated. Some lens manufacturers have developed tables for determining the field of view. The format size and focal length of the camera is cross-referenced to the column of the desired distance, and the width/height of the field of view is read from that column. In summary, whether a camera scene is useful depends on whether objects can be distinguished in the scene. Camera resolution, camera format size, lens focal length, as well as lighting, shadowing, camera aiming, and camera sensitivity all play a role in being able to distinguish objects. Resolution and performance of other components such as TV monitors, recorders, and signal transmission equipment must be considered also. Cameras are specified with the number of horizontal lines of resolution and active picture elements. Most security cameras available today range from 300 to 700 horizontal lines of resolution. Black-and-white security cameras commonly have a horizontal resolution of 500 to 600 lines, while color cameras for security applications have 300 to 400 lines. In many exterior applications and some interior applications, a greater number of low-resolution (200-300 lines) cameras may be necessary in order to distinguish objects than would be necessary using higher resolution (500- 600 lines) cameras. 9. Camera housings One of the first considerations in selecting a camera housing is the environment. Is the camera to be installed outdoors or indoors? For indoor housings, the overall conditions where the camera is to be installed must be considered. Is the camera to be installed in a classroom, pool area, gymnasium, hallway, lobby area, or inside a school bus? A camera housing design can either help or hinder the installation and maintenance of a camera. In the outdoors, a watertight housing is desired; in some areas a heater may be required. Good ventilation is required in warmer climates. Domed enclosures are a special version of housings that can be used to conceal the position of the camera(s) via the use of viewing windows and various liners. The dome housing may also offer a more attractive look that can be designed to blend into its environment. When installing housings in areas that drop below 30 degrees F, the housing should have a heater. This is not so much to keep the camera warm as it is to protect the lens and to keep the viewplate free from condensation. Many auto-iris and zoom lenses can begin to experience mechanical problems at temperatures close to and below freezing. For this reason, the housing heater should be located toward the front of the housing, preferably in a U-shape or circle around the lens area. This will keep the lens warm and the front faceplate clear. The camera itself will provide ample heat (under most conditions) to keep it operational. Check the specifications listing for the camera's operating temperatures. In extremely cold environments, it may be necessary to purchase a housing that is also insulated. Extremely cold environments would be any location where temperatures drop to less than -30 degrees F. A sunshield may be required in some locations. A sunshield can provide artificial shade and serve as a glare screen. A sunshield can lower the internal temperature of a housing by 10-15 degrees F and can reduce the effects of sunrise/sunset glare. Dome housings, because of their overall design, do not usually have a sunshield option. In warmer climates, housing ventilation may be required. Many housings or domes have an optional fan attachment and air vents. Filters over the vents will need to be cleaned or replaced on a regular basis, thus adding to maintenance requirements. Sealed housings with fans for heat dissipation or condensation control can be used, but are usually more expensive. Humidity can do the most damage to cameras and other electronic equipment. If the camera is to be installed in an obviously high-humidity area, a pressurized environmental housing may be required. These are purged and pressurized with dry nitrogen. The sealed pressurized housing ensures that changing outside pressures will not force any dirt, humidity, and/or oxygen into the tube. Cabling for these units is installed through the back via a specialized plug. Corrosion caused by salt can be a major problem in areas of the country with high humidity that are near an ocean (such as Florida). In pool areas, chlorine is a problem. These different types of corrosives can reduce the life expectancy of a camera or lens dramatically. Therefore, if an environment is considered corrosive, only those housings or domes that are considered environmentally sealed should be used. A camera's vulnerability to vandalism must be taken into consideration (exhibit 2.12). A housing or dome that can accommodate a lock may be required. To prevent tampering, the housing should be made of steel, although fairly tough plastic housings are available. Such tamper-proof housings or domes are often made of 10-gauge (or higher) steel. Some situations call for bullet-resistant housings. These units are usually constructed of 12-gauge stainless steel. The front glass will be constructed of a 1/4 -inch or thicker Lexan-type material. Two squares of 1/4 -inch plate glass sandwiched around a 1/4 -inch square of Lexan can probably prevent scratching of the surface due to washing, wind, and dust. When choosing a proper housing or dome, it is important to consider the actual dimensions of the unit. Refer to the camera and lens specification sheets to determine the size of the housing. Leave enough room for cable connectors. The objective is to keep the unit small but allow room for everything to fit and to be accessible. Ideally, the selected housing will allow the camera to be focused and the parameters adjusted while the camera is mounted inside the housing. This depends on the design of the housing. Some housings have a hinged cover, opening from the top, that allows for easy focusing and adjustment. If mounted inside near the ceiling, this type of housing may not be feasible. Some housings allow the cover to slide off the base for easy adjustment of the camera parameters. The prices of camera housings vary considerably. When going out on bid, be certain that your requirements document includes the features you will need. 10. Placement and mounting To avoid the effects of blooming, streaking, and glare, all of which can wash out the video image, exterior cameras should be mounted below the nighttime lighting sources and aimed downward to shun direct sunlight, especially that occurring during sunrise and sunset. This may require a minimum mounting height of 18-20 feet. An even higher mounting height will help prevent vandalism of the camera. Consider the height required if a truck can be parked directly beneath the camera, where a perpetrator could stand on the truck's cab to reach the camera. Cameras should always be mounted on solid surfaces to prevent wind movement and vibration. Wooden poles can twist with high winds over a period of time and cause the camera view to change. Under these conditions, the camera may periodically require direction alignment. In the interior environment, cameras cannot be mounted higher than the ceiling so it may be easier for an intruder out-of-view of the cameras to vandalize or tamper with them. This situation can be helped if the scene viewed by two cameras includes the other camera, such as cameras mounted at each end of a hallway or room and aimed to include a view of the other. Cabling to the cameras must be protected from vandalism and tampering. In interior installations, wires can be hidden from view and therefore protected by routing them through the ceiling and/or walls. However, the small amount of wiring that may run from the camera to the wall or ceiling must be in a conduit. Also be aware that employees with access to the ceiling could tamper with your camera wiring. For exterior camera installations, the video and power cabling to the cameras should be installed in a conduit. For underground runs, special cabling for direct burial should be used if the cable is not installed in a conduit. The cable running up poles or buildings to the cameras must be in a conduit because this is a very vulnerable location for vandalism and tampering. Camera mounts should be selected to handle the weight of the camera, lens, and housing. A good rule of thumb is to select a mount that will handle twice the weight of the load as calculated from the specification sheets of the selected components. Mounts are usually specified as indoor or outdoor mounts. A mount designated for installation outside also can be used for interior installations, but an indoor mount should not be used outdoors. Outdoor mounts are treated for corrosive effects not normally encountered indoors (although one common exception would be in a high-humidity area such as an indoor pool). Some mounts have separate mounting bases and must be selected for either suspended ceiling or solid wall/ceiling mounting locations. Pole mount brackets are available for some outdoor camera mounts. The mounts should have adjustable heads to allow for up/down and sideways adjustment of the camera field of view. Mounts also come in different lengths, and this may be a consideration when a camera housing adds to the length requirement. Primarily, the mount should be rigid enough and mounted securely enough to the surface so that the camera does not vibrate under normal operating conditions. Many camera manufacturers and distributors also carry a full line of camera mounts, as well as housings for their cameras. Mounts are priced anywhere from approximately $30 to $150. 11. Lighting requirements and nighttime applications Most schools generally will not attempt to use exterior CCTV cameras during the nighttime because of the high light levels that are required. For exterior nighttime CCTV applications, proper lighting is very important. A number of lighting types are available. These types include incandescent, fluorescent, and high-intensity discharge. Incandescent lighting is the most expensive to operate and includes the flood or quartz lights that are commonly used for exterior home security applications. Most fluorescent lighting is used indoors for office and work area lighting. High-intensity discharge lighting is the least expensive to operate (more light is produced with less power consumption) and is the most common for commercial exterior lighting applications. It includes high-pressure sodium and low-pressure sodium lighting. A disadvantage of high-intensity discharge lighting is the restrike time. If a momentary power outage occurs, these lights will go out and can take up to several minutes to return to full brightness. The advantages of high- and low-pressure sodium lighting, however, outweigh this disadvantage for CCTV applications. Low-pressure sodium lighting is the most desirable choice for exterior CCTV applications because it is somewhat more efficient to operate than high-pressure sodium, and the types of light fixtures available provide a fairly uniform light pattern. A disadvantage to low-pressure sodium is the monochromatic yellow light it produces, which some people find objectionable. Important items to consider for nighttime camera lighting are illumination level, camera sensitivity, lens type, light-to-dark ratio, area of illumination in the camera field of view, and lighting position. Note: These are not simple issues to be addressed by a neophyte. Be certain that you discuss lighting issues with your local power company or lighting expert. Illumination level, camera sensitivity, and lens type. Lighting levels must be high enough for the camera to produce a useable image. The light level required will depend on camera sensitivity and lens type and quality. Black-and-white cameras generally have more light sensitivity than color cameras and are recommended for most nighttime applications. A minimum illumination level of 1.5 foot-candles, as measured on a horizontal plane 1 foot off the ground, is recommended for a black-and-white camera with a sensitivity specification of 0.007 foot- candles faceplate illumination. This assumes the camera has a good-quality, F/1.4 fixed focal lens. A color camera or a camera with a zoom lens will require a higher light level in order to get equivalent brightness and contrast. Light-to-dark ratio. A recommended maximum light-to-dark lighting ratio is 6 to 1 (as measured on a horizontal plane 1 foot off the ground). This maximum applies to the entire area of interest that the camera is viewing. It is also recommended to design the lighting for a 4-to-1 ratio to allow for some degradation over time. A 6-to-1 light-to-dark ratio will prevent areas that are so dark or so bright that a person or object would be obscured. Area of illumination in the camera field of view. A minimum illumination of 70 percent of the camera field of view is recommended. A camera is an averaging device. If too little of the field of view is illuminated, the camera will average between the illuminated areas and the nonilluminated areas, resulting in blooming and loss of picture detail in the illuminated area. Lighting position. The position of lighting in relation to the camera field of view is also important. As much as possible, light sources must be kept out of the camera's field of view. Lights that are illuminating a camera scene should be mounted higher than the cameras. When determining a location and field of view for a camera, extraneous light sources, such as building-mounted lighting for pedestrians that will be in the camera view, must be considered. Extraneous light sources can cause blooming and streaking in a camera, rendering portions of the field of view unusable. Distant light sources that are relatively dim are usually not a problem. Other lighting. Another type of lighting is known as infrared (IR) or near infrared. The spectrum for this lighting is just below red and is not visible to the human eye. Most black-and-white cameras have sensitivity into the infrared. A black-and-white camera can be used with this type of lighting to observe areas at night without having lighting that is visible to humans. To make use of IR lighting, the camera must not have an IR cut filter. Cameras can be ordered without IR cut filters; be sure to specify no IR cut filter when ordering. Commercial IR light sources include incandescent and the light emitting diode (LED). The incandescent type typically use a 300- to 500-watt lamp and a visible light cut filter. These are expensive to purchase ($800-$1,200) and expensive to operate and maintain (2,000 hours is a nominal life expectancy of the incandescent lamp). The LED type emits light in the IR and is also expensive to purchase (around $1,200) but uses less power and has a much longer life expectancy. The incandescent type will provide more illumination than the LED type. With either type of IR light, more light fixtures will be required to illuminate an area than with visible lighting. While IR lighting has the advantage of not being visible to humans, it is fairly expensive. Alternatives to lighting. There are two camera technologies that can see at night without the use of artificial lighting. These technologies are intensified cameras and thermal cameras, though they are probably both cost-prohibitive for most schools. Intensified cameras use a photomultiplier (light intensifying) tube in front of the camera imaging device. Depending on the generation of the photomultiplier tube, these cameras can produce a picture in conditions ranging from moonlight to starlight. Disadvantages of these cameras include initial costs, maintenance costs, and lower resolution. Costs for an intensified camera can begin around $8,000. The photomultiplier tube has a life expectancy in the range of 8,000 to 10,000 hours, requiring replacement every 1-2 years depending on the amount of use. In terms of horizontal TV lines, intensified cameras have lower resolution than a good-quality surveillance camera. Thermal cameras are sensitive to thermal energy radiated by objects. The low-end and minimum-performance thermal cameras start around $7,000. The high-performing thermal cameras range up to $30,000 and require equipment for cooling the thermal imaging device. This cooling equipment can be maintenance intensive. Resolution is also lower than in general CCTV surveillance cameras. Uncooled cameras are currently coming down in price and may offer a better alternative in the future. 12. Covert cameras There may be times when it is suspected or known that unlawful events, including drug deals, fighting or intimidation, vandalism, or nighttime theft, are occurring on campus. With cameras in plain view, it is clear to all where not to carry out such dealings but; where incidents of concern are out of sight, it may be beneficial to temporarily install a camera hidden from view of the suspects (exhibit 2.13). (Schools should make certain that they consult an attorney before utilizing hidden cameras.) Cameras hidden from the view of suspects under investigation are referred to as covert cameras. In school applications, these cameras are generally hidden behind a wall or ceiling or within a common building fixture. In some instances, it may be practical to use a normal size, readily available camera if a convenient hidden location is available, such as behind an air duct. It would be reasonable for a school district to have at least one smaller camera available for covert applications. A whole new industry has arisen in the past few years that specializes in these tiny, easily hidden cameras. These tiny cameras designed for hidden applications are available in black-and-white or color. Microphones are included with some cameras, but caution is advised in their use due to state laws regarding privacy of conversations. An amazing array of disguised cameras already installed within smoke detectors, clocks, speakers, light switches, junction boxes, neckties, caps, and so forth are available in security trade journals; it is then up to the security department to appropriately place the item where it will not be suspicious. The size of available covert cameras themselves measure about 1.25 inches square. The lenses, including pinhole lenses, come in sizes ranging from 2.5mm to 25mm. Covert kits will provide both the camera and a set of several lenses that will handle a wide range of applications, from wide-angle to telephoto. Passive infrared cameras and surface-mount cameras also are available. They can allow surveillance in some low-light environments. Voltage requirements for the cameras are normally 9 or 12 volts dc and can be battery powered. The video recorder that will be necessary to record the images captured by a covert camera must also be hidden from view. This may not be a simple matter. The smallest video recorder is much larger than the smallest camera. It requires ventilation, a somewhat clean environment, accessibility, and it makes noise. It may be necessary to install the recorder in a separate secure room or even in another building. The video signal must be transmitted from the camera to the recorder. Coaxial cable is needed for these connections. Wireless covert board cameras are available. Although their use can greatly simplify installation, their transmission ranges are limited to about 300 feet. Covert black-and-white board cameras start at around $150, with a resolution of about 380 lines. Color covert cameras are close to $300, with a resolution of around 330 lines. For these operations, black-and-white cameras may be adequate or even desired. Many covert situations occur in fairly small areas, and a higher resolution black-and-white camera may be more appropriate than a lower resolution color camera. Cameras already mounted covertly within a fixture can cost between $250 and $500. Wireless cameras can range from $500 to $1,000 or more. 13. Maintenance and expected lifespan After successful installation, the required regular maintenance of a fixed camera is normally to clean the outside lens. Depending on the strength of the camera's mounting and the stability of the structure it is attached to, occasional repositioning of the camera to correct the viewing angle may be required, especially for exterior applications. (It is not unusual to see one or more incorrectly positioned camera scenes on the monitors of an established security communications room because regular maintenance of camera mountings has not been provided for.) Housings will protect the camera lens from dust and dirt, but the glass front of the housing must be kept clean. Some super housings come with their own wiper blades and wiper fluid dispenser. The dispenser mechanism is activated remotely by an operator to keep the camera scene clear. However, this feature can add to the required regular maintenance as the dispenser must be refilled with fluid as needed. The dome enclosures for interior ceiling-mounted cameras (usually pan-tilt-zoom cameras) are intended to reveal the presence of a camera but not its current direction or field-of-view. Dust (or mischief) can obscure the view, but otherwise, maintenance is low. The average lifespan of a modern solid-state camera is greater than 5 years. Many camera failures occur early in a camera's life. This allows for most cameras with defects to be returned during the warranty period. Cameras do occasionally need repair, so the availability of parts should be considered. This can make a good deal on an older camera system less fortuitous. If a camera unit used in a critical application must be sent away for repair, it is wise to have a backup camera available. Maintenance contracts should always address repair time and the availability of loaner units. In the absence of a maintenance contract, there are many local repair shops in most medium and large cities. Check the availability of local repair options before you purchase your system. There are several resources for camera maintenance available to customers across the country who are willing to ship their equipment; repair generally takes less than 2 weeks. Most of these resources may be located on the Web. 14. Price ranges Standard-resolution solid-state cameras can cost between $300 and $1,000. High-resolution cameras can range anywhere from $1,500 to $8,000. For most school applications, the standard-resolution camera is probably adequate. The less expensive cameras (nearer to $300) need more light to accurately capture a scene. The more expensive cameras ($1,000 or more) tend to be more sensitive, using more sophisticated electronics so that they require less light to accurately capture a scene. 15. Going out on bid for equipment and system maintenance contracts While it is difficult to prevent every possible mistake when going out on bid for CCTV systems, there are a few commonsense approaches that should be incorporated in every request for quote (RFQ). The security equipment industry is no different from any other supplier; they will bid on and provide what is asked for. Even generally standard options that would seem reasonable to assume would be included should not be assumed to be part of any RFQ. If you can precisely describe what you require, the bidders will be less apt to submit bids on dissimilar systems. Do not accept or pay for a camera system until it has been installed and is demonstrated to operate according to your specifications. Remember, the vendor doesn't like surprises any more than you do so specify your acceptance criteria very clearly in the RFQ. This includes the "quality" of installation (exhibit 2.14); occasionally a contractor may try to save money by merely tacking cabling along the top of a wall instead of running the cabling within a conduit and within the ceiling. Don't assume anything. When going out on bid, the ideal specifications for a CCTV system would describe the desired capabilities or goals of the system, not the quantities of different components. For example, if it is desired to have cameras viewing the locker bay area to discourage and identify daytime thieves, do not request "two cameras, one installed at the end of each hallway." A more profitable request could be: "The images saved to videotape and viewed on the system monitor will allow the customer to distinguish, as a measure of acceptance testing, between the geometry teacher and the school secretary standing anywhere within the locker bay area, with at least one image per camera captured and recorded per second. Quoted product and installation should be vandal-proof, such that an individual, given a few minutes of uninterrupted time, would not be able to vandalize the equipment without being recorded on tape and being identifiable, providing they are not wearing any type of mask." Include room dimensions and even a few photographs of the area for which the requested equipment is intended, or offer all potential bidders a tour of the area. It is common for the prices received from such a request to be substantially higher than the school originally intended. It is efficient to include a request in the original RFQ for two different camera layouts and their associated costs. One layout would provide the exact capability requested. The second layout would be the best possible configuration within a specified dollar amount, with the expected capabilities as well as deficiencies that are expected with this layout, clearly identified by the vendor. It is to both the school's and vendor's benefit to request these two different layouts--a principal or security official armed with such information can approach the school district or school board to request the additional funding necessary to meet the goals of the security system if the less expensive system will perform substantially below the school's requirements. Typical warranties on video cameras are 90 days, with up to a year or more for more sophisticated cameras. It is common for cameras that are defective to fail fairly quickly after installation. Be prepared for this; assign a person to be responsible for checking regularly on the functioning of the equipment and to immediately remove failing components and return them to the manufacturer within the warranty period, or to contact the vendor and make certain that he responds in a reasonable amount of time. If a school does desire to have a maintenance contract, either because of lack of internal manpower or because of available funding, the vendor should specify the maximum time it will take to respond to calls for help and the maximum time the customer will have to be without this equipment if a repair is required. It is possible for a school to request faster response times or even that the maintenance contractor provide loaner equipment for any down time greater than 24 or 48 hours; however, this will increase contract costs. 16. Signage for use of cameras on school grounds Very visible and hard-to-miss signs at the entrances to a school campus and at major entrances into school buildings serve many purposes. Their value to security should not be underestimated. Signs are not overly expensive, but the price of not having one can sometimes be astronomical. o Signs that inform the public and the school occupants that certain security measures are in force can provide a frontline deterrent. Without any other knowledge, an outsider faced with the choice of vandalizing a school with security warning signs or a school with no signs or other obvious indications of self-defense will choose the latter. o As described in the section of this manual on legal issues, liability can be minimized through the use of signs. A piece of information that can be important to include on a warning sign is whether cameras are not being monitored. There have been a few lawsuits in the United States that have been filed and consequently won because someone at a facility was attacked, but the victim did not try to defend himself or herself against the perpetrator; he or she was under the impression that, because a video camera was aimed directly at him or her, help would surely arrive soon. This is a common assumption. Sample wording for a school sign regarding this particular issue could be: WARNING: This facility employs video surveillance equipment for security purposes. This equipment may or may not be monitored at any time. o Covert approaches to security can sometimes be open to contention, especially by someone who is caught in this way. The use of covert cameras can be extremely effective in providing evidence for prosecution; however, not all school districts or school boards will support their use. It may not be necessary, however, to post signs regarding every security detail being incorporated on a campus. It may be quite sufficient to insert a warning regarding the use of covert cameras in the school policy document that is signed by every student and parent at the beginning of the school year and in the contracts signed by every employee. (Don't forget to include this information in contracts for outside services.) 17. Legal aspects of the use of video cameras in schools Laws concerning privacy issues and civil rights may vary widely, so before beginning any electronic surveillance program, be sure to check with your school attorney. However, the following generalities are fairly consistent across most of the country: Cameras may not be used in an area where there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Examples of these are bathrooms, gym locker/changing areas, and private offices (unless consent by the office owner is given). Examples of where cameras are generally acceptable are in hallways; parking lots; front offices where students, employees, and parents come and go; gymnasiums; cafeterias; supply rooms; and classrooms. The use of cameras in classrooms is often debated by teachers who want cameras for protection and teachers who do not. At this point in time, it is probably wise to use cameras in classrooms only when the teacher is given an option and notification that a camera is to be used. Signage can be an important legal component in the use of video cameras in schools. As mentioned in the previous section, it is important that the presence of video cameras not lead a person to believe he or she will be rescued if attacked. Dummy cameras should not be used (which is in contrast to the "black boxes" on buses, in which cameras may or may not be located at any time). While a fake camera can create a temporary deterrent to some security incidents, the potential liability it creates due to a victim's impression of being rescued quickly is not acceptable. Audio recording is often considered to be of greater legal concern than video recording in most States. The recording of conversations is viewed as more of an invasion of privacy, as conversations often take place where the participants do not expect to be overheard. B. Video recording equipment 1. VCRs: the weak link The video cassette recorder (VCR), commonly used in most school surveillance systems, is the weakest link in the video system due to its mechanical nature. (The more reliable but much more expensive digital recorder is discussed later.) Industrial quality VCRs range in price from $500 to $4000. A school can plan to spend approximately $500 to $1,200 for a good-quality VCR appropriate for most of its applications. (This price range does not necessarily include some of the desirable features discussed later.) The inexpensive $200 VCR is not recommended for nonhome use. Unfortunately, the most ignored maintenance task in most school security departments is the regular servicing and cleaning of VCRs. VCR heads should be cleaned after every 100 hours of use--about every 4 days of constant recording. This head cleaning can be accomplished using isopropyl alcohol and industrial swabs and takes about 10 minutes. The cleaning tapes that are available to clean VCR heads are not recommended, as they can cause excessive wear on the heads. The entire VCR unit should be serviced every 2,400 hours, or about every 3 months of constant use. This complete servicing includes replacement of bands and rubber components. If well-serviced, a typical VCR will last about 4-5 years with constant use. At least one moderately expensive ($200-$300) head replacement should be expected during this time. Premium-quality tapes are recommended for the constant use experienced in most school applications. These tapes will cost about $10 each and are available from your VCR vendor. Their expected quality lifespan is about 25 recordings. Recording over the same tape indefinitely is not recommended because this practice introduces several logistical problems. Sometimes incidents are reported several days after they occur, and the video of the incident has already been recorded over. A good recording plan includes 6 new tapes every fall and spring, labeled Monday, Tuesday, . . . Friday, and Weekend. Each morning, the appropriate tape is put into the VCR. When an incident occurs, that particular tape should be pulled and labeled as "removed," along with the date it was most recently recorded on. A new tape labeled with that day of the week should replace the original. If faithfully done, this will probably be adequate for most schools. By replacing the tapes every spring and fall, the tape quality is not compromised. VCRs, which operate at temperatures between 32 degrees F and 104 degrees F, need to be used indoors where relative humidity is less than 80 percent and the air is free of noncondensing moisture. Because an industrial time-lapse recorder is designed to run 24 hours a day for long periods of time, proper physical location of the unit must be considered. Recorders generate heat, and because heat is the worst enemy of the recorder (next to dirt), the recorder must be placed in a well-ventilated location. If the recorder is to be installed in an environment where there is a lot of dust or dirt in the air, provisions must be made to keep the unit clean. (A single grain of dirt in the right place can crack a video head.) If a recorder must be placed in a dirty environment, a housing with a fan, vent holes, and filters should be used. Another important consideration in setting up a VCR is locating it in a secure, protected area (exhibit 2.15). VCRs are attractive targets for thieves, but even more importantly, tapes can be stolen or destroyed if there is an illegal incident to be covered up. VCRs should usually be placed in a strong locking cabinet within a locked room. Only the school principal and one security person should have the key to this cabinet. 2. Multiplexers Multiplexers can be used to combine two or more individual video camera signals and send them to a single recorder. This is often referred to as timeshare multiplexing and allows up to 16 video camera signals to be recorded on a single half-inch videocassette simultaneously and played back as individual pictures or combinations of pictures upon command. A multiplexer could be either a simplex multiplexer or duplex multiplexer. The simplex multiplexer can only display a full-screen image of one selected camera or a sequence of selected cameras while recording. A duplex multiplexer can also display multiscreen images while still recording. Essentially, a multiscreen display consists of a split screen that allows for the viewing of all camera images on the system simultaneously (exhibit 2.16). Timeshare multiplexing can also be used to transmit multiple video camera signals (up to 16) from one point to a second point by a single cable or transmitter (microwave, fiber optic, infrared). Another multiplexer at the second point can be used to separate the multiple video signals back into individual video signal outputs. A duplex multiplexer is higher in cost than a simplex multiplexer. Generally, a duplex multiplexer is used if someone is watching or operating the system while it is recording; if it is unmanned, as in many school applications, a simplex multiplexer is more cost-effective. A true duplex system allows the user to watch multiple screens while recording without affecting the multiplexed output to the video camera recorder (VCR). A simplex system allows for full-screen or sequenced viewing in the record mode. If multiscreens are activated during the recording, the multiscreen itself might be recorded, thereby not allowing full-screen playback. A duplex system also allows for recording and playback simultaneously if two VCRs are connected. The multiplexer should provide two monitor inputs if this feature is used so live viewing of the facility is not lost. In most applications, a simplex unit is suitable and more economical if recording can be stopped while the video is reviewed. The recorded videotape can then be retrieved in a full-screen or in a multiscreen configuration. Most multiplexers available from established manufacturers feature camera titling for recording and a permanent time/date stamp on each frame of recorded video. Another feature is compensation for camera synchronization. Multiplexers are equipped with an alarm input for each camera. When activated, these can be used to generate an output to the VCR to place both the multiplexer and VCR into the 2-hour recording mode (real time) for a predetermined period of time. Some multiplexers allow only images from the alarm camera to be recorded, but others allow a choice of interleaving (every other field). Onscreen programming of the multiplexer allows for simpler programming and review of settings. Programming features should display VCR tables because it is important to synchronize the multiplexer to the particular model and brand of VCR to avoid missing crucial information. 3. Time-lapse recorders Time-lapse recorders have the ability to incrementally record at specific time intervals, recording a single field or frame of video information with each increment. In the 2-hour (real time) recording mode, a video recorder is recording 60 fields or 30 frames of video information each second. To determine the time interval between pictures recorded at specific speeds, the following formula can be used (based on using a T120 tape at 60 Hz): Recording speed divided by 120 = Seconds between frames Because the tape is slowed down in the time lapse mode, and the video heads record only specific fields of information, some actions are easily lost. If a tape recorded in real time (2-hour) was compared to a tape recorded at a 240-hour speed, there would be lost information between them. The slower the tape speeds during recording, the more information that can be lost. Exhibit 2.17 presents recording intervals for various recording tape speeds. There are some low-priced time-lapse recorders (approximately $500) on the market today, but dependability and resolution may be sacrificed if an industrial-quality recorder with at least 400 lines of resolution (approximately $1,200-$2,700) is not specified. A high-resolution camera and monitor may be used with good results during realtime viewing, but if the playback tape has been recorded with a standard time-lapse recorder with low resolution, the results may be disappointing. For best results, a high-resolution industrial-quality recorder should be used. 4. Event recorders It may not be necessary to have all the features of a time-lapse recorder. Time lapse was developed to give a continuous flow of recorded information that could span long periods of time in a very small, storable format. If a school is able to interface its intrusion detection or other type of alarm system with their CCTV system (which is viewing the area where an alarm is occurring), an event recorder is capable of turning itself on to record that event almost instantaneously. Not only does this feature allow a tape to be used for very long periods of time, as no recording is being done during uneventful times, but event recorders are generally cheaper than time-lapse recorders. 5. Digital recorders The security industry now has access to technology that allows the digital recording of full-motion video. Over the next few years this type of system will likely become even more accessible, with an increase in digital storage technology and a decrease in the overall costs associated with hardware. Digital storing and recording have many advantages over a time-lapse or event recorder. The most important advantage is that digital recorders require no human intervention, which means no maintenance and no cleaning. On the other hand, a major disadvantage is that the security industry has yet to establish standards for compressing digital information for recording (compressed digital information takes up less storage space). Hence, it is common to experience compatibility problems between alarm monitoring systems. For school applications, a major consideration is the increased cost of digital recorders over conventional video recorders. A minimum system for digitally stored images on a hard drive is estimated to cost at least $3,000. Without video compression hardware/software, the digital storage system is not very practical; it has been estimated that the cost for a single stored