MENU TITLE: Youth Gangs: Problem and Response
Series: OJJDP
Published: 10/91
243 pages
558,472 bytes

DRAFT 10/91

Youth Gangs: Problem and Response

Irving Spergel

with the assistance of
G. David Curry, Ron Chance, Candice Kane, Ruth E.
Ross, Alba Alexander, Pamela Rodriguez, Deeda
Seed, Edwina Simmons, and Sandra Oh

National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention
Program
School of Social Service Administration
University of Chicago

Distributed By:

Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20850
1-800-638-8736

------------------------------
ABSTRACT

This draft report represents the result of an
extensive review of the research literature
available on the youth-gang phenomenon conducted
by a team of researchers at the University of
Chicago, headed by Irving Spergel and sponsored by
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice.
The report explores the research on such topics as
definitions of youth gang and related terms, the
nature and causes of the gang phenomenon, and the
effectiveness of various responses from law
enforcement, the judicial system, social welfare
agencies, schools, and communities. It concludes
with a summary and conclusions regarding the
nature of the problem, the responses offering the
most hope, and the possible courses for further
research. An extensive bibliography is also
provided. With bibliography, the report numbers
301 pages. 

------------------------------

PREFACE

No region of the United States is without youth
gangs. Gangs exist in many large and middle-size
cities and are spreading to suburban and smaller
communities. Youth gangs increasingly create
problems in correctional and school settings.
Compared with nongang offenders, gang members are
responsible for a disproportionate percentage of
serious and violent offenses and are more likely
to engage in the sale and distribution of drugs.
Race or ethnicity and social isolation,
interacting with poverty and community
disorganization account for much of the gang
problem. Gangs take different shape and character
in the same or different communities over time.
The gang is an important social institution for
low-income male youths and young adults from
newcomer and residual populations because it often
serves social, cultural, and economic functions no
longer adequately performed by family, school, and
the local market. Four major policy emphases for
dealing with gangs have evolved: local community
mobilization, youth outreach, social
opportunities, and gang suppression. Improved
policies require the integration of these
approaches with special emphasis on community
mobilization and targeted social opportunities.

Appreciation is expressed to Malcolm Klein,
Sheldon Messinger, Norval Morris, Michael Tonry,
Walter Miller, and Paul Tracy for comments on
earlier drafts of this report. This project was
supported by grant No. 87-JS-CX-X100 from the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

------------------------------

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

PART A: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
 Objectives of the Study

CHAPTER I: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
 Definitions
 Delinquent Group versus Gang

CHAPTER II: SCOPE, SERIOUSNESS, AND CHARACTER OF
THE GANG PROBLEM
 Estimates of Numbers of Youth Gangs and Youth
gang Membership
 Youth Gang Violence
 Gang and Nongang Member Studies: Violence and
Serious Crime
 Drugs and Violence

CHAPTER III: GANGS AS ORGANIZATIONS
 Gang Alliances 
 Cliques and Gang Size
 Types of Gang Members
 Leadership
 Territoriality

CHAPTER IV: MEMBERSHIP DEMOGRAPHICS
 Class, Culture, and Race/Ethnicity
 Age
 Females and Gangs

CHAPTER V: MEMBERSHIP EXPERIENCES
 Entering and Leaving the Gang
 Individual Status and Gang Cohesion
 Intellectual/Personal Disability

CHAPTER VI: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF GANG
DEVELOPMENT
 Family
 School
 Politics
 Organized Crime
 Prisons

PART B: RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER VII: ORGANIZED RESPONSES TO GANGS
 Community organization/mobilization
 Social Intervention/Youth Outreach/Street Work
 Opportunities Provision
 Gang Suppression
 Organizational Change and Development

CHAPTER VIII: SOCIAL INTERVENTION

CHAPTER IX: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
 Police
 Emerging Strategy

CHAPTER X: PROSECUTION, DEFENSE, AND THE JUDGE
 Prosecutorial and Defense Guidelines
 Defense Attorney
 Judiciary

CHAPTER XI: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND CORRECTIONS
 Probation
 Parole
 Corrections

CHAPTER XII: SOCIAL OPPORTUNITIES: SCHOOLS AND
JOBS
 Local School Programs
 Employment Strategy
 Local Employment

CHAPTER XIII: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
MOBILIZATION
 Governmental Mobilization
 Local Community Mobilization
 Neighborhood Youth Organizations
 New Federal Mobilization

CHAPTER XIV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

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PART A: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

Youth gangs are not unique to contemporary urban
America. They have existed across time and
cultures. Youth gangs tend to develop during times
of rapid social change and political instability.
They function as a residual social institution in
different ways in different communities when other
institutions fail, and they provide a certain
degree of order, solidarity, and sometimes
economic gain for their members. 

Youth gangs have existed in Western and Eastern
societies for centuries. As early as the 1600's,
London was "terrorized by a series of organized
gangs calling themselves the Mims, Hectors,
Bugles, Dead Boys . . . who found amusement in
breaking windows, demolishing taverns, assaulting
the watch. . . . The gangs also fought pitched
battles among themselves dressed with colored
ribbons to distinguish the different factions"
(Pearson 1983, p. 188). In the 17th and 18th
centuries, English gangs wore belts and metal pins
with designs of serpents, hearts pierced with
arrows, animals, and stars. Possibly the oldest
structured pattern of criminal gang organization
is the Hong Kong-based triads, which evolved from
secret societies organized during the 17th century
to overthrow the Manchu Ching Dynasty (General
Accounting Office 1989, p. 3).

Youth gangs in urban centers of the United States
existed before the 19th century (Hyman 1984). A
historian of gangs in New York City writes, "By
1855 it was estimated that the metropolis
contained at least 30,000 men who owed allegiance
to gang leaders and through them to the political
leaders of Tammany Hall and the Know Nothing or
Native American Party" (Asbury 1971, p. 105). The
New York City Civil War draft riots were said to
have been precipitated by young Irish street gangs
(Asbury 1971, p. 105). Prison gangs existed in
Illinois as early as the 1920's. The crimes of
many of these early prison groups were similar to
those practiced today and included "intimidation,
extortion, homosexual prostitution, and other
illegitimate business. Riots and killings were
numerous" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 57). The
gang tradition has been particularly strong in
America's Southwest in recent decades. Some gangs
in Los Angeles date back 60 or more years--at
least in terms of name and tradition (Pitchess
1979). Philibosian estimates that gangs are active
in 70 of the 84 incorporated cities in Los Angeles
County (1989, p. 7). One writer reports that
"today a Hispanic in Los Angeles may be a fourth
generation gang member" (Donovan 1988, p. 14).

Outside the United States, youth gangs and gang
problems have been reported in most countries of
Europe, the Soviet Union, Kenya, Tanzania, South
Africa, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Taiwan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic
of China (Oschlies 1979; Specht 1988). Youth gangs
apparently are present in both socialist and free-
market societies and in both developing and
developed countries.

The Japanese Yakuza (De Vos, Wagatasuma, Caudill,
and Mizushima 1973), the Chinese Triads (Morgan
1960; President's Commission on Organized Crime
1985), and the Italian Mafia (Arlacchi 1986) are
organized criminal adult gangs that have youth
street-gang affiliates or aspirants.

The Japanese Ministry of Justice reports that
52,275 gangsters were arrested in 1983 (excluding
those arrested for relatively minor crimes;
Ministry of Justice 1984a). The number of
juveniles identified as members of gangster
organizations who entered Japanese reformatory
schools in 1983 was 713, or 12.3 percent of the
total of 5,787 juveniles (Ministry of Justice
1984b).

Sir Clinton Roper observes that "ethnic gangs" are
a major problem in New Zealand prisons. "They
behave as a cohesive group . . . are in conflict
among themselves . . . and present a real danger
to prison staff. . . . a predominant gang can
virtually run a wing of a prison. . . . they adopt
stand-over tactics against nongang members, which
results in many inmates seeking protective
segregation where there is little available. . . .
the active recruitment of new members in the
institution is a strong impediment to
reintegrating inmates into a law-abiding life on
release" (Roper 1988).

There were and continue to be different views
about the nature, scope, and severity of youth
gang activities. In earlier times, the American
boy gang was often regarded as spirited,
venturesome, and funloving--mainly a problem of
unsupervised lower-class youth from immigrant
families situated in transitional inner-city areas
(Puffer 1912; Thrasher 1936). Just before and
after World War II, certain researchers (Whyte
1943; Suttles 1968) emphasized the stable,
organized, functionally constructive,
nonaggressive, and community-integrated character
of many youth gangs or street-corner groups.

Close connections between delinquent and adult
criminal groups or gangs were noted in the early
research of Thrasher (1936) and Shaw and McKay
(1943) but somehow disappeared in much of the
theoretical speculation and research of gangs in
the 1950's and early 1960's (Cohen 1955; Miller
1958; Short and Strodtbeck 1964; however, see
Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Spergel 1964). These
connections were reemphasized in the 1970's and
1980's (Moore 1978; Spergel 1984; Needle and
Stapleton 1983; Maxson, Gordon, and Klein 1985; G.
Camp and C. Camp 1985; C. Camp and G. Camp 1988).

How much youth gangs in the United States have
changed over the years, especially in the last two
or three decades, is unclear. According to Miller
(1975, p. 75), the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967),
and the National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals (1976), "youth gangs
are not now or [sic] should not become a major
object of concern. . . . Youth gang violence is
not a major crime problem in the United States. .
. . what gang violence does exist can fairly
readily be diverted into `constructive' channels
especially through the provision of services by
community agencies." Miller's study (1975, p. 75),
based on a national survey, however, concludes
that the youth gang problem of the mid-1970's was
then of "the utmost seriousness."

Walter B. Miller's 1975 report, Violence by Youth
Gangs and Youth Groups as a Crime Problem in Major
American Cities, was the first nationwide study of
the nature and extent of gang violence. The Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
U.S. Department of Justice, supported this pilot
study by Dr. Miller to determine whether there was
"enough substance to claims of increasing gang
problems in major cities" (p. 2). He gathered
national-level information based on a variety of
local data sources, mainly through site visits to
12 of the Nation's largest cities and use of an
interview guide to gather information from expert
informants from at least 18 types of
organizations--including criminal justice, youth-
based, grassroots, and planning agencies.

Dr. Miller's data sources were handicapped by lack
of reliable data on gangs and lack of a single
agency "which takes as a continuing responsibility
the collection of information based on explicit
and uniformly applied data collection categories
which would permit comparability from city to city
and between different periods of time" (p. 3). To
this day, this basic methodological problem
continues to handicap national estimates of the
scope and seriousness of the gang problem and the
effectiveness of efforts to address it.

Dr. Miller's major contributions to the research
on gangs were to begin to assess the problems of
violence by youth gangs and delinquent groups as
separate entities and to provide preliminary rough
estimates of the scope of the problem. He
concluded his study with the statement that "Youth
gang violence is more lethal today than ever
before [and] . . . represents a crime problem of
the first magnitude which shows little prospect of
early abatement" (p. 76).

Since publication of Miller's 1975 study, a number
of local studies and media reports have continued
to demonstrate the spread and increase in severity
of the gang problem in many cities. For example,
Tracy's study (1982), based on findings from the
Philadelphia cohort studies (Wolfgang, Figlio, and
Sellin 1972), demonstrates that youth gangs
account for a substantial share of serious and
violent crime in the city. High levels of fear of
gang crime in or about schools are reported in
several recent studies (Chicago Board of Education
1981; Miller 1982; Rosenbaum and Grant 1983; Dolan
and Finney 1984; Kyle 1984).

In the late 1980's, gang problems received
national attention, much of it stimulated by
reports from California--especially Los Angeles.
The executive director of the Office of California
Criminal Justice Planning claims in a recent
newsletter that "gangs are a violent and insidious
new form of organized crime. Heavily armed with
sophisticated weapons, they are involved in drug
trafficking, witness intimidation, extortion, and
bloody territorial wars. In some cases they are
travelling out of State to spread their violence
and crime" (Howenstein 1988, p. 1).

Some recent reports indicate the variability and
complexity of gang problems: white-power gang
activities have increased somewhat in various
cities (Coplon 1988); the school busing of youth
from inner-city to other neighborhoods and the
suburbs has brought more gang problems, at least
temporarily, to some communities (Hagedorn 1988);
Hispanic and black gangs continue to be largely
responsible for drive-by shootings; white gangs
tend to be a major source of graffiti, vandalism,
theft, and burglary; undocumented Latin American
youth are now present in some established gangs or
are forming their own gangs; many of the recent
arrivals from Latin America, the Caribbean, and
Asia have become suppliers of drugs; conflicts
between some black gangs over drug turf have
escalated in some communities; the drug problem
within and among black and Hispanic gangs across
communities appears to be different in terms of
sale and use patterns; a variety of Asian and
Pacific Island ethnic-group gang problems is
spreading (Duran 1987).

Youth gangs may be both an endemic and acute
feature of urban culture that varies over time in
form, social meaning, and antisocial character.
The late 1980's and early 1990's in the United
States may be a time in which--especially in some
cities and communities--youth gangs have taken
especially disturbing form and character.

Objectives of the Study

This survey of the literature is part of the first
stage of a four-stage research and development
program to develop and test promising approaches
to the youth gang problem. The stages include:
assessment, model development, creation of
technical assistance manuals, and field testing.
The review has three objectives: to describe what
is known about youth gangs in the United States;
to explain gang phenomena, mainly within social
disorganization and poverty perspectives; and to
describe and assess, where possible, organized
responses to the problem.

The study is organized into two parts. Part A,
Nature of the Problem, includes chapters I through
VI. Chapter I examines definitional issues and
data sources. Chapter II considers the scope and
seriousness of the gang problem. Chapters III
through V consider, respectively, the group
character of youth gangs, membership demographics,
and membership experience. Chapter VI discusses
the social contexts of youth gang development.

Part B, Response to the Problem, focuses on
organized responses to the gang problem with
special attention given to existing and evolving
strategies, policies, and programs of youth
service, criminal justice, community-based
(including local school and grassroots)
organizations; and Federal and State legislative
initiatives. Chapter VII deals with historical
roots, and development, of key antigang
strategies. Chapter VIII discusses social
intervention strategies with special attention to
evaluation. Chapter IX begins a discussion of
criminal justice system, in particular, police
suppression strategies. Chapter X examines the
approaches of prosecutor, defense, and judges in
addressing the gang problem. Chapter XI focuses on
current and emerging probation, parole, and
corrections strategies. Chapter XII emphasizes the
importance of social opportunities, especially
improved educational and employment opportunities,
targeted to gang youth. Chapter XIII is concerned
with issues of community organizing and mobilizing
both agencies and neighborhood residents. Finally,
Chapter XIV summarizes key findings of the study
and provides policy recommendations.

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CHAPTER I: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

Society needs to better understand youth gangs.
The sources of knowledge concerning youth gangs
are diverse and provide little consistency, and
basic research and program evaluation findings are
scant. However, recent media, justice system, and
academic interest has resulted in a sharp increase
in attention as well as information available. I
have drawn selectively upon government documents,
agency and conference reports, the mass media,
practitioner or "expert" experience, and, as fully
as possible, academic and research literature.
Some news reports, agency data, and various
analyses of youth gang problems--not consistently
of the best quality--have been used when more
reliable research sources were not available.

Accurate national assessments of the scope of the
gang problem do not yet exist. The nature of the
"migration" of gang members and the possible
related spread of drug-related phenomena across
States, cities, and neighborhoods is unclear
despite extensive police and media attention.
Fairly good general estimates, however, can be
made about certain types of gang-related violence
within some large cities for particular periods. 

Various reasons exist for the lack of "good" data
on gangs. The most immediate or direct data
source, the gang member, is unreliable. Gang
members tend to conceal and exaggerate information
and, in fact, may not know the scope of the gang's
activities (Klein 1971; Miller 1982; Spergel
1984). The news media do not consistently or
regularly report gang events and often exaggerate
or sensationalize the subject (Downes 1966; Cohen
1972; Patrick 1973; Gold and Mattick 1974). Miller
suggests that the national media, centered in New
York City, ignored the gang problem in other
cities in the 1970's. For example, about 300 gang
killings in 1979 and 350 in 1980 in Los Angeles
went largely unreported nationally (Miller 1982;
however, see Klein and Maxson 1989).

There is no national center or agency for
reporting gang data. Neither the U.S. Census
Bureau, the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
Health and Human Services, the National Institute
of Mental Health, nor the U.S. Department of
Education collect or compile national-level data
on youth gangs. However, in the past year or two,
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the
General Accounting Office have begun to report on
the drug-related scope and character of the youth
gang or street-gang problem nationwide.

There has been some progress in the development of
reliable statistics on gang crime in a growing
number of large and medium size cities. However,
only gross estimates of gang violence are
available in most cities. Some police gang units
collect gang crime data, mainly on homicide and
sometimes on felony assault and robbery; other
index and nonindex gang crime data tend to be
sporadically collected (see Needle and Stapleton
1983). Data on gang crime are collected mainly on
an incident rather than on an individual-offender
basis. Consequently, it is difficult to target
repeat offenders or to determine the extent of
solo offending or nongang companionate crime
committed by gang members (Reiss 1987).
Considerable interest has developed recently in
the creation of information systems at city,
county, and State levels and in correctional
institutions at different jurisdictional levels
(C. Camp and G. Camp 1988). Law enforcement
officials have cited the need for a nationwide
tracking and identification methodology,
specifically for those gang members and criminal
groups that appear to carry on illegal activities
with other gangs and expand into areas outside
their neighborhoods (General Accounting Office
1989, p. 57).

Local values and traditions, political
considerations, public pressures, organizational
predispositions, news media pressures, academic
influences, and statutory language all influence
how law enforcement authorities and community-
based agencies establish their definitions of
gangs, gang members, and gang incidents. There are
striking differences between cities' and States'
definitions (Overend 1988).

In a recent sample survey, over three-quarters of
the police departments surveyed responded that
violent behavior was the key criterion for
distinguishing groups as gangs (Needle and
Stapleton 1983). The Los Angeles Police Department
defines "gang-related crime" as homicide,
attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon,
robbery, kidnapping, shooting at an inhabited
dwelling, or arson in which the suspect or victim
is identified in police files as a gang member or
associate member (usually on the basis of a prior
arrest or identification as a gang member). In
Chicago, a wider range of crimes may be classified
as gang related but only if the incident grows out
of a gang function, gang motivation, or particular
circumstances. Any robbery involving a gang member
is gang related in Los Angeles, but a "gang-
related robbery" in Chicago must be due mainly to
gang purpose or grow directly out of gang
structure and interest. Philadelphia, Boston, New
York City, and other cities (even within the State
of California) have different criteria for
identifying and classifying an incident as gang
related (Miller 1975, 1982).

A variety of theoretical and methodological
problems have hindered the development of adequate
knowledge about gangs. The approach to the study
of gangs has been categorical rather than variable
(Kornhauser 1978). Categories and concepts have
not been clearly defined or distinguished. There
has often been a failure to distinguish norms from
behaviors, subcultures from gangs, gangs from
delinquent groups, different ethnic gang patterns,
variability in gang problems in different cities,
and gang patterns within the same city over time.

Researchers have tended to employ
nonrepresentative or age-truncated samples and
limited data-gathering technologies. Small
nonrandom samples of gangs served and supplied
through local police, youth agencies, or
correctional agencies have been studied, usually
without control or comparison groups. Adolescent
gangs, until recently, have been almost the
exclusive focus of research or program evaluation,
to the exclusion of preadolescent and young adult
gangs. Observational studies have been time
limited--usually 1 to 3 years with no long-term
systematic followup. Conspicuously absent have
been studies of the socialization of gang youths
compared with other nongang youths and studies of
the socialization of different subgroups of youths
in the same gang, of those who use or sell drugs
and those who do not, and of those who are
extremely violent and those who are not.
Longitudinal studies that examine the stability
and changing character of these structures and
processes over time have not been conducted.
Participant observation has been the favored mode
of study, at times resulting in very limited
perspectives and sometimes researcher
overidentification with subjects. Also,
insufficient use has been made of official
statistics, systematic self-reports, or surveys of
youths or adults in high-crime or gang-crime
areas, although each of these have their
methodological limitations as well. Variations
among gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and
countries and across schools, prisons, and other
institutional contexts often have been disregarded
(however, see Spergel 1964; Downes 1966; Patrick
1973; McGahey 1986; Fagan 1989; Sullivan 1989).

Definitions

The term "gang" can mean many things. Definitions
in use have varied according to the concerns and
interests of law enforcement, policymakers, media,
community residents; academic fashions; and the
changing social realities of the gangs.
Definitions in the 1950's and 1960's were often
related to issues of etiology and were based on
liberal, optimistic, social-reform values.
Definitions in the 1970's and 1980's were more
descriptive, emphasized violent and criminal
characteristics, and may have reflected more
conservative social philosophies (Klein and Maxson
1987).

Gang definitions evoke "intense and emotional
discussions" (Miller 1977, p. 1) and can become
the basis for quite varied policies, laws, and
strategies. Definitions determine whether we have
a large, small, or even no problem; whether more
or fewer gangs and gang members exist; and which
agencies will receive most of the funds to address
the problem.

Some of the more benign conceptions of the gang--
used by gang members, agency personnel, and a few
academics--stress the gang's residual communal or
social-support function. According to one gang
member, "Being in a gang means if I didn't have no
family, I'll think that's where I'll be. If I
didn't have no job that's where I'd be. To me it's
community help without all the community. They'll
understand better than my mother and father"
(Hagedorn 1988, p. 131).

A former gang member, later a staff member of a
local community organization, says: "A gang is
what you make it. A gang is people who hang out;
they don't have to be negative or positive" (Allen
1981, p. 74). Sister Falaka Fattah, director and
founder of the House of Umoja, a model residential
and community-based program deeply committed to
the social support and development of gang youth,
observes: "A traditional Philadelphia black street
gang was composed of friends who lived in the same
neighborhood and usually had kinship links
developed over generations with ties to the South.
Many of these traditional gangs were founded by
families, since recruitment took place at funerals
where families and friends gathered in mourning"
(Fattah 1988, p. 5).

The gang may be viewed, in this perspective, as
performing significant social functions. It is an
interstitial group, integrated or organized
through conflict. While its opposition may include
other baseball teams, parents, storekeepers, and
gangs on the next street (Thrasher 1936), the
"gang is not organized to commit delinquent acts.
. . . The gang is a form of collective behavior,
spontaneous and unplanned in origin" (Kornhauser
1978, p. 52). Morash observes that "gang-likeness
is not a necessary condition to stimulate members'
delinquency" (1983, p. 35; see also Savitz, Rosen,
and Lalli 1980).

Miller observes that there are at least two ways
to perceive gang activity as constructive or
benign. Some community groups, agencies, and gangs
may perceive gang behaviors as "normal and
expectable" so long as such behavior is relatively
unserious or infrequent (Miller 1977, p. 11). Gang
members may be perceived as protecting their
respective communities by attacking and driving
out "unwanted" elements, including drug dealers or
members of other races or ethnic groups (Miller
1977, pp. 13-14; see also Suttles 1968). Recently,
gangs have been regarded as collectives or
organizations integrated into local community--
even bringing in local commerce and resources (for
example, through drug dealing).

Some veteran gang researchers have recently
changed their minds as to gang character, in large
measure because gang behavior has probably
changed. Earlier, Miller viewed the gang as a
stable primary group, neither especially
aggressive nor violent, that prepared the young
male for an adult role in lower-class society
(1958, 1962, 1976b). More recently, because of
increased levels of violent or otherwise illegal
behavior, Miller concludes that "contemporary
youth gangs pose a greater threat to public order
and a greater danger to the safety of the
citizenry than at any time during the past" (1975,
p. 44; see also Miller 1982).

Similarly, Klein initially characterized the gang
as an adolescent group perceived by both
themselves and others as involved in
delinquencies, but not of a serious or lethal
nature (1968, 1971). In recent years, Klein and
his associates report that gangs commit a large
number of homicides and participate in extensive
narcotics trafficking, although perhaps not as
much as is commonly believed (Klein, Maxson, and
Cunningham 1988; Klein 1989).

Yablonsky, by contrast, has consistently portrayed
gang boys--particularly leaders and core members--
as law-breakers trading in violence and primarily
organized to carry out illegal acts (Yablonsky
1962; Haskell and Yablonsky 1982).

The principal criterion currently used to define a
"gang" may be the group's participation in illegal
activity. Miller suggests that the term can be
applied broadly or narrowly by the key definers of
the phenomena, law enforcement officers. Police
departments may apply the term quite narrowly in
large cities, but more broadly in small cities to
cover more types of offenses (Miller 1980). Needle
and Stapleton (1983, p. 13) suggest that
perception of youth gang activities as major,
moderate, or minor problems varies with the number
and size of youth gangs, the problems they are
believed to cause, and the prevalence of youth
gang activity as a proportion of total crime. The
media, distressed local citizens, and outreach
community agencies tend to use the term more
broadly than do the police to cover more
categories of youth behavior.

The most widely used definition was developed by
Klein almost 20 years ago: a gang refers "to any
denotable adolescent group of youngsters who (a)
are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation
by others in the neighborhood, (b) recognize
themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably
with a group name), and (c) have been involved in
a sufficient number of delinquent incidents to
call forth a consistent negative response from
neighborhood residents and/or law enforcement
agencies" (Klein 1971, p. 111).

Miller differentiates among 20 different
categories and subcategories of law-violating
youth groups of which "turf gangs," "fighting
gangs," and "gain-oriented gangs" are three
subtypes (1982, chapter 1). He provides a
definition of a youth gang that emphasizes
organization and control of turf or criminal
enterprise:

A youth gang is a self-formed association of peers
united by mutual interests with identifiable
leadership and internal organization who act
collectively or as individuals to achieve specific
purposes, including the conduct of illegal
activity and control of a particular territory,
facility, or enterprise (Miller 1982, p. 61).

According to the California Penal Code, section
186.22, a "criminal street gang" is defined as
"any organization, association, or group of three
or more persons whether formal or informal . . .
which has a common name or common identifying sign
or symbol, where members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal activity." These criminal acts
are identified as follows: assault with a deadly
weapon; robbery; unlawful homicide or
manslaughter; and the sale, possession for sale,
transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or
offer to manufacture controlled substances.

We find also that certain problem youth groups,
such as racist "skinheads" and neo-Nazi groups,
may be identified distinctively by their dress and
codes of behavior. They engage in violent and
criminal activities for ideological--including
political and religious--ends and are increasingly
under the purview of gang units of the police and
probation departments, as well as legislative
commissions studying youth gang problems. These
changes suggest a further extension and
specification of the concept of the youth gang
(Reddick 1987).

Delinquent Group versus Gang

Much juvenile crime is committed by groups of
young people (Erickson and Jensen 1977; Zimring
1981). Is the "gang" simply equivalent to the
concept of "delinquent group?" Shaw and McKay were
interested in the companionate character of the
delinquent acts for which 8 out of 10 youths were
brought to juvenile court, but they used the terms
"gang" and "delinquent group" interchangeably
(Shaw and McKay 1931).

Thrasher (1936) implicitly recognized the
difference between the gang and the delinquent
group. Whyte's (1943) and Suttle's (1968) gangs or
street-corner groups were not particularly
delinquent, and certainly were not violent. The
major theorists and researchers of gangs in the
1950's and 1960's generally viewed the delinquent
gang and delinquent group as equivalent or
synonymous, although reference was made to core
delinquent cliques in gangs (Cohen 1955; Cohen and
Short 1958; Miller 1958, 1962; Cloward and Ohlin
1960; Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Klein 1968,
1971). More recently, a researcher in Scandinavia
conducted a series of sophisticated network
analyses on the assumption that the term "gangs .
. . simply signifies groups" (Sarnecki 1986, p.
11). However, an academic informant recently
stated that Sarnecki has changed his mind.
Sarnecki now believes that Scandinavian delinquent
groups are not gangs, at least not in the sense
the term is used in the United States (Klein
1989). Gangs and delinquent groups are more likely
to be viewed as equivalent in the study of
juveniles than of older adolescents and young
adults.

A number of theorists and researchers have tried
to distinguish between gangs and delinquent groups
(Kornhauser 1978; Morash 1983; Cohen 1969a,
1969b). Bernard Cohen insists that "gang and group
delinquency are different forms of juvenile
deviance and should be approached etiologically,
as well as for purposes of treatment and
prevention, from different starting points"
(1969a, p. 108). Based on police data, he found
that gang offenders were a little older and more
homogenous with respect to age, race, sex, and
residence patterns than nongang group offenders.

Curry and Spergel provide an extended definition
that attempts to distinguish delinquent groups
from gangs with some attention to the variability
and complexity of gang structure and behavior.
Group delinquency is defined as law-violating
behavior committed by juveniles in relatively
small groups that tend to be ephemeral--that is,
loosely organized with shifting leadership. The
delinquent group is engaged in various forms of
minor or serious crime. A current variant or
subcategory of delinquent group or youthful
criminal organization, particularly popular in
Eastern States is the "crew" or "passe." It can be
diffuse or well organized directed primarily to
illegal gain activity, especially drug
trafficking.

We define gang delinquency or crime as law-
violating behavior committed by both juveniles and
adults in or related to groups that are complexly
(although sometimes diffusely) organized and are
sometimes cohesive with established leadership and
rules. The gang also engages in a wide range of
crime--but significantly more violence--within a
framework of communal values in respect to mutual
support; conflict relations with other gangs; and
often a tradition of turf, colors, signs, and
symbols. Subgroups of the gang may be
differentially committed to various delinquent or
criminal patterns, such as drug trafficking, gang
fighting, or burglary. The concepts of the
delinquent group and the youth gang are not
exclusive of each other but represent distinctive
social phenomena. (Curry and Spergel 1988, p. 382)

Maxson and Klein's recent work on gang homicides
has indicated also that "gang violence is
substantially different in character from nongang
violence. . . . the character of reported gang
violence is primarily a function of the setting
and participant characteristics of the violent
event and the investigative and reporting
procedures of the police . . . The character of
`big city' gang violence is quite similar to that
found in smaller cities with more recent
development of street gangs" (Maxson and Klein
1989, p. 18). 

It is also possible to argue, based on recent
survey data (Spergel et al. 1989), that
nondelinquent and delinquent groups in some cities
can be converted or organized into youth gangs.
Much depends on population change, particularly
the movement of families with gang members to
nongang areas, the entrepreneurial efforts of gang
drug traffickers, and the gang socialization of
delinquent or criminal youths that takes place in
prisons. Youth gangs, in turn, may be changed or
co-opted into criminal organizations of various
forms. Some youth gangs, gang members, and
cliques--or their current equivalent--may no
longer fit traditional images of youth with
identifiable clothing, colors, or signs concerned
primarily with intimidation, protecting turf, or
developing reputation, but are now directed toward
making money through a variety of, or even
shifting, criminal activities.

In the pages that follow, the term "youth gang" is
used generally to refer to groups and behaviors
that represent an important subset of delinquent
and sometimes criminal groups and their behaviors.
Although the more inclusive term "delinquent
group" is useful for some purposes, the purpose
here is to examine gang phenomena of contemporary
interest to researchers, policymakers, and program
personnel; for this purpose it is "gangs," not
"delinquent groups," that is our focus.

------------------------------

CHAPTER II: SCOPE, SERIOUSNESS, AND CHARACTER OF
THE GANG PROBLEM

In this chapter, we provide evidence on numbers of
gangs and gang members, gang members'
participation in serious crime, and, particularly,
gang violence and the relation between drug
trafficking by gangs and violence associated with
the drug trade. Although data sources are diverse
and of varying reliability, some substantive
information is available that provides a possible
basis for forming conclusions about magnitudes and
trends.

Youth gangs today are found in almost all 50
States, including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
other American territories, with possible
exceptions in a few Northeastern States and North
Central Mountain States. Miller (1982, chapter 3)
estimated that in the late 1970's, gangs were
present in almost 300 U.S. cities, or 13 percent
of all cities with populations of 10,000 or more.
Miller (1982, chapter 2) also found that 5 out of
6, or 83 percent, of the largest cities had gang
problems, as did 41 out of 150 cities with a
population of 100,000 or more. Needle and
Stapleton (1983) report a somewhat similar
proportion: 39 percent of cities with populations
between 100,000 and 249,999 have gang problems.
Gangs now exist in smaller cities and suburban
communities but do not necessarily exhibit the
same degree or intensity of criminality and
violence. Sometimes these gangs share names and
loose ties with gangs in nearby large cities
(Rosenbaum and Grant 1983).

The reason gangs are present or a more serious
problem in certain cities and regions of the
country than others is not clear. Although no
region is without youth gangs, gangs seem to be
concentrated and problematic in certain Western,
Midwestern, and Southeastern States. A substantial
number of smaller cities and communities in these
States now have gang problems. At the same time,
however, there appear to be many more cities with
delinquent youth groups than with specific gang
problems (Miller 1982; Needle and Stapleton 1983).
Some cities do not have gang problems even though
they are in regions with high concentrations of
youth gang problems. 

The existence of gangs in certain areas has waxed
and waned over the past several years. Cities that
reported gang problems in the 1970's or early
1980's are without these problems in the late
1980's (Spergel et al. 1989), and some cities with
current youth gang problems did not have or were
not aware of these problems in the 1960's and
1970's. The terms "emerging," "chronic," and even
"reemerging," should be regarded as variables and
are now used to describe the different and
changing nature of gang problems experienced in a
variety of cities and jurisdictions. 

Gangs are present in State and Federal
correctional systems and in many school systems.
In a 1981 study, Caltabriano calculated that 53
percent of State prisons had gangs. G. Camp and C.
Camp (1985) found that 32 out of 48, or 67
percent, of the State prison systems studied had
gangs present, as did the Federal system. Youth
and young adult gangs were identified in State
prisons on the West Coast as early as the 1950's
and 1960's and in Midwestern States in the 1960's
and 1970's. In Chicago, all public and some
parochial high schools, and many suburban high
schools reported the presence of gangs or gang
members and gang problems. (Chicago Board of
Education 1981; Spergel 1985). Gangs or gang
problems are increasingly present in inner-city
school systems in Midwestern and Western States.
However, the number of gang members in most
schools may be quite small.

Estimates of Numbers of Youth Gangs and Youth gang
Membership

It is not possible to devise meaningful estimates
of the number of youth gangs in the United States,
partly because there is no standard or national
definition for the term "gang." Often gangs and
delinquent groups and/or criminal youth
organizations are confused. Also sometimes a
number of different gangs that share the same or
similar names are considered one gang, and
sometimes factions of a fairly small gang are
reported as separate gangs. National estimates
have been made primarily for rhetorical purposes.
Dolan and Finney (1984, p. 12) claim that "since
the close of World War II, the number of youth
gangs has grown astonishingly, with a recent study
revealing that there are now far more than 100,000
in the country." The estimate is sufficiently
exciting that the U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, used it in the introduction to a
recent public request for proposals on gang
research (Federal Register 1987).

It is difficult to determine the consistency or
meaning of the following estimates: 760 to 2,700
gangs in the 8 largest cities of the United States
(Miller 1975, p. 18); 2,200 gangs in approximately
300 U.S. cities and towns (Miller 1982, chapter 4,
pp. 30-31); 1,130 gangs in the 10 largest gang-
problem cities between 1970 and 1980 (Miller
1982). Furthermore, how would these estimates
compare--or can they be compared--to Thrasher's
(1936) estimates of 1,313 gangs in Chicago in the
1920's?

A somewhat more meaningful estimate may be that
law-violating delinquent youth groups other than
gangs far exceed the number of gangs, perhaps by
50 times. Miller (1975, 1982) suggests that the
number of police-recognized gangs has remained
fairly constant over the past 2 decades in some
cities. More recent observations suggest a sharp
increase in some cities and a sharp decline in
others (Spergel et al. 1989).

Increases in numbers of gangs, gang members, or
gang incidents have been reported in the following
cities in recent years. In Dade County, Florida,
there are reported to have been 4 gangs in 1980,
25 gangs in 1983, 47 gangs in 1985, and 80 in 1988
(Reddick 1987; Silbert, Christiano, and Nunez-
Cuenca 1988). In Los Angeles County, California,
there were 239 gangs reported in 1985, and 400 to
possibly 800 gangs in 1988 (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department 1985; Gott 1988; Knapp 1988;
see also Philibosian 1989). In Santa Ana, Orange
County, the number of cases assigned to the gang
detail jumped from 286 cases in 1986 to 396 cases
in 1987, including 8 gang-related homicides--the
highest number since 1979, when there were 13
(Schwartz 1988). 

In San Diego County there were 3 gangs and fewer
than 300 street gang members in 1975, but 19 to 35
gangs, if factions are included, and 2,100 street
gang members in 1987 (Davidson 1987). In Phoenix,
reports of numbers of gangs have seesawed: 34 in
1974, 74 in 1982, and down to 31 gangs in 1986. In
the past year, a surge of gang drug activity has
been blamed on an influx of black young adults
from Los Angeles (Frazier 1988).

In other cities over the same period, there were
reports of sharp declines in gangs, membership,
and gang activity. In New York City, there were
315 gangs and 20,000 members reported in 1974, 130
gangs and 10,300 members in 1982, and 66 gangs and
2,500 members in 1987 (New York State Assembly
1974a; Galea 1982; Kowski 1988). In Fort Wayne,
Indiana, there were 6 gangs with over 2,000
members reported in 1985-86, but only 3 gangs and
50 members in 1988 (Hinshaw 1988). El Monte, in
Los Angeles County, reported 10 to 12 gangs and
1,000 gang members in the mid 1970's, but noted
only 4 gangs and about 50 active gang members in
1988 (Hollopeter 1988). The police department in
Louisville, Kentucky, reported 15 gangs and 40 to
50 gang incidents per month in 1985, but only 5
gangs and 1 gang incident per month as recently as
July 1988 (Beavers 1988).

It is not clear what accounts for these shifts in
different cities over similar time periods. We do
not know if overall juvenile or young-adult crime
rates or patterns of crime have changed in each of
the cities. Gangs may affect the form and process
of delinquent or criminal activity rather than its
incidence or prevalence over time. It is possible
that, if the members of gangs age in a particular
community, if patterns of violent behavior are
constrained, if opportunities for legitimate jobs
increase, or if more rational income-producing
illegal activity such as drug trafficking, rises,
then group activity may no longer be conducted
through traditional turf structures.

Estimates from law enforcement or police agencies
may be slightly more useful, particularly if such
figures are based on arrests or focus on clearly
defined "high profile" gangs. Police prevalence
figures tend to be on the conservative side, and
those of news reporters, academics, and community
agency informants are often higher. For example,
in the 1940's, the police estimated that there
were 60 to 200 gangs in New York City, but a
contemporary observer reported that there were
then at least 250 gangs in Harlem alone (Campbell
1984b). One police commander estimates that there
were 127 active gangs in New York City in the
1970's, with another 144 gangs that were less
active. (Hargrove 1981, p. 90). Another claims
that there were 130 "delinquent" gangs in the
early 1980's and an additional 113 gangs under
investigation (Galea 1982), but an academic
researcher estimates that there were 400 gangs in
New York City in 1979 (Campbell 1984b). The New
York City Police Department reports there were 37
gangs (23 delinquent, 14 marginal, and 51 other
youth gangs) under investigation in 1988 (Galea
1989).

Miller (1975, p. 13) states there were 1,000 gangs
in Chicago in the 1960's but that the number
dropped to 700 by 1974. In his 1982 report, Miller
claims the number of Chicago gangs was only 250
between 1970 and 1980. Chicago Police Department
estimates of the number of gangs were 110 in 1985,
and 135 in both 1986 and 1987.

Estimates of the number of prison gangs may also
be meaningless unless the character, size,
frequency, and seriousness of criminal behavior
are indicated. Estimates have varied from 47 gangs
in 24 prisons in a 1981 report by Caltabriano, to
114 gangs in 33 prisons in a 1985 report (G. Camp
and C. Camp 1985). Camp and Camp also indicate
that the figure could go as high as 219 gangs if
gangs with the same names in different California
State prisons are counted. Thus a gang such as the
CRIPS in the California prison system is counted
once in reports but a different set of CRIPS gang
may exist in many different California
institutions. CRIPS is made up of at least 180
street gangs whose membership is reported to be in
the thousands (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985).

Estimates of gangs in public schools have also
been made for some of the large cities. Spergel
estimated that there were 53 male and 7 female
gangs in 60 public high schools in Chicago in
1985. These were school gangs with names of high-
profile street gangs. The number represented 211
male factions in the 60 public high schools.
Furthermore, based on police data, 19 male and 4
female major youth gang factions were also found
in the city's Catholic high schools (Spergel
1985). One witness testifying before a Senate
subcommittee hearing estimated that there were 207
gangs operating on public school campuses of the
Los Angeles Unified School District in 1983
(Philibosian 1983, p. 4). We need to know,
however, how many gang-related or nongang
delinquency problems were caused by gang members
on school property. It is quite possible that
schools with many gangs, but with small numbers in
each of them, may experience fewer problems of
social disorder or deviance, particularly if such
schools are well run and have reasonably high
academic standards, than poorly managed schools
with one or two gangs (Spergel 1985).

Membership numbers for youth gangs have also been
estimated with little attention to such critical
factors as membership statuses or roles or the
extent and degree of members' participation in
delinquent behavior. Miller estimates that there
were 96,000 gang members in 300 American cities
and towns in the 1970's, with an average of 48
members per gang. Gangs are larger on average than
are other law-violating youth groups. Although
there are 50 times more law violating youth groups
than youth gangs, members of law-violating youth
groups are only 15 times as numerous as gang
members (Miller 1982).

The proportion of a youth population in a
particular city or locality estimated to be gang
members may range over time. Thrasher (1936, p.
412) reported that "one tenth of Chicago's 350,000
boys between the ages of 10 and 20 are subject to
the demoralizing influence of gangs." But Klein
(1968) estimated that the census tract with the
highest known number of gang members in Los
Angeles in 1960 had only 6 percent of 10- to 17-
year-olds affiliated with gangs. A Pennsylvania
civic commission report of 1969 reported that only
6.4 percent of all juvenile arrests in 1968 were
of known gang members (Klein 1971, p. 115). Vigil
(1988) recently estimated that only 3 to 10
percent of boys in the Mexican barrios of Los
Angeles are gang members.

A variety of self-report studies has been
conducted, and the proportion of youths declaring
they are gang members does not seem to have
changed radically over the past two decades, with
a few exceptions. Savitz, Rosen, and Lalli (1980)
determined that 12 percent of black and 14 percent
of white youths in Philadelphia who claimed to be
gang affiliated members had Philadelphia Police
Department records. Another self-report study
found that 10.3 percent of black youths in
suburban Cook County said they were gang members
(Johnstone 1981). In a self-report study in
Seattle, 13 percent of youth said they belonged to
gangs (Sampson 1986). In an as-yet-unpublished
study of several very poor inner-city
neighborhoods of Chicago, the following
percentages of adult males 18 to 45 years old
reported they "had belonged" to gangs:
Mexican/Mexican-Americans, 3.5 percent; Puerto
Ricans, 12.7 percent; white, 10.7 percent; and
blacks, 13.8 percent (Testa 1988). In another
recent self-report study of four inner-city
neighborhoods in three large cities across the
country, one male in three reported gang
membership; however, this sample may have been
preselected for gang membership (Fagan, Piper, and
Moore 1986).

Recent informant or "expert" estimates of the
percentage of gang youth in large cities have
ranged from 0.7 percent in San Antonio to 7.3
percent in New York City (Miller 1982). A
California State task-force report estimates that
there were 50,000 gang members in Los Angeles
County (California Council on Criminal Justice
1986). However, a later estimate places membership
at 70,000 in Los Angeles County (Gott 1988). A Los
Angeles newspaper reports "there are 25,000 CRIPS
and Blood gang members or `associates' in Los
Angeles County--an estimate based on arrests and
field interrogation of persons stopped but not
arrested. That represents 25 percent of the
county's estimated 100,000 black men between the
ages of 15 and 24" (Baker 1988a). Another estimate
is that there are 70,000 CRIPS and Bloods alone in
Los Angeles County (O'Connell 1988). Estimates of
gang membership in Chicago have ranged from
"12,000 to as many as 120,000 persons" (Bobrowski
1988, p. 40). Spergel estimates that 5 percent of
students in elementary school, 10 percent in high
school, 20 percent in special school programs, and
35 percent of school-age dropouts between age 16
and 19 are gang members in Chicago. This produces
a figure of 38,000 public school-age students who
were gang members in Chicago (1985).

The estimated figures for gang members as a
proportion of population necessarily are higher in
criminal justice settings. They range from 0 to 90
percent or more. G. Camp and C. Camp (1985)
estimated that 34 percent, or 5,300, of Illinois
prison inmates were active gang members as of
January 1984 and, not quite consistently, that 90
percent of Illinois prison inmates "are, were, or
will be gang members" (p. 134). A family court
worker reported that 20 percent of children going
before the Queens County, New York, Family Court
were involved in gang-related activities (New York
State Assembly 1974b). One study of Cook County
juvenile court probationers indicated that 22.7
percent were gang members (Utne and McIntyre
1982). Orange County's probation department
reports that it currently provides services to
approximately 520 active gang members or 17
percent of the total juveniles supervised by
probation (Orange County 1989, pp. 7-8). A
California Youth Authority study found that 40 to
45 percent of the wards could be identified as
gang members in 1979, but the estimates had
increased to between 70 and 80 percent in 1982 and
1983 (Hayes 1983). However, an official in the
California Youth Authority more recently estimated
that approximately a third of its 13,152 wards
were "gang identified" (Lockwood 1988).

These estimates, variable and unreliable as they
may be, indicate that gangs are present in
significant numbers in a variety of social
contexts. Furthermore, gang membership may have
reached critical proportions in certain cities,
schools, and prison systems. However, the data are
not clear as to the relationship between numbers
and proportion of gang members to problems of
social disorder or criminality. Certain gangs and
gang members may be only peripherally involved in
delinquency or gang crime or not at all. It is
likely that the larger and more concentrated the
number of gang members from different gangs in a
relatively small area, such as a prison, the more
likely serious gang-related disorder and crime are
to occur (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988).

Youth Gang Violence

Reasonably adequate data have begun to be
available on the current nature and scope of
violence committed by gang members. There is good
evidence of an increase in gang-related violence
and that gang members, at least those with arrest
records, are responsible for a disproportionate
amount of violent crime. This, however, tends to
be concentrated in particular areas. The
proportion of serious gang-related violence may be
very high in a certain neighborhood, school, or
correctional institution at a particular time.
However, the proportion of serious, including
violent, crime by youth gang members tends to be
small on a city, school system, or prison system
basis. Bobrowski, who uses a definition of "gang
incident" based on gang-related function or
motivation rather than individual gang membership,
indicates that for Chicago "Part I street gang
offenses measured less than 0.8 percent of
comparable city-wide gang crime [between January
1986 and July 1988] . . . The seriousness of the
problem lies not in the extent of street gang
activity but in its violent character and relative
concentration in certain of Chicago's community
areas" (1988, p. 41). Property crime is still the
major type of offense committed by gang members,
often in a nongang capacity.

The classic research on types of offenses by
juveniles, youths, or young adults in delinquent
groups or gangs suggests that violent crime was
less common in earlier periods than it is now
(Thrasher 1936; Shaw and McKay 1943). Whyte (1943)
stressed that street gangs in Boston did not
typically engage in brawls or gang fights that
resulted in serious injury. Miller (1962) and
Klein (1968, 1971) insisted that the gangs they
evaluated in the 1950's and 1960's were not
particularly violent. Miller's (1962, 1976a)
Boston gangs rarely used firearms, and their gang
fights seldom resulted in serious injury. Klein
(1971, p. 115) noted the relative rarity of the
"truly violent act" among East Los Angeles
Hispanic gangs in his project areas over a 4-year
period. Bernstein (1964) and Short and Strodtbeck
(1965) reported that delinquency and violence by
juvenile gangs were relatively mild. More fighting
took place within the gang than against opposing
gangs. The most common form of offense appeared to
be "creating a disturbance," noisy roughhousing,
or impeding public passage (Miller 1976a).
Yablonsky (1962) and, to a lesser extent, Spergel
(1964) were in the minority of observers when they
reported that New York gangs of the 1950's
frequently could be violent, with homicides
occurring.

Gangs were different, however, in the 1970's and
1980's: "the weight of evidence would seem to
support the conclusion that the consequences of
assaultive activities by contemporary gangs are
markedly more lethal than during any previous
period" (Miller 1975, p. 41); "the cycles of gang
homicide now seem to end higher and retreat to
higher plateaus before surging forward again. If
homicide is any indicator, gang violence has
become a far more serious problem during the most
recent decade" (Klein and Maxson 1987, p. 4).
Miller (1975, pp. 75-76) makes stark claims:
violent crime by gang members in some cities was
as much as one-third of all violent crime by
juveniles. Juvenile gang homicides were about 25
percent of all juvenile homicides in approximately
65 major cities in the United States. Block's
study (1985, p. 5) more recently finds, based on
police data, that gang homicide accounted for 25
percent of teenage homicides in Chicago between
1965 and 1981 and 50 percent of all Hispanic
teenage homicides. In the last few years, Los
Angeles may have supplanted Chicago as the
country's worst gang-violence city. There were 387
gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County in
1987, 452 in 1988, and 554 in 1989.

On the other hand, we note that some smaller
cities may have higher gang homicide rates than
either Chicago or Los Angeles City or County.
Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico,
with a population of about 200,000 recorded 21
gang homicides for the first half of 1989, a rate
far higher than Chicago or Los Angeles (Office of
the Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989).

We are not convinced that these statistics portend
an inexorable upward spiral of gang violence, even
though Los Angeles and Chicago may currently be
recording the highest level of gang homicides in
their respective histories. There are peaks and
valleys in the number of gang homicides over
fairly long time periods. Gang homicides averaged
about 70 per year in Chicago between 1981 and
1986, 63 per year in the next highest period of
1969 to 1971, but only 25 gang homicides were
noted per year in the period between 1973 and
1978. Furthermore, gang homicides based on
official statistics have sharply declined in New
York City and Philadelphia in the past 15 years.
Gang homicides in Chicago as a percent of total
homicides have ranged from 1.71 percent in 1975 to
11 percent in 1990. During the recent 1990 peak
year in Chicago, 101 gang homicides occurred.

Bob Baker, a Los Angeles Times reporter, adds
critical qualitative meaning to analysis of the
gang homicide problem. He argues that these less
organized attacks, in which one or two members
shoot somebody because they are trying to settle
their own score, should not be called "gang
killings." "In most of Los Angeles, gang members
contend that for all the publicity about killings,
the gangs themselves are pretty quiet . . .
Assaults by one group of gang members on another
are far less frequent than they were at the turn
of the decade when turf lines were less hardened
and incursions tended to be more explosive. . . .
For all the attention being paid to spectacular
violence committed over soured drug deals and
arguments over territory, the largest number of
gang killings still occur in this haphazard
chaotic way" (Baker 1988b).

Again, depending on how one reports and interprets
these homicides, the basic youth violence
situation in Los Angeles may be little different
than it is in Chicago or New York. Although the
New York Police Department claims a very low level
of gang crime, youth violence and drug violence
currently "may be at an all time high" (Galea
1988). The rate of youth violence generally may be
higher in Detroit than in Chicago, although
Detroit police claim a very low level of youth
gang activity.

The puzzles of gang-crime statistics and what they
mean are not easy to resolve. The proportion of
violent crime attributed to gang members is
relatively higher than the proportion of violent
crime committed by nongang members in most social
contexts. Yet we are not clear about the
relationship of gang to nongang violent crime in
seemingly similar cities. In 1987, gang homicides
were 25.2 percent of the total number of homicides
in Los Angeles City, but 6.9 percent of the total
number of homicides in Chicago. Gang felonious
assaults were 11.2 percent in Los Angeles, but 4.3
percent in Chicago. Gang-related robberies were
6.6 percent of the total robberies in Los Angeles,
but only 0.8 percent of the total robberies in
Chicago. These differences may reflect not only
different definitions but also different police
practices, different local situations, and
fluctuations over short-term periods.

The increase in gang violence in some cities in
the past 8 to 10 years has been attributed to
several factors. Gangs have more weapons (Miller
1975; Spergel 1983) than they have had in the
past. Guns are used more often from a moving car
(drive-by shooting). The ready availability of
improved weaponry (.22's, .38's, .45's, .357
magnums, AK 47's, Uzis, and sawed-off shotguns) is
associated with the changing pattern of gang
conflict. The "tradition," "report," or myth of
intergang rumbles based on large assemblages of
youth arriving for battle on foot, which may be
easily interdicted, has been supplanted by
smaller, mobile groups of two or three youths,
usually in a vehicle, prowling for opposing gang
members. Although shootings are sometimes planned,
spur-of-the-moment decisions to attack targets of
opportunity are common (see also Horowitz 1983).
Klein and Maxson suggest that increased gang
violence may not reflect "greater levels of
violence among and between gangs [but] . . . a
growth in the number of gangs or gang members . .
. or an increasingly violent society [or perhaps]
. . . more sophisticated gang intelligence [and
law enforcement]" (1989, p. 218).

The older ages of gang members may also be
responsible for greater use of sophisticated
weaponry and consequent violence. More and better
weaponry may be available to older teenagers and
young adults than to juveniles. For the past 10
years, the median gang homicide offender in
Chicago has been 19 years old with a 20-year-old
victim. (Spergel 1986). Los Angeles data (Maxson,
Gordon, and Klein 1985) and San Diego police
statistics (San Diego Association of Governments
1982) also indicate that older adolescents and
young adults are mainly involved in gang
homicides.

Motorcycle and prison gangs also appear to have
become more lethal. Motorcycle gangs are no longer
simply "free-wheeling riders" but now may engage
in struggles over domination of a prison or a
territory's lucrative vice or narcotics trade,
prostitution, extortion, protection, and murder
for hire (Davis 1982a, 1982b). These somewhat
older gangs are still only partially disciplined
and engage in internecine combat and brutality (G.
Camp and C. Camp 1985). Half of all prison
homicides are estimated to result from gang
activity. Some State prisons are particularly
violent. Of 20 gang killings in prisons in 1983, 9
occurred in the California system. Between 1975
and 1984, there were 372 gang-related homicides in
California prisons, "a record unsurpassed by any
other organized crime group in California" (G.
Camp and C. Camp 1985, p. 2).

Gang and Nongang Member Studies: Violence and
Serious Crime

The relationship between gangs and violence is
most evident when patterns of behavior by gang
members and nonmembers are compared. Gang youths
engage in more violent crime than do nongang but
delinquent youths. Klein and Myerhoff (1967, pp.
1-2) observed that "the urban gang delinquent is
different in kind from the urban nongang
delinquent . . . Gang members have higher police
contact rates . . . and become involved in more
serious delinquencies than nonmembers." Most
recently a Swedish researcher found that
delinquents who were group or "network" related
committed more frequent and serious offenses that
were nongroup or non-network delinquents (Sarnecki
1986). Orange County probation statistics indicate
that gang-affiliated minors had significantly
higher technical and new law-violation rates (55.1
percent) than nongang affiliated minors (26.4
percent) in 1987 (Orange County 1989).

The most consistent and impressive differences
between gang and nongang offense patterns of
delinquents arise from findings by different
researchers in Philadelphia over a 20-year period.
Bernard Cohen (1969a, pp. 77-79), using data
collected by the Philadelphia Police Department's
gang unit, found evidence that "gangs engage in
more violent behavior than do delinquent nongang
groups," as 66.4 percent of gang events but only
52.6 percent of delinquent-group events fell into
violent offense categories. Only 1.4 percent of
gang events, but 13.7 percent of group events,
were property crimes. Gang members' offenses were
more serious and more often involved display or
use of a weapon.

Friedman, Mann, and Friedman (1975) sought to
distinguish gang, nongang delinquents, and
nondelinquents in the early 1970's. They found
that violent behavior differentiated street-gang
members from nongang members better than all the
other legal, socioeconomic, and psychological
factors studied. Gang members were also
characterized by the attributes of more police
arrests for nonviolent crime, more truancy, and
more alcohol and drug abuse (Friedman, Mann, and
Friedman 1975, pp. 599-600).

Based on a sample of the 1945 Philadelphia cohort
study (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972), Rand
(1987, pp. 155-56) found support for her
hypothesis that "boys who join a gang are more
delinquent than those who do not. The 31 boys who
reported gang affiliation represented 29 percent
of the total offender sample and were responsible
for 50 percent of the offenses."

Tracy (1987, p. 14) is currently analyzing
criminal characteristics of gang and nongang
members, using the 1945 and 1958 Philadelphia
birth cohort studies, based on official police
records and juvenile and adult self-reports.
Official offense data of the 1945 cohort show that
juvenile gang membership is associated with
significantly higher levels of delinquency. The
offenses of gang members have higher average
seriousness scores.

For nonwhites, the rate of nonviolent offenses is
about 1.7 times as high for gang members as for
nongang delinquents; the rate for violent offenses
is almost twice as high; and, for aggravated
assault, it is three times as high. The pattern
for whites is less consistent. Analysis of the
1958 cohort, not yet complete, suggests a quite
similar pattern (Tracy 1982, 1987). The self-
report components of Tracy's 1945 cohort study are
consistent with the official data findings.

Gang influence on criminality does not stop at the
end of the juvenile period. When offense frequency
and seriousness based on official and unofficial
records are examined for the adult period, 18 to
26 years of age, gang members equal, if not
exceed, the magnitude of differences observed for
the juvenile period. Thus, gang membership appears
"to prolong the extent and seriousness of the
criminal career" (Tracy 1987, p. 19). These
conclusions are consistent with those of a
Philadelphia researcher, who more than 20 years
earlier noted that a "large portion of 'persistent
and dangerous' juvenile gang offenders become
'even more serious' adult offenders" (Robin 1967,
p. 24).

Finally, a California Department of Justice study
(G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, p. 108) found that gang
members who have been released from prison commit
many serious crimes. Two hundred and fifty gang
members were randomly selected from California
prison gangs (Nuestra Familia, Mexican Mafia,
Black Guerilla Family, and Aryan Brotherhood
Gangs), and their careers were tracked. Between
1978 and 1981, 195 of the 250 gang members were
arrested, often repeatedly, for the following
crimes: 65 misdemeanors and 350 felonies,
including 24 arrests for murder, 57 arrests for
robbery, 46 arrests for burglary, 31 arrests for
narcotics offenses, 44 arrests for weapons
offenses, and 28 arrests for assault with a deadly
weapon.

Drugs and Violence

The relationship between gangs, drug use, and drug
trafficking has not been clear and has received
only passing attention in the classic street-gang
literature (however, see Short and Strodtbeck
1965). Alcohol and drug use usually have been
addressed in tandem or not distinguished (Klein
1971). The relation between drug use and drug
selling also was not systematically explored.
Chein and his associates (1964) found little drug
use or selling by youth gangs contacted by New
York City Youth Board workers. The existence of
drug using and selling by gangs was not clearly
demonstrated in the 1950's and 1960's (Cloward and
Ohlin 1960; Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Spergel
(1964) found a close relationship between drug use
and limited drug dealing by older youth gang
members making a transition out of the gang.

The relationship among gangs, drug use, and
trafficking has been found most consistently in
criminal justice system populations. Of 276
documented gang members on probation in San Diego
County, 207 (or 75 percent) had drug convictions
(Davidson 1987). The Orange County Probation
Department found that 71 percent of gang members
under supervision by its Gang Violence Suppression
Unit displayed occasional or frequent drug and/or
alcohol use (Orange County 1989). Moore (1978)
found an integral relationship between Hispanic
imprisoned gang members and drug trafficking; and
a close relationship between prison gangs and drug
trafficking has been observed in certain State
prisons over the past two decades (G. Camp and C.
Camp 1985; C. Camp and G. Camp 1988). A recent
study of 589 property offenders from three prison
intake centers in Ohio found that drugs,
unemployment, alcohol, and gangs, respectively,
were the most important factors in property crime
(Dinitz and Huff 1988). Recently, a great deal of
media attention has been directed to the
relationship between gangs and major drug
trafficking, especially rock cocaine in Los
Angeles and increasingly in other cities.

Earlier gang studies indicated a certain
ambivalence or even negative reaction by gang
members to drug use or sale in the local area.
Reports of core gang members forcing drug-abusing
members out of the gang, particularly those using
or "shooting up" heroin, and threatening
neighborhood drug dealers to stop trafficking were
not uncommon (Spergel 1964; Short and Strodtbeck
1965). Many gangs, however, traditionally
tolerated use of marijuana. Street workers, who
work with community-based programs, reported that
42.5 percent of black gang members and 33.6
percent of white gang members used "pot" in the
late 1950's or early 1960's. However, such drug
use then had very low legitimacy among these
youths (Short and Strodtbeck 1965, p. 82).

In the early 1970's, New York City officials
believed that most youth gangs were not
extensively involved in the sale of narcotics
(Collins 1979). A New York State Assembly report
(1974a, p. 5) indicated that "many gangs engage in
shakedowns of area merchants, residents, and
others trafficking in soft drugs, such as
marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine."
By the late 1970's, however, there was evidence
that gangs, particularly those containing older
members with prison experience, were significantly
engaged in drug dealing. The Blackstone Rangers,
now the El Rukns, were a continuing target of the
Chicago Police Department for drug dealing, shady
property investments, and other organized criminal
activities.

By the middle 1980's, there were reports of
extensive drug use and selling by gang members in
both small and large cities. Hagedorn indicates a
very heavy use of drugs by gang leaders in
Milwaukee. "Less than 5 percent of those
interviewed said that at this time they never used
drugs . . . 60 percent . . . admitted they used
drugs (mainly marijuana) most or all of the time"
(1988, p. 142). A recent Florida legislative
report indicates that 92 percent of gang members
admitted experimenting with narcotics, mainly
marijuana and cocaine (Reddick 1987). Fagan,
Piper, and Moore (1986) report that individual
prevalence rates for both drug use and delinquency
were higher for gang youth in several inner-city
neighborhoods than for general adolescent
populations in the same area.

Limited drug dealing has long been a means by
which gang members support their individual drug
use or habits. Drug selling has increasingly
become a means of making a living. Nearly half of
the 47 gang "founders" interviewed by Hagedorn
said they sold drugs regularly: "over two-thirds
said that members of the main group of their gang
sold drugs `regularly' and nearly all said someone
in the main group sold at least `now and then'"
(1988, p. 105).

Recently, the County of Los Angeles Probation
Department reports that "gang members are now
rarely addicts. Traditionally drug dealers were
addicts selling to support their own habit . . .
Typical monthly data from specialized drug
pusher/seller intensive . . . caseload reveals
that only 2 of 39 probationers had positive or
`dirty' narcotic test results. Current gang drug
dealers are not habitual drug users" (Los Angeles
County Probation Department 1988, p. 2).

With media reports of extensive drug trafficking
by gang members has come the belief that drug
selling by gang members is now closely associated
with an increase in urban violence. Law
enforcement officials and the media in many parts
of the country, but especially in the Los Angeles
area, have voiced extreme alarm (Los Angeles City
News Service 1988). All 300 black street gangs
within the city are blamed for selling rock
cocaine. "These gangs have a hierarchy of drug
selling, with young teens at the bottom who start
as lookouts or runners and later move into selling
at the top of the hierarchy . . . city-wide police
blame gangs for 387 homicides in 1987, almost all
of it drug-related" (Washington 1988). Another
newspaper reporter indicates that young
neighborhood males seeking to make "fast money
through drugs [must] pledge at least surface
loyalty to a neighborhood gang if they wanted a
piece of the action" (Baker 1988b).

The claims of the General Accounting Office in a
recent report are a little less dramatic and
inclusive. It concludes that "10 percent of all
gang-related murders involve narcotics [and that]
. . . more than half of gang-related homicides
involve individuals who are not associated with
gangs." On the other hand, the report states that
within the past 3 to 4 years the CRIPS and the
Bloods "have gained control of 30 percent of the
crack cocaine market in the United States." Los
Angeles street gangs are viewed as a
nontraditional "sophisticated criminal
organization" (GAO 1989, pp. 3, 19).

Criminal justice agencies are apparently deeply
concerned. The Federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (1988) claims that Los Angeles
street gangs, especially older former members of
CRIPS, have been identified with selling drugs in
46 States. The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges has recently recommended that
judges take drastic action in responding to a
presumed drug-gang crisis: "Beginning in the mid-
1980's, some youth gangs with origins in the large
urban centers of Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago,
Detroit, and New York became major criminal
entrepreneurs in the supply of illicit drugs. In a
very short time, many of the gangs have developed
intrastate and interstate networks for the purpose
of expanding . . . in the . . . national drug
sales market . . . Ominously these gangs are even
more committed to the use of violence than the
most notorious old-line criminal organizations"
(Metropolitan Court Judges' Committee 1988, pp.
27, 30).

A range of contrasting views accounts for the
gang/drug crisis. The origin of the problem in
many cities is often claimed to be the
transportation of drugs from some other city. "Los
Angeles is now the main port of entry for cocaine
nationwide as well as the home of 30,000 black
gang members" (Donovan 1988, p. 2). Yet the
explanation or blame for the current state of
affairs is laid to the "1982 Federal crackdown on
cocaine smugglers in Miami . . . The movers of
dope decided it might be better for them to move
their important drugs to another location [Los
Angeles]" (Washington 1988). However, officials in
Miami claim that the connection between gangs and
drugs is now bigger than ever. A key problem is
the trafficking of drugs by gang members traveling
from cities in the Northeast to Miami.

Law enforcement officials in many cities, for
example, Denver; Boston; Washington, D.C.;
Columbus; Fort Wayne; Seattle; Milwaukee;
Minneapolis; and Jackson, Mississippi, claim that
the "crack" problem and the gang violence problem
were developed in the course of an incursion of
black drug gang-related entrepreneurs from the
central cities of New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. Often violence was reputed to have been
associated with a deliberate plot to takeover and
transform local traditional turf-based black youth
gangs into drug market criminal gang-related
organizations. The spread of the "crack" gang-
related problem, however, is increasingly
attributed more to market forces and normal
migration patterns of individuals and families
seeking economic opportunities than to a
centralized, bureaucratic franchising campaign.

Available research, however, suggests neither
strong nor clear inter-relationships among street-
gang membership, drug use, drug selling, and
violence. Fagan (1988) found both violent and
nonviolent black and Hispanic youth gangs in
inner-city communities of Chicago, Los Angeles,
and San Diego, whether the gang engaged in drug
trafficking or not. Gang involvement in violent
activity is neither cause nor consequence of drug
use or drug dealing: "while some incidents no
doubt are precipitated by disputes over drug sales
or selling territories, the majority of violent
incidents do not appear to involve drug sales.
Rather they continue to be part of the status,
territorial, and other gang conflicts that
historically have fueled gang violence" (Fagan
1988, p. 20).

Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham (1988) recently
explored the relationship between gangs, drug
dealing, and violence in Los Angeles. Basing their
study on analysis of police records for 1984 and
1985, they found that rock cocaine dealing and its
increase were principally a product of normal
neighborhood drug-selling activity, often
unattributable to gang activity. The occurrence of
violence during cocaine sale arrest incidents was
quite low; the explosion of drug homicide
incidents was more characteristic of nongang than
gang involvement (pp. 6, 10-11).

The diversity of views about the relation between
gang membership, drug dealing, and violence at the
street level can be partly explained by such
factors as city size and drug supplies,
organizational development phase of the gang and
its involvement in drugs, and the stability of the
drug market. The traditional gang structure seems
to dissolve under the impact of drug use and
selling. This is particularly evident in the large
northeastern cities and increasingly in midwestern
large and small cities. Traditional turf-related
gang violence and gang crisis inspired cohesion
are not directly functional to drug use, selling,
and associated criminal enterprise, which requires
more rational kinds of organization,
communication, and distribution.

However, the broadness or narrowness of the
definition of "gang incident" and whether the unit
of analysis is the gang or gang member also
accounts for much of the sharp variation. A broad
definition of "gang incident" is likely to find
strong and frequent connection among gangs, drugs,
and violence. Bobrowski (1988) states that of 62
street gangs or major factions responsible for
street gang crime in Chicago between January 1987
and July 1988, 90 percent, or all but 6, showed
some involvement by its membership in vice
activity. Of vice offenses reported, 91 percent
were drug-related.

However, the relationship between arrests for drug
dealing, possession, use, and violence by gang
members is quite tenuous in Chicago. Bobrowski
(1988, p. 25) also reports, based on Chicago
Police Department statistics, that vice activity
was discovered at the gang-incident level in "only
2 of 82 homicides, 3 of 362 robberies, and 18 of
the 4,052 street gang-related batteries and
assaults" in the year-and-a-half study period. He
concludes that the suggestion that "street gangs
have been enmeshed in some web of violence and
contentious criminality pursuant to, or in
consequence of, their interests in vice [mainly
drug trafficking or use], appears to be
unsupported by the available data" (1988, pp. 44-
47). However, the Chicago Police Department
definition of a gang-related incident is much
narrower than that of the Los Angeles Police
Department. Still, McBride (1988) of the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department states that
only 10 percent of gang homicides have been
related to drugs.

Evidence exists in several cities at the present
time of a pattern in which Hispanic gangs may be
relatively more involved in traditional turf gang-
related activities, and black gangs or their
members may be more relatively involved in drug
trafficking. In Chicago, where the total
population is approximately 41 percent black and
16 percent Hispanic, there were 77 Hispanic male
offender suspects and 66 black male suspects
identified by police case reports in 82 gang-
related homicides between January 1987 and July
1988. The vast majority of black and Hispanic gang
homicides, 78.7 percent, were within racial or
ethnic offender-victim groups. Although 45.2
percent of all serious gang-related assaults (N =
2,890) city-wide involved black suspects, 43.8
percent involved Hispanic suspects. However, 65.7
percent of vice (mainly drug) gang-related
suspects (N = 4,115) were blacks, but only 27.6
percent were Hispanics. Hispanic gang members may
be less entrepreneurial (or less obvious at the
street level) than black gangs, at least in
Chicago, when it comes to drug trafficking
(Bobrowski 1988, table 18A).

Reports suggest that members of different ethnic
or racial gangs may be differentially involved in
the trafficking of different types of drugs. For
example, in Los Angeles, "crack cocaine seems to
be associated primarily with black youth. There
seems little disagreement about the lack of
involvement by Chicano youth in the crack cocaine
trade" (Skolnick et al. 1988, p. 17). White
motorcycle gangs "continue to produce and traffic
in methamphetamine" (Philibosian 1989, p. 6),
Hispanic gangs seem to be a significant problem in
their use and sale of PCP and marijuana
(Philibosian 1989), and Chinese youth gang leaders
in New York City are reported to be active in the
heroin trade (Chin 1989). However, increasing
participation of gang members in drug trafficking
does not mean that the relationship between drugs
and gangs is interdependent and that a causal
relationship necessarily exists between the
development of gangs and drug dealing. Skolnick
observes that the traditional turf-based Mexican-
American gang in Southern California has not
formed for the purpose of selling drugs, but some
gangs in various parts of the State have organized
primarily for the purpose of distributing drugs,
and the "gang" or "mob" represents a "strict
`business' operation" (1988, pp. 2-3). It is
likely that black, white, and Chinese gangs are
less tied to traditional gang or neighborhood
norms.

Finally, the relation between drugs and gangs, as
well as with violence, particularly as it bears on
the socialization process, appears to be variable.
There is evidence of an indirect and sequential
relationship between gangs and violence and drug
trafficking. Johnson et al. (1989, pp. 63, 78)
report, using New York City evidence, that drug-
selling organizations frequently recruit persons
who have previous histories of violence. Such
persons, in turn, may seek out drug-selling
groups. Gangs provide members with a sense of
group identification and solidarity that may prove
a useful qualification and readily transferred to
a drug organization. This may be the case in Los
Angeles as well.

A closer interrelationship of fighting and drug-
selling patterns may be developing with Hispanic
gangs. The introduction of younger males to the
drug business often serves to meet membership
criteria and respect in the traditional but
changing Mexican-American gang in Southern
California. "An individual may prove that he is
worthy of respect and trust if he can show that he
can sell for one of the `homeboys' and be trusted
with the merchandise" (Skolnick et al. 1988, p.
4).

----------------

CHAPTER III: GANGS AS ORGANIZATIONS

Gangs have been viewed as both loosely knit and
well organized. It is possible that the loosely
knit characterization refers to process, while the
well-organized characterization refers to gang
structure, form, or longevity. Thrasher (1936, p.
35) originally conceived of the ganging process
"as a continuous flux and flow, and there is
little permanence in most of the groups. New
nuclei are constantly appearing, and the business
of coalescing and recoalescing is going on
everywhere in the congested area." Yablonsky
(1962, p. 286) called the gang a "near-group"
characterized by (1) diffuse role definition, (2)
limited cohesion, (3) impermanence, (4) minimal
consensus of norms, (5) shifting membership, (6)
disturbed leadership, and (7) limited definitions
of membership expectations. The traditional gang,
according to Klein (1968), is an amorphous mass;
group goals are usually minimal, membership
unstable; group norms not distinguishable from
those of the surrounding neighborhood. Short and
Strodtbeck noted the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of drawing up lists of gangs from
which probability samples could be drawn in their
research, "so shifting in membership and identity
are these groups" (1965, p. 10). Gold and Mattick
concluded that gangs in Chicago are "loosely
structured sets of companions" (1974, p. 335),
less stable than other groups of adolescents (p.
37). Torres observed that Hispanic gangs in the
barrios of East Los Angeles are "always in a state
of flux" (1980, p. 1). By contrast, however, some
of these same analysts have viewed gangs as
complex organizational structures, referring to
them in bureaucratic terms or even as "supergangs"
(Sherman 1970; Short 1976).

The New York City Youth Board (1960) proposed a
scheme for describing the varied, purposeful
structures of gangs that includes such
categorization as vertical, horizontal, and
autonomous or self-contained. The vertical gang is
structured along age lines and comprises
youngsters living on the same block or in the same
immediate neighborhood. There may be a younger
"tots" group 11 to 13 years old . . . a "junior"
division 13 to 15 years old . . . a group of
"tims" 15 to 17 years old . . . and the "seniors"
17 to 20 years old and older. The age lines are
not hard and fast. This type of structure occurs
where there is a long history of group existence
and activity dating back 10 or more years. Group
morale and fighting traditions are informally
handed down. This kind of group tends to be
ingrown, with cousins and brothers belonging to
the respective divisions (New York City Youth
Board 1960, p. 22).

A later description of the vertical gang structure
in New York City in the 1970's suggested a wider
spread of these age-based subunits with "Baby
Spades," 9 to 12 years old; "Young Spades," 12 to
15 years old; and "Black Spades," 16 to 30 years
old (Collins 1979). More recently, in
Philadelphia, the police department describes
three general age-related gang divisions: bottom-
level "midgets," 12 to 14 years old; middle-level
young boys, 14 to 17 years old; and upper-level
"old-heads," 18 to 23 years old (Philadelphia
Police Department 1987). On the West Coast and
elsewhere the very young aspirants to gang
membership, usually 8 to 12 years old, are labeled
as "wannabes."

The New York City Youth Board (1960) described
horizontal gangs as follows: "The horizontally
organized group is more likely to include
divisions or groupings from different blocks or
neighborhoods comprising youngsters of middle or
late teens with little differentiation as to age.
The horizontal group may, and usually does,
develop out of the vertical or self-contained
group structure" (pp. 23-24). The horizontal youth
gang structure has become the most common type of
structure when gangs with the same name spread
across neighborhoods, cities, States, and
countries. These structures have evolved into
coalitions, confederations, "supergangs," and
nations--often originating in, or developing more
sophisticated structures on, the basis of prison
experience. They are particularly prevalent among
black and Hispanic youth in California and
Illinois. Variations of these structures,
especially by ethnicity or race, are discussed
below.

The terms "clique" or "Klika" have also been used
for black or Mexican-American gangs, respectively,
to refer to a specific age group "jumped" into the
gang or forming a separately identified cohort of
the gang in Los Angeles (Klein 1971; Moore 1978).
The term "set," however, seems to have a slightly
different meaning and is used currently to refer
to a specific black gang unit of a larger gang
confederation of the same name in California, but
not restricted to an age grouping. In the Mexican-
American community, an age cohort is given a name-
-usually a variation of the general gang name----
that remains identified with that cohort
throughout its life history. Whether the clique or
Klika is large or small, it represents a larger
group than a small clique or subgroup of a
particular gang or group. These youth may be
"jumped" into a gang that is the only active gang
in the community (see Vigil 1988; Harris 1988).

Gang Alliances

Thrasher (1936, p. 323) noted the possibility of
complex affiliated gang structures decades ago:
"In some cases federations of friendly gangs are
formed for the promotion of common interests or
protection against common enemies. These may be
nothing more than loose alliances." In several
cities, gangs or sets of gangs have been paired as
enemies with "enmity brief, sometimes lasting"
(Miller 1975). The terms "nation" and later
"supergang" were coined in Chicago in the late
1960's to describe a particular large gang
reportedly numbering in the thousands with units
spread throughout the city. The term "nation" is
still commonly used, particularly by gang members
rather than by police or youth agency personnel.
Some of these gangs have hierarchies, board
structures, elders, and elites (Sherman 1970). Two
major multiethnic gang coalitions (somewhat
distinct from a gang nation or supergang), "the
People" and "the Folk," developed in Chicago and
Illinois prisons in the middle 1970's. These
"nations," supergangs" or gang alliances contain
older members, are more criminalized, and are
probably more sophisticated and somewhat better
organized than the gangs of the 1950's and early
1960's (Short 1976).

The origins of the People and the Folk as super-
alliances of other named gangs took place in
prison, according to Chicago Police Department
information, when the predominantly white Simon
City Royals agreed to provide narcotics in
exchange for protection by inmates belonging to
the Black Disciples, a loose constellation of
street gangs (Folks). Shortly thereafter and in
response to the super-alliance, members of the
Latin Kings, a constellation of gangs of mainly
Hispanic ethnic origin (Mexican-American and
Puerto Rican), aligned with the Vice Lords, a
"nation" of black gangs or factions (People).
These super-alliances spread to the streets of
Chicago and other Midwestern and Southern cities.

According to a recent report, there are currently
about 31 street gangs in Chicago that identify
with the Folks and about 27 that identify with the
People. A few particular gangs in certain
neighborhoods are known only as Folks or People
with no other identifiers. About 19 street gangs
remain independent. In addition, there are
factions of gangs and gangs with unknown
affiliations. Membership is about evenly divided
between Folk and People. Seventy (70) percent of
the gangs identifying with the Folks are Hispanic,
19 percent are black, and 10 percent are white; 56
percent of the gangs identifying with the People
are Hispanic, 22 percent are black, and 19 percent
are white (Bobrowski 1988). It is not clear how
many gangs or gang members outside of prison are
related to these larger gang entities. Most are
more closely identified with particular gangs or
gang factions. There is "no centralized
organization and chain of command . . . and no
clear leadership has emerged . . . In fact, local
disputes, power struggles, or ignorance often
result in conflict among . . . affiliates"
(Bobrowski 1988, pp. 30-31).

Gang coalitions are also common in the Los Angeles
area, throughout California and adjoining States,
and in correctional institutions in several
States. Black gangs are reported to be divided
into two main aggregations in California: "CRIPS"
and "Bloods," with the CRIPS containing more units
or sets and members. There is some recent evidence
of a few white, Asian, Pacific Island, and
Hispanic members in these gangs and of multiethnic
or racial aggregations of these black gangs with
Hispanic, Asian, Pacific Island, and white gangs.
Crips tend to be more aggressive; members of Blood
sets rarely fight each other. Fights between CRIP
gangs are reported to have accounted for one-third
to one-half of all gang-versus-gang incidents in
various Los Angeles jurisdictions (Baker 1988b).

The competition between the Bloods and the CRIPS
has assumed almost legendary status. Members of
the CRIPS--which may consist of a whole series of
organizations, not necessarily with close
relations with each other--have been arrested for
a variety of crimes, mainly drug trafficking, in
most States of the United States. The California
Department of Corrections reportedly has
acknowledged the "existence of an emerging
umbrella CRIP organization known as the
Consolidated CRIP Organization (CCO) and a similar
Blood gang organization known as the United Blood
Nation (UBN) . . . The California Youth Authority
(CYA) has an estimated black street gang member
population [comprising mainly these two gang
constellations] of 5,000 inside CYA facilities and
7,000 on active parole" (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department 1985, p. 8).

Gang typologies and organizational classifications
suggest a bewildering array, complexity, and
variability of structures.1 Gangs may not be
simply cohesive, loosely knit, or bureaucratic but
at times variable small networks or parts of
larger networks across neighborhoods, cities,
States, and even countries (Collins 1979). These
networks may be more or less cohesive or clearly
structured at various periods in their
development. Gang tradition and these networks
develop independent of particular youths, leaders,
cliques, and gang organizational forms (see also
Sarnecki 1986; Reiss 1987).

Cliques and Gang Size

The small clique is the basic building block of
the gang. The violent character of the gang is
often determined by the membership interests of
the key clique, but the size of the delinquent
gang or clique has been a source of controversy
among researchers over the years.

Thrasher (1936, pp. 320-321) defined the gang
clique as a "spontaneous interest group usually of
the conflict type which forms itself within some
larger social structure such as a gang . . . In a
certain sense a well-developed clique is an
embryonic gang." The idea of "delinquent group" is
often congruent with that of gang clique. Shaw and
McKay (1931) noted that the most frequent type of
delinquent group, in which juvenile offenses are
committed, is the small companionship group
consisting of two or three boys. Downes (1966), a
British researcher, observed that small cliques
were responsible for the bulk of delinquency,
however, be made a distinction between them and
more "organized" gang behavior. Klein (1971)
refers to a "specialty clique" that may be part of
the larger gang structure but sometimes exists as
an independent unit. It consists of three to a
dozen boys. It can maintain or stimulate
distinctive patterned behavior, criminal behavior,
conflict, and drug use. 

The clique and the gang may be viewed as parts of
a network. Cliques may operate outside of gang
structures and even across other opposing gang
structures. Theft or robbery subgroups or cliques-
-and more recently, drug-trafficking cliques--may
identify with the gang for socialization and
conflict purposes but may recruit members from
outside the gang for particular "jobs," or ally
themselves with similar interest cliques in so-
called opposition gangs. The pattern of activity
of the gang may be determined by the leader or the
influential clique. The particular activity--
intergang tension or hostility, for example--may
cause the membership of the gang to expand rapidly
(Gold and Mattick 1974).

Competition between cliques may be a central
dynamic leading to the gang splitting into
factions or into separate gangs. The gang is
seldom cohesive and at maximum strength and may be
viewed as a series of loosely knit cliques, except
during times of conflict (Thrasher 1936; New York
City Youth Board 1960). Even this statement needs
to be qualified since actual combat between gangs
is usually carried out by a small group of two or
three youths, although a great deal of milling
about and a higher rate of interaction between
members of rival gangs may be observed on these
occasions--more for purposes of communication,
gesturing, and mutual excitement than directed
hostility.

The relation and significance of clique or gang
size to clique or gang influence may be difficult
to establish. It is possible to assess clique size
in terms of the number of arrests or participants
per gang incident. However, the use of official
data undoubtedly underestimates the number of
offenders or suspects (although it overestimates
the number of crimes committed by juveniles; see
Zimring 1981). The co-offenders or participants
may be viewed as roughly equivalent to a clique in
a specific gang-related offensive event. In one
Chicago study of reported violent gang incidents,
Spergel (1986) found that approximately three
offenders were arrested per gang incident. An
earlier Chicago study had revealed that slightly
less than two offenders were arrested per gang
homicide incident (Spergel 1983). In a more
inclusive Los Angeles gang and nongang homicide
study, Klein, Maxson, and Gordon (1987) found
approximately four suspects--as opposed to
arrested offenders--per gang homicide incident.
They also found that gang homicide incidents
produced about twice as many suspects as nongang
homicide incidents (1987).

The average size of the gang or clique has been a
source of disagreement among researchers and
observers. Some have emphasized that gangs are
generally small--hardly larger than a clique--
ranging from 4 or 5 to 25, with 8 to 12 members
most common (Gold and Mattick 1974). Others have
viewed the size of the gang as generally ranging
from 25 to 75 members (Collins 1979), 25 to 200
(Philadelphia Police Department 1987), and from
about 30 to 500 (Torres 1980). Since the late
1960's and to this day, some analysts believe the
size of some gangs--whether "supergangs" or
coalitions--may range into the thousands (Spergel
1972; Miller 1975, 1982; Short 1976). These
numbers may include peripheral and associate
members as well as core members, both active and
inactive members, and "wannabe" members and are
usually based upon sightings of large groups of
youth at a particular event--such as a dance; mass
meeting; or during "declarations" by gang members
that a particular school, housing project, or
prison is "theirs"--or upon estimates by law
enforcement or prison officials, based on
interviews, arrests, or informant observations. 

There is some evidence that gang size grows during
periods of crisis--especially with threats of
strikes or retaliations or competition for drug
markets----and decreases in the absence of
conflict and in the presence of "peace." Gang size
may also vary for students during different school
seasons or transitional periods--larger in the
fall when school starts, again during school
holidays, and especially at the start of the
spring or summer break. Recruitment efforts in the
fall of the first year of high school also may
produce an increase in gang ranks (see Klein
1971).

Many questions remain regarding the relation
between numbers of gang members, gang problems,
and gang size. Is the number of gangs in an area
or setting related to the number of gang members?
Are there more gangs in newly settled communities
but not necessarily more gang members compared to
the settled area? We know, for example, there are
more Hispanic than black gangs in Chicago but not
necessarily more Hispanic gang members (Bobrowski
1988). There may be more gangs represented in a
magnet or citywide high school than in a
neighborhood high school, but does this mean there
are more gang members or gang problems present
(Spergel 1985)? Similarly, gang membership and
problems may or may not vary with the numbers of
gangs in a particular prison (G. Camp and C. Camp
1985).

Types of Gang Members

The structure of the gang is based on needs for
group maintenance or development. It requires that
certain roles be performed and includes a variety
of membership types--core members, including
leaders and regulars; peripheral or fringe
members; and "wannabes," or recruits. The core may
be regarded as an inner clique that is actively
engaged in the everyday functioning of the gang.
Core members interact frequently and relate easily
to each other. They have been described as "those
few who need and thrive on the totality of the
gang's activity. The gang's level of violence is
determined by the hardcore" (Pitchess 1979, p. 2).
Core members may make key decisions, set
standards, and provide support and sanction for
the action of leaders. They are also the key
recruiters (Sarnecki 1986; Reiss 1987). 

Peripheral members and those who associate with
the gang but who do not recognize or are not
recognized by others as members of the gang may be
regular or irregular in their attendance at
particular gang events or gatherings. Their
relationships may also be primarily to particular
core members. They may not be seen as part of the
gang by all core members or the entire group. Some
associates may have higher status and respect than
peripheral members.

"Floaters" may exist in and across gangs. They are
special kinds of associates with high status, yet
are not clearly identified as gang members. They
are often brokers across gangs with access to
special resources, or they may exhibit special
talents needed by the gang. For example, they may
possess information about the activities of other
gangs and serve as communication links and
negotiators in times of tension or intergang
conflict. They may arrange deals for weapons,
drugs, or stolen property between gangs and with
others outside the gang. They tend to be
entrepreneurial, well respected, and articulate,
with many community connections.

Wannabes or recruits are the younger, aspiring or
potential members. They are the targets of efforts
by core or regular members to increase the size of
the gang.

Law-enforcement agencies have special strategic
and tactical reasons for identifying different
types of gang members. Most police departments
want to arrest or neutralize gang leadership. But
also they usually must be concerned with not
exaggerating the numbers of gang members. Law-
enforcement agencies distinguish among gang
members, for example, as "verified" or "alleged"
(New York State Assembly 1974b, p. 3), "known,"
"suspected," or "associated" (Baca 1988). The
verified hardcore or known members are viewed as
making up 10 to 15 percent of the gang and are the
target for most law-enforcement interventions
(Collins 1979).

Whether and under what circumstances gang members
develop particular types of, or maintain, career
roles is unclear. At one extreme, membership and
gang roles are vague and shifting. Some members
join for a short time--days or weeks. Gang members
may "graduate" from a lower- to a higher-status
gang role or even gang, particularly as they grow
older. However, they may also shift from core to
peripheral roles and back again. A youth may
switch membership from one friendly gang to
another and even to a formerly hostile gang--
particularly when gang membership requires little
in the way of formal identification or investment
of time or energy or, more often, when the gang
member's family moves or the youth must adopt
membership in a dominant gang at a new school or
in a correctional agency. It is not always clear
to gang members who is a recognized gang member
and who is not, although the status, rank, or
respect of a core gang member may be more readily
established. Relationships among gang members may
be weak and tenuous (Yablonsky 1962; Klein 1971),
although not always or necessarily so (Horowitz
1983). Leadership and core-member roles,
particularly in established gangs, may be viewed
as long-term. Such roles assume greater stability
and articulation in certain stable low-income
ghetto communities and in prison (Jacobs 1977).

There appears to be general agreement, however,
that core members are more involved in delinquent
or criminal activities than peripheral or fringe
members. Klein (1968, p. 74) reports that during
the 4 years of the Los Angeles Group Guidance
Project, "core members were charged with 70
percent more offenses than fringe members." Core
members committed their first offenses at an
earlier age, committed subsequent offenses at a
more rapid rate, and committed their last juvenile
offenses at a later age than fringe members (1968,
p. 274). Sarnecki's (1986) findings in Sweden are
similar. Juveniles affiliated with the network
were considerably more actively delinquent while
they belonged to it and faced a greater risk of
persisting in their delinquent activity, which
often led to drug addiction or imprisonment. The
more central the roles played by the juveniles,
the greater their likelihood of continuing in a
delinquent career. Those who were accomplices of
the central characters in the network also ran
greater risks than the average participant
(Sarnecki 1986, p. 128). Conversely, Fagan (1988,
p. 22) reports no significant differences between
leaders and other kinds of members in self-
reported involvement in drug and delinquent
activities. His findings, however, are not clearly
developed and are opposed to all other research
findings on this question.

Debate has also raged over whether core or fringe
members are more or less socially adjusted or
psychologically troubled. Yablonsky (1962) claimed
that core members are often psychologically
disturbed or sociopathic, and fringe members are
more likely to be "normal." Short and Strodtbeck
(1965), Klein (1971), and Gold and Mattick (1974)
take an opposing position; they say that
leadership and core members are likely to be more
socially capable, perhaps more intelligent. Fringe
members or "crazies" are likely to have low status
or to be ostracized by the group--except when used
for certain aggressive purposes (Horowitz 1983).
The extensive set of case vignettes in the
descriptive and program report of the New York
City Youth Board (1960) suggests that core and
fringe members come with all sorts of personality
makeups, capabilities, and disabilities and that
it is extremely difficult to relate gang role to
personality type.

Leadership

The notion of leadership is not usually clearly
defined by gang members or by researchers. Some
gangs have formal leadership positions such as a
president and vice president. More recently, gangs
in ghettoes, barrios, and prisons have referred to
their leaders as king, prince, prime minister,
general, ambassador, don, or chief. Some highly
violent gang leaders or influentials may have no
formal designation or flamboyant title and are
simply called "shot callers" or "shooters" by gang
members or police. There is a tendency for leaders
to be more clearly or "officially" identified in
black than in Hispanic gangs.

Gang researchers' disagreements center around
whether leadership is a position or a function and
may be only partially related to the issue of
whether the gang leader is a psychopath and
sociopath or relatively normal and socially
capable. Klein has taken two views. He has stated
that gang leadership is best defined as a
"collection of functions that may be undertaken at
various times by a number of members" (1971, p.
92). He has also stated that leadership may reside
within "relatively stable, `cool' youngsters who
have earned their fighting status through a
variety of abilities, fighting prowess, cool-
headedness, verbal facility, athletic abilities,
or inheritance from older brothers" (1969, p.
1432). Short (1963, p. 38) suggests that the
"ability to get along with people is one of the
basic skills associated with gang leadership."

These researchers and others have generally agreed
that leaders are usually capable people and have
special traits that others look up to (Thrasher
1936, pp. 345-349). Yablonsky's (1962, p. 156)
view of gang leadership is at the other extreme:
"Leaders are characterized by megalomania"; they
are profoundly disturbed and were very insecure
and unhappy as children and try to compensate
through their "contemporary `power' role of gang
leader."

Territoriality

The gang is often defined and organized in terms
of the territory in which it is located or claims
to be its own. The notion of territoriality or
turf is integral to the defensive character of the
traditional gang. Degree of commitment to turf may
vary by particular cultural tradition, age of the
gang's members, and by the changing interests or
purposes of the gang. "Gang warfare is usually
organized on a territorial basis. Each group
becomes attached to a local area which it regards
as peculiarly its own and through which it is
dangerous for members from another group to pass"
(Thrasher 1936, p. 175). The identification of
gang with territory is nowhere better illustrated
than in many Hispanic areas of Los Angeles where
the terms "gang" and "barrio" are traditionally
synonymous with the concept of neighborhood and
the two terms are used interchangeably (Moore
1978) or in many Puerto Rican and Mexican-American
communities of Chicago (Horowitz 1983; Spergel
1986).

Proximity emerges as a critical factor in
motivations for gang conflict. Of 188 gang
incidents among 32 gangs in Philadelphia between
1966 and 1970 (homicides, stabbings, shootings,
and gang fights), 60 percent occurred between
gangs who shared a common boundary, and another 23
percent between gangs whose territories were 2
blocks or less apart. Only two incidents occurred
between groups whose turfs were separated by more
than 10 blocks (Ley 1975, pp. 262-63). Certain
inner-city groups experience not only an economic
but also a social and cultural marginality. Their
marginalization may provide the mandate for a
"territorial imperative . . . for the
establishment of a small secure area where group
control can be maximized against the flux and
uncertainty of . . . the city" (Ley 1975, pp. 252-
53). Graffiti becomes the visible manifestation of
a gang's control of social space. Gang graffiti
becomes denser with increasing proximity to the
core of a territory. Graffiti is a clue to both
the extent and intensity of "ownership" of a
territory by a gang, which often varies inversely
with the strength of adult community organization
in the exercise of control over the particular
area.

Gang territoriality may expand when gang members
and their families move from one neighborhood to
another, to the suburbs, or even to other cities;
gangs with the same names suddenly seem to appear.
Gang names and symbols of territoriality may
develop through the influence of the media. A
copy-cat phenomenon directly or indirectly is
encouraged. Gangs most often seek to expand the
perimeter of their territory into adjoining
streets. A battle of gang markings and
countermarkings occurs when the perimeters of two
gangs' territories are unstable. Sometimes gangs
expand by absorbing smaller, lower-status gangs
nearby (Moore, Vigil, and Garcia 1983). Conflict
over gang turf may result from tensions and
competition over who "owns" or controls schools,
parks, jails, prison areas, illegitimate
enterprises or rackets, and even political
institutions of neighborhoods (Thrasher 1936;
Asbury 1971; Spergel 1972; Kornblum 1974).

At the heart of the concept of territoriality or
turf are two component ideas: control and
identification. Control is the stronger imperative
or driving force for gangs. Collins (1979, pp. 68-
69) observes that "street gangs have been known to
actually control the activity and events of
certain streets and blocks. They attempt to
control playgrounds, parks, and recreation centers
. . . to the exclusion of all other gangsters . .
. Other gangs have been known to march in front of
a witness' residence, exhibiting guns and weapons,
inferring `keep your mouth shut.'"

Miller (1977, pp. 23-25) suggests that three
categories of turf rights: (1) ownership rights,
where gangs "own" the entire area or property and
control all access, departure, and activities
within it; (2) occupancy rights, where gangs share
or tolerate each other's use and control of a site
under certain conditions (for example, deference,
time, and the nature and the amount of usage of
the space); and (3) enterprise monopoly, where
gangs claim exclusive right to commit certain
kinds of crimes. Miller gives examples of
"enterprise monopoly rights." A Boston gang
claimed the exclusive rights to steal from stores
in a claimed territory and forcefully thwarted
others who attempted a store robbery in the area.
Chinese gangs in a few cities, especially in San
Francisco, have a history of violence resulting
from challenges to exclusive extortion rights of
certain businesses.

Much of the violence among black gangs or
subgroups in recent years apparently results from
competition over drug markets. Gang entrepreneurs
or former gang members may seek to develop or
expand their business operations by recruiting or
converting existing street groups--often in
different neighborhoods or cities--to sell,
deliver, store, protect, or aid in the marketing
of drugs. Conflicts develop when these new
entrepreneurs enter an area controlled by another
gang or criminal organization engaged in drug
trafficking.

The traditional concept of physical turf or
territory has probably assumed less significance
in recent years. Physical, social, and economic
concepts of turf have become increasingly complex
over time. A particular gang may hang out,
socialize, or do business in different parts of
the neighborhood, city, or county. It may no
longer need a specific or the same center or
building as a point of identification or control
for each of these purposes. It may engage in
criminal activities or socialize in different
parts of towns, cities, or States as opportunities
presents themselves--more often fortuitous than
planned.

Miller (1977) also notes that certain cities have
a less developed tradition of locality-based
gangs. In the older cities or those with
established gangs----such as in New York,
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago----they are
more sophisticated and criminalized and are often
less identified with physical locations.
Increasingly important are the availability of
criminal opportunities or markets as gangs have
become highly mobile. A law-enforcement officer in
New York City observes that criminal youth no
longer hang out and now commonly move from corner
to corner and neighborhood to neighborhood to join
with others for a burglary, robbery, drug deal, or
whatever criminal opportunity arises that day
(Galea 1988). Under such circumstances, the notion
of gang changes or becomes more closely associated
with that of delinquent or crime group; in the
process, gang turf, colors, symbols, jackets,
caps, signs, names, and traditions may weaken
change, or come to serve either traditional
territorial or evolving criminal gang purposes,
and sometimes both in varying patterns and
sequences.


1 A great variety of gang dimensions, as a basis
for classifying or typing youth gangs by
academics, law-enforcement personnel, and others,
has emerged in recent years. They include (1) age;
(2) race/ethnicity; (3) gender composition [all
male, all female, or mixed]; (4) setting [street,
prison, or motorcycle (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985;
C. Camp and G. Camp 1988)]; type of activity
[social, delinquent, or violent (Yablonsky 1962;
Haskell and Yablonsky 1982; Jackson and McBride
1985)]; (6) purpose of gang activity [defensive or
aggressive (New York City Youth Board 1960;
Collins 1979), turf, retaliation, prestige, or
representation (Bobrowski 1988)]; (7) degree of
criminality [serious, minor, or mixed (Pleines
1987)]; (8) level of organization [simple or
corporate (Taylor 1988), vertical or horizontal,
spontaneous specialty clique, horizontal alliance,
or violent gang (Klein and Maxson 1989)]; (9)
stage of group formation or development [early,
marginal, or well-established (Collins 1979; New
York State Assembly 1974b)]; (10) degree of
activity [active, sporadic, or inactive
(Philadelphia Police Department 1987)]; (11)
nature or level of personality development or
disturbance of group members (Scott 1956; Klein
1971; Jackson and McBride 1985); (12) group
function [socioemotive or cultural and
instrumental (Berntsen 1979; Huff 1988; Skolnick
et al. 1988)]; (13) drug use/selling (Fagan 1988);
(14) cultural development [traditional,
nontraditional, or transitional (Vigil 1983,
McBride 1988)]; (15) new types, [heavy metal, punk
rock, satanic, or skinhead (Baca 1988; Coplon
1988)].

----------------

CHAPTER IV: MEMBERSHIP DEMOGRAPHICS

This chapter is concerned with ecological,
socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic
characteristics of gang members. Included are
class, culture, race or ethnicity, age, gender,
and female participation as components of youth
gang structure. Interaction between these
components and gang membership, group processes,
and individual personality are discussed in
chapter V.

Class, Culture, and Race/Ethnicity

Contemporary youth gangs are located primarily in
lower-class, slum, ghetto, barrio, or changing
communities; but it is not clear that class,
culture, race, or ethnicity per se primarily
account for gang problems. More likely, these
variables interact with other community
characteristics such as poverty, social
instability, racism, ethnic insecurities, social
isolation, and failures of social policy and
interagency coordination.

The gangs of the early part of the century in
urban areas like Chicago were mainly first
generation youths born of Irish and German, and
later Polish and Italian, parents who lived in
areas of transition or first settlement (Thrasher
1936). To what extent they represented lower-class
elements or the lowest-income sectors in their
communities or in the city as a whole is not
clear. We know that middle-class gangs--regardless
of race, ethnicity or location--are less prevalent
and certainly different in character than lower-
class gangs (Myerhoff and Myerhoff 1976; see also
Muehlbauer and Dodder 1983). But it is still not
clear that the gang problem, at least its violent
manifestations, is most severe in the poorest
urban neighborhoods (Spergel 1984) or that gang
members necessarily are the poorest youths or come
from the poorest families in low-income
communities. Delinquency and crime are generally
closely associated with poverty, but the poverty
relationship cannot be as strongly demonstrated
for gang-related crime as for nongang crime.

The assumption that poverty, low socioeconomic
status, or lower-class lifestyle is related to the
prevalence of delinquent or violent youth gangs
has been questioned. The communities in which
black gangs flourished in the early 1960's were
generally below city averages in housing standards
and employment rates but not below city average
unemployment rates (Cartwright and Howard 1966).
Gang members often come from low median family-
income census tracts in Philadelphia, but not from
the lowest (Cohen 1969a). The members of conflict
groups in New York City were not drawn necessarily
from the poorest families of the slum town areas
(Spergel 1964). Many of the street gangs of New
York City in the 1970's "emerged from a lower-
middle-class lifestyle" (Collins 1979). Hispanic
fighting gangs in East Los Angeles were not
limited to the lowest-income areas of the city
(Klein 1971). The spread of gangs in Los Angeles
County reportedly is due in part to the upwardly
mobile families with gang youth to middle-class
areas (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
1985). Violent and criminal motorcycle gangs are
reportedly composed of mainly lower-middle-class,
white, older youth, and young adults (Davis 1982a,
1982b). Recently identified white gangs in
suburban communities, "Punks," "Stoners," "White
Supremacists," "Satanics," and others, seem to
come from lower-middle-class and middle-class
communities (Deukmajian 1981; Dolan and Finney
1984). The class identity of the newly developing
Asian gangs is not clearly established, but gang
members often come from two working parent
families.

In some cities, authorities claim that media
attention has influenced the development of
ephemeral middle-class street gangs composed of
younger adolescents who have adopted some of the
attributes of traditional gangs (wearing colors),
as well as of instrumental gangs (making money).
They may function as roving bands engaged in
criminal activity, including narcotics use and
vandalism, for profit or for thrills. They have
been dubbed "mutant gangs" in Orange County and
"Stoner gangs" in Los Angeles County. The Mexican-
American Stoner gangs of East Los Angeles of the
early 1980's have been integrated into the
reemerging turf gangs, accompanied by a sharp rise
in intergang violence.

Youth gang problems in the United States continue
to involve mainly blacks and Hispanics, with
indications of increasing Asian gang participation
and a more differentiated white youth gang
problem. The largest variety of youth gang types
may occur on the West Coast, particularly in
Southern California, and increasingly in Texas,
New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Florida. Asian and
Pacific Island youth gangs are reported in many
States, particularly in the Western part of the
United States. American Indian gangs have been
active in Minneapolis. Mixed race and ethnic gang
membership patterns are not uncommon in many
States, although black gangs tend to be all black.
The relation of black American gangs to Jamaican
gangs ("Posses") is unclear; ethnicity may be a
stronger bond than race. Hispanic gangs tend to be
predominantly Mexican-American or Puerto Rican,
with increasing numbers of Central and South
Americans. Asian and Pacific Island youth gangs
tend to be Korean; Thai; Laotian; Cambodian;
Hmong; Japanese; Samoan; Tongan; Filipino; and
Chinese, with origins in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Vietnam. White gangs, depending on location, can
be predominantly of second- and third-generation
mixed Italian, Irish, Polish, or Central-European
origin in inner-city "defensive" enclaves,
suburban areas, or small towns. Some of the more
entrepreneurial white gangs tend to have weak
territorial identifications. Motorcycle gangs roam
widely.

Race and ethnicity play a role in the development
of the gang problem, but in more complex ways than
is ordinarily conceived. Blacks and Hispanics
clearly constitute the largest numbers of youths
arrested for gang offenses at the present time. In
his first national survey, Miller (1975) estimated
that 47.6 percent of gang members in the six
largest cities were black, 36.1 percent Hispanic,
8.8 percent white, and 7.5 percent Asian. In a
more extensive survey of all gang members in 9 of
the largest cities, Miller (1982) found that 44.4
percent were Hispanic, 42.9 percent black, 9
percent white, and 4.0 percent Asian. Miller
(1982, chapter 9) speculates that illegal Hispanic
immigrants, especially from Mexico, may have
played a large role in the increasing numbers of
gangs in California and in their spread to smaller
cities and communities in that State.

Curry and Spergel (1988) report a distinctive
pattern for black and Hispanic gangs in Chicago in
recent years. There was a relative and absolute
increase in black-gang homicides and a relative
and absolute decline in Hispanic gang homicides
for the 1982-85 period compared with the 1978-81
period. Black (non-Hispanic) gang homicides
increased from 61 to 160. Hispanic gang homicides
decreased from 125 to 83. White (non-Hispanic)
gang homicides decreased from 23 to 12. The
Hispanic gang homicide rate, relative to the
population, was the highest during the entire
period (Curry and Spergel 1988). In 1986 and 1987,
the black-gang homicide rate began to decrease
again.

By contrast, in recent years gang homicides in the
Los Angeles Sheriff's jurisdiction have been
disproportionately black (67 percent). Hispanic-
gang homicides have been significantly fewer (29.1
percent), although Hispanics make up a larger
proportion of the population and constitute more
gangs. According to law-enforcement officials,
high rates of black-gang violence is related to
narcotics dealing, primarily crack. But this
contrast in pattern may be, in part, a result of
differences in definitions of a gang incident in
Chicago and Los Angeles. The Chicago definition
serves to exclude more black crime and the Los
Angeles definition to include more black crime as
gang related. In both cases, overall crime rates
are higher for blacks than for Hispanics. 

Some Latin street gangs in Southern California
have existed within particular localities for two
or more generations. "Parents and in some cases
even grandparents were members of the same gang.
There is a sense of continuity of family identity"
(Jackson and McBride 1985, p. 42). Donovan (1988,
pp. 14-15) writes, "Today an Hispanic in Los
Angeles may be a fourth generation gang member,
and gangs comprise a distinct Hispanic subculture
with their own stylized dress, language, writing,
and rituals. They possess the same extended
kinship structure and tight group-cohesiveness
found in larger Hispanic culture . . . Their
intense identification with the barrio or `turf'
translates into gang members' considering
themselves closer to soldiers who defend it than
to criminals who victimize it."

Bobrowski (1988) notes differences among Hispanic,
white, and black gangs in Chicago. Symbolic
property crimes are more common among Hispanic
than black gang members (Bobrowski 1988, p. 19).
The ratios of personal crime to property crime
(mainly graffiti) for Hispanics and whites are 3
to 1 and 4 to 1, respectively, while for blacks it
is 8 to 1 (Bobrowski 1988, p. 21).

Duran (1987, p. 2) recently observed that
traditional Chicano gangs in certain parts of East
Los Angeles have declined in membership but that
membership in immigrant gangs from Mexico and
Central and South America is on the increase.
However, the traditional Hispanic gangs that
fight, kill, and risk their lives for turf and
"respect" remain dominant.

In general, gang violence tends to be intraracial
or intraethnic. Exceptions occur during periods of
racial conflict (Thrasher 1936) and rapid
community population change. Local gangs may be
organized to defend against newcomers. However,
the most serious and long-term gang conflicts
arise from patterns of traditional animosity
across adjacent neighborhoods with quite similar
populations.

Not all low-income Hispanic or black communities
necessarily or consistently produce violent gangs.
Although there was a history of gang formation and
gang violence in Philadelphia's inner-city
neighborhoods in the 1970's, that did not happen
in Puerto Rican enclaves. Relatively little
criminal or violent gang activity occurred in
Chicago's low-income black communities in the
middle and late 1970's, and violent gang activity
at that time was particularly high in Hispanic
communities.

Gang activity appears to vary by race and
ethnicity, although this may be primarily a
function of acculturation, access to criminal
opportunities, and community stability factors.
White gangs, of a somewhat higher class-level than
black gangs, were reported to be rowdier; more
rebellious; more openly at odds with adults; and
more into drinking, drug use and sexual
delinquency than black gangs in Chicago in the
late 1950's and early 1960's (Short and Strodtbeck
1965). White gangs in Philadelphia in the middle
1970's were less territorially bound, less
structured, and therefore more difficult to
identify than black gangs (Friedman, Mann, and
Adelman 1976). There were more white than black
gangs in Boston in the 1950's and 1960's, and
there was more violence among white gangs than
among black gangs--but the level of violence among
Boston gangs was and probably still is lower than
in other cities (Miller 1976b).

White gangs--although there are relatively few of
them today--come in many varieties, particularly
on the West Coast: Stoners, freaks, heavy-metal
groups, satanic worshipers, bikers, and fighting
gangs. "Stoners" originally were groups made up of
persistent drug or alcohol abusers; heavy-metal
rock music was a common bond. One of the special
traits of these original Stoner groups was
practice of satanism, including grave-robbing and
the desecration of human remains and churches.
Stoner groups have been known to mark off
territory with graffiti. They also may adopt
peculiar dress styles (Jackson and McBride 1985,
pp. 42-45).

Many, but not all, Skinhead groups are neo-Nazi
gangs who model themselves after punk rockers and
Skinheads in England. They may have ties with
adult racist groups--such as the Ku Klux Klan, the
American Nazi Party, and the National Socialist
White Workers Party. The SWP (Supreme White Pride)
name has recently spread from the prisons to the
streets. The racist and violent Skinheads have
been identified in major cities on the West Coast,
in the Midwest, and in the South. Law-enforcement
officials in parts of Southern California believe
the Skinhead movement may be a reaction by white
youth in certain middle-class neighborhoods to a
sudden increase in the number of black, Hispanic,
and Asian residents. Skinhead group-structure and
style fit the gang pattern: a gang name, colors,
tattooing, distinctive dress, drug use, and
criminal behavior. "American Skinheads are as
likely to be middle class as working poor. But in
other respects they are typical gang members"
(Coplon 1988, p. 56; see also Jackson and McBride
1985; Anti-Defamation League 1986, 1987; and
Donovan 1988).

A recent report of the Florida State legislature
(Reddick 1987) noted that the Skinheads started in
Jacksonville and are now uniformly found in major
urban areas all over the State. They profess to
"being anti-black, anti-Jew, and anti-homosexual,
while promoting their pro-God, pro-white American
ideology." Their activities in Florida have been
"primarily harassment, violence, fighting, and
provoking riots and racial incidents." Often,
parents of these youths are either unaware of
their activities or support them (Reddick 1987, p.
9). Coplon (1988, p. 56) claims Skinhead ranks
have swelled throughout the United States from 300
in 1986 to 3,500 in 1988.

Another type of predominantly white gang is the
motorcycle gang--although Hispanic and black
motorcycle gangs and groups exist. Most have set
the minimum age requirement at 18 or 21 years old.
They may have elaborate rituals, signs, symbols,
and tattoos and complex organizational structures-
-including written constitutions--with chapters of
the larger gangs in Canada and Europe, as well as
in many States. They consist mostly of working-
class young adults, sometimes from rural areas,
with limited education. They have engaged in a
wide range of illegal activity, including the sale
and use of drugs, extortion, disorderly conduct,
vandalism, theft, prostitution, white slavery, and
hijacking (Commission de Police du Quebec 1980).
Ties have been reported to major criminal
organizations and syndicates, particularly in the
transport or sale of drugs.

Increasing numbers of criminal and violent Asian-
youth gangs were reported in the 1970's and
1980's. Miller (1982) estimated the number of
Asian youth gangs then almost equaled the number
of white gangs on the West Coast. Asian gangs may
now be almost twice as numerous as white gangs
(Duran 1987). They have also spread from the West
and East coasts to inland American cities. They
tend to be more secretive than non-Asian gangs;
they are less interested in status, honor, or
reputation; but they are more involved in
criminal-gain activities, such as extortion,
burglary, and narcotics selling. However, a few
Vietnamese, Cambodian, and other Asian youth gangs
are reputed to be acting like typical street
gangs: dressing alike, taking gang names, using
graffiti, and having affiliated girl groups. Asian
youth gang members are sometimes used by adult
criminal organizations as "enforcers" (Breen and
Allen 1983). They tend to be highly mobile and are
usually not closely identified with a particular
turf. They are particularly difficult to detect
because most police units lack Asian-language
facility or the confidence of Asian communities.

The different ethnic Asian gangs may be quite
distinctive. There is some evidence that Japanese,
Taiwanese, and Hong Kong gangs may be the best
organized, perhaps the most secretive, and very
well-disciplined. Vietnamese street gangs may be
particularly mobile and have--on occasion--
affiliated with black gangs, CRIPS, and Bloods.
Samoan gangs are also reported to have been
assimilated into black gangs, to wear tattoos and
distinctive gang dress, to use graffiti, and to
have reputations for violence. Filipino gangs in
California are apparently older (members range in
age from 20 to 40 years old), at times adopt black
or Hispanic gang characteristics, and engage in a
range of criminal activities (auto theft,
extortion, burglary, drug trafficking) (Donovan
1988). However, Filipino youth gangs, with members
age 14 to 21 years old, along with Samoan gangs,
are reported to predominate in Hawaii, especially
in Oahu (Office of the Governor, State of Hawaii
1989).

Age

In recent decades, gang activity was perceived as
primarily or exclusively a teenage, if not a
juvenile, phenomenon. Researchers and analysts
partially based this perception on youth samples
they examined in street work programs in the
1950's and 1960's. This widespread perception was
also probably based in reality, and may be the
reason why--until recently--mainly juvenile or
youth units of police departments dealt with youth
gang problems. Many of these units have now been
transformed into gang or street-gang units or
sections.

The age composition of gangs undoubtedly varies by
city, race/ethnicity or culture, social setting,
i.e., prison, school or the streets, and
historical period. Nonetheless, there is again a
growing recognition that gang membership presently
extends into young adulthood--certainly into the
early and mid-twenties, and less frequently into
the 40's and 50's. Thrasher's (1936) gang members-
-as they do today--ranged in age from 6 to 50
years old, but were concentrated in two groups:
"earlier adolescent," 11 to 17 years old, and
"later adolescent," 16 to 25 years old. Whyte's
(1943) street-gang members were in their twenties.
Much of the theory and the limited research on
gangs in the 1950's and 1960's, however, was based
on early and middle teenage samples. While the
literature of this period focused on teenage
gangs, there also must have been young-adult
street gangs and even significant numbers of young
adults in teenage gangs. Many case histories (New
York City Youth Board 1960; Yablonsky 1962;
Spergel 1964; Klein 1971) provide ample evidence
of the presence and influence of young adults in
street gangs of that era. There may, however, have
been relatively fewer older teenagers and young
adults associated with gangs of the 1950's and
1960's than appears to be the case today.

It was already clear, however--at least in New
York City by the early 1970's--that the age range
of gang members was broader "at the top and the
bottom than in the fighting gangs of the 1950's.
The age range in some gangs starts at 9 years old
and elevates as high as 30 years old" (Collins
1979, pp. 30-40). A recent report on San Diego's
gang problem indicates that the age range of gang
members was 12 to 31 years old and that the median
age was 19 years old (San Diego Association of
Governments 1982).

Some analysts continue to insist that the
"traditional" age range of gang members is 8 to 21
or 22 years, with only minor exceptions (Miller
1975, 1982). Based on a small data sample (N=121),
Miller (1982), for example, found no gang
offenders or victims in Chicago who were 23 years
of age or older. However, based on 1982-84 police
data on 1,699 offenders and 1,557 victims, Spergel
(1986) found that the age range for offenders was
8 to 51 years old, and for victims was 3 to 76
years old. Miller's mean age categories were 16
and 17 years old; Spergel's mean age for offenders
was 17.9 years old and for victims was 20.1 years
old. Based on Chicago Police Department case
reports for 1987 and the first half of 1988,
Bobrowski (1988) finds that the average age of the
male offender was 19.4 years old and of the female
offender was 15 years old. For victims, the
average age was 22.1 years old, although the modal
or most frequently arrested group were the 17 year
olds (p. 40).

Some researchers and law-enforcement officials
continue to assume, without adequate or
sufficiently relevant data, that gang "violence
appears largely in early adolescence" (Moore 1978,
p. 38) or that "very young offenders commit such
accomplice offenses as . . . gang fighting" (Reiss
1987, p. 265). A related confusion appears to be
that older gang members tend to use juveniles or
younger adolescents to carry out violent attacks,
or "hits," against members of opposing gangs. Data
on gang homicides and aggravated assaults do not
support these conclusions, although juveniles may
frequently be used by older gang members to commit
certain property crimes and carry out certain
drug-trafficking activities.

The age locus of gang homicides, the most violent
gang activity, is late adolescence and young
adulthood. The average age of the gang homicide
offender in Los Angeles city and county in the
1980's was 19 and 20 years old respectively
(Maxson, Gordon, and Klein 1985; see also Torres
1980; and Horowitz 1983). Spergel's (1983) gang
homicide offender data in Chicago for 1978-81
indicate major age category percentages as
follows: 14 years old and under, 2.2 percent; 15
to 16 years old, 17.6 percent; 17 to 18 years old,
32.4 percent; 19 to 20 years old, 21.7 percent; 21
years old and older, 25.9 percent. These
percentages for these categories are approximately
the same for a later 1982-85 analysis of gang
homicides in Chicago (Spergel 1986).

Three interdependent factors may account for the
apparently increased age of gang youth. First, a
"real" aging of the youth gang population may have
occurred along with that of the general population
over the last three decades. A second explanation
may be the changing structure of the economy and
the loss of desirable unskilled and semi-skilled
jobs, so that it has become increasingly difficult
for dropout and unskilled gang youths to leave the
gang and graduate to legitimate job opportunities
that offer even a modicum of social respect and
income. Third, increased illegitimate
opportunities, particularly in the drug market,
may have induced older youths and younger adults
to remain in gangs, but give up strictly status-
related gang activity, and modify the gang
structure to more effectively distribute drugs.

The age at which offenders are involved in gang
violence is extremely important for theory and
policy. If the early- or middle-adolescent period
accounts for most gang violence and serious gang
crime, one set of theories and policy strategies
may be appropriate. If it is the late-adolescent
and young-adult period, an entirely different set
of explanatory theories, policy priorities and
program interventions may be required.

Females and Gangs

Most gang members are males, and it is mainly
males who commit gang related crimes----
particularly violent offenses. Data on the number
and distribution of females in gangs are extremely
sparse. The older literature on gangs almost never
refers to "gang girls" or their characteristics
(Thrasher 1936). Bernard Cohen (1969a, p. 85)
indicates that 6.3 percent of delinquent group
members arrested in the early 1960's were females
but that only 1.4 percent of juvenile-gang arrests
were females. Tracy, (1982, pp. 10-11) found that
17 percent of violent delinquents in the 1958
Philadelphia cohort study were females but that
most were arrested for nongang offenses.

Despite occasional media reports and social agency
warnings, the current situation appears to be
unchanged. In a study of 4 police districts in
Chicago between 1982 and 1984 which produced 1,504
reported gang incidents, Spergel (1986) found that
95 to 98 percent of the offenders in each district
were males. In a study of 345 gang-homicide
offenders in Chicago in the 4 year period 1978-81,
only 1 was female. Of 204 gang homicide victims
for this period, 6 were female (Spergel 1983).

In a more recent Chicago police study, Bobrowski
(1988) reports 12,502 male offenders; females were
only 2 percent of the total over a year-and-a-half
period (January 1987 to July 1988). The most
frequent index category of gang offenses was
serious assault. Of 2,984 offenders, only 94, or
3.2 percent, were females. The pattern varies
little for other gang-related offenses (Bobrowski
1988). Thus, it appears that the participation of
females in gang-related offenses has changed
little over the past several decades.

Focusing on females as gang members rather than as
gang offenders, Collins (1979, p. 51) estimated
that males outnumbered females by a margin of 20
to 1 in New York City gangs of the 1970's. He also
reported that half of all street gangs in New York
City had female chapters or auxiliaries. Miller
(1975) reported that females made up 10 percent of
gang members.

Females are most likely to be members of
auxiliaries to male youth gangs, occasionally to
be members of mixed-sex gangs, and least likely to
be members of independent or unaffiliated female
gangs. As members, Campbell (1984a) observes,
females function as "partial and pale facsimiles"
of male gang structures, processes, and behaviors.
The female affiliate may develop a conventionally
positive and distinctive solidarity and set of
"sisterhood" relationships, female members still
define gang-related achievement largely in male
terms (Campbell 1984a). Female gang members have
the same basic need for status as the males,
although the criteria for its achievement are
defined somewhat differently. Female gangs appear
to have a higher turnover, a shorter life span,
less effective organization and leadership, and a
"more pervasive sense of purposelessness" than
male gangs and members (Campbell 1984a). 

In a recent publication, Harris (1988) indicates
that female gang members are relatively closely
identified with the male gang-member role. They
emulate the males, dress like "homeboys," and
consider themselves as tough as the males are;
they are motivated to participate in a "subculture
of violence" based on "honor, local turf-defence,
control, and gain." (Harris 1988, pp. 173-174).

As with males, however, it is not clear whether
the most delinquent and aggressive offenses of
affiliated female gang members are gang- or
nongang-motivated. "Gang girls" are more likely to
develop police records when they are with the
delinquent group or gang than when they are not.
Also, the more delinquent the male group, the more
delinquent the affiliated females. Nevertheless,
the larger proportion of delinquent females
appears to be unaffiliated (Sarnecki 1986), and
the most delinquent females are not gang
affiliated.

The active gang female, like the active gang male,
is part of a highly turbulent and violent social
world. But according to one set of observers,
violence patterns of female gang members seem to
be quite different. While violence occasionally
occurs from being a perpetrator of a fight or in a
dispute over leadership in the female auxiliary,
more often it results from resistance to becoming
a victim in a robbery, rape, a domestic quarrel
with a male gang member, or as "defense against
slights to public reputation, such as accusation
of cuckolding, promiscuity" by other female gang
members (Campbell 1984b). Much female violence
results from intragroup female auxiliary tensions
and disputes over affections for the same male;
only rarely do females develop a reputation for
use of knives or guns or for being vicious
fighters (Brown 1977).

On the other hand, Harris states that Latino gang
girls in the San Fernando Valley, California, have
been engaged in a similar range of offenses--some
extremely serious--"vandalism, narcotics, assault,
battery, rape, burglary, extortion, and murder"
(Harris, 1988, p. 1). One of the "homegirls"
Harris interviewed reports that she had "a couple
of guys up against the wall with a hammer . . .
here . . . The girls run with the guys. They do
like whatever comes down" (Harris 1988, p. 128).
Of the 21 homegirls studied, "only two reported no
drug use . . . all others reported heavy drug use-
-especially PCP. Three of the girls had been drug
dealers, one was a heroin addict who had spent the
major part of her years between ages 13 and 18 in
detention centers for drug abuse, and three others
were or are heroin users" (Harris 1988, pp. 132-
133).

Females have been viewed in the past as both the
cause and the cure of much male delinquency.
Evidence for these assertions has not been
systematically gathered. The general assumption is
that females achieve status and excitement through
provocation of fights between members of rival
gangs, carrying messages, spying, and carrying
concealed weapons. Sarnecki (1986) claims the
presence of females may incite males to commit
delinquent acts. Some observers, however, suggest
the female affiliate operates on its own to
socialize as well as to produce or stimulate
deviant behavior (Giordano 1978; Quicker 1983;
Campbell 1984a). The most important approval or
sanction for female gang members' deviant behavior
may come from interactions with other females and
on the basis of norms of the auxiliary, rather
than from the male gang. There is also some
evidence that females may be instrumental in
persuading boyfriends to leave the gang and settle
down. They can be instrumental in preventing males
from engaging in situational gang delinquencies.
Males will tend to avoid gang delinquencies in the
presence of females (Klein 1971; Bowker, Gross,
and Klein 1980).

A similar set of contradictory notions exists
regarding the social and psychological character
of the female gang member. On the one hand, female
gang members are reported to have low self-esteem,
to do poorly in school, to be rebellious, and to
use their affiliation with auxiliary or male gangs
to shock parents or other peers (Campbell 1984a;
Harris 1988). Women in motorcycle gangs are
reported to be especially disturbed and abused.
They join because of "the excitement gang life
offers" (Davis 1982a, 1982b) but soon may be held
involuntarily or continue to stay because of fear.
The motorcycle woman--often older than her street-
gang equivalent--may develop strong dependency
needs, plays the role of servant or prostitute,
and often becomes a "battered woman" (Ibid.).

On the other hand, some researchers argue that
female gangs or auxiliaries are socially adaptive
to life opportunities in the ghetto or barrio.
Females who join the gang are not severe deviants
or misfits. They use the gang for a variety of
"normal" or typical adolescent purposes: to learn
about grooming and keeping secrets from the adult
world (Campbell 1984a), how to meet prospective
mates, and how to get along in the harsh world of
the ghetto (Bowker, Gross, and Klein 1980; Quicker
1983).

The particular geographic-historical-cultural
context may define the gang role of the female. In
Ponce, Puerto Rico, "sexes are seldom mixed, but
there is a phenomenon in which female leaders may
take over male gangs temporarily while their
partners are in prison. Gangs in Ponce are often
family-based where members have close blood
relationships" (Office of the Governor,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989, p. 10).
Leadership is maintained in a single family, gang
roles are inherited, and there are training and
initiation patterns for youth (Office of the
Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989, p.
10).

The patterns of entry and departure from the gang
or auxiliary seem to differ for females and males.
Females are rarely drafted into the gang. They
join and leave even more casually than males do.
The age range of females entering the gang appears
to be a little younger than for males, about 12 to
14 years old. Most females cease their membership
between the ages of 16 and 18, at an earlier age
than males. Hagedorn (1988, p. 5) reports that
almost all members of the four female gangs he
studied in Milwaukee matured out of the female
gang when they turned 18 (also see Harris 1988).

A variety of reasons have been set forth for why
females do not seem to form gangs as readily as
males, to participate as extensively, or to be as
substantially affected by them. Thrasher (1936, p.
228) suggests that females have been conditioned
to be less aggressive and violent than men. "The
behavior of girls, powerfully backed by the great
weight of . . . custom, is contrary to the gang
and its activities . . . Girls, even in urban
disorganized areas, are more closely supervised
and guarded than boys and are usually well
incorporated into the family group or some other
social structure." Brown offers these reasons for
why females in Philadelphia's black ghettoes seem
less attached to gangs than boys: "First, it is
common practice in the lower-class black family to
assign the females the task of supervising younger
siblings . . . and practicing domestic chores . .
. this . . . limits the amount of exposure the
female will have to street life and gang
interaction. Second, lower-class black females
have more exposure to mainstream ideals . . .
[they] move [more] freely . . . between the ghetto
. . . and mainstream life style than do black
males . . . Third and most important . . . females
are not pressured into joining gangs [or] . . . to
aid in territorial defense" (1977. pp. 222-23).

In any case, a variety of questions and issues
remain with respect to who the female gang member
is and why and how she participates in gang
activities. We know much less about the
characteristics and performance of gang females
than gang males.

----------------

CHAPTER V: MEMBERSHIP EXPERIENCES

The youth gang is temporarily adaptive to the
interests and needs of the youth in terms of his
mainly adolescent stage of development within
particular contexts. It provides psychological,
social, cultural, economic, and even political
benefits when other institutions, such as family,
school, and employment, fail. The individual grows
and develops and learns to survive through his
gang experience. But, as a rule, the gang serves
the youth poorly in preparing him for a legitimate
career or for a personally satisfying long-term
life experience.

Entering and Leaving the Gang

Most of the discussion has been at the individual
or social-psychological level, with the social or
economic environment as a background. There has
been little systematic research on why, how, and
especially under what circumstances a youth joins
a gang and even less research on why, how, or
under what circumstances a youth leaves a gang.
Beginning efforts are being made to specify risk
factors for entry into a gang, for example: known
association with gang members; presence of
neighborhood gangs; having a relative in a gang;
failure at school; prior delinquency record,
particularly for aggressive acts; and drug abuse
(see Nidorf 1988; Spergel and Curry 1987).
Probation officers in Orange County, California,
identify minors "at-risk for gang involvement," if
they display one or more of the following
characteristics: self-identification with a gang,
wearing colors, writings about a gang (such as
placa, or graffiti), association with a gang
members, as well as having gang members in the
family (Orange County Probation 1989). 

Some recent reports refer to social situations or
contextual events that account for the development
of gangs, or the conversion of street groups to
gangs, and for those circumstances that are
associated specifically with the breakup of gangs.
The development of gangs in Los Angeles city and
suburban communities has apparently occurred under
various circumstances. Gang violence developed
first in the city and was followed much later by
drug dealing. In the suburbs, drug dealing came
first, followed by gang recruitment and gang
development (Valdivia 1988). In Milwaukee, two
analysts recently observed that group social
events can trigger gang formation; "The emergence
of some of the gangs was associated with . . .
youth . . . breakdancing and drill teams [that]
swept the black communities. In some cases, the
transition from dance groups to gangs came about
when fights broke out after dance competitions.
But there were also a number of traditional corner
boy-groups already in existence at the time. As
fighting between groups became more common, the
corner boys, like the dance groups, began to
define themselves as gangs" (Moore 1988, p. 12).

Gang socialization processes vary by age, context,
situation, and access to alternative roles. A
great many reasons for joining a gang have been
identified. Some youths join a gang because of
needs or wishes for recognition or status, safety
or security, power, excitement and new
experiences--particularly under conditions of
social deprivation (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Ley
1975). The youths seek identity and self-esteem
they cannot find elsewhere (Cartwright, Tomson,
and Schwartz 1975).

Joining a gang may be viewed as normal and
respectable even when the inevitable consequence
is a series of delinquent and violent acts.
Stealing, aggression, and vandalism may be
secondary to the excitement of interacting with
other peers of similar class, interest, need, and
persuasion (Sarnecki 1986). The consequences of
joining a gang and participating in delinquent
acts may not be recognized by adolescents or even
young adults (Deukmajian 1981; Rosenbaum and Grant
1983).

Joining a gang has been viewed by some as a
desirable and expected process in certain
communities. Honor, loyalty, and fellowship are
viewed as the reasons youths join gangs at a
certain age, particularly in lower-class white
ethnic and Hispanic communities with extended
family systems and strong traditional
identification of the residents with each other
and the neighborhood. The gang is seen as a
vehicle for "preserving the barrio and protecting
its honor" (Torres 1980; see also Horowitz 1983).
The gang serves as an extension of the family and
the development of the clan. Older brothers,
relatives, friends, and friends of friends have
belonged to the gang. Multigeneration gang
families identified with the same gang are not
uncommon (Deukmajian 1981).

Joining a gang may also result from a rational
calculation to achieve personal security--
particularly by males in certain neighborhoods.
The youth may be harassed or attacked on the
street or in school if he is unaffiliated, belongs
to the wrong gang, or comes from the wrong
neighborhood. Ironically, although the gang member
may feel safer, there is evidence that a gang
member is more likely than a nongang member to be
attacked, at least by another gang member (Savitz,
Rosen, and Lalli 1980). This problem may assume an
ingroup, out-group, inter-ethnic, or interracial
conflict character. Youth from Hispanic, Asian, or
black populations new to a school or community
dominated by another ethnic or racial populations-
-whether white, Hispanic, or black--may be
constrained or persuaded to join a gang for the
purpose of protection.

Joining a gang may meet social and psychological
developmental needs of troubled and deprived
youth. It provides a way of achieving status and
self-importance. The gang member can "control"
turf, schools, parks, and prisons often when he
cannot perform adequately in these settings and
achieve respect for himself through legitimate
means (New York City Youth Board 1960; Yablonsky
1962).

Some youths indicate that they join and stay in
gangs for financial reasons. The gang provides
sanction, contacts, and preparation for a variety
of criminal gain efforts. Historically, the gang
member has been able to attract the special
attention of adults in organized crime (Spergel
1964; Ianni 1974). In recent years, the gang has
become a place to make contact with drug dealers
and prepare for a career as a drug dealer,
enforcer, or hit man for a drug entrepreneur
(Miller 1975).

Joining a gang may not be difficult. It most often
occurs as a youth hangs around and comes to be
accepted by certain key members: "You come to the
square, you belonged to the group" (Berntsen 1979,
p. 92). Forcible recruitment is not common and
intimidation is more indirect than direct. The
threat of intimidation is seldom carried out,
although on occasion a youth who refuses to join
can be severely beaten.

Initiation requirements have become part of the
tradition of gang life (New York City Youth Board
1960; Yablonsky 1962; Jansyn 1966; Patrick 1973).
These requirements, which may be in large part
mythology or at least inconsistently applied, are
said to range from drinking, using drugs, fighting
other members, and running a gauntlet to stealing,
shooting a member of an opposing gang, and even a
police officer.

There is little research on the process of a
youths leaving gangs, but there is growing
evidence that substantial numbers of gang members
do not cease affiliation at the end of
adolescence, usually in the late teens. Youths
leave gangs for a variety of reasons--including
the influence of a girlfriend, interested adults,
and of concerned parents. Often battle fatigue
sets in. Frequent arrests and incarcerations take
a toll on the youth emotionally and on his
family's finances. The family, including the gang
youth, may move out of the neighborhood to avoid
gangs or seek better job opportunities. The gang
may splinter or dissipate. As the youth reaches
the end of adolescence, he may feel he is ready
for the role of adult, find a job and settle down-
-if alternate roles are open to him (New York City
Youth Board 1960; Spergel 1966).

A youth may wish to leave the gang but be unable
to, particularly if he remains in close physical
proximity to other gang youths in the neighborhood
or prison. The threat of violence from opposing
gangs or his own gang may also induce him to
remain. The murder of core gang members or leaders
planning to leave their gang has been reported
(Collins 1979, p. 35).

There is now ample evidence of the presence of
young adults in gangs. Gangs composed mainly of
young adults, even with middle-aged gang members,
have been acknowledged. Horowitz (1983) makes the
following observations in respect to Chicano gangs
in Chicago:

Only a few core members turn away from street
status once they reach 18. Some become politically
conscious, others turn to families, and a few
become drug addicts. [p. 181]

Once a reputation has been publicly confirmed, it
does not fade away overnight. It becomes difficult
for a former gang member to refrain from fighting
when a breach of etiquette against him was meant
as a challenge to his claim to precedence. [p.
183]

Many gangs on 32nd Street have senior
organizations or previous members now in their
twenties, thirties and even forties . . . If
asked, they still identify themselves as gang
members and claim other members as their best
friends. [p. 184]

Hagedorn, Macon, and Moore, referring mainly to
black gangs in Milwaukee, indicate that: "More
than 70 percent of the 260 who founded the gangs
were reported as still being involved with the
gang today, more than 5 years after the gang was
founded" (1986, p. 5).

Gang members who worked in community-action
programs, supported by foundation grants in the
late 1960's, were typically in their twenties
(Spergel et al. 1969; Poston 1971). Motorcycle
gangs consist mainly of young adults. Prison gangs
are composed largely of young men in their
twenties and thirties (Jacobs 1974, 1977; Moore
1978; G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Some observers
have come to view gang membership in recent years
as "permanent and lifelong" (Moore, Vigil, and
Garcia 1983) and as "a way of life, a cause"
(Daley 1985).

Individual Status and Gang Cohesion

A need for recognition or reputation or status is
the most common explanation for why individuals
participate in gangs. This recognition can be
achieved through delinquent or violent activity
which involves group support or cohesion, which in
turn creates a further need by the individual to
maintain or augment status in the gang and
stimulates even more delinquent and violent
activity. These relationships may be nonrecursive
(see fig. 1). 

Status-seeking is a central concept in the
explanation of the behavior of the violent youth
gang (see Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Spergel 1964;
Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Klein 1969, 1971; Moore
1978; Horowitz 1983). The process of achieving
status is sometimes interpreted by psychologically
oriented analysts as a way of resolving a variety
of personal and social problems.

Relationships among gang members may be viewed as
a continuing struggle to manage status as defined
and redefined by the gang (Thrasher 1936, pp. 275-
76). Each gang member seeks status through certain
types of aggressive or defensive behavior
meaningful in the eyes of members of his gang,
members of opposing gangs, peers, or adults in the
community (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975).
The achievement of gang status may signify power,
influence, or access to illegal opportunity or
markets. The drive for status can be all-
compelling and the behavior required to achieve it
may result in arrest and imprisonment which
becomes a further means to elevate one's status--
particularly for younger members. The gang status
system thus creates special problems for
traditional law-enforcement.

Short and Strodtbeck observe that the "existence
of the gang is crucial to an understanding of the
manner in which status management is carried out
by gang boys regardless of whether the threat
originated from within or outside the group. The
gang provides the audience for much of the acting
out which occurs . . . It's the most immediate
system of rewards and punishments to which members
are responsive much of the time" (1965, p. 215). A
situation may "arise when a gang leader acts to
reduce threats to his status by instigating
outgroup aggression . . . leaders resort to this
action because of the limited resources they have
for internal control of their group--particularly
when their status is attacked" (Short and
Strodtbeck 1965, p. 185). The strong need for
status comes fundamentally from the lack of
resources and the weakness of controls internal
and external to the group. The constant
competition for honor and reputation, the
precarious ranking system, and hierarchical
structure that "depends on continuous confirmation
by others of one's placement" results in a
constant state of flux, highly unstable
relationships, and a continual forming and
reforming of the group (Horowitz 1983, p. 89; see
also Patrick 1973). Unstable and frustrating as
the gang status system is, it nevertheless assumes
special importance in poor or changing
neighborhoods, in schools with extremely high
failure rates, and increasingly for minority youth
and gang adults in prisons.

Over time, however, a gang may stabilize. There
may be less competition for positions of honor and
less turnover among leaders and core members.
Researchers disagree about the conditions under
which status striving is reduced or enhanced in
its contribution to delinquency and violence--
particularly through the process of group
cohesion.

Two different sets of arguments regarding the
relation between cohesion and delinquency,
including violence, have arisen. The first
question has to do with whether gangs are cohesive
or not. Are gangs loosely or closely knit, stable
or unstable? A current argument is that youth
gangs are less cohesive than media and police
reports suggest. Law enforcement agencies and the
media often speak of organized criminal gangs.
However, many gang-type groups, particularly in
Eastern cities, e.g., New York City in the 1980's,
have been regarded as so loosely knit that they
are essentially "pick-up groups" (Galea 1988). The
members or participants hardly know each other and
may associate only for a few hours or days. Some
of these groupings are not even classified as
gangs but rather as delinquent groups which
participate either spontaneously or with some
purpose and limited plan in violent and/or non-
violent crimes.

The alternate argument is that gangs may be more
cohesive and stable than is traditionally
recognized. In some communities, particular gangs
persist over time, members interact as friends,
and mutual support develops and persists. Gang
members trust and depend on each other and create
strong bonds over the years. "There are few
culturally accepted forms of affiliation in which
they can maintain close relationships and remain
tough warriors--an identity for which there are
few alternatives" (Horowitz 1983, p. 179). Young-
adult gangs involved in a good deal of criminal
activity may also require bonds of trust and
mutual dependency. Jacobs emphasizes the important
attitudinal dimension of gang attractiveness in
prison: "By far the most important function the
gang provides their members at Stateville is
psychological support . . . the organizations give
to the members a sense of identification, a
feeling of belonging, an air of importance.
According to the Chief of the Vice-Lords, `It's
just like a religion. Once a Lord always a Lord.
People would die for it . . . The Lords allows you
to feel like a man . . . it is a family with which
you can identify'" (1977, pp. 152-53; see also
Moore 1978).

A further argument is that gangs can be both
cohesive and loosely knit, stable and unstable in
the same settings or communities. The same gang
may go through various phases. In his study of an
Italian gang in a stable community, Jansyn
observes that gangs go through periods of high and
low cohesion and that phases of organization and
disorganization increase or decrease solidarity
(1966).

The second set of questions has to do with the
relationship between gang cohesion and delinquent
behavior. There may be a connection between the
gang member's need for status and the connection
or interactions between gang cohesion or
solidarity and delinquency. Jansyn (1966) argues
that when gangs go through a phase of
disorganization, a burst of activity--often
delinquent--occurs to mobilize and cohere the
group once again. Klein and Crawford (1967), by
contrast, argue that group cohesion precedes
delinquent behavior and that the highly cohesive
gang is likelier to engage in gang activity than
is the diffuse or weakly organized gang. Klein
(1971) later modified this view and proposed that
delinquent behavior and gang cohesiveness were
interactive, although the predominant direction
was from cohesion to delinquent activity.

Several writers argue that delinquency and gang
membership are not only important and interactive
but also depend on the kind of delinquency engaged
in and the measures of cohesion used (Cartwright,
Tomson, and Schwartz 1975; see also Morash 1983;
Stafford 1984). Other researchers suggest the key
element may be the need for status by persons
vying for, or exercising, leadership. When a
member aspires for leadership or an established
leader feels threatened, gang activity--of a
delinquent or more often a violent character--and
increased cohesion follow (Yablonsky 1962; Short
and Strodtbeck 1965). The implication, therefore,
is that delinquency, violence, or at least some
individual's provocative activity may occur even
prior to group interaction and feelings of
solidarity (see also Thrasher 1936; Kornhauser
1978).

Klein's (1971) Ladino Hills experiment in Los
Angeles was an effort to test the notion that gang
cohesion causes delinquency and that a reduction
in group cohesion would be followed by a reduction
in delinquent behavior. This first, theoretically
conceptualized, quasi-experiment in gang
intervention was partially successful. Attempts at
de-cohering the gang were successful. Gang size
and the group delinquency rates were reduced.
However, the rate of mutual interactions of those
who remained, or were part of the gang system, was
not reduced. Fewer delinquent gang events
occurred, but individual delinquency rates did not
significantly change during the two-year test
period (1 1/2 years of program and a subsequent
six-month followup period). Klein (1971) claims he
was most successful in limiting the recruitment of
new members and the development of a new klika to
the gang, at least over the short term.

Intellectual/Personal Disability

We know little about the intellectual and personal
disabilities of gang delinquents that distinguish
them from nongang delinquents, or about the
differences among different types of gang youth.
There has been speculation that core members are
more troubled or troublesome than fringe members
(Yablonsky 1962; Klein 1971).

We have little systematic knowledge about gang
members' intelligence or physical and mental
health. The weight of opinion is that gang
members' intelligence may be somewhat below normal
(Klein 1971) and that they tend to be more than
normally "hostile, disruptive, defiant, aloof,
distant, arrogant, and defensive" (G. Camp and C.
Camp 1985, p. 12). Yet the bases for these
judgements are not clear. A variety of
demographic, socio-economic, and community
conditions have not been adequately specified.

On purportedly culture-bias-free measures of
arithmetic, vocabulary, memory, and information,
gang members tested lower than other lower-class
nongang boys (Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Based on
performance on a standardized intelligence test
where a normal score is 100, Klein reports that in
a sample of 243 gang members that the median score
was 84, and only 8 youth tested above 100. "One-
third of the boys have scores that would dictate
their placement in special education classes"
(1971, p. 85). Farrington, Berkowitz, and West
(1982, p. 331) indicate that "frequent group
fighters" tended to have low vocabulary scores at
ages 10 and 14. However, in a recent survey of
prison gangs, officials estimated that gang
members were of average intelligence. In fact,
their education level was perceived as above
average (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Taylor (1988)
recently reported that youths in corporate drug
dealing gangs in Detroit did well in school and
some came from middle-class families.

More attention has been paid to the socio-
emotional than to the intellectual disabilities of
gang members. A wide range of views exists, but it
tends to emphasize the troubled and defective
character of the gang member's development. Almost
all of the research is observational with few, if
any, scientific controls.

At one extreme are claims that core members tend
to be pathological and gang leaders tend to be
sociopaths or megalomaniacs. The gang is a useful
channel for expression of hostility and striving
for power (Yablonsky 1962; see also Cartwright,
Tomson, and Schwartz 1975). Certain gang members
show a preference for aggression based on their
feelings of inferiority and their fear of being
rejected or ignored by others (Gerrard 1964).
Peter Scott, a British psychiatrist, concludes
that the "gang proper" is an atypical form
springing from pathological rather than social
pressures (Scott 1956; see also Downes 1966). An
observer of gangs in Glasgow, Scotland notes that
it was not the "strongest nor the fittest, the
tallest nor the brightest boys who became leaders
of lieutenants in gangs, but the most
psychologically disturbed, those with lowest
impulse control" (Patrick 1973, pp. 100-101).

Other analysts tend to characterize gang members
as troubled, perceptually disoriented, or
emotionally disturbed--but not in such fearsome
terms. The gang boy is viewed as an emotionally
unstable individual who has difficulty making
satisfactory interpersonal relationships and has
"poor impulse control." The gang is an aggregate
of individuals with "shared incapacities";
aggression is a "coping mechanism that receives
constant reinforcement within the gang" (Klein
1971, pp. 81-85). Gang members have "worse
relationships than boys who do not have a criminal
record . . . those boys appeared to be anxious to
be accepted by their mates" (Sarnecki 1986, p.
20). The motorcycle gang member is a "free spirit
who has very little loyalty to others. His
essential commitment is to himself . . . he has
difficulty keeping close friends. He has no
remorse about his behavior" (Davis 1982a, p. 22).
Gang boys are "inferior in their general powers of
concentration and in their perceptual ability to
integrate meaningful wholes out of partial
information (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz
1975, p. 11).

A number of writers have observed that leaders of
gangs who are considerably older than the average
age of members are often very personally troubled.
In one gang where the average age was 16, the core
members were 26, 24, 23, and 19, and the leader
was especially violent (New York City Youth Board
1960, p. 16).

In some contrast, other writers see gangs as
composed of youths with social liabilities, but
who also have certain social strengths and who
find positive values in the gang. "Gang boys are
less assertive. They are more reactive to false
signals . . . they tend to be neurotic and
anxious, less gregarious and more narcissistic."
However, the gang member is not characterized by
"desperation in search of stable human
relationships, nurturance and security. He seems,
rather, to have worked out a reasonably realistic
solution to problems. The gang boy, in many
respects, is a pragmatist" (Short and Strodtbeck
1965, pp. 231-33). Gordon considers gang behavior
"not merely an expression of individual
psychological disturbances or of group norms, but
also as a complex of techniques through which boys
in a group strive to elicit nurturant, accepting,
and highly dependable responses from each other--
perhaps to compensate for deprivation in their
family backgrounds or other institutional
contexts" (1967, p. 48).

The gang member's disturbance is seen by some as
functional to survival in his environment through
the gang's status system. Krisberg states that the
theme of survival permeates many of the
explanations of why youths join gangs and do the
"crazy things" they do. Few of these youths have
experienced anything but severe economic
deprivation. They find themselves on the brink of
adulthood without education or training to compete
successfully in the labor market. "Survival
through `hustling' or `fighting' is a functional
adaptation to an uncompromising social
environment" (Krisberg 1974, p. 116).

Furthermore, the breakdown or weakness of a series
of social institutions is often cited as an
explanation of a gang member's disturbance and of
his desire for gang membership. In one type of
explanation, gang members come from "stressful
family situations, especially the disproportionate
female-centered or transient-male adult models"
(Vigil 1988, pp. 5-8). The identity crisis for the
male adolescent Chicano is resolved by his joining
the gang "which stresses male survival traits on
the streets" (Vigil 1988, pp. 5-8). Vigil suggests
that the gang institution serves the same function
as male initiation rites in other cultures (Vigil
1988, pp. 5-8; see also A. Cohen 1955; Bloch and
Niederhoffer 1958; Miller 1958). Vigil has also
developed the notion of "multiple marginality" to
explain the role of the gang member in adapting to
street life in the inner city. The youth gang--
especially in the Mexican-American community in
southern California--is viewed as a collective
resolution to problems associated with "territory,
age-grading, and gender socialization."

A more positive view of gang-boy personality is
taken by other researchers who reject the idea
that most gang members are psychopathic,
sociopathic, or even that they are significantly
socially or personally disabled. This rejection is
implicit in Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) assumption
that gang boys are not alienated from conventional
institutions or middle-class values. Since they
cannot make it in these systems or through
established means, they simply find alternate ways
to achieve their desired objectives (Cloward and
Ohlin 1960; see also Short and Strodtbeck 1965).

The most sanguine view of the personalities of
gang members is that of Walter Miller--at least in
his earlier writings: "They are not psychopaths,
nor physically or mentally `defective'; in fact,
since the cornerboy supports and enforces a
rigorous set of standards which demand a high
degree of fitness and personal competence, the
gang tends to recruit from the most able members
of the community" (1958, p. 17). Some gang leaders
complete high school, a few go on to college, or
even graduate school and settle down to middle-
class business or professional lives.

While there is considerable disagreement as over
whether gang youths are emotionally disturbed and
to what degree, there appears to be some consensus
about the dynamics of gang violence and crime and
the status and control purposes that such behavior
serves in the group context. For certain youths,
violence in the gang context is "highly valued as
a means for the achievement of reputation or
`rep'" (Yablonsky 1962, pp. 194-292). The social
disabilities of gang youths "contribute to the
status dilemmas of these youngsters and in this
way contribute to involvement in delinquency"
(Short and Strodtbeck 1965, p. 243). The need for
status is pronounced among gang members and should
be viewed as "compensatory over-assertion" (New
York City Youth Board 1960, p. 58; see also
Cartwright, Howard, and Reuterman 1970). The gang
fulfills "status needs that would otherwise go
unmet" (Friedman, Mann, and Friedman 1975, pp.
600-601). Gang violence, minor or major, may be
viewed as an effort to establish and maintain
power, whether exercised democratically or
autocratically (New York City Youth Board 1960).

----------------

CHAPTER VI: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF GANG
DEVELOPMENT

Social disorganization, often brought on by rapid
and/or large scale population movement, and
poverty interact to weaken institutions of
socialization, social support, and social control
and create the need for alternative social roles
and career routes through residual organizations,
such as youth gangs. This chapter examines the
contexts and institutional conditions--family,
school, politics, and organized crime--that
encourage or support gang development.

Insight to the development of gangs has often been
sought through theories of ecological and social
disorganization. Ecological theories attempt to
relate characteristics of a population to those of
its surrounding space and material conditions.
Social disorganization refers to the disarray of
norms, values, and social and organizational
relationships or the lack of social integration at
system rather than subsystem levels. In other
words: families, groups, and organizations may
seem to function well on their own terms but not
as part of a coherent, complex informal and formal
system committed to dominant cultural norms and
values. 

More than 60 years ago, Thrasher wrote that
"gangland" occupies the "poverty belt" and
"interstitial areas" of the city and is
characterized by "deteriorating neighborhoods,
shifting populations, and the mobility and
disorganization of the slum . . . It is to a large
extent isolated from the wider culture of the
larger community by the processes of competition
and conflict which have resulted in the selections
of its population. Gangland is a phenomenon of
human ecology" (Thrasher 1936 [also 1929 edition],
pp. 22-23; see also Shaw and McKay 1943). 

Urban ecologists and criminologists have
speculated that different kinds or degrees of
social organization may exist in low-income
communities. The disorganized low-income community
is characterized by more extensive deterioration,
more pronounced social disorder, and greater
violence than are other communities (Kobrin 1951;
Gold 1987). Gangs arise and develop in both more
stable and less stable slum areas, but assume a
different character when social institutions fail
to function as agencies of social control (Shaw
and McKay 1931, pp. 107-8).

The growth and development of cities may be
characterized by a succession of different racial,
ethnic, and income groups, with "a corresponding
succession of gangs, although gang names and
traditions may persist in spite of changes in
nationalities" (Thrasher 1936, p. 198). This
process may occur in small or large, suburban or
inner-city areas where poor immigrant communities
are settling. It may also develop where social
institutions are in the process of rapid change
and where community organization is weak.

Short observed that the most unstable or
disorganized local communities produced conflict
subcultures of violent gangs in Chicago in the
early 1960's: "Areas which have undergone very
rapid transition from white to Negro, such as the
West Side . . . Here was found the fullest
development of the conflict subculture . . . and
areas on the fringe of expansion of the `Black
Belt' . . . in such areas, conflict most often
occurred for the purpose of `keeping the niggers
out'" (Short 1963, p. 32).

The 1960's through the 1980's saw the exodus of
higher-status whites and nonwhites from many
central city areas, a consequent increase in
proportions of lower-status minorities in certain
areas, and the development of segregated barrios
or ghettoes--often in low-income public housing
projects. The recruitment pool from which members
of youth gangs and law-violating youth groups are
drawn increased (Miller 1975). Some note that in
the newer of the changing ghetto areas, children,
adolescents, clubs, developing gangs, and
established gangs teem and engage in conflict with
each other because so many groups of different
backgrounds and orientations come together at
school, community centers, or on the streets (New
York City Youth Board 1960; Breen and Allen 1983;
Hagedorn 1988).

Gang violence may be less virulent in the
stabilized low-income ghetto. Internecine conflict
may subside as smaller gangs are integrated into
larger, better-organized gangs and into the
general community. Competition and conflict may be
rationalized and focused on criminal gain, not
simply on turf and status. Still, some of these
less unstable but very poor areas with lower rates
of gang conflict may have higher overall rates of
delinquency and crime than do high gang-crime
areas.

Systematic tests of these ideas have only begun to
be carried out. Cartwright and Howard (1966)
performed an ecological analysis of the prevalence
of gangs in Chicago in the 1960's using community
area data. They did not find support for
Thrasher's (1936) notion that delinquent gangs
were concentrated in Chicago's "poverty belt";
gangs in the 1960's were found in all parts of
Chicago. In the 1980's, gang incidents were
reported in all of the Chicago Police Department's
25 districts, although incidents were concentrated
in certain districts. Cartwright and Howard (1966,
pp. 357-58) found that high-crime-rate gang areas
were coterminous with only about half of the high-
crime-rate delinquency areas. In other words, high
rates of gangs and gang activity were also found
in lower-delinquency-rate areas.

Bernard Cohen (1969a, 1969b) found in the 1960's
that gangs, mainly black, were located not simply
in poor communities but in those segregated
sections of the city that were culturally and
socially isolated. He reasoned that certain
populations--whether first-generation European
immigrants in the 1920's and 1930's; blacks in the
post-World War II era; or, most recently, Hispanic
groups--may be "set apart, stereotyped and placed
in a ghetto culture." The entire life experience
of youth may be confined to a particular area or
social context and result in intense
identification with the territory (Cohen 1969a,
1969b). Social and cultural isolation may interact
with social disorganization, poverty, and low
income to produce different gang problem rates.

Curry and Spergel (1988) performed an ecological
analysis of the relation of gang homicide,
robbery, and burglary to poverty level,
unemployment rate, and mortgage investment on a
community-area basis in Chicago in the 1970's and
early 1980's. Gang homicide and serious
delinquency rates were differentially distributed
in Chicago's 77 highly racially segregated
community areas. The best predictors of
delinquency rate were economic variables; however,
the best predictors of gang homicides were a
combination of social-disorganization factors that
are identified with recently settled Hispanics and
income variations.

In a recent study, Shannon observes that
"different types of delinquency and crime are
generated in different social milieus . . . ." He
adds that "to the extent that a relationship
exists between juvenile and adult behavior, it may
be explained by the operation of the juvenile and
adult justice systems, as well as by continuities
in the behavior of juveniles and young adults"
(1988, p. 213). He also found that more serious
offenses--such as assault, burglary, theft, and
robbery--had significantly increased within the
three age cohorts in Racine, Wisconsin, from 1942
to 1955--particularly for the age group between 18
to 20 years old (Shannon 1988, p. 214).
Furthermore, "crime rates were highest in the
inner-city and interstitial areas whose residents
were employed at lower-level jobs and were
frequently unemployed" (Shannon 1988, p. 214).

Shannon and his associates attribute the changing
rates and growing severity of the crime problem to
the city's rapid growth during the 1950's and
1960's, which was accompanied by increasing
individual mobility. "Delinquency and crime had
become part of a cyclical pattern of change which-
-while it involved decline and deterioration in
the inner city and interstitial areas--was
likewise an outgrowth of population movement to
and commercial and recreational development in
peripheral areas that were readily accessible by
auto or bus" (p. 215).

The interaction of social disorganization and lack
of legitimate resources or availability of
illegitimate resources may largely account for the
development of deviant-group and subcultural
phenomena in a variety of contexts. The family,
school, politics, organized crime, and prison may
contribute in special ways to the formation and
development of gang patterns and individual gang-
member behavior. Very limited direct attention has
been paid to the relation of gangs to these
institutional contexts. What we do know about the
relationships is usually a product of studies
designed for other purposes--such as the relation
between family and delinquency, between school and
delinquent peer group, the assessment of safe
schools, the nature of participation in grassroots
or "machine" politics, the patterns of recruitment
to organized crime, or the pattern of general
correctional system change. Some exceptions exist:
Thrasher's (1936) chapter on "The Gang in
Politics," Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) formulation
of the "criminal subculture," Spergel's (1964)
discussions of "Racketville" and "Haulburg,"
Jacobs (1977) description of the development of
the gang problem in a correctional institution,
and--most recently--Sullivan's (1989) discussion
of differential work opportunities and youth crime
in three inner-city neighborhoods.

Family

A large school of theory and research finds the
origins of delinquency, youth affiliation with
delinquent groups, and related individual personal
and social disorders primarily in the defects of
family relationships, parental character, and
early childrearing practices (Rutter and Giller
1983), though little research has been done
specifically on the relationship between family
variables and participation in delinquent gangs.

Vigil states that gang members in southern
California generally are "raised in poorer homes,
in disproportionate mother-centered family
situations, with more siblings, and under
problematic impoverished economic pressures, such
as unemployment and welfare . . . In large part,
[there are] early childhood indications of deviant
activities, such as running away from home, petty
shoplifting, and street fighting" (1988, p. 3). He
argues that the process of becoming a gang member
occurs through an accumulation of parental
physical and emotional neglect by parents, abuse
from older street-children, punitive educational
incidents, and poor role models.

Disruption or disorganization of the family may
lead youths to seek compensatory values in gang
membership (Sherif and Sherif 1965, 1975).
Research observers and gang members have indicated
that the gang is like a family in many ways. The
gang can be very appealing to immigrant or
newcomer youths in urban areas, who are cut off
culturally, socially, and economically from their
families. The gang leader often adopts a paternal,
or even a maternal, role--somewhat passive, yet
controlling; providing guidance, warmth, and
affection (New York City Youth Board 1960).

Some researchers downplay the importance of family
variables in determining gang involvement. Among
delinquents, gang and nongang youths do not vary
significantly in such characteristics as broken
homes, having parents with criminal histories,
level of intelligence, or the highest school grade
achieved (Friedman, Mann, and Friedmann 1975).
Earlier studies by Shaw and McKay (1931) and
Tennyson (1967) suggest that equal numbers of
nongang boys seem to come from the same types of
family structure and low socioeconomic backgrounds
as gang boys. In a recent cohort study of sixth
through eighth graders in four inner-city schools
in Chicago, Spergel and Curry (1988) found that
the absence of a father was a fairly strong
predictor of arrests for Hispanic youth, but was a
weak predictor of arrests for black youth. Family
structure did not enter into a second series of
regression equations to explain gang-related
activities. Instead, the presence of a gang-member
sibling or parent in the home was the best
predictor of gang activity, particularly for
Hispanic youth (Spergel and Curry 1987).

Miller (1976b) suggests that the family and the
gang may play complementary socialization roles
for gang members, teaching them different survival
skills. Sager (1988) sees the gang as
complementary to the family in the lower-class
Mexican-American barrio culture in Los Angeles;
the women perform dominant roles in the home and
the men perform their warrior roles on the street.
Yet the family, school, and gang exist in
distinctive and parallel social and cultural
subsystems. Furthermore, while there may be an
adequate relationship between the youth and his
family, the family may be unable "to affect ties
with other societal institutions--educational,
cultural and social" (Harris 1988, p. 153). There
may be little interpenetration or interdependency
among these societal institutions. Thus, in the
two-or three-generation gang family--while there
may be little explicit support or encouragement
for gang membership--a functional cultural
relationship may still exist. 

There seems to be a consensus that other variables
interact with family variables to produce gang-
problem youths (Rutter and Giller 1983). Thrasher
(1936) saw the lack of adequate parental or family
supervision as contributing to the likelihood that
a youth would become a gang member in a poor,
disorganized community. Based on a series of
recent studies, Reiss's study concludes that "it
is the territorial concentration of young males
who lack firm controls of parental authority that
leads them into a peer-control system that
supports co-offending and simplifies the search
for accomplices" (1987, p. 251).

School

Considerable attention has been paid to
delinquency in the school (Toby 1983; Elliott,
Huizinga, and Ageton 1985; and Gottfredson and
Gottfredson 1985). There has, however, been little
examination of the relation of gang problems to
schools. Thrasher (1936), for example, paid scant
attention to gangs in schools. Albert Cohen (1955)
noted that delinquent subcultures were often in
opposition to the norms of the school's middle-
class culture. Hargreaves (1967) and Rutter et al.
(1979) have described delinquent groups and
subcultures in public schools in Great Britain
that developed not so much in opposition to the
school's system or norms and values, but as
alternatives to it.

Concern with gangs and schools arose in the mid-
1970's. National surveys, however, scarcely
addressed group-related delinquency in or around
the school or differentiated between delinquent-
group and gang-related problems (National
Institute of Education 1978; Gottfredson and
Gottfredson 1985). The few studies that
specifically address the school and gang problem
are based often on nonrandom informants,
nonsystematic data collection, and subjective or
perceptual data sources. Statistics usually are
not provided or are open to question. Issues of
reliability, validity, and especially consistency
of operational definitions can be raised.

In six large cities, informants reported "the
presence of identified gangs operating in the
schools, stabbings, beatings, and other kinds of
assaults on teachers," and that the schools in
Philadelphia are "citadels of fear" with "gang
fighting in the halls" (Miller 1975, p. 46). In
Chicago, 50 percent of public school students
believe that "identifiable gangs are operating in
and around the majority of schools, both
elementary and secondary." One in 10 students
reports that street-gang members make them afraid
when they are in school, have either attacked or
threatened them, and have solicited them for
membership--although mainly when they are not at
school. Gangs are present in all 20 districts of
the Chicago school system (Chicago Board of
Education 1981, pp. 182-84, 189).

Kyle (1984) reports that 45 percent of the males
and 22 percent of the females in two public high
schools in probably the most gang-ridden community
of Chicago were asked to join gangs in or around
the school (p. 10). Twenty-five percent of the
dropouts interviewed said that their major reason
for dropping out of school was "fear of gangs"
(Kyle 1984, p. 10). Kyle also claims the "the
authority within the schools ultimately belonged
to the gangs, rather than to the school
administrators" (1984, p. 10).

A report on the Evanston, Illinois school system
provides a somewhat similar picture. Ninety-one
percent of the high-school students "personally
know one or more students who are gang members"
and "almost half (47 percent) of the students
describe the gang problem as a big problem"
(Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 16). In an
evaluation of alternate education programs in 50
schools around the county in 1982, 13 percent of
males and 5.2 percent of females reported they had
been involved in a gang fight (Gottfredson,
Gottfredson, and Cook 1983).

Ley (1975) observes that the majority of school
transfers in Philadelphia's inner-city schools--
particularly at the high-school level--were
related to the students' fear of gangs or to their
desire and need of high- school officials to move
students--either to protect them or to get rid of
key "gang bangers." Two law-enforcement officers
from Los Angeles claim the "student-opportunity
transfers and busing programs" served to "spread
gang violence" into the immediate area of the
school as well as back to the original
neighborhoods and express the hope that "these
programs will not be prolonged any longer than is
necessary" (Jackson and McBride 1985, p. 28).

The school-related gang problem appears different
in character from the street-level gang problem.
It is generally less serious and involves younger
youths. Self-report and police-arrest data appear
to tap different dimensions of the gang problem.
The Chicago Board of Education study reports that
younger students, aged 12 or 13, are as likely as
students aged 18 or older to be solicited for gang
membership (1981, pp. 184-87). However, a
substantial majority of youths arrested for gang-
related crimes are over 14 years of age (Spergel
1986). Teachers and principals perceive gangs to
be considerably less of a problem in and around
schools than do students (Chicago Board of
Education 1981, p. 189).

Police data generally indicate a more limited
school gang-problem than do other reports. Chicago
Police Department statistics show that 10 to 11
percent of reported gang incidents in 1985 and
1986 occurred on school property generally. Only
3.3 percent of the reported gang incidents took
place on public high-school property in 1985.
Chicago public-school discipline reports for the
same period show that only 2 percent of discipline
code violations were gang-related, but that gang
incidents were disproportionately serious--
accounting for 12 percent of weapons violations,
26 percent of robberies, and 20 percent of
aggravated batteries (Spergel 1985).

Participant-observation studies over three decades
consistently indicate that gang members are
typically behind in their studies or are school
dropouts (Klein 1968). All of the 47 gang
"founders" interviewed in Milwaukee had dropped
out or been kicked out of school; most had been
suspended (Hagedorn, Macon, and Moore 1986).
School is regarded as alien ground by many gang
members, and they seek to leave as quickly as
possible (Horowitz 1983). The school is a place
where gang members' weaknesses and inadequacies
are made public (New York City Youth Board 1960).
In one recent study, 80 percent of gang members
were high-school dropouts (Reddick 1987). In
another study, less than a third of gang members
graduated from high school or later returned for a
general equivalency diploma (Hagedorn 1988).
However, gang members do not necessarily devalue
school and do not criticize gang members or others
for doing well (Short and Strodtbeck 1965;
Horowitz 1983). But most gang members believe that
formal public education has little to offer them:
"In an environment where education is meaningless,
the gang-barrio fulfills the young man's needs . .
. It is not the school . . . but in the
neighborhood gang is the stuff of living as he
knows it" (Pineda 1974, p. 15).

Gang researchers have observed that gang behavior
may result as much from school defects as from
problems and pressures at home (Short and
Strodtbeck 1965; Joe and Robinson 1978). School
variables are apparently highly predictive of
later criminal adaptations and careers of
delinquent-group or gang youths (Gold and Mattick
1974; Sarnecki 1986).

Politics

Youth gangs have often been linked to urban
political systems in times of rapid change and
social turmoil. Gangs in some cities (particularly
Chicago) and in some contexts (notably prisons)
have provided a means of communication between
political leaders and alienated or isolated low-
income populations. The short-term costs of such
linkage are low but the long-term costs are high
if the gang becomes legitimized and begins to
control information and sanctions affecting local
residents or prison inmates. Gang organizational
strength increases, and opportunities for illegal
behavior are enhanced.

According to one analyst, in the middle of the
19th century: 

. . . gangs were the medium through which the
grassroots and City Hall communicated. Politicians
relied on the gangs for contact and stability,
while residents used the gangs to acquire and
distribute services and jobs. The gang imposed a
social conscience on local businessmen by policing
the neighborhoods; periodically sacking the homes,
hotels, warehouses, and factories of the rich; and
instantly redistributing scarce goods to the
needy. From the 1850's through the dismemberment
of the Tweed Ring in the 1870's, New York's
political machine was largely run from below"
(Stark 1981, p. 441).

During times of social unrest and political
crisis, the gang may be recognized as an
instrument of power and influence and comes to
control resources. A symbiotic relationship
develops between urban politicians and gangs. In
Chicago in the first third of this century,
Thrasher (1936) observed: 

the political boss . . . provides uniforms,
camping funds, and children's picnics to `get him
in good' with the parents and friends of the gang
boys . . . To repay the politician for putting
gang members on official payrolls and providing
subsidies, protections, and immunities . . . the
gang often splits . . . the proceeds of its
illegal activities, controls for him the votes of
its members . . . and performs for him various
types of work at the polls--such as slugging,
intimidation, . . . vandalism (such as tearing
down signs), ballot-fixing, repeating repeat
voting, stealing ballot boxes" (pp. 452, 477).

Kornblum observed the continuity of this pattern
in Chicago in the early 1970's:

A second group of neighborhood influentials which
joined the opposing 10th ward faction was a small
group of superannuated Mexican street-fighters.
Men with nicknames such as `The Rat' and `The
Hawk' with reputations in the Mexican precincts to
match . . . were in ward politics . . . When a
campaign becomes heated . . . a challenging
faction may see fit to call upon its `heavies' for
various strategies for intimidation--including the
systematic removal of the opposition's street
signs and lamp posters" (1974, p. 166).

Use of the gang members was evident in recent
elections in Chicago. The primary elections of
1986 in the 26th Ward--containing mainly newcomer,
low-income Puerto Ricans--involved fierce
competition between Hispanic Alderman Torres,
supported by the Democratic machine; and his
challenger, Gutierrez, supported by reform Mayor
Harold Washington--who was attempting to
consolidate his newly gained power. Both
candidates used gang members to perform a variety
of tasks--getting out the vote, hanging election
posters, and persuading or intimidating voters who
favored the opposition. Members of one gang
supported one candidate, and the opposing gang
supported another. One candidate's coordinator of
precinct captains was the former leader of a major
Hispanic gang renowned for its violence and drug-
dealing activities.

Participation of gangs in urban-community affairs
took different forms during the turbulent 1960's.
Gangs were not an essential component or a
precipitant of urban riots or civil-rights-related
disorders, but peripheral and opportunistic
participants (Knopf 1960; Skolnick 1969). Gangs
are not ordinarily committed to social or
political causes or ideology (however, see Anti-
Defamation League 1986, 1987). Gangs were,
nevertheless, enlisted in Chicago and elsewhere
during the riot period to "cool" and control local
residents. They were used by the police as an
auxiliary force to maintain order; sometimes they
were organized into youth patrols with identifying
hard hats and arm bands to patrol riot-torn
streets. Some gangs "protected" storekeepers
against riot damage for a fee.

Gangs in the 1960's were also solicited by
frightened government departments, private
foundations, social agencies, and community
organizations to participate--as partners or
recipients of funds--in a variety of community-
development and social-service projects. Gangs
were viewed as one of the few viable organizations
that could stabilize the disordered ghettoes. The
fact that gangs could represent criminal interests
and contain disoriented and incapable members was
usually overlooked or misunderstood.

In this period, gangs were sometimes asked to
participate in political campaigns and support
candidates. Gang members, themselves, ran for
political offices--including alderman and model
cities representative in Chicago. Major
controversies arose among politicians, community
organizations, and units of government over the
participation of gangs in community and political
affairs (see Spergel 1960, 1972; Spergel et al.
1969; Poston 1971; Short 1976). Such gang
involvement subsided in the 1970's; however, there
have continued to be occasional efforts by black
gangs in Chicago's West and South sides to charter
and establish separate political parties.

It can be argued that gangs continue to serve the
interests of a variety of organizations and
officials concerned with urban problems. The
media, law-enforcement agencies, youth-serving
organizations, and local political administrations
use the gang problem as a means to obtain
resources. Moral indignation, various community
campaigns, and social-intervention programs seem
to have more often benefitted criminal justice,
youth-serving, and local community organizations,
and political administrations in a variety of
ways, but not necessarily in controlling or
reducing gang problems.

Law enforcement agencies are particularly prone to
citing gang activities as a rationale in
requesting resources for increased manpower,
specialized equipment, and the development of gang
units and special task forces. The police have
also tended to politicize the gang problem--using
it to protect "police turf" and their competing
suppression philosophy against other competing
organizations--such as probation departments,
youth agencies, and community organizations--and
more moderate or prevention approaches. The police
may initially claim victory in their "fight"
against gangs, until it becomes clear that the
problem is worsening and more complex approaches
are required (see Miller, Baum, and McNeil 1968;
Sherman 1970).

Organized Crime

Some case studies (Spergel 1964; Ianni 1974) and
theoretical speculations (Cloward and Ohlin 1960)
portray certain youth gangs as stepping-stones to
roles in adult organized crime. Although a
significant number of gang youths become adult
criminals, it is unclear what proportion move into
organized crime. Much depends on how organized
crime is defined. This narrow definition is
offered by the President's Commission on Organized
Crime: "Groups that engage in a variety of
criminal activities are [classified as] organized
crime when they have the capacity to corrupt
governments" (1985, p. 181). Ianni claims, more
broadly, that "any gang or group of criminals
organized formally or informally to extort money,
shoplift, steal automobiles, or rob banks is part
of organized crime--regardless of its size or
whether it operates locally or nationally" (1974,
pp. 14-15). If burglary, the selling of weapons,
and drug selling are added, most criminally
oriented youth gangs or youth segments of adult-
controlled criminal gangs would be considered as
organized crime.

Thrasher noted more than 50 years ago that there
is "no hard and fast dividing line between
predatory gang boys and criminal groups of younger
and older adults. They merge into each other by
imperceptible gradations, and the latter have
their real explanations for the most part in the
former. Many delinquent gangs contain both
adolescents and adults" (1936, p. 406). Scholars
in the 1950's and 1960's possibly exaggerated the
distinctiveness of youth gang subcultures in
different types of lower-class neighborhoods
(Cloward and Ohlin 1960; but see Short and
Strodbeck 1965). Certain minority groups, for
example, African-Americans, in certain lower-class
communities across the country, no longer seem
blocked off from significant access to criminal
opportunity systems, particularly drug
trafficking.

Youth gangs and adult criminal subcultures
probably became more integrated with one another
in the 1970's and 1980's than they were in the
1950's and 1960's with the increased entry of
newer minority groups into organized crime,
greater competition among nascent criminal
organizations, the relative increase in older
youth and adults in street gangs, and expanded
street-level drug markets. 

It is also no longer possible to claim a sharp
distinction between conflict and criminal gang
subcultures. Gangs, drug trafficking, and violence
are related, but in contradictory and unclear
ways. The recent increase of gang violence and
homicide in some black communities in Los Angeles
and on the southside of Chicago has been
attributed to competition over drug markets. By
contrast, the reduction of gang violence in
certain inner-city black communities on the
westside of Chicago has been attributed to control
and domination of the drug market by black gangs.
Furthermore, the decline of gang problems in other
cities--such as New York and Detroit--has been
attributed to increased opportunities for drug
trafficking and the ready transfer of street-gang
knowledge and skills to street-level drug
distribution groups.

The development of motorcycle gangs and especially
prison gangs with close ties to street gangs has
further weakened the distinction between violent
gangs and criminal enterprises. Motorcycle gangs
may have characteristics similar to those of
street gangs: they seek to control and protect
territory and illegal markets, and they "will
resort to bloody violence if the threats and acts
of intimidation fail" (Daley 1985, p. 2).

Planning and organization characterize at least
some of the actions of street gangs and their
subgroups--particularly those engaged in drug
trafficking. The penetration of gangs into
legitimate businesses (albeit under questionable
circumstances) such as store ownership and slum
management appears to have occurred in Chicago
(Pleines 1987). Members of one street gang in
Chicago have recently been convicted of conspiracy
to acquire and sell illegal weapons and to commit
terrorist acts for Libya (Sly 1987a, 1987b).

Law-enforcement officials claim that some of the
older and more successful black street-gang
members in the Los Angeles County area "have
purchased legitimate businesses in order to
launder money. Some of the businesses are
carwashes, auto-painting and fender shops, motels,
auto dealerships, and liquor stores. The next step
could be the added respectability for these
subjects in the community as business leaders or
through politics" (National Law Enforcement
Institute 1990, p. 24). 

Ianni (1974) suggests a close relationship between
youth gangs and adult organized-crime. In New York
City, he reports that "black and Hispanic crime
activists follow the street `rep' of youngsters
just as carefully as the Italians did, and use the
same process of gradual involvement to draw
youngsters into the networks" (1974, p. 124). The
youth gang and the prison are the two major
institutions that prepare youths for participation
in criminal networks.

Ianni predicted the transformation of "what is now
a scattered and loosely organized pattern of
emerging black control in organized crime" into a
"Black Mafia" and into a future Hispanic Mafia
(1974, p. 11). Youth gangs and organized crime may
serve social functions of integrating deprived
minority groups into the larger American culture--
in effect serving as early and middle stages in
America's complex social-mobility system (Ianni
1974, p.15; see also Bell 1953).

It has been said that gangs are undergoing an
evolution from "fighting and relatively
disorganized criminality to the level of organized
criminal activity with adult participation . . .
the transition from `protecting' a streetcorner to
the utilization of the gang as a `power base' to
control narcotics flow on those same streetcorners
should not be an unexpected one" (Sampson 1984,
pp. 7-8). However, it is possible to exaggerate
the organized character of this relationship; it
remains fragmentary and ad hoc even as gang
members move up to mid-levels of street-level drug
trafficking.

Our own recent observations of gangs in a lower-
class Puerto Rican community in Chicago suggest
that a variety of pressures and opportunities
exist for youths in violent gangs to participate
sporadically in organized criminal behaviors. Gang
youths 14 or 15 years of age may engage in part-
time drug peddling--often to augment family
income. One gang leader led younger gang members
in violent intergang rivalries and shootings while
simultaneously engaging in burglary, receiving
stolen goods, and selling cocaine. In another
instance, a local drug-dealer employed a gang
leader on a contract of $4,000 to kill a rival
drug-dealer. The youth shot and killed the wrong
person, however.

Gang members and drug dealers have developed
symbiotic relationships in some inner-city slum
neighborhoods where drug selling is rampant. Gang
members provide protection for drug dealers and,
in return, are paid well for running errands and
performing other favors. Antagonisms between drug
dealers and youth gang members may no longer be as
serious as reported in the earlier literature;
youth gangs may no longer chase dealers out of the
neighborhood (New York City Youth Board 1960;
Spergel 1964; see also Moore 1978).

Furthermore, there is some recent evidence that
the symbiosis between youth gangs and drug dealers
has grown stronger, more pervasive, and may not be
confined simply to inner-city or ghetto area low-
income residents. Taylor speaks of a small
sophisticated group of "organized corporate gang
members" 13 to 19 years of age (1988, p. 27). Some
attend school regularly, a few may do better than
average academic work (Taylor 1988, p. 27). He
estimates that 30 percent come from middle-class
and 2 percent from upper-class homes. The
predominant majority, 80 percent, said it did not
use drugs, but all said their main objective in
joining gangs was money. Their primary criminal
operation was drug sales (Ibid.).

There is recent but spotty evidence that Asian
youth gangs may be more directly linked to
organized crime than are black or Hispanic youth
gangs. Chin states that "the emergence of Chinese
street gangs is closely related to the Tongs [i.e,
certain businessmen's or community benevolent
associations] . . . when members dropped out of
schools and began to hang around streetcorners in
the community, Tong leaders hired them to run
errands for gamblers and to protect the gambling
places from outsiders and the police" (1989, pp.
83-84). He traces the historical socialization
sequence as follows: 

In 1964, the first foreign-born Chinese gang known
as Wah Ching (Youth of China) was organized by
young immigrants to protect themselves from
American-born Chinese . . . A year later, when the
immigration laws were changed, the Wah Ching
rapidly evolved into a powerful gang by recruiting
members from the influx of new arrivals . . .
Later, Wah Ching members became the soldiers of
the Hip Sing Tong. The gang converted itself from
an ordinary street gang into the youth branch of a
well-established adult organization" (1989, pp.
87-88).

A police official in California indicates that the
Bamboo gang from Taipei "invited some of our young
street-gang members in, and they organized and
established [a local faction] of the Bamboo gang .
. . They remained in our city . . . laying out an
organizational structure, areas of responsibility
for all the crimes, and--in effect--took control
over certain types of racketeer activities in our
city and in the surrounding cities" (President's
Commission on Organized Crime 1985, p. 188).

An official in the Miami Police Department
reported that black and Hispanic street-gang
leaders from Chicago and New York recently arrived
to hold a business convention with major South
American drug suppliers and to "have a good time"
(Wade 1987 personal communication). Relationships
among youth gangs in New York, Ohio, Florida,
Illinois, and elsewhere were cemented, and
discussions centered upon drug distribution,
increased contact with main suppliers, and
avoiding middle-level dealers to maximize profits
(Wade 1987).

Johnson et al. suggest that New York City youth
gangs have replaced existing basic institutions no
longer able to perform legitimate socialization
functions and are channeling youth into roles in a
criminal underclass economy:

The power of the crew lies in being highly
structured at a time when other structures, once
taken for granted (schools, family, traditional
work), are either weak or transient. The crew
recruits naturally aggressive youngsters, channels
their energy into productive moneymaking work,
accepts them into a group, and provides a
foundation where loyalty and honesty are rewarded
(1988, p. 54).

One may speculate that a rough sequence of stages
develops in the relationships among law-violating
youth groups, youth gangs, and criminal
organizations. Deviant youths in lower-class
communities often find their way into law-
violating youth groups or cliques that may develop
into youth gangs under conditions of population
change, intense poverty, racism, social isolation,
and consequent community disorganization. In due
course, youth gangs as such may splinter and
dissolve or lose their violent character when
criminal opportunities, such as drug trafficking,
and adult criminal organizational controls are
imposed. If such controls are partial, the levels
of individual violence may rise as gang violence
decreases. 

Prisons

Prison gangs and street gangs may be components of
the same gang. In most States, prison gangs are
outgrowths of street gangs, but there is some
evidence that gangs formed in prison may also
immigrate to the streets. The prison gang has been
defined as a "close-knit and disruptive group of
inmates organized around common affiliation for
the purpose of mutual caretaking, solidarity, and
profitmaking criminal activity" (C. Camp and G.
Camp 1988, p. 71). Of 33 State correctional
systems reporting the presence of gangs, 21
indicated counterpart organizations in the streets
of cities within the same States (G. Camp and C.
Camp 1985). The leaders of the inmate gangs are
usually individuals who held high reputations and
still have influence on the streets.

The prison gangs of the 1970's may not be quite
like the prison gangs of an earlier period. The
earlier tradition of accommodation between inmate
culture and prison administration no longer
appears to be functioning well. Many of the prison
gangs exist as a response, not to the prison, but
to the streets. The power of prison gangs in
recent decades appears to result from both urban
social and economic breakdown and from changes in
the prison control system (Jacobs 1977).

Gang problems on Chicago's streets increased in
the 1960's during a period of rapid social change
and political instability. Mass jailing of gang
leaders and members followed. The Chicago gangs
gained a foothold in the Illinois prisons in the
early 1970's. Some observers attribute
contemporary gang problems in the Illinois prisons
to a mistaken approach in the 1970's when certain
prison administrators acknowledged the gangs as
organizations and tried to work with them to
maintain inmate control. Leaders were expected to
keep order and, in return, were rewarded with
special privileges and prestige. The result was
"increasing gang power and control, as well as
gang rivalries and violence" (C. Camp and G. Camp
1988, pp. 57-58).

The rise of prison gangs and disorders in
Washington State prisons has been attributed to
the development of "the drug subculture and civil
disobedience--as a result of the Vietnam War,
black nationalism, and the civil-rights movement;
increasing prison numbers; changes in political
power; changes in State corrections systems; and
rehabilitative prison reforms . . . Unprecedented
latitude was given to the prisoner population . .
. organizations occupied physical space that was
off-limits to staff" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988,
pp. 59-60).

When prison officials recognize, legitimize, and
collaborate formally with gangs, the result may be
a short-term improvement in housekeeping routines
but a long-term struggle among staff,
administration, and gang leaders for power (G.
Camp and C. Camp 1985). As on the street, the gang
can serve as a residual source of quasi-control
and stability, but with negative consequences for
legitimate order and the long-term conventional
adaptation of individuals or gang members.

The criminal activities of gangs in prison have a
more organized character than on the streets.
Money, drugs, and property represent important
symbols of the gang's ability to control and
exercise influence. The sense of ganghood is
reflected in macho images, tatoos, special attire
(G. Camp and C. Camp 1985), official titles, and
sometimes even religious symbolism. The activities
of prison gangs include "extortion, intimidation,
drugs, gambling, strong-arm robbery and homosexual
prostitution . . . Violence has centered around
the enforcement of threats, discipline of members,
and gang rivalry over turf. Gangs infiltrate
strategic assignments; bribe weak officers; and
abuse visitation privileges, money and drugs" (C.
Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 57).

The special problems that confront prison
administrators and staff include intimidation of
weaker inmates; extortion that results from
strong-arming; requests for protective custody;
violence associated with gang activity; occasional
conflict (usually racial) between gangs that
creates disturbance; and contracted inmate-murders
(G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, pp. 46-55; see also
Smith 1987). Discipline problems are far more
severe among gang members than nongang members.
Jacobs observes that disciplinary tickets were
considerably higher for gang members, whether in
segregated cells or not. Most depredations of
gangs generally are not directed against prison
officials but are related to "taking care of gang
business" (1977, pp. 138-174).

Intergang conflict has assumed serious proportions
not only in State prisons but in local jails where
individuals may not yet be sentenced. According to
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, "In
1984, CRIPS were responsible for 25 percent of all
robberies and 54 percent of all felonious assaults
reported in the men's central jail. In just the
first 6 months of 1985, the CRIPS and the Bloods
were responsible for 40 percent of the robberies
and 61 percent of all felony cases there" (1985,
p. 7). The situation had become so serious that a
special unit of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department gang squad was on duty within the jail
as well as on the streets.

----------------

PART B: RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER VII: ORGANIZED RESPONSES TO GANGS

Recent decades have produced four basic strategies
for dealing with youth gangs. Each of the
strategies has assumed some dominance in different
historical periods, and each is related to
different assumptions about cause and effect and
what to do to reduce and control the gang problem.
The strategies, in order of historical sequence,
have included (1) local community organization and
mobilization; (2) social intervention, including
youth outreach or street-gang work; (3) social and
economic opportunities provision; (4) gang
suppression and incarceration; and
(5) organizational change and development. This
fifth strategy usually modifies or elaborates the
four primary strategies.

The strategies or approaches are usually mixed and
implemented through an array of evolving policies,
organizational and program arrangements, and
services and procedures. Youth agencies, criminal
justice agencies, local community organizations
and schools, and increasingly city, State, and
Federal policies appear to have been the means of
development and implementation of these
strategies. There has been extremely little
systematic evaluation of these approaches. Program
research has been carried out mainly in relation
to the youth-agency social intervention strategy
of the 1950's and 1960's. Almost no evaluation
research has taken place on the effectiveness of
the law enforcement suppression approach. The
following discussion examines the nature of these
organized responses to the youth gang problem with
special attention to promising policy and program
arrangements.

Community organization/mobilization

This early strategy, based on the idea of social
disorganization, focused on the rapid population
and institutional changes that were regarded as
contributing to gang formation at the local
community level. Urban ecologists of the 1920s and
1930s observed that great waves of immigration,
mainly from Europe, were associated with problems
of cultural and social adaptation (Thomas and
Znaniecki 1918; Park and Burgess 1921; Shaw and
McKay 1943). Family ties were weakened and new
community institutions were not strong in the
transition to social patterns acceptable to the
larger society. Adjustment was particularly
difficult for first generation males. Delinquent
groups and gangs grew and developed as residual or
interstitial socialization structures in the
inner-city areas where these populations usually
settled (Shaw and McKay 1943; Thrasher 1936). The
gangs were products of insufficient supervision or
social control by existing institutions, such as
the family, church, school, or youth agency.

The organized response to youth gangs prior to
World War II involved local community groups
taking more responsibility to deal with immediate
neighborhood or local community conditions
presumed to have influenced the creation of youth
gangs and delinquent groups. The Chicago Area
Project and its community committees and later
decentralized local welfare councils attempted to
bind elements of local citizenry, local
organizations, and the criminal justice system
into collaborative responses to address the
delinquent group problem--probably relatively mild
compared to current youth gang problem (Kobrin
1959; Schlossman, Zellman, Shavelson 1984).
Emphasis was on community mobilization and
coordination of available local resources, with
special emphasis on utilizing indigenous
leadership, even ex-delinquent group members or
ex-convicts. A key idea was to restore a sense of
community--to use local leaders to provide support
and to stimulate citizen involvement that would
directly and indirectly lead to more acceptable
youth behavior.

The development of the youth gang problem in the
1940's and 1950's brought with it more complex
efforts to better coordinate agency and community
efforts. Citywide or even statewide special
projects evolved. Outreach social services were
sponsored by welfare councils or coalitions of
agencies as well as youth authorities (Crawford,
Malamud, and Dumpson 1970; New York City Youth
Board 1960) and probation departments (Klein
1968). Citywide social welfare or youth-service
programs were introduced into local communities to
deal with gang problems. The earlier base of local
white ethnic organization did not exist in the
weaker, more recently arrived or expanded black
and Hispanic communities in the northern urban
centers. Specialized non-community-based
organizations were established, and the strategies
and interests of various agencies, particularly
police and youth agencies, at times clashed or
went their separate ways (Spergel 1969).

The pattern of separate, specialized approaches
was intensified in the late 1950's and throughout
the 1960's with the introduction of private
foundation and Federal resources to deal with
race, economic, inner-city youth, and delinquency
problems. The civil rights movement, the growth of
local community-action organizations stimulated by
the Office of Economic Opportunity, and
established agency and political interests created
an increasingly diverse and clashing set of values
for addressing social problems. Also, changing
labor markets no longer provided easy access to
unskilled jobs and opportunities or inducements
for youth to leave the gangs. Youth gangs probably
grew larger and more complex due to changes in the
labor market structure as well as conflicting
philosophies, policies, and uncoordinated agency
programs in response to the evolving gang problem
(Moore 1978; Poston 1971). On occasion, gang
members were viewed as local community leaders and
involved in programs of urban development and even
citizen patrols; more often, they were considered
hoodlums and budding racketeers who had to be
suppressed and incarcerated. With the development
of a broader public welfare set of approaches in
the 1960's, community organization and urban
development efforts no longer clearly targeted
delinquent or gang youth. Focus shifted to larger
problems of housing, education, jobs, and
empowerment for the mass of citizens in low income
areas, most of whom were not delinquent or gang
members.

The strategy of community mobilization to deal
with delinquency and youth gang problems did not
disappear in the 1970's and the 1980's. It took a
variety of forms, increasingly focusing on the
interests of the "good" local citizenry against
the interests of the "bad" local citizenry, mainly
the youth delinquents. Crime prevention and crime
control efforts were more and more closely aligned
with suppression approaches in an attack on crime
(Roehl and Cook 1984; Wilson and Kelling 1982).
Attention turned to the control of violence on
school grounds--school staffs, parents, and
students were mobilized to preserve safety and
maintain security (Gottfredson and Gottfredson
1985; Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and Cook 1983).

In its most recent evolution in the late 1980's
and early 1990's, the idea of community
organization or mobilization indicates the
development of coalitions of agencies, schools,
criminal justice agencies, community groups, and
even former gang members (as workers or mentors)
in efforts to deal collectively and consensually
with the problem of gangs, especially gang
violence and drug trafficking. The idea
incorporates notions developed in prior historical
periods, including local community agency
responsibility, interagency coordination,
grassroots citizen participation, community or
problem-oriented policing (including law
enforcement prevention activities), as well as
youth involvement. A recent 1989 initiative of the
Office of Human Services, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (Federal Register, April
14, 1989), to deal with the problem of juvenile
drug gangs illustrates this newer approach.

Social Intervention/Youth Outreach/Street Work

Beginning in the 1940's, a stream of social
science theory and empirical findings served as a
basis for social agency interest in the 1950's and
later in outreach services for deviant youth. The
assumption was that lower-class communities,
lower-class culture, and deviant youth groups were
coherent and functional systems. Certain lower-
class communities and youth gangs were not
disorganized, but stable, even positive phenomena
(Whyte 1943; Kobrin 1951; Miller 1958; Suttles
1968). Gangs were viewed as serving a variety of
adaptive needs of lower-class male youth in coping
with status frustration, alienation, or social
isolation in a middle-class dominated world
(A. Cohen 1955). Norms and behavior pertaining to
group rivalries, insults, retaliations, colors,
signs, symbols, and identification with turf did
not, in the 1940's and 1950's, apparently result
in as deadly street-gang wars as those currently
in certain cities.

The assumption of youth-agency programs was that
youth gangs were viable or adaptive and could be
redirected to fit in with the expectations and
needs of the larger society. Youth gang norms and
values could be changed with the aid of outreach
supportive services. Counseling and group
activities could be used to persuade youth gang
members to give up unlawful behavior. The gang
itself was to be the vehicle of its own
transformation. The small gang or subgroup was to
be the unit of attention of the street worker. The
manipulation of gang structure through group
meetings, recreation, group counseling, and
referral of individual members for services was at
the heart of the efforts to co-opt or redirect
gang values and behaviors.

Street-gang programs, including outreach efforts,
special peer counseling and group development
activities, and crisis intervention or mediation,
were the means for the transformation of the gang
and its member behaviors. A principal assumption
was that the gang had positive potential and that
only selected negative structural and process
elements required modification. Workers who
understood group dynamics, were sensitive to the
distinctive norms and patterns of gangs, and able
to establish positive relationships with
aggressive and troubled youth could serve as
mediators of youth gangs in conflict with each
other and with the conventional world. An
important goal was to de-isolate youth; but first
youth gangs had to be "reached" and worked with in
their own setting and to some extent on their own
terms (Spergel 1966).

The youth outreach approach targeted specific
gangs and gang youth. It was often not part of
other existing youth service programs. Close
relationships were established with gang youth and
some of the workers were viewed as overly
identified with gang members. The police began to
argue that youth or street workers served to
cohere gangs and contributed indirectly to an
increase in gang crime. Klein's research found
that gang crime was reduced when street workers
were withdrawn from service to youths on street
corners, and when gang members were dispersed
(1968). This view was not necessarily shared by
other researchers (Gold and Mattick 1974).

Youth-outreach approaches were sharply curtailed,
if not abandoned, in the late 1960's and 1970's as
gang conflict problems seemed to subside in a
number of cities, as youth agencies turned their
attention to other forms of youth deviancy, such
as status offenses, and especially when it became
evident that older youth and young adults were now
part of gangs that had become criminalized and
were not amenable to traditional street-work
counseling or recreational strategies. A few
programs remained, but social intervention and
value transformation gave way to limited social
control or mixed social intervention and
suppression approaches in the form of city or
area-wide crisis network intervention programs in
close collaboration with criminal justice
agencies.

By the late 1980's, youth agencies began to target
younger youth in efforts to prevent serious gang
violence and criminal behavior, especially drug
trafficking. Street workers decreasingly
emphasized mediation of intergang disputes and
more frequently attempted to coordinate efforts
with law enforcement and probation. Involvement of
local citizens and former gang members in these
control efforts characterized newer modified youth
outreach approaches. The schools slowly became a
context for preventive efforts. An implicit or
explicit division of responsibility developed with
law enforcement taking primary responsibility for
dealing with older, hardened core gang members,
now increasingly involved in drug trafficking, and
youth agencies responsible for work with at-risk
younger youth.

The social intervention strategy has been slowly
modified and become increasingly varied in its
implementation. The strategy has now been
incorporated into a range of social agencies,
treatment organizations, criminal justice
agencies, schools, and grassroots groups,
including churches. The strategy now includes
crisis intervention, outreach, diversion,
counseling, role modeling, group work, casework,
drug prevention and treatment, pre- and post-
sentence services, tatoo removal, conflict
resolution, intergang mediation, leadership
development, referral for services, job training
and development, temporary shelter, case
management, and attempts at religious conversion.

Opportunities Provision

Concern with the rising rates of delinquency,
unemployment, and school failure by inner-city
youths in the late 1950's and 1960's led to a
series of large-scale resource infusions and
efforts to change social institutions, including
schools, and establish new types of training
institutions directed to inner-city youth. These
efforts included, also increased, opportunities
for political participation for local citizens and
a new relationship between the Federal Government
and local neighborhoods in the solution not only
of delinquency, but poverty itself. Conventional
youth-work strategies based on notions of changing
the individual or youth gang were regarded as
insufficient. Structural strain, lack of
resources, and relative deprivation were the key
ideas that explained delinquency, including youth
gang behavior. Social and economic institutions,
or the lack of sufficient legitimate means rather
than the criminal behavior of gangs and individual
youth, had to be primarily addressed (Merton 1957;
Cloward and Ohlin 1960).

The opportunities provision strategy in the
1960's, however, did not specifically address the
youth gang problem. Existing agencies and
institutions serving low-income and minority
populations were the principal targets of the
newer policies and programs supported mainly by
Federal initiatives in the late 1960's and early
1970's, often on a city- or statewide basis. The
Ford Foundation, the President's Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development, the
Office of Economic Opportunity, the Labor
Department, and local foundations stimulated the
development of new programs through the schools,
neighborhood organizations, special training
programs, job projects, business, and industry
toward the social and economic advancement of
people, including youth, in disadvantaged inner-
city and rural areas.

Broad-scale multi-service agency programs were
established and directed to alleviating problems
of poverty through provision of increased social
opportunities or access to them. Distinctions
between social intervention and social opportunity
strategies and objectives were not clearly made.
Grassroots and client groups were involved in the
development, but more often in the delivery of
these opportunity-related services. Youth gangs
were not often targeted specifically, but when
they were, the programs sometimes enhanced rather
than reduced the development of gang and criminal
behavior (Poston 1971; Spergel 1972).

Nevertheless, delinquents and gang members were
sometimes participants in marches and
demonstrations by civil rights and cultural
movement organizations to increase opportunities
in the black and Hispanic communities. It was not
clear, however, that these social movements or
reform social policies substantially benefitted or
served the social development interests of delin-
quents or gang members. On the other hand, there
is evidence that programs such as Head Start and
Job Corps were generally successful, at least over
the short term, in the socialization, academic
development, and retraining of inner-city minority
young people, and even in reducing delinquency. We
are less clear how well these programs targeted
actual or potential gang members.

There is some evidence that the idea of
opportunities provision has narrowed in recent
years. A variety of services are still viewed as a
way of providing access to opportunities, but
counseling and various personal development
activities per se are not in fact equivalent to
basic social opportunities for youth. Focus now
appears to be more sharply on the idea that
opportunities must directly contribute to improved
social status and personal achievement. Therefore,
jobs, job preparation, job placement, job
development, and various training, educational,
remedial, tutoring, apprenticeship and competency
building activities are more directly regarded as
opportunities. Moreover, social opportunities are
increased primarily by societal reallocation of
resources rather than through organizational
changes or community reorganization.

Gang Suppression

A philosophy of major institutional change was
replaced by growing conservatism. With the decline
of community and youth-outreach efforts, the
inability or insufficiency of opportunity
provision approaches to target or modify gang
structures, and increased criminalization of gangs
in the late 1970's and 1980's, community alarm
stimulated the development of a dominant police
suppression approach. The gang was increasingly
viewed as dangerous and evil, a collecting place
for sociopaths who were beyond the reach of most
community-based institutions to influence or
rehabilitate. Vigorous law enforcement to protect
the community became a key goal. Gang members were
to be arrested, prosecuted, and removed from
society for long prison sentences.

Police and prosecutors came to play the primary
response roles. Information systems, surveillance,
and tactical patrols by specialized police units
were developed. Hard-core gang member prosecution,
intensive supervision and vertical case management
by probation departments were the new
organizational mechanisms established to meet the
gang threat. State legislation was passed to
enhance sentences for participants in serious gang
incidents. Interagency task forces evolved and
increasingly targeted older, hard-core youth,
particularly to assist law enforcement with
intelligence gathering and support for large-scale
sweeps and arrests. The schools and youth agencies
also directed services to so called "at-risk"
younger youth, often with the involvement of law
enforcement and probation officials.

The suppression strategy has been associated not
only with more arrests, convictions, and longer
stays in prison for gang members, but with
continued growth and spread of gangs within and
across many cities. The suppression strategy has
at times been associated with a decline of
traditional gang-related criminal activity, but it
has also been associated with a rise in gang
member-related drug trafficking. A massive influx
and concentration of gang-youths in prison has
created problems of custody, and increased
organization and criminalization of gang youths in
some States. The strategy of suppression, in
itself, like youth outreach, local community
coordination/mobilization, or opportunities
provision, has not proved sufficient to reduce the
gang problem and return "control of the streets"
to local citizens. At the close of the 1980's,
many localities, States, and the Federal
Government were seeking effective ways to deal
with an increasingly complex and intractable youth
gang problem.

Organizational Change and Development

Focus on general or abstract strategies may
overlook the variability and complexity of
individual agency or local community responses to
the gang problem. Strategies and programs of
specific community-based social agencies, criminal
justice organizations, school, grassroots groups,
and State and Federal agencies are often mixed,
change over time, and may have distinctive
characteristics. Some of these responses may have
been more successful than others in a given time
and place. Elements of actual programs, such as
specific patterns, procedures, objectives, and
organizational arrangements, need to be carefully
described and analyzed to better understand
traditional and evolving policy and program
models.

Often organizational values have tended to
emphasize narrowly focused program interests.
Agency policy has been based often on separate and
unrelated program goals, such as family
preservation, community protection, youth
development, as well as safeguarding existing
institutional boundaries and organizational
interests. Professional methodologies and
bureaucratic procedures have contributed to
limited or segmented perspectives and programs.
Formulations for dealing with gangs have not
depended on careful assessment and comprehensive
data collection, nor analysis and the development
of complex, interrelated approaches to the
problem. The existence of a youth gang problem has
been denied, distorted in its character and scope,
and even used as a basis for protecting or
augmenting unrelated program objectives.

Presently evolving policies and programs may be
viewed as more comprehensive and community-based
and with a firmer foundation in gang research.
They may emphasize the integration of suppression,
social intervention, opportunities provision, and
community development strategies. The gang is now
more clearly recognized as a residual institution
that develops when family, school, and job market
do not function satisfactorily. Evolving policies
and programs assume that institutions such as
schools, law enforcement, and social services must
adopt new social support and control functions,
while greater efforts are made to strengthen
families and family values and to provide jobs for
at-risk youths. 

The notions of conventional and evolving
strategies, policies, and programs may be useful
as frames of reference to examine and evaluate
what organizations have done and what they may do
in the future to more effectively deal with the
gang problem. Although particular organizations
within law enforcement, probation, corrections,
youth work, local community organizations,
schools, or government may be identified with
either a traditional or evolving model for dealing
with the youth gang problem, the models in reality
are distinctive, rather than each being
categorically different. Although we propose that
an evolving comprehensive and community-based
model is preferred for future policy and program
development, it must also be sensitive to the
interests and needs of a particular agency or
community in specific time and place and
respectful of the critical role for the family in
socializing youth. The best we can do in the
analyses that follow is to emphasize the findings
of policies and programs that have been tested to
some extent in the past, and propose promising
approaches for the future, based on theoretical
and experiential criteria.

----------------

CHAPTER VIII: SOCIAL INTERVENTION

The social intervention strategy, specifically
street-gang work, has probably been subjected to
more evaluation than any other approach to date.
Klein (1971) has described and analyzed
conventional youth-work programs. He attributes
their continuing failure to a variety of program
defects, including confusion over goal priorities.
Program designs usually are not clear as to
whether the central goal is control of gang
fighting, treatment of individual problems,
providing access to opportunities, altering basic
values, or prevention of delinquency (see also
Spergel 1966). Gang programs tend to be process-
oriented, atheoretical or "blandly eclectic,"
producing "inconsistency, random or uncoordinated
programming and uncertainty" (Klein 1971, p. 53),
making it difficult to determine what approach has
been employed and indeed what constitutes success.
Agencies and their workers seem to find value in
activities for their moral imperatives and fiscal
accounting purposes--with little or no relation to
delinquency, gang control, or prevention (Klein
1971, p. 53). This state of inadequate and
disorganized program intervention has produced
"extreme flexibility with respect to client
targets, intervention techniques, and theoretical"
positions (Klein 1971, p. 150); extreme reliance
on generalized counseling techniques and group
programming with emphasis on club meetings,
sports, dances, and camping trips. Klein observes
that the continued use of these approaches that
consist mainly of value transformation, attitude
change, and worker-client identification--despite
repeated evaluations "which prove them worthless--
is enigmatic and suggests that a major function of
control and prevention programs continues to be to
sustain rather than to solve the problems" (1971,
p. 150).

Others have asserted the positive value of street-
work approaches, generally without supporting
data. For example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960)
referred to two "successful" street-work projects-
-the New York City Youth Board Project and the
Roxbury Project in Massachusetts: "The advent of
the street-gang worker symbolized the end of
social rejection and the beginning of social
accommodation" (Cloward and Ohlin 1960, p. 176).
They also observed that "a successful street-gang
program . . . is one in which detached workers can
create channels to legitimate opportunity; where
such channels cannot be opened up, the gang will
temporize with violence only as long as a street
worker maintains liaison with them" (1960, p.
177). In fact, the New York City Youth Board
Project--the largest in the country, which endured
for at least a dozen years--was never evaluated.
Despite initial claims for the Roxbury Project's
success, Miller (1962) concluded in his full
assessment that delinquency was not reduced.

Short and Strodtbeck, observing the work of YMCA-
detached workers, speculated that the presence of
workers "makes less frequent the need for status-
maintaining aggression by [gang] leaders . . . the
gang also recognizes its obligation to the worker
as a quid pro quo for services performed by the
worker and the additional status within the gang
world that accrues to a gang by virtue of their
having a worker" (1965, p. 197). They do not
provide any data to support these claims. Later--
with some contradiction--they note, "Whatever the
effectiveness of the detached worker . . . it
seems to arise from his monitoring of the flow of
events, rather than his effectiveness in changing
personality or values of gang boys" (1965,
p. 270). The quid-pro-quo notion (in terms of the
idea of the "tightness" of the worker/youth gang
member relationship) was tested a few years later
with negative results (Gold and Mattick 1974).

The Roxbury street-work project, begun in the late
1950's and early 1960's, included a comprehensive
set of intervention components: community
organization, family casework, detached work with
gangs, organized group work, recreation, and job
referral. An evaluation, using comparison groups
and a variety of data sources, indicated no
reduction in immoral, law-violating behavior or in
court appearances; the project's impact was
determined to be negligible (Miller 1962).

The Chicago Youth Development Project of the
Chicago Boys' Club, conducted between 1960 and
1966, was based on the same assumptions as the New
York City Youth Board (1960), Roxbury street-work
(Miller 1962), and Chicago YMCA-detached worker
(Short and Strodtbeck 1965) projects. The Chicago
Youth Development project emphasized "aggressive
street work and community organization" (Gold and
Mattick 1974, p. 257) and worked with groups
rather than with individuals. Results indicated
that the target areas continued to account for
"more than" or "at least their share" of
delinquency (Gold and Mattick 1974, p. 257) and
failed to support a key expectation that an
intensive (or "tight") worker-youth relationship
was positively related to effective outcome.
Rather, those youths who said they were closest to
their workers were most often in trouble with the
police (Gold and Mattick 1974, p. 189). It was
concluded that recreational programs accomplish
little. 

One bright spot of the project was that it seemed
to raise youths' educational aspirations
significantly; there was measurable reduction in
delinquency among those who were helped with their
school adjustment (Gold and Mattick 1974, pp. 205,
265). Overall, however, the evaluators had a
negative and pessimistic view: 

Despite the successful efforts of the staff in
finding jobs, returning school dropouts, and
intervening in formal legal processes, the youth
unemployment rate remained at about the same
level. The school drop-out rate increased slightly
and the arrests of youngsters in the CYDP areas
increased over time, with a lesser proportion of
them being disposed of as station adjustments . .
. . On balance, and in the final analysis, the
`experimental' population resident in the action
areas of the CYDP seemed to be slightly worse off
than the `control' population resident in a
similar area selected for comparative purposes"
(Gold and Mattick 1974, pp. 296-97).

Yablonsky's (1962) project in the Morningside
Heights area of New York City was established at
about the same time to control delinquency and
gang activities; it was never formally evaluated.
But Yablonsky's observations are consistent with
the findings of the analysts of other projects:
"to direct the gang's energies into constructive
channels such as baseball did not seem necessarily
to change the Balkans and their patterns . . .
working with them . . . to play baseball resulted
mainly in bringing some additional `baseball
players' into the gang" (1962, p. 53).

The Wincroft Youth Project in the United Kingdom
also used an outreach approach; a variety of group
and casework services were supplied by a large
volunteer staff (Smith, Farrant, and Marchant
1972). While there was no overall reduction in
delinquency rates, the younger youths (aged 14
years and under) with low maladjustment scores who
had never been convicted before appeared to fare
the best--possibly contrary to findings of some
other projects (Smith, Farrant, and Marchant
1972).

The Los Angeles Group Guidance Project, a four-
year detached-worker effort under the auspices of
the Los Angeles County Probation Department
between 1961 and 1965, was similar to the Roxbury
Project and emphasized group programming,
including use of parent clubs. A "transformational
approach"--that is, change of gang-member values,
attitudes, and perceptions through counseling and
group activities--was the key strategy. Klein
concluded that the "project was clearly associated
with a significant increase in delinquency among
gang members" (1968, pp. 291-92). The gangs served
most intensively did the worst and the delinquency
increase was greatest at the lower age levels. He
attributed much of the rise in delinquency to an
increase in programming, especially group
activities that may have increased gang cohesion
and commitment (especially in younger youths) to
delinquent patterns (Klein 1968).

Klein (1971) conducted a followup project to test
the idea that reducing gang cohesion by reducing
group programming and providing alternative
individualized services would reduce delinquency.
The project lasted 18 months with a six-month
followup period. Klein found that the overall
amount of gang delinquency was reduced, but the
delinquency rate of individual gang members
remained unchanged. The size of the gang was
reduced by completely stopping the entry of new
members. Group cohesion was partially reduced.
Klein viewed his project as promising, but
concluded that cohesion reduction was not
sufficiently achieved--and, therefore, the
hypothesis was not adequately tested (1971, pp.
301-307).

Other analysts have endorsed the strategy of
attacking gang cohesion as a means to control and
prevent gang delinquency. Yablonsky, for example,
notes that sometimes the street worker can
unintentionally provide services that give "a
formerly amorphous collectivity structure and
purpose," thereby increasing cohesion and
delinquency (1962, p. 290). Lo, a Hong Kong social
worker and researcher, recently suggested that
gang subgroups should be kept apart and worked
with as independent systems, especially avoiding
communication and cooperation between younger and
older members (1986). "Some older gangsters . . .
likely to grow out of delinquency" should be
"accelerated" out of the gang and "fringe
gangsters, isolated members, scapegoats, outcasts,
and new members weaned away" (Lo 1986, pp. 94-97).

Group-work and value-transformation approaches
have persisted nevertheless. The California Youth
Authority mounted a three-year gang-violence
reduction project in the late 1970's which was
evaluated through 1981, and again for a three-year
followup period from 1982 to 1984 (Torres 1985).
The project negotiated antagonisms between gangs
to resolve feuds, provided positive group
activities--particularly sports and recreation,
and employed gang consultants who were generally
influential members of the gangs (Torres 1980).
More recently, emphasis has shifted to preventing
youngsters from joining gangs and promoting their
involvement in community improvement activities
(Torres 1985, p. 1).

The reported results from the California Youth
Authority project have been positive, but
ambiguous and controversial. Claimed reductions in
gang homicides, for example, may result from a
decision to exclude offenders and victims whose
gang affiliations were unclear from the analysis
(Torres 1985, p. 8). There is also some dispute
over whether incidents of gang violence began to
decline prior to the start of the project. The use
of violent gang-leaders as workers in the project
and the nature of their performance have been
continuing sources of controversy (Bernstein
1980).

The most extreme case of using the gang structure
itself to prevent and control gang crime--
particularly violence--was the Youth Manpower
Project of the Woodlawn Organization in Chicago.
The project employed a considerably modified
social intervention approach and limited social
opportunity strategy and was conducted for one
year from 1967 to 1968.

This highly controversial million-dollar project
was conceived by the Community Action Program of
the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity and was
developed by The Woodlawn Organization, a militant
grassroots organization in conflict with Mayor
Daley's office. Its goals were manpower
development--including job training and job
referral, reduction of gang violence, and
reduction of the risk of riots. The project was
staffed, in part, by leaders of two major gangs:
the East Side Disciples and the Blackstone
Rangers. Each gang was to control and staff two
training centers. The professional supervising
staff of four was too small to deal with both a
gang staff of approximately 30 young adults and
600 program participant youths, 16 to 19 years old
and older. The implicit objective (or possible
assumption) of change of criminal values did not
occur or was not present.

The project stirred great community and political
controversy. The police, local and national
legislators, community agencies, and the newsmedia
took sides in praising or condemning the project.
Finally, the program was shut down, because the
Office of Economic Opportunity refused to provide
funding for a second year. Key leaders of one of
the gangs were charged and successfully prosecuted
for fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The
available aggregate outcome data indicated that
there was an overall decline in crime in the
community during the project period, but a rise in
aggravated battery and gang homicides. There was
no evidence of abatement of gang conflict or
success in job training or placement (Spergel et
al. 1969; Spergel 1972). The two gangs served by
the project have survived and continue to thrive
20 years later--participating in more violent,
criminal, and notorious behavior than ever.

Gang-staffed community development projects in the
late 1960's and early 1970's were part of a
national grassroots movement. Especially
noteworthy were programs established in New York,
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Gang
leaders or ex-convicts with gang backgrounds were
involved in social agency programs, manpower
development, housing rehabilitation, and even
community planning and economic development. In
these projects, conventional youth-work
programming shifted in focus from juveniles to
older adolescents and young adults. They also
attempted to develop a national association of
youth gang organizations called Youth
Organizations United (Poston 1971). No systematic
evaluation or comparative analysis of these
programs exists. A variety of anecdotal reports
indicate that they all eventually foundered. The
programs were not conceptually well-developed;
they were poorly administered, and malfeasance
occurred (Poston 1971). Kahn and Zinn report that
ex-convict gang members even took over some of the
programs. "Gangs, especially Mexican Mafia, have
infiltrated drug treatment and other social
programs, [and] committed bank robberies in Los
Angeles, starting in the early 1970's" (1978, pp.
59-63).

G. Camp and C. Camp (1985) describe a 1976
government-funded project that relied heavily on
gang structure to carry out a service and
community development program. A key objective was
to help ex-convicts, mainly gang members "to
readjust to living in society" (1985, p. 98).
Funds apparently were misappropriated for vehicles
used in gang homicides and in the purchase of
heroin before the project was finally investigated
and shut down. 

Interest and faith in generalized outreach and
social services for gang youth did not die easily.
Just prior to the prototype Crisis Intervention
Network program in Philadelphia, a series of
outreach social service efforts was attempted in
that city. Youths--many of them from gangs--were
recruited from the streets and enrolled in or
referred to counseling, educational, and
employment programs. The premise of one of these
programs in Philadelphia was that adequate
delivery of services would be sufficient to
curtail violent gang disruption by providing
alternative incentives and activities (Royster
1974). Evaluators concluded, however, that such
highly individualized service referral programs
were not effective. Rates of gang homicides rose.
Services to youth did not improve. The failure of
the program was attributed to "poor management
techniques, lack of visibility in the community,
[and] lack of ability on the part of workers to
deliver services" (Royster 1974, pp. 4-17).

Unique to the Crisis Intervention Network, as it
evolved in Philadelphia, was the integration of a
probation unit into the street-work program to
provide control and supervision of older
influential gang members. A suppression or
surveillance strategy was now integrated into a
social intervention or youth-outreach approach.
Street workers and probation officers cooperated
in this landmark approach. A variety of mothers'
groups and grassroots organizations were also
closely involved in crisis intervention,
mediation, and community education activities.
While a formal evaluation was not conducted,
police data suggest a substantial reduction in
gang incidents and especially gang homicides
between 1974 and the 1980's (Needle and Stapleton
1983, p. 81). Some questions remain, however,
about whether the decline may have begun prior to
the initiation of the program and the adequacy of
gang-incident reporting by the Philadelphia police
since 1973 and 1974 has been questioned. A
significant decline of the gang problem in
Philadelphia was also apparently correlated with
other community organization activities.

A unique program in Philadelphia coexisting with
the Crisis Intervention Network was the House of
UMOJA (a "Swahili" word for "unity"), a resident
and nonresident program for gang and other
delinquent youth that created "a sanctuary, a
sheltered environment" (Fattah 1987, p. 4). The
program required adherence to strict house rules
and a signed contract. Individual counseling and
assistance with educational development, job
development, and personal problems were provided
to each youth. The program was comprehensive and
addressed health and recreational needs. It was
based on the assumption of the importance of the
interrelated notions of "the extended family" and
a "modern adaptation of African culture" (Fattah
1987, p. 38).

Earlier, the House of UMOJA had been successful in
its employment of a gang-mediation or gang-summit
strategy, particularly as it mobilized and
involved all sectors of the community. "UMOJA . .
. called for a summit meeting on gang matters . .
. 75 percent of the gangs responded. Over 500
members . . . were in attendance, along with
social workers, ministers, police, teachers, and
other interested persons. The meeting produced a
60-day truce in which no one died from gang
warfare" (Fattah 1987, p. 39). Organizers
solicited the support of gang members in prisons
throughout the entire State before the summit was
called. A "No gang war" poster became the symbol
of a city-wide campaign in which State and city
authorities and businesses participated. Continued
peace meetings were held in schools, police
stations, and campsites throughout the year 1974.
Young people apparently responded massively and
positively (Fattah 1988, p. 9).

While these anecdotal and newsmedia reports
indicate a high degree of success in this
comprehensive program, no systematic evaluation of
UMOJA was available as of 1988. A replication,
however, was planned in Wilmington, Delaware,
through the Juvenile Education Awareness Program.
UMOJA was also operating a similar program in
Portland, Oregon as of 1991.

Gang summits or mediation meetings continue to be
tried on a more limited basis in a variety of
contexts with mixed results. Sometimes they appear
to succeed for a brief period. One knowledgeable
law-enforcement gang expert states, "From time to
time, these `accords' have averted intergang
turmoil, but there hasn't been a peace treaty to
date that can prohibit the disorder that breaks
out when a gang leader summons his `boys' to
retaliate against any foe who offends him, or
dishonors the gang" (Collins 1979, p. 64).
Furthermore, many gang analysts and practitioners
subscribe to Haskell and Yablonsky's statement
that "violent gangs should not be treated by any
official community program as a `legitimate'
societal structure" (1982, p. 457). Giving
credence to an illegitimate structure feeds gang-
leader megalomania and legitimizes the possibility
of further violence.

Whether the activities of the Crisis Intervention
Network, the efforts of other community
organizations or agencies, special police task
forces, or indeed, the availability of alternative
criminal opportunities such as drug trafficking
were primarily responsible for the reduction in
gang violence in Philadelphia remains unclear. A
major decline in gang activity occurred in New
York City at about the same time it did in
Philadelphia without benefit of special crisis
intervention programs or community efforts.

Support for a mixed social-intervention or crisis-
intervention approach, with strong deterrent and
community-involvement characteristics, however,
was also obtained from a recent brief nine-month
field experiment in Humboldt Park, an extremely
violent gang-ridden community of Chicago.
Ecological and individual-level analyses indicated
that the program exercised significant control
over violent gang activity in comparison with
three other similar parts of the city, but had
little effect on nongang crime. The effectiveness
of the program appeared more evident for juveniles
than young adults (Spergel 1986). Other
contemporary crisis-intervention programs in Los
Angeles and Chicago apparently have not fared as
well as the early Philadelphia Program, possibly
because they deemphasized or even replaced the
combined community-involvement and crisis-
intervention strategy with a generalized social-
services gang prevention, value transformation, or
group work model (see Klein and Maxson 1987). A
more recent emphasis on local-community citizen-
involvement seems to be occurring in the Los
Angeles Crisis Intervention project, California
Youth Group Services (CYGS) with some apparently
positive results.

A recent street-work program in San Diego that
emphasized counseling, job referral, acceptance,
and work through existing gang structures was not
clearly successful. Gang-related felonies
decreased by 39 percent in the target area over
two one-year periods, but such crimes were also
reduced by 38 percent in the control area during
the same periods. Furthermore, it should be noted
that while the street-work program was in
operation, the probation department and the
district attorney's office were also concentrating
on gang crime. It is not known what the separate
effects of the detached-worker program were in
comparison to the effects of law enforcement. The
gang problem appeared to abate in San Diego in the
early 1980's (Pennell 1983), but the gang and drug
problem grew more serious again in the middle and
late 1980's, and stronger deterrent approaches are
now being implemented in this city.

With increased concern about youth gang problems
in many parts of the country, there remains a
strong focus on group and individual counseling
with younger youth, coupled with stronger
deterrent emphasis by law enforcement, probation,
and parole agencies in dealing with older youths.
These differential approaches may reflect a
traditional division of labor in which community-
based youth service agencies serve younger,
peripheral gang youths while established control
agencies focus on older, core gang members. This
duality is apparent in the current strategies of
the Los Angeles and especially the Chicago crisis-
intervention programs. The effectiveness of such a
division of labor in the face of an organic social
problem that involves older and younger youth in
interactive, if not interdependent, relationships,
remains to be demonstrated.

Gottfredson (1987) recently reviewed the results
of a series of experiments on peer group or peer
counseling approaches in schools and community
agencies. He concluded that they lend "no support
to any claim of benefit of treatment, with the
possible exception that the treatment may enhance
internal control for elementary school students.
For the high school students, the effects appear
predominantly harmful" (1987, p. 710).
Furthermore, he suggested that "it may be useful
to avoid delinquent peer-interaction entirely
rather than to attempt to modify its nature"
(Gottfredson 1987, p. 710). Community-based peer-
group experiences seem to be somewhat successful
when small group activities integrate a limited
number of delinquent or predelinquent youth into
small groups that are dominated by conventional
youth and guided by conventional youth leaders
(Feldman, Caplinger, and Wodarski 1983).

Individual counseling approaches with gang youths,
where evaluated, have also produced poor results.
The individual gang member seems to be more
strongly influenced by gang norms and gang
pressures in what he does, rather than in what he
says he will do or promises to do during
individual counseling sessions (Short and
Strodtbeck 1965). Caplan reported that "over time,
individual subjects repeatedly demonstrate a
tendency to nearly succeed in adopting final
change behaviors advocated by the treatment plan .
. . remotivation remains a major hurdle to
overcome in reorienting the activities of urban
[gang] youth" (1968, pp. 84-85).

In sum, social intervention programs--whether
agency-based, outreach or street-work, or crisis
intervention programs--continue to emphasize
conventional approaches that show little effect or
even may worsen the youth gang problem. They seem
to be slightly more effective and produce some
positive results when they are designed as part of
a comprehensive or mixed approach. Multiple-agency
service approaches--including value-
transformation, deterrent, or supervisory as well
as opportunity provision strategies, which are
closely integrated with local citizen involvement
and targeted at younger gang youth--may be
promising.

----------------

CHAPTER IX: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Typically, a review of this topic often describes
rather than analyzes the nature and influence of a
variety of suppression and alternate justice-
system strategies and programs for dealing with
the youth gang problem. Very little research or
evaluation has been conducted on the specific
nature and effectiveness of these various policies
and programs. Nevertheless, in the past decade,
the dominant approach for addressing the youth
gang problem has shifted from social intervention
to suppression, although there is currently a
growing awareness by seasoned officials that the
recent tradition of arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration may be insufficient. Other
approaches, usually not clearly defined, may also
be required. 

Justice units are relatively more interdependent
than other systems that deal with gang youth, and
it is difficult to address them separately because
they respond to and sometimes shape the gang
problem. Nevertheless, the police require primary
attention because they are usually first on the
scene of a gang incident and the key definers of
the nature and scope of the gang problem for the
justice system and the community. The police
report data about gang involvement, usually
orienting other units of the justice system to the
problem--and expecting certain behaviors from
them. The police directly determine community and
justice system perceptions and often legislative
responses to the gang problem.

Police

Police approaches are surprisingly complex,
variable, and not easily categorized because they
may represent certain emphases or central
tendencies in a given city or State at a
particular time. Furthermore, certain assumptions,
strategies, and tactics characterize traditional
and evolving approaches. Specialized or clearly
articulated strategies have begun to be developed
in certain police departments in recent years, but
there is still little systematic description and
analysis of law-enforcement strategies for youth
gangs. (However, see Needle and Stapleton 1983;
Collins 1979; Jackson and McBride 1985). No
research evaluations of police antigang programs
exist as they do in the youth-work field,
particularly in respect to outreach or street-work
programs and social intervention strategies. At
this time, therefore, any analysis of criminal
justice systems--especially of police or law-
enforcement programs--must be largely descriptive
and tentative.

A law enforcement suppression strategy
specifically directed against youth gang crime has
been developing mainly since the 1960's. It has
become increasingly sophisticated, resulting in
more arrests and case clearances. The approach
until about 1990 has been based on a "war model"
in most cities, especially in California,
requiring use of special equipment and procedures,
such as: battering rams, helicopters, task forces,
sweeps, sophisticated intelligence, tracking
systems, and specialist training. At the same
time, where the technology of "the war against
gangs" is most advanced, the scope and severity of
the problem often have increased; some critics
believe that there is a causal relationship
between these two developments:

In 1963, when Gang Control [of Philadelphia] was
able to monitor 27 violent gangs, there were 4
gang homicides. Repeated violence mainly took the
form of rumbles, of which there were 46. There
were only 13 shootings . . . . By the 1970's, all
105 [gangs] were being watched . . . . The number
of shootings rose drastically and the number of
rumbles plummeted. In 1973, there were 43 gang
deaths, 159 shootings, and only 7 rumbles.

A gang shooting is fast, low-visibility violence.
It requires one gunman and a moment under cover of
night . . . (Lieber 1975, p. 47).

The correlation between traditional police
strategy, increased police organization, and their
use of sophisticated technology and weaponry; and
the rise in rates of gang violence is probably
spurious. It is not uncommon to blame--directly or
indirectly--a worsening gang problem on law
enforcement. For example, the rise of gang crime
in Chicago in the late 1960's was attributed, by
some, to the activities of the newly formed Gang
Intelligence Unit of the Chicago Police Department
(Sherman 1970). Gold and Mattick claimed that,
because of media publicity generated by the Gang
Intelligence Unit, the Blackstone Rangers' gang
name became widely known to many street groups of
Chicago's black neighborhoods. Furthermore, the
Chicago Police Department (and more recently
Federal law-enforcement authorities) have made
periodic claims to the destruction of this gang,
since the late 1960's (Gold and Mattick 1974, pp.
335-36).

These claims appear to have limited or temporary
foundation in fact. The Blackstone Rangers and
their successor organizations, the Blackstone
Ranger Nation and the El Rukns, have survived,
developed in jail, and continue today to be one of
the significant black gangs in Chicago. On the
other hand, the police--whether a gang unit or
some other unit--cannot be held responsible for
the rise and development of gang organization. The
police cannot be held responsible for the failures
of socialization, social and economic development
by families, schools, neighborhoods, employment,
and for the systematic racism and social isolation
which appear to be highly correlated with, if not
causative of, the gang problem.

The police and the media are sometimes responsible
for a deviancy-amplification process. Stanley
Cohen observes that the gang problem in England
seemed to worsen when the police and media began
to view certain street groups as "warring gangs."
The police "tightened social control efforts" and
expanded the definition of delinquency; the
increased publicity and tension "prepared [the
youths] more for potential conflict, for example,
by carrying weapons. Such actions increased
potential for serious violence" (quoted in Morash
1983, p. 328). The media (newspapers, television,
the record industry, and most significantly the
movies in their portrayal of gang incidents based
largely on police reports) have been responsible
for the spread of gang phenomena (e.g., emerging
and middle-class "copy-cat gangs"). We do not
consider the police or the media responsible for,
but rather interactively facilitative of the
problem at times.

Police, along with delinquents or criminals,
occupy the same no man's land that respectable
society refuses to see or do much about. The
police have been known to refer to themselves
facetiously as "gangs." Furthermore, there is an
old urban tradition of police taunting and
attacking gangs, and vice versa (Asbury 1971). Our
own recent field observations indicate that police
may cross out or mar rather than expunge gang
graffiti and sometimes trigger a turf battle. They
may deliberately release gang youths in opposing
gang territory to see what happens. Occasionally,
a supervisory police officer will admit that his
men commit such provocative actions, but also
imply efforts to control such behavior:

We have problems like police officers acting like
another gang . . . Cops were snatching hats,
urinating in them, stealing jackets . . . a
clubhouse was burned down . . . shortly after two
police officers left the building (Reported by
Sergeant Hargrove, New York City Police Department
in Woodson 1981, p. 89).

The frequency of these police provocations and the
seriousness of their consequences are unknown. On
the other hand, there is ample evidence of
effective intervention by well-trained police
officers in the prevention and breakup of specific
gang situations and the solving of gang crimes. In
fact, there is an extremely high rate of
clearances of serious gang cases--as high as 90
percent--especially in cases involving homicide in
Chicago and Los Angeles. Violent gang crimes tend
to be very visible public-street displays, with
offenders often flaunting colors or gang
paraphernalia and, at times, shouting their own
gang slogans. Witnesses are often present and the
offenders are not difficult to identify.

The key issue, however, is that the ideology of
traditional, "hard-nosed" police suppression is
often developed without reference to the value of
other strategies. "Soft," "preventive," or
community problem-solving strategies are
downgraded or ignored. The police approach is also
often expressed in both moralistic and
organizational-interest terms; for example,
through an attack on sociological or juvenile-
court rehabilitative models.

There is no reason any citizen . . . [should] be
literally held hostage in his home by fear, afraid
to walk his neighborhood. The solution is simply
to take the streets back from the young thugs. As
they make war on the citizens, we must virtually
make war on them. We have waited on the great
enlightened solutions from the sociological world
and they have failed to materialize. It is now
time to take control of our streets and place the
blame squarely where it has always belonged--on
the gang member and on his parents for allowing
him to be what he has become--a street hoodlum
(Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Testimony 1985,
p. 6).

Another major problem with the juvenile system
response to the gang member who engages in
narcotic offenses is due to the parens patria
reason in the juvenile court . . . . These
offenders . . . have learned how to manipulate the
system and avoid proper consequences for their
actions . . . . Law enforcement continually
expresses frustration when an arrested juvenile
drug offender is almost immediately released back
into the community pending adjudication (Davidson
1987, p. 6).

In the hard-nosed deterrent approach, police have
blamed the social reform movement of the 1970's
for current problems that result in lack of
adequate attention to "gangbangers." According to
the police, the problem began with the
deinstitutionalization of status offenders or
runaways. The courts were "prohibited . . . from
taking action against juvenile status offenders .
. . . These laws . . . caused us to abandon those
children who need intervention . . ." (Commander
Lorne Kramer in McKinney 1988, p. 3). Our own
research on status offenders, however, reveals
that only about 2 percent of status offenders who
came to the attention of the Chicago Police
Department in fact have histories as gang
offenders (Spergel and Hartnett 1990).

In the traditional suppression approach, law
enforcement represents itself as an organization
of courageous individuals doing personal battle
against the "bad guys" who should get their just
desserts (Pillsbury 1988). If the gang cannot be
wiped out or destroyed, it must be at least
neutralized, made illegal, or swept up and placed
behind bars, out of sight. Furthermore, a policy
of extreme suppression may emanate from
legislative mandate. The police may be required to
increase "the number of individuals identified as
gang members and the number arrested for violent
gang-related crimes [and] improve the clearance
rate of reported crimes targeted as gang-related"
(Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, pp. 10-
11). The police in California tend to operate
under a broad inclusive definition of gang member
and gang incident. Law enforcement agencies may
come to be not only more specialized and
centralized, but suppressive as well.

Needle and Stapleton have identified three
specialized police forms that deal with the gang
problem: the Youth Service Program, the Gang
Detail, and the Gang Unit. These different
organizational arrangements are, in part, a
function of differences in the perceived scope and
seriousness of the gang problem, department size,
and available resources. In the Youth Service,
juvenile division, or community-relations form,
personnel usually are not assigned gang-control
responsibilities on a full-time basis, but retain
other duties. In the Gang Detail, one or more
officers are assigned responsibility to deal
exclusively with gang control. In the Gang Unit, a
separate and elite structure may be developed to
deal solely with gang problems. Sometimes both
gang and narcotics-control functions are assigned
to the same specialized unit. In a few of the
large cities, specialized gang-units may encompass
comprehensive intelligence, investigation,
enforcement, prevention, community relations,
followup, and liaison responsibilities (Needle and
Stapleton 1983, p. 19ff). More recently in the Los
Angeles police department, the narcotics unit was
assigned responsibility for dealing with gang-
related drug crimes.

The various types of organization may comprise
anywhere from 1 to 400 or more personnel. The gang
unit may be centralized in one location, or
decentralized in several--assigned as part of
local-precinct or district operations. The units
do not evolve necessarily from less to more
specialized structures. Nor do the very large
cities have necessarily the most specialized,
centralized, or largest gang units. Currently, the
New York City and Philadelphia police departments
do not consider the youth gang problem to be
generally a large or serious one. Only two
officers until recently were assigned full-time
responsibility in the juvenile division in the New
York City Police Department, and youth officers in
the various city precincts deal part-time with the
problem. Approximately eight officers in 1988,
assigned to the Preventive Patrol Unit in the
Philadelphia Police Department, have
responsibility for gang youth as well as runaways,
sexually abused children, and other special youth
problems. On the other hand, the Los Angeles
Police and Sheriff's Department have specialized
gang units each with about 200 gang unit officers
each. Chicago's Gang Unit in 1991 contained over
400 specialized police gang officers, carrying out
a variety of functions.

The conventional police suppression strategy is
clear and simple. It is to quickly and effectively
arrest, investigate, track, and assist in the
prosecution and sentencing of gang members,
especially hard-core members or leaders, and to
keep them in jail as long as possible. The
strategy is achieved through such tactics as
surveillance, stakeout, aggressive patrol and
enforcement, followup investigation, the
development of extensive intelligence, and
infiltration of gangs or contexts in which gangs
are found--such as schools (Davidson 1987, p. 1).
Close coordination, exchange of information,
development of information systems, and education
of prosecutors, judges, probation, parole, and
corrections officers are also key elements of this
strategy. Gangs are to be broken up and harassed.
Periodically, saturation patrol and sweeps are
employed. Often, it is the aim of the police to
acquire increased firepower, so that they can deal
with "drug gangs" armed with sophisticated weapons
and vehicles.

A recent concern has been the lack of sufficient
coordination among law-enforcement or supervisory
units, especially in relation to drug trafficking.
This has lead to innovative interorganizational
arrangements with State and Federal law-
enforcement units to improve crime-analysis,
surveillance, communication, investigation, and
other techniques to monitor gang drug-trafficking.
In certain communities, however, a variety of
impediments such as language barriers and distrust
of law enforcement reduce the value of
investigative tools and technology (e.g.,
wiretaps, informants, undercover operatives)
(General Accounting Office 1989). 

Increasing amounts of information are needed to
discover who is a gang member and what criminal
activities are carried out or being planned by the
gang. In consequence, extensive departmental and
interagency computer information and gang tracking
systems have been developed or are planned in
certain counties and States. Increases in arrests
and long-term reduction of gang-related crime are
expected to be the payoffs of these information
systems (Guccione 1987). Many computerized gang
files, however, are outdated or contain erroneous
information (Burrell 1990). Consequently, one
recommendation has been that information on
alleged gang members about alleged crimes be made
available to the youth or guardian (under
appropriate circumstances), so that it can be
challenged and, if appropriate, deleted.
Occasionally, gossip about gang affiliation which
had been kept previously in the police officer's
head or in personal files, has been incorporated
indiscriminately into a computer data base
(Guccione 1987).

There appears to be increased attention to
expunging files of persons listed as gang members
3 to 5 years after the last listing, if no repeat
arrest takes place. The time period varies with
police jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions,
informal files of these originally listed members
are still kept. Moreover, the expunging of the
names of gang members in prosecution and probation
files after a particular time appears even less
likely to occur, making it extremely difficult to
de-label gang members or former gang members.

Also, because information from these data systems
is not purged frequently, an artificial aging of
active or inactive gang members occurs which can
lead to erroneous conclusions about the
disproportionate number of adults involved in gang
crime. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that
improved data systems and coordination of
information across different justice-system
agencies will lead to more gang members being
removed from the streets, more rapidly prosecuted,
and put into prisons. For example:

Law-enforcement officers with information that the
drunk suspect is on probation will generally be
able to arrest the suspect . . . . All of a
sudden, a simple drunkenness arrest can land a
suspect in State prison rather than an early-
morning release on bail . . . .Probation
violations are also easier to prosecute . . .
there is no trial and the prosecutors don't have
to prove the suspect is guilty within a reasonable
doubt unless he is charged with a separate crime .
. . the procedure is cost-effective . . . and by
breaking up a group of drunken gang members with
probation violation arrests, the law-enforcement
officer often stops potential crimes . . . [since]
. . . most gang-related crime sprees begin with an
innocent gathering of members (McBride 1988).

One defense attorney observes, however, that there
may be constitutional impediments to such
suppression and tactics if the primary basis for
stopping or arresting an individual or group of
individuals is their identification as gang
members or associating with gang members:

Detentions are sometimes premised on the officer's
belief that the detained is subject to a probation
condition prohibiting association with gang
members, wearing colors, or being present in
certain parts of the city. The validity of such
court-imposed conditions has not yet been
determined in published decisions. Conditions
addressing association, or free travel, may well
be unreasonable restrictions on protected
liberties (Burrell 1990, pp. 26-27).

We have no data that clearly indicates a
suppression approach is effective over the short
or long term in controlling or lowering youth gang
crime. There is some evidence that gang sweeps--
particularly if not targeted--are ineffective. In
one recent gang sweep by a Los Angeles Police
Department Task Force, "so many people were
arrested that police were forced to set up a
mobile booking unit at the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum" (Burrell 1990, p. 7) and about half of
the weekend's cases were rejected for insufficient
evidence. The Los Angeles Police arrested 1,453
people, including 794 gang members. Charges were
filed in "32 of 60 felony cases . . . many of
those arrested [were] back on the streets in 24
hours" (S. Gibbons 1988).

Uninformed, proactive, police gang-fighting
activity can result in outrage by community
residents, parents, and civil-rights organizations
such as the NAACP and ACLU. One such community
protest occurred when the Los Angeles authorities
questioned and photographed students who wore blue
bandannas blue being the color of the CRIPS gang)
which turned out to be a prank. "In another
campaign, Los Angeles police made random street
stops of young people believed to be gang members,
and photographed them for police files . . . .In
many instances, these youngsters had committed no
crimes, and . . . were not even gang members"
(Burrell 1990, p. 6).

On the other hand, there is anecdotal information
that an early suppression approach may be
effective in eliminating, delaying, or stopping
for a period of time the threat of gang formation,
violence, and possibly drug trafficking
particularly in smaller- or middle-sized cities
such as Flint, Michigan; Louisville, Kentucky;
Fort Wayne, Indiana; and Tallahassee, Florida)
where gangs have not yet established a firm
foothold. Some police officials claim that a
proactive approach of arresting and harassing
small gang formations--especially gang leaders--
can successfully "nip the problem in the bud." To
what extent community cohesion, interagency
collaboration, and community group involvement
have also played a role in these situations, is
not clear. In addition, when traditional turf-
based gang violence is suppressed or regarded as
successfully controlled, it is often replaced by
covert drug-related gang activity, which is much
more difficult to deal with.

Finally, we observe that the effectiveness of
specialized police in dealing with the gang
problem in large or small cities has not been
clearly demonstrated. The cities with the largest
and most specialized gang units, Chicago and Los
Angeles, appear to have much larger reported gang
crime problems than New York and Philadelphia,
which have very small and less specialized units
and where procedures for dealing with youth gangs
are more circumscribed. Gang forms, gang
behaviors, and the reporting of gang incidents may
not be readily comparable across these cities,
although youth crime and violence rates generally
may be comparable. In addition, it is not clear to
determine to what extent gang crime per se
contributes to high levels of violence or serious
crime.

Whether a high level of specialized police
activity is or should be directed to street gangs
in smaller communities with an emerging gang
problem is also unclear. While it is possible to
identify gangs in smaller cities in terms somewhat
comparable to those in larger cities, a recent
study suggests there is still little reason to
think specialized gang training and gang units
will make a practical difference. To deal with the
gang problem in highly specialized or bureaucratic
terms in a smaller community where the problem has
not crystallized has not been demonstrated to be
an efficient police strategy (Klein, Maxson, and
Gordon 1987, especially pp. 37-38).

Emerging Strategy

A community policing or problem-oriented approach
to the youth gang problem appears to be slowly
emerging. This more complex, multidimensional
police approach is not as widely accepted as the
conventional suppression approach. The newer
strategy assumes that the gang problem may be only
partially amenable to police suppression. Gang
causes and interventions are defined in broader
terms. The suppression strategy is incorporated as
a component of a larger interagency, community-
collaborative approach which also gives due
attention to prevention and social-intervention
strategies that must directly involve the police.

The evolving police strategy is a social-control
approach that strives for the prevention and
management of the gang problem through careful
analysis of community and situational factors. It
is no longer based on a "cowboy" or "war"
mentality. This newer approach assumes that local-
community groups and other agencies, as well as
gang members themselves, must bear responsibility
for control of gang violence and criminal
behavior. Successful policing results, in large
measure, from "consent and holding the trust of
the public" (Clarke 1987, p. 399). The role of the
gang-crime officer becomes one of maintaining
order as well as controlling the excesses of gang
activity. A process of joint involvement with key
community organizations and established agency
representatives is required, based on intimate
knowledge of local neighborhood and gang patterns.
When a gang-related crime occurs, it must be put
into context. The police officer should know who
might be involved and what the basis of the crime
might have been. This approach presumes a strong
day-to-day working relationship with key community
elements (Pillsbury 1988).

Herman Goldstein's recent work (1990) on problem-
oriented policing is consistent with a community
problem-solving approach to youth gangs. Goldstein
notes that the "majority of changes that have been
advocated in policing over the past several
decades reflect a continuing preoccupation with
means over ends; with operating methods, process,
and efficiency over effectiveness in dealing with
substantive problems" (p. 15). He advises that
"the police must do more than they have done in
the past to engage the citizenry in the overall
task of policing" (Goldstein 1990, p. 21). He also
notes that "conveying sound, accurate information
is currently one of the least used, but
potentially most effective means that the police
have for responding to a wide range of problems"
(Goldstein 1990, p. 14).

In recent years, the Federal Government has been
concerned particularly with issues of improved
coordination and communication across juvenile
justice units in dealing with serious habitual
offenders. The Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention has embarked on a series of
programs to prevent serious juvenile offenders
from falling through the cracks and avoiding
appropriate justice-system processing.
Cooperation, the sharing of information (including
rosters and profiles of targeted youth), and case
management involving police, prosecutors, schools,
probation, corrections, and social and community
aftercare services have been key goals of the
Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program and
Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action
Program (National Crime Prevention Institute 1987;
American Institute for Research 1988).

Increasingly, the notions of community
involvement, interagency coordination, and
information development and sharing have guided
the efforts of law-enforcement agencies
(especially the police) in addressing the gang
problem. The assumption that youth gangs can be
eliminated and that the gang problem should be
resolved by simply jailing all gang members may
not be valid. Jackson and McBride, gang-police
experts, observe that "experience and studies have
yet to show an instance in which a street gang was
dissolved or put out of action because of
suppressive police action. When police pressure is
intensified on a street gang, its members
typically go underground and become secretive"
(1985, p. 108).

It is instructive to contrast the styles, if not
the approaches of gang policing by the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department and the Los Angeles Police
Department. The Sheriff's Department has a
tradition of close association and interaction
with local-community groups in dealing with the
gang problem. The city police department is more
distant and somewhat distrustful of local-
community groups, which tend to be regarded as
unstable and ephemeral. Further differences in the
approach of the two departments are described as
follows:

The Sheriff's Department OSS (Office of Safe
Streets) program targets the most violent gangs
and emphasizes developing rapport. The members
work in plain clothes, are more informal, talk
often with gang members, and have many more
positive contacts. Their program includes an
extensive training program and the group
experiences very little turnover.

In contrast, LAPD's CRASH program aims at total
suppression and frequent harassment of gang
members. They work in more formidable uniforms,
are more confrontational and hostile, and in many
instances, have alienated themselves from possible
sources of information. They provide very little
training and there is very frequent turnover
(Harris 1988, p. 196).

Despite these claimed differences, there are
similarities in the high degree of saliency
attributed to the gang problem and to a variety of
means for dealing with it by both departments.
There is a good deal of cooperation between the
two departments as city gang-problems spill over
to the county and vice versa. Both departments
have been attacked by community groups and the
media in recent years for harsh and punitive
police practices against minority members,
including gang youth. Also, we do not yet have
evidence that the sheriff's approach is more
effective than the city police's approach in the
control or reduction of the youth gang problem.

Police structures for dealing with youth gangs may
be quite variable--including youth divisions,
community relations, homicide, violence, patrol,
and detective units, or task forces. Such units
tend to state their objectives in somewhat broader
terms than do specialized gang units. For example,
Philadelphia's Preventive Patrol Unit aims to
"render assistance and guidance to the youth of
the community as well as the investigation and
containment of acts of juvenile crimes in the area
of organized crime" (Philadelphia Preventive
Patrol Unit 1987, p. 1); the basic responsibility
is law enforcement (apprehension and arresting
violators), but emphasis is on "selective
enforcement concomitant with community need"
(Philadelphia Preventive Patrol Unit 1987, p. 1).
Effective enforcement not only serves the criminal
justice system and the community, but also aids in
the prevention and containment of the gang problem
(Collins 1979, pp. 155-56).

This broader, more complex approach involves
surveillance of gangs; patrol of designated areas
where gang activity has been in evidence;
ascertaining the identity, size, and location of
gangs and gang members; developing information
concerning pending gang fights or criminal
activities; counteracting gang warfare through
confiscation of weapons; investigating to
conclusion all outbreaks of violence and criminal
action by gang members; and using all forms of
cooperative effort with interested and
participating citizen organizations and
governmental agencies toward eliminating
particular youth gang problems (Philadelphia
Preventive Patrol Unit 1987, p. 3).

A great variety of community-based, preventive,
and developmental strategies may be incorporated
into this model, including school-based lecture
programs; school and probation liaisons; broad
scale information dissemination about gang
problems; recreation; job programs; counseling;
referral of youth to social and community
agencies; working with parents and community
organizations in preventive and control efforts;
training teachers, and agency and community
representatives how to recognize and deal with
gang members and gang problems (see Needle and
Stapleton 1983).

Special coordination mechanisms may be created
within and outside of police units to assist
troubled youngsters, including gang members. For
example, a Gang Event Response Team was
established in San Francisco to insure a
coordinated intradepartmental response to gang-
related incidents. Representatives of the
Narcotics, Gang Intelligence, Community Services,
and Patrol Units or Divisions jointly investigate
gang-related shootings. These resources are
additional to normal liaison with homicide and
other police units as well as with district
attorneys, probation officers, judges, parole and
correctional officials, and still other law-
enforcement agencies in overlapping jurisdictions
to facilitate gang suppression and justice and
correctional-system processing activities.

Local and national concern over the narcotics
problem has stimulated the development of a
variety of cooperative programs involving the
police and educational or human service agencies.
School Programs to Educate and Control Drug Abuse
(SPECDA) is a cooperative program of the New York
City Board of Education and the police department.
It operates in schools, serving students and their
parents from kindergarten through grade 12. SPECDA
has two aims: education and enforcement. Police
help provide classes and presentations on drug
abuse in the schools. At the same time, they
concentrate enforcement efforts, including
undercover surveillance within a two-block radius
of schools to create a drug-free corridor for
students. Drug dealing "crews" or youth gang
members have undoubtedly been subject to these
enforcement activities. Hundreds of schools are
targeted for these educational and control efforts
(President's Child Safety Partnership 1987, pp.
71, 88).

There is no easy, precise set of responsibilities
for law-enforcement agencies dealing with the gang
problem. It can be an overwhelming set of tasks if
approached in a rigid, exclusive way that is
focused only on suppression. However, there is
ample evidence of considerable creativity and
innovation by police departments in coping with
the youth gang problem in broad, evolving,
multidimensional terms. For example, the Phoenix
police sponsor many community programs that target
at-risk youth. Through a Police Activities League,
members of the police force take young people on
shopping trips; organize recreational, social, and
educational programs; and arrange job
opportunities. The police also sponsor a Boys'
Scout Explorer Post, with police officers
volunteering as Scout masters or leaders (McKinney
1988). In Pasadena, California, a Youth Services
Coordination and Intensive Care Unit was
established with specially trained police officers
to work on a one-to-one basis with juveniles who
had gotten into trouble with the law. The police
acted simultaneously as informal probation
officers, counselors, and "Big Brothers." Some
police officers even obtained teaching
certificates and were assigned to counsel and
teach students in class (Oleisky 1981).

In Oakland, California, the Transit Authority
joined with local civic leaders to simultaneously
attack graffiti and unemployment problems. Gang
leaders were offered jobs and encouraged to locate
other potential youths to clean buses. As a
result, the buses were cleaned, young people got
jobs, and the word got out that marking up buses
was not "cool" because cleaning them was tough
work. Furthermore, an organization encompassing
many youth gangs in the area, Bay Area United
Youth, was established as part of the Community
Values Program, Inc. In New York City, a somewhat
similar effort, Inner City Round Table on Youth
(ICRY), was encouraged by the police to bring
representatives of gangs together "in terms of
talking about training for the future . . . for a
vocation" (Galea 1982, p. 228). In El Monte,
California, the collaboration of the police and
the Boys' Club resulted in a special job-
development and referral project for gang members.
The police were influential in prevailing upon
local employers to hire gang leaders (Amandes
1979; Clayton 1983).

The Los Angeles City Police Department inaugurated
a "Jeopardy Program," which identifies young
children who are at risk of becoming involved in
gangs and "provides contact, information, and
alternatives for the parents . . . to deter gang
association or membership" (Los Angeles County
Probation Department 1988, p. 9). The Seattle
Police Department elaborated upon this program,
adding direct referrals (with parental permission)
to various social agencies that provide case-
management and counseling services. In addition,
there are other preventive programs in the schools
such as the Los Angeles Police Department's Drug
Awareness Resistance Education Program (DARE),
which secondarily deals with gang-membership
avoidance. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
has also developed a school gang-prevention
program through Substance Abuse Narcotics
Education (SANE) (Los Angeles County Probation
Department 1988).

The DARE and SANE programs are being replicated
nationwide. The DARE program is currently being
evaluated by the National Institute of Justice,
U.S. Department of Justice. These programs are
broad-scale educational efforts that reach many
children, however, who may not necessarily be
substantially at-risk of becoming gang members or
abusing drugs. In Los Angeles County, specially
trained deputies work closely with schools and
community organizations to "teach children that
there are positive alternatives to substance
abuse" (Los Angeles County Probation Department
1988, p. 9). Students in 4th, 5th, and 6th grades
are targeted. In some cities such as San
Francisco, drug- and gang-prevention curriculum
materials are introduced as early as kindergarten.
Over a period of 10 to 15 weeks, students are
taught coping skills for dealing with peer
pressure, decisionmaking skills, enhanced self-
esteem, accurate information about drugs and
alcohol, and how to stay out of gangs and avoid
confrontation with gang members. A variety of
evaluations on the effectiveness of these programs
is now in progress.

Thus, under the newer, evolving community-oriented
approach, the police officer can perform a variety
of roles, including helping a youth obtain a job,
counseling for school and social service referral
of youth with personal and family problems,
mediating gang fights, training other human
service personnel and neighborhood residents in
how to deal with gangs as well as arresting and
contributing to the prosecution of law-violating
gang youth. For example, Sergeant Galea of the New
York City Police Department has performed as a
social intervenor:

Galea, a police officer in the Gang Intelligence
Unit in Brooklyn [developed a] curiously friendly
relationship [with street clubs, i.e., gangs] . .
. .He listened to their problems, tried to effect
reconciliation with other clubs, [and] played
softball with them. They pumped him for gossip on
other clubs' activities, expected him to get
criminal charges against them dropped, even
demanded that he visit them in prison or write
them job references" (Campbell 1984b, pp. 1-2).

Sergeant Galea's view of his own work was a little
more complex:

I have two roles. I am their [gang members']
friend, but also their foe . . . .I personally am
responsible for many of them being locked up [but]
they always come to me to help them . . . getting
them jobs . . . back in school, we have got a
couple into the armed forces . . . .They know that
if they commit a crime they are going to be
arrested. But they also know that they can come
and talk about it to us (Galea 1982, pp. 223-25).

The police officer in this newer approach
emphasizes the importance of both suppression and
social intervention in arresting a gang youth,
obtaining information that will assure proper
prosecution and conviction, preventing youth gang
crime and gang membership, and involving gang
youth--directly or through referral--in improved
social functioning:

He has the responsibility of becoming
knowledgeable as quickly as possible with the gang
and its members; particularly the leadership of
the gang . . . .In meeting or `rapping' with the
gang, it will be his function to establish a
trustful or quasi-friendly relationship that will
elicit information and intelligence that can be
utilized and still allow him to return and speak
with the gang from time to time. The success or
failure of a Gang Intelligence Unit [GIU] is
dependent on the ability of a GIU officer to make
inroads with the gang or its members by his
ability to relate, identify with, and listen to
the real or imaginary problems they present
(Collins 1979, p. 140).

Again, we do not know whether this newer
multidimensional, community- and gang-targeted
approach is effective. No hard evaluative data is
yet available on police strategies that include
prevention or social intervention. In one limited
evaluation of an effort by police to assist gang
youth with job referrals, the results were mixed.
A gang member on his own did as well as a gang
member processed through a special job-referral
program developed by the police in successfully
finding and holding a job (Williams and Snortum
1982). It is possible that the success of both
conventional and newer police models varies under
different conditions in the community, including
the scope and severity of gang problems, State
law, the availability of strong police leadership,
and especially appropriate resources to support
and develop alternate strategies such as good
school remedial-programs and job opportunities.
Obviously, a great deal of descriptive and
evaluative research is required to determine the
specific nature and effectiveness of these various
police strategies and related implementation
activities.

----------------

CHAPTER X: PROSECUTION, DEFENSE, AND THE JUDGE

Prosecution attorneys and judges are the criminal
justice officials most likely to view the gang
problem in strict suppression terms. The
prosecutor sees his job as processing and
convicting gang youths on maximum charges as
quickly as possible and winning long sentences.
The judge, particularly the juvenile court judge,
may believe that the youth gang problem should be
outside the jurisdiction of his court. Gangs are
considered a serious threat to society, and judges
often believe that youths who commit gang crimes
do not deserve the special protection and services
of the juvenile court or the opportunity for
rehabilitation in the community. To some extent,
the defense attorney and probation may be able to
counter these extreme views when they are present.

Prosecution traditionally has been concerned with
process or procedure and almost exclusively with
establishing the guilt of defendants, particularly
in reference to adult offenders. The prosecutor
represents the State as guardian of the
community's interests--in particular, the
maintenance of the integrity of the justice system
through the vigorous enforcement of its laws. The
prosecutor in the juvenile court, in addition, has
the duty of maintaining the "community's and the
legal system's commitment to the integrity of the
family" (Fink 1987, p. 282) and the reciprocal
rights and responsibilities of parents and
children to each other.

Nevertheless, the prosecutor's overarching ethical
responsibility is to promote justice in its
broadest sense--not simply to convict individuals
or win legal battles. The lawyer's code of
professional responsibility explains that the
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate. His duty is to seek
justice--not merely to convict. Because the
prosecutor "represents the sovereign" and makes
decisions affecting the public interest, he should
"use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers," such as the selection of
cases to prosecute (Fink 1987, p. 282).

Gang cases pose special problems for prosecutors:
they tend to involve juveniles and adults; both
offenders and victims are usually gang members;
the offenses are group-motivated; the acts
committed are often extremely violent; prosecution
of gang cases may have immediate consequences for
the safety of witnesses and even for the
intimidation of jurors; gang defendants often are
not deterred by prison sentences; and the cases
require specialized knowledge about gangs and the
community contexts in which they occur.

According to Genelin and Naimen:

Gang cases are not easy to prosecute. Ten years
ago, the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office
was losing a large percentage of them because gang
members did not want to testify against rival gang
members. Instead they preferred street payback.
Furthermore, if nongang witnesses were at the
scene, they were either too frightened to
cooperate or soon became so because of threats,
actual physical intimidation, or murder. There was
another factor: gang members talked a language
unique to their culture. Attorneys did not
maximize results because they did not know what
questions to ask or how to ask them (Genelin and
Naimen 1988, p. 1).

The problems inherent in gang cases have lead to
new approaches and the use of new organizational
forms by prosecutors for improving efficiency and
maximizing convictions and sentences. Defense
attorneys are also developing tactics and
procedures in response to the newer "harder"
prosecutorial techniques. According to one defense
attorney, the label "gang-related" has "far-
reaching ramifications in a criminal case. Gang
cases are singled out for investigation and
prosecution by special units. At trial, gang
affiliation may raise a host of evidentiary
problems. At sentencing, evidence of gang
membership is sure to affect the court's exercise
of discretion" (Burrell 1990, p. 1).

In past decades, a few large and medium-size
cities with the stimulus of Federal initiative and
funds have created hard-core gang or vertical-
prosecution units, which pay special attention to
gang crime suspects. This development is probably
most advanced in California and is based also on
State legislation and special funding. The
prosecutor traditionally ignored the gang-related
circumstances of a case for several reasons. He
usually believed that the identification of a
crime as gang-related "tend[ed] to divert the
jury's focus from the actual crime to the question
of gang affiliation. This distraction [was] viewed
by many prosecutors as being counterproductive and
. . . therefore [to be] avoided" (B. Kahn 1974, p.
33). Furthermore, a prosecutor, not in a vertical-
prosecution unit, had incomplete information from
the police or sheriff about gang-situational
characteristics and was not able to determine
whether gang affiliation signified a greater or
lesser threat to community safety.

The evolving system of vertical prosecution
represents a rational, specialized, but mainly
deterrent outreach strategy by district or States
attorneys. It assumes that gangs can be controlled
best through an efficient and community-based
approach that is fully informed about gang events.
It emphasizes vigorous, proactive prosecution--
particularly for the most serious, violent, and
drug-related gang cases involving gang leaders or
core gang members. A premise is that "a few gang
members commit a significant proportion of the
crimes and negatively influence the behavior of
other gang members. Effective deterrence is to
incapacitate offenders through incarceration,
particularly those leading other gang members in
illegal, violent activities" (California Office of
Criminal Justice Planning 1987, p. 4).

Under vertical prosecution, usually one
prosecutor--rather than a shifting array of
prosecutors--handles a case from its "inception
until its disposition in the criminal justice
system" (Daley 1985, p. 18). One assistant State's
attorney or district attorney participates in the
"full range of prosecutorial functions for any
given case investigation, use of the grand jury,
arrest, filing of charges, preliminary hearing,
pretrial motions, plea conferences, trial, and
sentencing" (Daley 1985, p. 18). When both
juveniles and adults are involved, the same
prosecutor is used (often with the same police
officers) to deal with the various cases. If
selection of the more serious case is required,
the adult participant is more likely to receive
special attention. Recent elaborations of the
vertical-prosecution approach are special units
directed to gang-related narcotics cases in Los
Angeles (Los Angeles County Probation 1988, p. 10)
and to juvenile drug-gang cases in San Diego
(Davidson 1987).

Vertical-prosecution organizations vary in size,
ranging up to 35 or more deputy prosecutors in Los
Angeles County. Highly qualified prosecutors and
special investigators are selected. Reduced
caseloads and special coordinating relations with
law-enforcement agencies are established to
develop the most effective evidence for
prosecution and also to provide protection to
cooperating witnesses by preventing intimidation
or retaliation by the defendant's gang associates
(California Office of Criminal Justice Planning
1987, p. 4). The district attorney has been
accorded a leadership role in the community's war
against gangs in California. By California State
law, the vertical-prosecution attorney or senior
attorney also acts as chairman of an interagency
gang task force in each county. The task force
serves as a coordinating body not only for other
law-enforcement and supervisory authorities such
as police and probation, but also for school and
community-based agencies concerned with gang
problems. The task force is a communications
mechanism, a policymaking organization, and a
project-generating group. In Los Angeles County,
this body has stimulated the development of an
interagency gang-information system GREAT (Gang
Reporting Evaluation and Tracking) as well as
programs funded by "Youth At Risk" throughout the
city.

In recent years, California law has been concerned
primarily with law enforcement, prosecution, and
probation efforts in dealing with problems of gang
crime. Gang suppression has aimed at providing
broad, clear, and strong procedures for bringing
suspects and offenders to justice. The inclusion
of community-based organizations such as schools
and youth service agencies has served mainly to
extend and strengthen the investigative and
information-gathering capacities of law
enforcement. The provisions for special-school
curricula and services for youth at risk of gang
membership have thus far received secondary
attention and limited funding.

Susan Burrell of the Youth Law Center, San
Francisco, writes:

The Street Terrorism Act of 1988 makes it a crime
to engage in criminal gang-activity, subjects
persons to sentence enhancements for criminal
activity, creates a nuisance [abatement] provision
around buildings in which criminal activity takes
place, and permits the prosecution of parents
under a parental responsibility theory.
Legislation has also been proposed to require that
children found to have committed graffiti offenses
lose their driver's licenses for a year . . .
(Burrell 1990, pp. 10-11).

The new prosecutorial strategy has been
accompanied by a "growing panoply" of "gang law"
to address difficult evidentiary and logistical
problems which characterize the collective nature
of gang offenses (Daley 1985, p. 2). Of special
interest is the development of the law of
accountability or accessoryship in which a gang
member can be held responsible for the crimes of
another committed outside his presence where it
can be proved that he "advised, encouraged, aided,
or abetted the perpetration of the crime" (Daley
1985, p. 2). The law of conspiracy has been
associated with the law of accountability so that
"it is not necessary to show a formal agreement
between the parties . . . it is sufficient to show
a mutual understanding of the parties which may be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence
or combination thereof" (Daley 1985, pp. 5-6).
Innovative strategies and tactics have been
developed by prosecutors and defense attorneys to
implement and to challenge, respectively, these
laws or prosecutorial procedures.

Prosecutorial and Defense Guidelines

Genelin and Naimen (1988) have developed a set of
guidelines for more effective prosecution of gang
cases. They emphasize special techniques in case
filing, based on the use of trained investigators,
the education and selection of the jury, the use
of the police as expert witness, widening the
scope of the search warrant, setting bail, witness
protection, countering courtroom intimidation by
gang members, dealing with recalcitrant witnesses
and informants, and how to establish gang intent.

Genelin and Naimen emphasize the importance of a
well-trained gang-investigating officer who can
read placa (gang graffiti) and testify to its
meaning in court. The investigator must be aware
of gang processes and the current state of gang
and intergang activities and relationships in the
community. It is important not only that the
investigating officer meaningfully interview
witnesses, but also that the prosecutor himself
personally interview gang witnesses and record
testimony on videotape (whenever possible), which
can be played later before the jury. One or more
witnesses often will recant his testimony because
of preference for personal payback, because he was
intimidated, or because there is a general feeling
that the police are their real enemies. The video
or tape recording then becomes important as a
backup.

A special warrant is needed to obtain evidence.
Gang members often retain items that can be of
special value to gang prosecution such as whether
weapons, photos, or gang paraphernalia. "Gang
members are proud of the fact they are in a gang .
. . .They will paint their rooms with gang placa,
have banners . . . books of photographs of
themselves and other gang members flashing signs
and displaying weapons." These items are viewed as
good material for trial and the "critical task is
to obtain it" (Genelin and Naimen, p. 3) through
an expanded search warrant justified (for example,
searching for evidence of motivation for a crime)
by an experienced investigator.

The prosecutor should educate the jury about the
distinctive characteristics of a gang case.
Customs such as payback, gang signs, graffiti, and
intimidation must be stressed. The prosecutor
needs to be alert to certain prejudices in jurors
that will hurt his case. For example, if a juror
lives in the area of the gang member on trial, he
may be too frightened to render a "people's
verdict." Other factors that influence jurors'
perceptions include: whether the juror is related
to gang members, the juror's prior membership in a
gang, and his attitudes toward police (Genelin and
Naimen 1988, p. 6).

An expert witness can be used to establish not
only that the defendant is a gang member, but also
that a gang conspiracy to commit a crime exists.
Case law holds that gang membership can be
considered as circumstantial evidence of a
conspiracy. A qualified expert can testify about
membership in gangs, rivalry between gangs, common
practices of gangs and gang members, gang
terminology, street codes of conduct, and even
specific and identifiable types of gangs.
"Interlinking gang evidence with the crime is a
force for conviction, and explaining a witness's
demeanor by way of gang affiliation can go a long
way toward winning a case" (Genelin and Naimen
1988, pp. 5-7).

According to Genelin and Naimen, bail often should
be set as high as possible to avoid inappropriate
releases, develop additional information, and
persuade reluctant witnesses to testify. Gang
offenses may be very serious, and the defendant
often has a long prior record. The defendant may
attempt to flee; the victim may die; the defendant
himself may be at risk of a payback. The solution,
according to Genelin and Naimen, may be to re-
categorize the offense as a more serious crime,
which allows a pre-review, no-bail hold. There is
also an additional process that may be used if the
funds for the bail were obtained through illegal
means: "no bail bond shall be accepted unless the
judge or magistrate is convinced that no portion
of the security pledged was feloniously obtained
by the defendant" (pp. 12-13).

Furthermore, if a defendant is in jail, it may
allow for the development of additional evidence
"by way of jailhouse informants, seizure of
incriminating communications with codefendants, or
by simple observation of the defendant in a social
milieu with other members of his gang" (p. 5).
Genelin and Naimen also elaborate the uses of bail
or custody in California to persuade recalcitrant
witnesses for the prosecution to testify against
the defendant. "A magistrate may exact from each
witness who testifies at the preliminary hearing a
written promise that he will appear and testify or
else forfeit the sum of $500" (Genelin and Naimen
undated, pp. 11-12). The judge may also issue a
"body attachment for the defaulting witness . . .
.One night in custody is usually enough to ensure
cooperation from a witness, or at least his
appearance in court . . . " (Genelin and Naimen
undated, pp. 11-12).

Special attention may be required to protect not
only witnesses for the prosecution but the
defendant. Witnesses, as suggested above, may be
exposed to intimidation or undue influence from
members of the opposing gang. Furthermore,
defendants or sometimes witnesses as members of
opposing gangs should not be housed in the same
module or section of the jail or court-holding
cell. If the witness is released, the
investigators should keep track of him and what is
occurring in the community--since the subject may
be under great community pressure not to testify.
"Careful consideration should be given to removing
witnesses from the area and relocating them in
safer neighborhoods" (Genelin and Naimen undated,
p. 9).

A variety of techniques have been devised to
prevent or limit courtroom intimidation by gang
members who may be present for the proceedings,
including using additional investigators, police,
or bailiffs; identifying gang members to the judge
and jury; frisking and removing gang members from
court; police officers requesting gang members to
pose for a Polaroid picture to be placed in the
gang book; and arresting gang members in court (if
they are discovered to be on probation or parole)
for violation of provisions of nonassociation with
gang members.

Most importantly, the prosecutor is concerned with
the issue of how to establish group intent and
"how to attach criminal liability to the members
of the group," (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp.
15-16) even if they were not present at the scene
of the crime. California law makes it possible to
prove an abettor guilty of a crime if the
defendant "(1) acted with knowledge of the
criminal purposes of the perpetrator, (2) acted
with the intent or purpose of . . . committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
offense, or (3) by act or advice promoted,
encouraged, or instigated the commission of the
offense . . . . The conspirator . . . is guilty
not only of the offense he intended to facilitate
or encourage, but also of any reasonably
foreseeable offense committed by the person he
aides or abets" (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp.
15-16).

Defense Attorney

Defense attorneys have begun to develop techniques
and procedures for countering the efforts of
prosecution. The major objectives of the defense
are to dissociate the defendant from
identification as a gang member and to prevent the
crime he is accused of committing from being
classified as gang-related. Questions raised by
the defense attorney include: the adequacy of the
identification of the accused as a gang member;
the practice of stopping or arresting youths on
suspicion of being gang members and, therefore, of
having committed a crime; the nature of gang
evidence admitted in court and its relevance to
the crime committed; the qualifications of the
gang expert-witness; and the constitutionality of
the provision of the law (for example,
California's Street Terrorism Act).

Susan Burrell emphasizes the importance of the
discovery of police records of gang affiliation.
Mistakes are sometimes made in official
information that attributes gang membership or
affiliation to the accused. The counsel must find
out what the police think, what they know about
the defendant, the source of information, and
especially the standards used for the entry of
information into gang files, including procedures
for updating and purging files (Burrell 1990, pp.
19-20). To avoid identifying a youth as a gang
member merely because of the clothes he wears, his
demeanor, or other characteristics and then
arresting or detaining him, there must be
"specific and articulable facts leading the
officer to believe that (1) some activity relating
to a crime has taken place, is occurring, or is
about to occur, and (2) the person the officer
intends to stop or detain is involved in that
activity" (Burrell 1990, p. 25).

Burrell is particularly concerned with the use of
evidence that is irrelevant to the case at trial.
The defense needs to shield the defendant from any
gang reference to the extent possible.
Furthermore, membership in an organization does
not lead reasonably to any inference as to the
conduct of a member on a given occasion. It is
important to analyze carefully the prosecutor's
theory of relevance, and object if it is spurious
or goes beyond the purported theory. Even if gang
evidence is relevant, it may be inadmissible if
outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. "The
term `gang' could take on a sinister meaning when
associated with group activities" (Burrell 1990,
pp. 27-38).

Finally, Burrell would counter the prosecutor's
use of police officers as expert witnesses. She
states that according to the California code the
expert must have "special knowledge, experience,
training or education in the subject. Repeated
observations by a police officer without inquiry,
analysis, or experiment does not turn the observer
into an `expert'" (1990, p. 47).

One interesting prosecutorial development in the
city of Los Angeles has been the use of State
nuisance abatement laws, based on Civil Code
Section 3479 and Code of Civil Procedure Section
731. "The abatement action takes an offensive
approach and attacks the gang or gang action by
limiting all of its activities that contribute to
a public nuisance. A civil injunction is sought to
ban, for example, loitering, the wearing of gang
clothing, possession of dangerous weapons or
paint, approaching potential drug customers in
motor vehicles . . . " (Hahn 1987, pp. 2 -3).
Bruce Coplen, supervisor of the gang unit in the
Los Angeles city attorney's office, claims a 33-
percent reduction in gang crime in the Cadillac
Corning neighborhood, as compared to other areas
of Los Angeles, after aggressive use of nuisance
abatement laws (Coplen 1988). However, the
strategy apparently has not been extended to other
neighborhoods, and the number of gang incidents
and homicides has continued to climb throughout
the city.

There is little doubt about the short-term
effectiveness of the vertical prosecution of gang
cases. An evaluation of the Los Angeles County
vertical-prosecution unit found that, in cases
involving gang-related murders, the conviction
rate increased to 95 percent compared to a
preprogram period when it was 71 percent and to
contemporaneous nonvertical prosecution which was
78 percent (Dahmann 1983, chapter 6, p. 26). A
substantial increase in trial conviction and
incarceration rates also occurred (Dahmann 1983,
chapter 6, p. 33). Comparable achievements have
been described in Cook County, Chicago (Daley
1985). On the other hand, it should be noted that
a relatively small number of gang offenders are
subjected to vertical prosecution. While over
71,000 gang members were arrested in California
counties with a prosecution unit in fiscal year
1986-1987, only 546 defendants were vertically
prosecuted (California Office of Juvenile Justice
Planning 1987, pp. 17-18). The large majority of
gang arrestees were probably accused of minor
offenses (California Office of Juvenile Justice
Planning 1987, pp. 17-18).

Recent law used by vertical prosecutors has come
under challenge, at least at the trial-court
level. The claim is that legislation such as the
California Street Terrorism Act "poses serious
constitutional problems" (Burrell 1990, pp. 54-
55). Terms in the law that are essential to its
application and enforcement are vague,
particularly in regard to the imposition of civil
or criminal penalties for mere association with
others. Restrictions on associational freedom,
unless drawn to meet some compelling government
need, may be an intrusion in violation of
constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments (Burrell 1990, pp. 54-57).

Critics of vertical prosecution suggest that
prosecutors still have insufficient understanding
of barrio or ghetto life and its peer pressures
that lead a youngster to accompany a group of
youths in a drive-by shooting. Extreme sentences
may be requested for and sometimes accorded to
naive, impressionable juveniles who are simply
present on such occasions (Hicks 1988). It is also
possible that the district or States attorney's
approach should be broadened to include
preventive, social-intervention, social-advocacy,
and community-mobilization strategies, if he is to
target younger offenders as well as older, more
serious offenders. In some communities, support
groups, educational campaigns, and 24-hour hotline
reporting and advice services about the gang
problem have been established by vertical-
prosecution units. In Los Angeles County, a
community-agency referral service was planned for
persons concerned with or implicated in a variety
of gang-related problems.

Finally, we note that despite the increased
efficiency of vertical prosecution, it has not
been accompanied by a general decline in gang
activity or a reduction in gang crime or gang-
crime arrests in the community. The deterrent
effects of vertical prosecution, if they exist,
probably have been overwhelmed by community
changes and urban conditions facilitating gang
activity--including immigration, population
movement, poverty, and drug trafficking--over
which prosecutors have no control. Vertical
prosecution does not necessarily address the
consequences of long-term sentences and prison
overcrowding for the gang offender or for the
community when the offender returns.

Judiciary

Judges have paid considerably less explicit and
systematic attention to the gang problem than have
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or
probation. Judges seek to be as objective as
possible in judging cases. Thus, there is a
tendency for judges in jurisdictions where gang
cases frequently come to court to deny or avoid
recognition of the problem in order not to bias
consideration of cases. Judges may prefer that
information about gang-relatedness of the offense
or offender not be considered to prevent
prejudices in jury deliberations. Some judges will
rule such information out of order, unless
specifically germane to the facts of the case at
hand. Furthermore, some judges believe that gangs
are merely facilitative and are blamed for
problems that lie more fundamentally at home, at
school, and with defective community structures--
and therefore need not be directly addressed in
court.

However, information about gang-related
characteristics and pressures (often from other
sectors of the criminal justice system) does
intrude and probably influences judges' general
attitudes toward gangs and gang crime. Probation
reports of the social circumstances of youth,
including gang affiliation and prior gang offense
history, are viewed as quite appropriate in
presentencing consideration. Police in Chicago
have urged the judiciary to establish gang courts
so that more severe sentences can be imposed on
gang offenders. The Los Angeles County Sheriff has
urged that judges hold gang youths more
accountable for their crimes than nongang youth
(Gott 1988). The superintendent of schools in
Portland, Oregon, expects judges to identify gang
incidents "without bias," but says they should
recognize the serious nature of gang offenses and
respond with "quick dramatic intervention" (1988,
p. 4). The State of California has mandated that
many types of gang-related crimes require enhanced
sentences.

Although some judges have been active in
extramural or community efforts to deal with the
gang problem, it is not clear what the actual
practice of judges has been in respect to gang
cases in the court. With few exceptions, juvenile
and adult courts have not developed special
programs of counseling or control specifically
addressed to the gang youths coming before them.
Nor have court orders been formulated about gang
cases or situations specifically addressed to
schools or public or nonprofit agencies. Court
efforts to deal specifically with gangs have been
developed primarily by probation units (see
below).

The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges and its Metropolitan Judges Committee
recently expressed its views about how judges
should deal with youth gangs. Judges traditionally
prefer to take a conservative stance. Its first
reactions appear to be strongly suppressive. The
National Council essentially recommends a set of
punitive options based on the untested assumption
that youth gangs generally are involved heavily in
sophisticated and organized drug trafficking:
"These gangs have become interstate, regional and
national organizations commanding economic
resources and able to bypass collaboration with or
challenge more traditional organized criminal
networks" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee
1988, p. 29). Judges are urged to "mandate
severance of the gang affiliation as part of its
sanctions and remedies" (Metropolitan Court Judges
Committee 1988, p. 30).

The Metropolitan Court Judges Committee regards
the youth gang situation as "appalling and
[recommends that] such gang youths should not be
handled in juvenile court . . . when services and
programs available to the juvenile court are not
sufficient to protect the community or
rehabilitate the serious juvenile offenders"
(Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 30).
The waiver of gang youth to adult court is urged.
Nevertheless, the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges, recognizing somewhat its
limited factual base, recommends that "judges and
court-services personnel should develop their
knowledge and understanding of gang and gang-like
organizations and their appeal to youth" (1987, p.
22).

The judges' approach to nongang juvenile cases is
quite different, particularly in respect to
dependent, neglected, abused, and other kinds of
delinquent children and youth, including those who
are physically or sexually abused, exploited,
runaway, and incorrigible, as well as truants and
school dropouts. Recommended for nongang juveniles
in juvenile court has been "the establishment of a
working and effective partnership of courts and
public agencies with the full involvement of
businesses, labor, private foundations and
agencies, and citizen volunteers. Also regarded as
essential is an emphasis on prevention and
sensitivity to the rights of the individual child,
the family, and the rights and responsibilities of
the parent as well as those of the courts,
agencies, and legislators" (Metropolitan Court
Judges Committee 1986). How different gang and
nongang juveniles are, and why gang youths should
be treated differently from other types of
deprived, problematic, or troublesome youth, and
what the consequences of such different court
treatment for gang and nongang juveniles are in
terms of protecting the juvenile and the security
and welfare of the community, are issues not yet
explicitly addressed by the juvenile court.

There are individual judges who are attempting to
take a broad view of the problem. Their decisions
are guided by their understanding of the many
negative influences of the ghetto or barrio
contributing to a youth's resort to a gang for
protection and support which often leads to
criminal association and violent behavior. A
suppression strategy is not automatically
accepted. "Placing [gang] youth in large
correctional institutions is bad;" instead, gang
youth should receive "training and placement"
(Oleisky 1981, pp. 32-33). At the same time, many
judges believe that they are handicapped in
sentencing decisions because of lack of adequate
information about the youth's gang involvement and
especially about the community gang situation to
which he must return, as well as the lack of
adequate community resources available to deal
with the youth's problem.

One judge with years of experience with gang cases
states that he considers several gang-related
factors in his sentencing decisions. He assumes
that most gang youth have very low self-esteem and
are attracted to or dependent on the gang for the
little social support and sense of personal
achievement that is available to them. Some of the
gang youth are extremely destructive--both to
themselves and to the community. If a particular
offense is probationable on its merits, certain
gang-related factors enter his decision. These
include not only how to protect the community and
the youth from opposing gang members, but also how
to assist the youth to deal with his needs and
develop alternate opportunities and satisfactions.
Otherwise, the youth will return to gang
affiliation and most likely to gang-related
criminal behavior (Schiller 1988).

According to Judge Schiller of the Cook County
Adult Criminal Court, if the offense is not
probationable and he must sentence the youth to an
institution, certain questions arise. Can the
youth survive in an institution? If so, in which
kind of institution? It is important not to
sentence the youth to a particular correctional
institution that, for one reason or another, will
provide an inimical environment. There are special
gang, racial/ethnic, and behavioral
characteristics of institutions which can be
harmful to particular youths. Furthermore, a
correctional environment should reduce gang-
related opportunities for the youth. However, in
Illinois, as in California and elsewhere, it is
not uncommon for certain institutions to be
identified with a particular, dominant gang.
Certain juvenile institutions serve as recruiting
grounds for gangs, sometimes under the influence
of gang members in adult prisons. The juvenile
correctional institution may serve as a vehicle to
recruit or solidify juvenile ties to gangs.

Under ideal conditions--particularly if a youth
can be placed on probation--specific community
arrangements should be made which will provide
alternate legitimate opportunities for peer
affiliation, social status, and support which the
gang provides to the youth. Not only training and
job opportunities should be provided, but also
links to local organizations, social agencies,
fraternal groups, and even political clubs that
are neighborhood-based and easily accessible. Such
ties could induce gang youths to stay away from
former gang peers and constrain them from becoming
involved in crime-generating situations. Local
precinct police, in conjunction with probation,
could also be assigned to fulfill support as well
as surveillance functions for gang offenders in
order to reintegrate them into conventional
patterns within the community (Schiller 1988).

----------------

CHAPTER XI: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND CORRECTIONS 

Some probation and parole agencies have long
histories of experience dealing with youth gangs,
particularly in California. Interest in the gang
problem has been variable in most States and
jurisdictions, with occasional concerns voiced and
limited programs developed by probation or parole
officials and aftercare personnel. Juvenile
probation departments in communities or counties
with traditional gang problems (Chicago and Cook
County in Illinois, or Brooklyn and Kings County
in New York) have still not developed special
gang-service or gang-control programs, although
they have created special intensive probation
programs for property offenders. Only California
appears to have addressed the problem
systematically across the youth or young adult
offender age range over a sustained period of
time--at least in Los Angeles County. Certain
States, including California, Illinois, and
Washington, have also had extensive experience
dealing with prison gangs.

California probably has inaugurated and developed
more pioneering efforts directed to the youth gang
problem since World War II than all other States
combined. In recent years, these programs have
emphasized a suppression strategy, although in
increasingly complex and sophisticated ways. The
earliest of these programs began in the 1940's,
during World War II, when the Zoot Suit Riots
precipitated probation interest in gangs that
later evolved into the Los Angeles Group Guidance
Project, a special outreach probation youth-work
program. The approach was community-based and
sought to integrate youth into nongang, socially
productive life. It used social-group work with
youths and their parents as a major intervention
method and emphasized counseling and recreational
activities. It lacked a comprehensive community-
based character as well as effective collaboration
with law-enforcement and was evaluated negatively.
It suffered programmatic and public crises and was
eventually terminated (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL
INTERVENTION).

Probation

In more recent years, the Los Angeles Probation
Department has deemphasized its rehabilitation
approach in favor of not only a stronger
deterrence strategy and closer integration with
law enforcement, but also closer relations with
community-based agencies and schools. In October
1980, the Los Angeles Probation Department's Board
of Supervisors approved a Specialized Gang-
Supervision Program "to provide a more even
administration of justice, to rehabilitate
offenders, and to reduce gang violence with
emphasis on preventing gang-related homicides"
(Duran undated, pp. 1-2). Improved probation
control and surveillance and the return of
offenders or probation violators to court for
appropriate disposition were the key objectives.

The Los Angeles Specialized Gang-Supervision
Program is a very large one, serving 2,000
probationers 14 to 25 years of age. Strict
juvenile and adult jurisdictional distinctions are
avoided so that the gang problem can be treated on
its own as well as age-related terms. The program
has 40 probation officers in 5 units, with each
unit dealing with 400 gang offenders. No more than
50 cases are prescribed per officer, in contrast
to a normal caseload of 100 to 150 for the regular
probation officers. However, even the caseload of
50 is regarded as much too large for the varied
tasks required with difficult gang offenders. The
specialist gang-probation officers are expected to
be on duty in the evening and on weekends, and to
make their presence known in the community and in
schools. They participate in "ride-alongs" with
police agencies, are present at and on patrol
during special community events, and interact with
members of the County District Attorney's hard-
core units as well as the City Attorney's gang
prosecutors (Nidorf 1980's, undated).

While specialized gang-probation officers are also
expected to participate in a range of court
duties, community-based activities, drug-
prevention classes, presentations at schools, and
interagency coordination and networking, primary
emphasis is on strict supervision of, visitation
to, and search of the homes of youths, as
necessary. Traditional counseling, job referral,
and the conduction of truce meetings between gangs
are now apparently minimized (see Duran 1987).
Funding has been requested but apparently is not
yet available for leadership-training and social-
development programs directed at probationers.

The actual operational nature of this project and
its effects, however, remain somewhat unclear.
Despite the fact that serious gang violence was
relatively more characteristic of older teenagers
and young adults, the Specialized Gang Probation
Unit's caseload was 70-percent juvenile. A large
proportion of the youth it served were peripheral
gang members who did not get involved in violent
activity but were "typically . . . unmotivated
youth . . . [who were] into drug use, graffiti
writing, truancy, and [had] low social
achievement. Much of the efforts of the unit were
in the prosecution of technical violations and
petty offenses" (Duran 1987, p. 25). This
"Specialized Gang-Suppression Program" progress
report concludes with a recommendation for a
change in policy to target more "hard-core violent
youth" similar to the youth served by the Los
Angeles Police and Sheriff's gang units (Duran
1987).

Currently, the Los Angeles Probation Department is
pursuing a variety of new initiatives. An Early
Gang-Intervention Program was established "to
focus preventive resources on first-time youthful
offenders with limited peripheral gang
involvement" (Los Angeles County Probation 1988,
p. 7). In some Los Angeles County programs, on the
one hand, emphasis seems to be on early contact
with schools and community agencies to identify
youth at risk of gang membership and the provision
of special counseling, referral, and parent
contact services. On the other hand, the San Pedro
Project is a cooperative program between probation
and local law enforcement which "provides
coordination of probation to law-enforcement
agencies to enable easy pickup by police of those
violating conditions of their probation and serves
as a means of removing gang members from the
streets" (Ibid.).

For more serious and sophisticated criminal
offenders, the Gang Drug-Pushers and Sellers
Program of the Los Angeles Probation Department
"provides for increased sanctions, restrictions,
and electronic surveillance of the activities of
adult gang members known to be involved in the use
and sale of drugs and narcotics" (Ibid., p. 8). A
very recent project is a "reclamation program" in
Los Angeles County. The probation department
received funding for a pilot project from the U.S.
Department of Justice to assist in the development
of a combined justice-system and community-
organization effort for the coordination and
development of programs dealing with gangs in an
"emerging gang-problem city" (Los Angeles County
Probation 1988, pp. 5-11). The latter effort
seemed to have clear potential for addressing the
gang problem through a comprehensive approach but
was funded for only an 18-month period.

Another proposed innovative project by an
experienced probation department was that of the
California Orange County Probation Department.
Strategies of social intervention, opportunities
provision, and community mobilization were to be
integrated with a deterrent approach for younger
gang members. The goals of a proposed specialized
intensive probation supervision program include:
the diversion of 11- to 14-year-old juvenile gang
offenders from detention and incarceration
experiences to community-based alternatives; the
use of a comprehensive case-management approach to
deal with families and youth who are at risk of
gang involvement; the provision of special
opportunities to encourage at-risk youth to remain
in school and dropouts to return to school; the
linkage of current and potential youth gang
members with conventional types of organizations
or activities within the county; and the
involvement of parents, families, and
organizations in community activities designed to
change environmental factors that promote youth
gang involvement" (Orange County 1989, pp. 18-19).

A continuum of supervision levels has already been
established, dependent on the assessed risk of the
youth engaging in further delinquent or gang-
related behavior: field supervision, intensive
field supervision, house arrest, electronic
monitoring, mandatory substance-abuse treatment,
detention, and incarceration in a juvenile
institution. Specific indicators of gang
membership are explicitly identified, including: a
gang member's self-admission; the wearing of gang
colors and tatoos; the writing of gang graffiti
(placa); having a family member who is in a gang;
having a photograph of a minor with a gang member;
knowing that a minor associates with a gang
member; or having a minor identified as a gang
member by others.

On the other hand, a recent plan proposes an
opportunities approach to undermine the
recruitment process for gangs. It suggests that a
separate gang school be established to provide
remedial education, job readiness, and job
placement experiences. It also recommends an
intensive academic program, with a focus on
bringing minors up to grade level and an emphasis
on language skills. The special-school program
would focus on classroom social-skills development
and teach the minor how to gain positive attention
in the classroom, how to ask questions
comfortably, and how to obtain extra help when
needed so that he does not need to avoid class or
fail to complete assignments.

Each of the young gang-probationers would remain
in the special-school setting for approximately
one semester. The minor's transition back into his
neighborhood school would be carefully planned by
establishing ongoing relationships with the
minor's teacher, guidance counselor, and principal
so that progress begun in the special school could
be continued.

A consortium of support agencies and organizations
would be formed to target problems within the
gang-youth's family and to mobilize key business,
community agency, and governmental units to deal
with issues of education, jobs, and other matters
specifically affecting conditions closely
associated with gang development. The provision of
child care for the minor's younger siblings would
also be included in this proposed Orange County
Project; child care would be provided adjacent to
the special-school site to enable parents to
participate in counseling and skill development
for the family. In addition, the consortium of
agencies would provide adult education and
vocational training for parents to improve their
overall ability to cope with problems through
links with local community-college programs
(Orange County 1989).

Another probation program that emphasized a highly
coordinated, but primarily suppressive approach
was the Intensive Juvenile-Gang Supervision
Program of the Santa Clara Probation Department.
The purpose of the project was "to reduce the
impact of youth gang violence in Santa Clara,
Santa Cruz, and Monterey counties by enhancing
Probation/Parole services, coordinating with other
justice agencies, and promoting public protection
and providing assistance to victims and witnesses"
(Santa Clara Probation Department 1984, p. 1). A
key assumption was that inadequate justice-system
processing of gang offenders was due to a lack of
coordination between criminal justice agencies--
especially law enforcement, district attorney,
probation, and parole. Another program assumption
was that the coordination of these agencies is
essential to cope with the mobility of gangs and
the failure of justice agencies to share resources
and intelligence information. Prior to this
approach, these conditions resulted in a lack of
continuity in case handling through the different
phases of justice-system processing of the youth.

The Santa Clara Probation Department's activities
to achieve the goal of reducing recidivism have
included: vertical case management, or the
assignment of one officer to pursue a case through
all stages of the probation or parole process;
intensive investigation and supervision of gang
cases; imposition of special court orders;
commitment to rehabilitation facilities; and
services to victims and witnesses including
referral to community resources and maintenance of
secure court waiting areas (DeWitt 1983).

Sufficient time has elapsed since the start of
this project to permit some evaluation. After five
years, local officials claim that the number of
gangs has decreased from 50 to 20, with only 10 to
12 active on a regular basis. However, there has
also been a shift from Hispanic gang violence to
black gang drug trafficking and Vietnamese youth
gang crime involving residential burglaries and
robberies, commercial robberies, and vehicle
thefts. The relative shift from extreme violence
to serious property crime is viewed as an
improvement (Creamer 1988).

The Philadelphia Crisis Intervention Network was
probably the most community-based probation and
parole program that addressed the youth gang
homicide problem in a major urban area. This
network included mainly social intervention and
community organization but also a closely
integrated probation/parole component.
Relationships with schools, police, and other
agencies were developed. The probation/parole
component focused on the control of older youth or
young adults likely to influence younger gang
members and worked with street workers on a daily
basis. This program apparently produced or was
correlated with a sharp reduction in gang
homicides. Its positive results were sustained for
over a decade (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL
INTERVENTION).

Parole

There appear to be extremely few community-based,
supervised-offender projects directed to the gang
problem that are sponsored by youth or adult
correctional authorities. Probably the most
radical program is the Gang Violence Reduction
Project of the California Youth Authority. In many
respects it is a highly community-participation
youth-outreach program, assessed earlier in this
study (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL INTERVENTION). The
project, a special parole program in East Los
Angeles, assumes that certain elements of the gang
could make a legitimate and positive contribution
to prevention and control of the gang problem. The
primary methodology of the project has consisted
of mediation and community development, mainly by
consultants such as former gang leaders or
influential members of the warring gangs to which
they are assigned. Conflict resolution procedures
tailored to the culture of the barrio are employed
to find alternatives to gang violence. A variety
of community-oriented program activities are
employed, such as trips, athletics, neighborhood
meetings, gang- and drug-prevention discussions
and lectures in elementary schools, referral of
drug abusers for treatment, and involvement of
local businesses and parent groups. The project is
supervised by professional parole agents and has
received a positive evaluation by some researchers
and justice-system personnel, but not by others.
While the project is closely identified with
community groups and some social agencies, it
remains a source of controversy because of its
close, unique involvement with gangs that are
still engaged in serious violent activity.

Another more conventionally suppression-oriented
project of the California Youth Authority is the
Gang Service Project, a specialized parole unit
located in Compton. The parole agents specialize
in the direct supervision of:

known, sophisticated, hard-core gang members on
parole. Each ward assigned to an officer has a
history of gang violence and a special parole
condition regarding nongang association. The
condition is aggressively enforced. Parole agents
work flexible schedules--conducting surveillance
as well as monitoring parole behavior, often with
the assistance of local law enforcement. The goal
of the unit is to be highly visible in the
community and hold gang members accountable
(Lockwood 1988, p. 4).

The California Youth Authority has also created a
"Transitional Group Home" as a "safe house" in San
Diego County for wards who have made the decision
to leave the gang lifestyle. The program serves
older parolees, 17 to 24 years old, who "desire to
get away from the negative gang environment"
(Lockwood 1988, p. 4). Parolees in this
residential program receive weekly therapy and
drug counseling. They are also provided with the
resources of a local employment specialist to
assess their training needs and assist in job
development. The minimum stay in the house is
three to four months. Parolees are not allowed to
move out of the facility until they have gained
steady employment. Approximately 37 percent of the
house residents are estimated to have completed
the program (Lockwood 1988, p. 5).

Finally, an attempt has been made by the
California Youth Authority, through its
Information Parole Coordinators, "to collect gang
information whenever Youth Authority parolees are
involved within their respective
jurisdictions . . . .The designated agents attend
local law-enforcement gang meetings, compile
records on the activities of gang members, and
exchange information with local authorities"
(Lockwood 1988, p. 4). The California Youth
Authority, like the Los Angeles Probation
Department, appears to have a variety of programs
directed to youth gang members. The nature of the
relationship and the degree of coordination
between these two major gang-offender community
supervisory agencies in California is not clearly
known. Recent State legislation does not appear to
accord a key or integral role to parole--as it
does to probation and law enforcement--in the
development of comprehensive local systems to deal
with the gang problem.

Corrections

More than other criminal justice agencies. prisons
and training institutions can be both a context
for the development of the gang problem and a
societal response to it. In recent decades, prison
populations have been seen as helping create
sophisticated criminal street-gang organizations
in the streets (Jacobs 1977). Prisons are thought
to have an interactive deviancy-amplifying effect
both within the prison and on the streets.
Furthermore, the prison-gang problem, in
interaction with the street-gang problem, has
spread across communities and States. The prison
has provided a source of continuity for gang
members who go to prison and yet are able to
maintain gang membership that began in the streets
(Moore 1978). Imprisonment or incapacitation,
though a simple short-term solution, has clearly
contributed to increased gang cohesion and
membership recruitment (Reiss 1987).

The problem is clearly more serious in adult than
in youth corrections, and different responses are
necessary, but the distinctions can be overdrawn, 
particularly since the majority of inmate gang-
members are probably still in their twenties, at
least in most States. In any case, comprehensive
and balanced suppression and treatment or social-
opportunity approaches are probably more likely to
develop in youth or juvenile facilities than in
adult correctional systems.

Prison issues of what to do about gangs and which
approaches to use are similar to those faced by
other justice-system and community-based
representatives, but the issues are more sharply
posed. Gangs in prisons cannot easily be ignored,
and the consequences of wrong decisions are more
severe. Unlike their position in other criminal
justice agencies, gang members must be considered
a full-time participating member of the structure
and organization of the prison or training school.
The operational problem of defining membership is
immediately raised for the entering inmate: what
should be administrative policy? "One school of
thought proposes that gang membership, in and of
itself, is not sufficient to warrant official
sanction. As long as individual gang members do
not violate the rules of institutional conduct
they may participate in activities available to
other inmates and move about the institution as do
other inmates" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 9).

Another perspective, increasingly dominant, is
that the presence of gangs or any unauthorized
criminal-oriented organization in prison or youth
correctional institutions constitutes a threat and
a challenge to the administration. A policy is
usually formulated that:

any inmate identified as a gang member will be
segregated from the general population. This
policy requires provision for enough segregation
cells . . . a plan for how segregation
units . . . are to be operated, including
contingency plans for gang warfare . . . .This
strategy puts great emphasis on screening for gang
membership upon admission and the development of
detailed official criteria for establishing gang
identification (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 13).

The issues of gang identification and recognition
and the related development of information systems
are critically important for control of the gang
problem, both internal and external to the
institution. Is it desirable, for example, to
distinguish between the "acknowledgement and [the]
recognition of prison gangs" (Camp and Camp 1988,
p. 12)? Acknowledging the presence of gangs as
illegitimate organizations but not formally
acknowledging their existence as legitimate
organizations minimizes the risk of providing
credibility to the gang and their manipulation of
the institution's control system. Camp and Camp's
recommendation is that detailed information on
gang-membership and gang-activity characteristics
(inside and outside of the institution) be placed
on computer systems. Such information should be
shared with a variety of other justice-system
representatives to enhance control and prevent
violence and other gang crime (C. Camp and G. Camp
1988, p. 21).

However, issues of prisoner rights and due process
also arise. Labeling an inmate as a gang member
for the purpose of singling him out for special
attention, deprivation, or punishment in the
absence of observed criminal behavior may be
unlawful. Inmates cannot be excluded from prison
activities or deprived of regular privileges
because they are gang members without due process.
Another dilemma is that the prison administration
must protect a prisoner who is not a gang member,
or a gang member who seeks to leave a gang, from
harm by "predatory gang prisoners" (C. Camp and G.
Camp 1988, p. 19).

A variety of incentives and deterrents have been
considered in order to limit criminal gang
behavior in the institution. The California
Department of Corrections has considered awarding
"good time" to inmates including gang members, 
leading to early release. However, police in
Chicago claim that the early release of gang
members without alerting the police led to a
renewal and escalation of the black-gang problem
in Chicago public housing projects in the early
1980's. Prison administrators are more likely to
use deterrents such as vigorous criminal
prosecution for crimes by prisoners, use of
technology to reduce introduction of drugs through
visiting areas, inmate drug-testing, strengthening
controls over inmate funds, stricter restrictions
for inmates confined in segregation units, and
making gang membership an aggravating factor when
sanctions are applied for rule violations (C. Camp
and G. Camp 1988, pp. 56).

An alternative and more socially oriented
strategy, recently encouraged by administration,
staff, and inmates, is well-designed housing that
"may not only deter gang violence but also
reinforce constructive behavior" (C. Camp and G.
Camp 1988, p. 27). The key to the improved ability
of the staff to supervise inmate activity and
improved inmate satisfaction is smaller housing
units. They provide "more options for housing
assignments [and] reduce gang-member
contacts . . . " (Camp and Camp 1988, p. 27). The
use of smaller units and dispersing both the
general and the gang inmate population "reduces
the likelihood of housing units being labelled as
one particular gang's `turf' and . . . makes
communication within the gang more difficult" (C.
Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 27).

In institutions, particularly in adult
correctional institutions with a critical mass of
inmates who are gang members or where there has
been a tradition of gang violence, the critical
factor according to Camp and Camp has been the
efficient implementation of a suppression
approach. Adequate numbers of staff are necessary,
and experienced, professional line staff must be
available to enforce prison rules in a
professional manner. Guards must avoid implicit or
explicit pressures not to enforce rules for gang
members in exchange for helping to keep the peace
as a quid pro quo. Gang inmates--especially gang
leaders--should not be given any notoriety within
the system or in public, and they should not be
combatted with any strategy that acknowledges gang
structure or values. It is not considered wise to
allow inmate clubs or organizations to meet
privately. It is important never to abdicate
control of any room or area to a gang. It is
recommended that prison staff and administration
not speak through gang leaders to their
memberships (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 45).

Finally, the ultimate control weapon may be the
transfer of negative gang leadership out of one
institution to another, where his ties and
patterns of influence may be reduced. "Separating
and isolating gang leaders interrupts
communication and can serve to fragment and
cripple a gang operation" (Camp and Camp 1988,
p. 49). On the other hand, the interinstitutional
transfers of hard-core gang members may in fact
spread the gang problem without necessarily
alleviating a current gang problem, particularly
where a line of secondary leadership in the gang
has already been developed (C. Camp and G. Camp
1988, p. 47). To what extent these various
elements of a supposedly efficient suppression
strategy have been implemented, and how successful
they have been in dealing with the prison-gang
problem, is not clearly known.

In essence, a traditional corrections strategy is
based on effective control. It includes swift
reaction to and forceful prevention of forceful
acts when necessary, special lockup arrangements
for gang members, moving gang leaders or members
from one location to another within the State
correctional system or to another system across
State lines, and isolation of gang leaders by
almost any means possible. While this traditional
approach assumes the presence of actual or
threatened violence in a prison, another approach
argues that prison violence may not always be a
direct result of intergang friction, but rather of
other problems. The presence of gangs may be a
convenient rationale for frequent, erratic
lockdowns and shakedowns (Caponpon and Tagatac
1985).

An evolving approach, slowly developing in a few
youth correctional institutions, is based on
notions of effective coordination with a variety
of law-enforcement officials outside the
institution; effective communication between
correctional officials and inmates; social
intervention, especially values-change programs;
provision of internal institutional opportunities,
such as education, training, and jobs for positive
inmate change and development; and external
community-based involvement and support programs.
Good communication and rapport with inmates are
carefully nurtured within a framework of effective
supervision of inmate activities and sound
organizational and community relationships.

A variety of techniques have been developed to
facilitate coordination and communication with
external system and community representatives. For
example, victims of gang violence or parents of
victims may be brought into the institution for
discussion with inmates (Terhune 1988). Youth
agencies and community organizations may be
invited to provide a variety of services,
including education, training, and preparation for
social reintegration into the community. The
process of adjustment back to the community may
commence before the youth leaves the correctional
facility.

An experimental social services approach directed
at gang youth has been developed by the Wisconsin
Department of Health and Social Services, Division
of Corrections. A special program for hard-core
gang offenders in their late teens (many of whom
have been drug traffickers) has been established
at the Ethan Allen Boys School in Wales,
Wisconsin. A particular cottage, Draper Hall,
containing these youths is the locus of the
experiment. The assumption of the program is that
"youth can eliminate delinquent behavior and
disassociate themselves from gangism as a means of
socialization . . . .The program within Draper
Hall is individually designed while utilizing the
power of group dynamics" (Shade 1988, p. 4).

The program addresses four general categories of
intervention: psychosocial,
educational/vocational, family/community
functioning, and program evaluation. The treatment
plan is designed for a maximum of 26 youths in a
seven-month program involving intensive
counseling, monitoring, and group participation.
The staff anticipate some problems, as well as a
few benefits, in the concentration of youth from
different gangs in the same residential location.
On one hand, it creates risk and generates some
management challenges, but on the other hand, "the
very design keeps the gang behavior from going
underground and undetected, which then enables the
staff to directly confront the resident in his
activities, its purpose, and its negative results-
-creating the opportunity to challenge the gang
values and participation" (Shade 1988, p. 18).

Another aspect of the program is individual and
group counseling based on "the application of the
Behavioral Error in Thinking" procedure which
requires the youths to keep logs, identify
behavior resulting from an error in thinking, and
develop an alternative strategy that would be
successful. The program also uses group training
sessions to encourage successful communication and
values clarification. The Draper Hall experiment
is in sharp contrast to other youth institutional
systems where officials either are not aware of
gang problems, deny their existence, or simply
emphasize the maintenance of orderly institutional
routines rather than gang-related rehabilitation.
The Wisconsin program appears to be a genuine
attempt to change attitude and behavioral patterns
and prepare the gang youth for outside living and
social development in the community. Program
processes and their outcomes in this experiment
are to be systematically researched.

----------------

CHAPTER XII: SOCIAL OPPORTUNITIES: SCHOOLS AND
JOBS

We believe it is important to define the policy or
program strategy of social opportunities in
somewhat restrictive terms to focus specifically
on issues of education, training, and jobs. In
part, this is to avoid confusion of the primary
strategy of opportunities-provision with those of
social-intervention and even, at times,
deterrence. In practice, these strategies are
often mixed or interrelated, but strategy emphasis
is critical for policy and practice, as well as
for analysis. Human services tend to equate social
opportunities with social intervention and to
overemphasize the value of personal counseling and
various support services per se without reference
to their linking or enabling function to basic
institutional opportunities. Thus, youth services
have been mistakenly viewed as functionally
equivalent to educational and job opportunities.
Juvenile detention and child-welfare placement can
sometimes be regarded as a social opportunity,
since they place youths in a stable environment
and enable them to catch up on their schooling and
get "cleaned-up," at least physically.

In the short and long term, school and job
opportunities must be closely interrelated
targeted to a range of types of gang youth,
younger and older, at-risk and hard-core. A
social-opportunities approach (in the highly
specific and strategic sense in which we define
it) requires that other strategies and programs of
social intervention and deterrence also are
provided on school or employment premises, or are
closely connected with them. Finally, a social
opportunities approach to dealing with the gang
problem must be conceptualized and structured in
such a way as to avoid labeling and social
isolation of gang youth from mainstream
developmental opportunities. It is critical to
interrelate various mainstream and specially gang-
focused educational, training, job development,
and competency building programs to the optimal
extent possible.

Local School Programs

Local community schools should be the primary
locus for the development of early intervention
programs for the gang problem. Local schools,
along with parents and other institutions, bear
principal responsibility for socializing and
resocializing youth. Schools, especially
elementary and middle schools, are identified with
local communities and are an integral part of the
life of families with children. The gang problem
usually manifests itself on the streets, often
around a school in a local community. A youth's
joining a gang engaged in delinquent activity is a
key indicator of defective socialization. The
schools are an excellent locus for gang-related
social change and development for the youth, since
schools maintain both academic and social
responsibility for youths six hours a day.

When a gang problem is present in a community, it
may be manifested directly in the school. The
schools often becomes a base for gang recruitment
and sometimes drug selling and drug use by gang
youth. As suggested above, while gang fights are
more likely to occur outside than inside the
school, gang activities--including fights--are
likely to be planned at school. Gang graffiti and
related trespasses onto school property are not
uncommon in gang-problem neighborhoods. While the
gang problem can occur in more serious form at the
high-school level, it usually involves relatively
fewer youth, since an extremely high proportion of
gang youth drop out after the ninth grade in many
urban jurisdictions. The local elementary schools
would appear to be the preferred location to
develop school-based gang prevention and the
middle schools a principal focus for early
intervention programs.

The nature and extent of the schools' response to
the gang problem has been highly variable. Most
school systems would probably prefer to ignore the
problem, which, if recognized and dealt with, 
would involve a complex and expensive process of
organizational change and development. School
administrators often claim that there are other
serious social problems such as teenage pregnancy,
drug abuse, and dropouts, which afflict their
schools, and that there are insufficient
resources, including teacher and staff skills, to
deal with the gang problem. When the school system
does recognize the existence of gangs and reacts,
the problem is dealt with as a school security
problem. Special security arrangements may involve
recruiting school-employed personnel, stationing
youth- or juvenile-division police officers in
selected schools, or employing outside security
firms to provide services to safeguard school
employees and students and protect property. Few
of the security efforts are directed at the gang
problem per se but rather at general problems of
school crime, violence, and disorder, which, in
many cases, are closely associated with specific
gang situations.

This situation often results in an elaborate
suppression strategy that brings in outside
criminal justice agencies. For example, the School
Crime-Suppression Program, recently approved by
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, calls
for "a 40 percent reduction in gang crime, with a
primary emphasis on gang activities on school
campuses. Probation officers assigned to the
program are present on campus everyday" (Los
Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 17).
Probation officers are expected not only to
supervise minors who are gang members known to the
court, but also to "engage in prevention of gang
activities on the campus as a whole" (Los Angeles
County Probation Department 1988, p. 17).

The Portland school system has developed a
systemwide approach which--while focused on
deterrence--has developed programs for youth-at-
risk and their parents. The Portland school policy
includes provisions for "closely monitoring school
campuses for signs of gang
behavior . . . searching lockers or students
whenever there was any indication of weapons or
drugs . . . [recognizing] the display of certain
clothing or adornments that indicated gang
membership . . . [and] strictly monitoring
visitors to school campuses" (McKinney 1988,
p. 7). Portland has also developed in-school
support groups and counseling programs for
students who display characteristics that may lead
to gang battles, and also for their parents
(McKinney 1988, p. 7). At the high-school level,
programs stress helping high-risk students find
something other than minimum-wage employment.
Portland schools work with private industry
councils to provide special job-related programs
for high-risk students.

The Portland school system is also proactive, with
apparently sufficient resources to deal with the
youth gang problem on a citywide basis, often
beyond school boundaries. In addition to its other
school-centered responsibilities, the Portland
school system "is providing leadership and full
cooperation with community, city, county, State,
and Federal agencies to thwart gang activities and
criminal behavior" (Prophet 1988, p. 3).
Furthermore, school police officers have developed
"expertise to become Portland's major resource for
information and intelligence on youth gang
activities--not just activities affecting the
schools, but activities affecting the entire
community" (Prophet 1988, p. 3).

Some schools are beginning to experiment with
special counseling programs for the parents of
students in the schools. The Los Angeles Unified
School District has recently inaugurated a program
that focuses on the development of self-esteem in
parents and teachers, rather than focusing
directly on gang youths. The program differs from
the usual DARE (Drug Awareness Resistance
Education) or SANE (Substance Abuse Narcotics
Education) school prevention programs, which focus
on youths at risk of gang membership. This program
aims rather at building self-awareness and
competencies among parents and school staff "for
the purpose of passing the attributes on to
students, who may be potential gang members and
drug abusers" (Los Angeles Unified School District
1989, p. 7). The School District also has a
special interest in "enhancing the self-esteem of
girls and women" (Ibid.).

Some school systems are experimenting with a
variety of broadly based programs that include
social-intervention and preventive-education
efforts. The National School Safety Center
describes school programs around the country that
have established behavior codes, graffiti-removal
activities, conflict-prevention strategies, and
crisis-management procedures to prevent and
address gang emergencies when they occur (National
School Safety Center 1988). Social agencies,
community organizations, recreation groups, and
police and sheriff's departments are often invited
to conduct these educational and social-
intervention programs.

Many of the preventive programs focus on
elementary-grade students, pointing out the
dangers of gang activity and urging students not
to join them. "The Alternatives to Gang
Membership" curriculum of the city of Paramount in
Los Angeles County, not only provides comic books,
posters, and discussion opportunities for students
that address the gang problem, but also sponsors
neighborhood meetings led by bilingual leaders.
The program also sponsors the informal counseling
of individual youth who appear to be at increased
risk of gang involvement. The fifth-grade antigang
curriculum, introduced in the Paramount Unified
School District in 1982, develops constructive
youth activities in the neighborhood.

At least 15 other cities in California have
developed school-gang diversion programs modeled
after the Paramount plan. The Santa Ana City
Council recently approved a school antigang
program "aimed at students in the fourth, fifth,
or sixth grades. Students will receive weekly one-
hour lessons on gangs intended to counteract the
`glamorizing' they may be offered by older
students already in gangs" (Schwartz 1988, p. 45).
The Los Angeles Unified School District also has
inaugurated an ambitious Gang-Resistance Education
and Training curriculum in grades 3 through 9,
with the capability to expand the range to
kindergarten through grade 12 by changing the
vocabulary and some of the activities. The program
is designed so that the "classroom teacher can
further enhance students' self-esteem and their
ability to solve problems without violence or
negative behavior. Topics for lessons include
resisting pressure to join a gang, alternatives to
gang activity . . . how to recognize and manage
stress in school . . . and communication skills in
situations where the student must be assertive
with peers and adults" (Los Angeles County
Probation 1988, p. 11).

Chicago developed an innovative proactive early
intervention program for a short period of time. A
model project in two middle schools in a high-
gang-crime, inner-city community provided not only
a curriculum to counter gang influence and special
security arrangements to deal with school disorder
and maintain school discipline, but also a crisis
outreach program. The intervention program called
for a unconventional staffing pattern.
Paraprofessional school-employed outreach workers,
specialist teachers, and counselors targeted 40
gang youths in sixth, seventh, and eighth grade
who were already having serious academic and
behavioral difficulties in each of the two
schools. Many of the youths were known to the
police, some with official records (up to 30
percent in one school). They were provided with
remedial academic assistance and special
counseling and service referral help, which was
also extended to their parents. Crisis
intervention at school and in the immediate
neighborhood was provided during actual or
potential gang fighting situations. Gang youths
were not suspended from school but were required
to complete classwork and were subjected to
special tasks, surveillance, and discipline within
the school. The development of a community
advisory-group and parent meetings, as well as
special recreational activities and visits by the
targeted youth to jails and drug clinics, were
also part of the program (Spergel and Curry 1988).

Most of the school antigang, gang-prevention, or
gang-rehabilitation programs have been undertaken
only recently. How the programs will evolve over
time is not yet known. Suppression strategies
appear to predominate and pressures exist in some
States to make the schools a place where law-
enforcement and other criminal-justice agencies
can focus on the early targeting and surveillance
of gang offenders. However, this outlook may not
pay adequate attention to the need for the
academic, vocational, and social development of
these vulnerable youth (California Office of
Criminal Justice Planning 1987).

Some youth agencies work closely with schools in
prevention and social-intervention programs. The
San Diego Youth and Community Services'
Neighborhood Outreach Program employs a two-
pronged intervention approach for middle-school
youth-at-risk. This particular program is
sustained through high school. The approach has a
youth-specific component which includes the
formation of a cohesive peer or club-type group
that engages in consistent ongoing recreation,
provides role-modeling, and assistance with
educational goals, job development, and job
placement.

The family-specific component of the San Diego
community program includes work with "parents or
parental figures, other siblings, and members of
the household to provide a support base for youth
to remain gang- and drug-free and in school" (San
Diego Youth and Community Services 1989, p. 1).
The program also emphasizes case management and
intensive intervention across generations.

Few evaluations of school antigang programs have
been conducted and the results, thus far, are
ambiguous--mainly because of the incompleteness or
inadequacy of the research. Most programs are not
directed primarily to current gang members but to
"wannabes" (marginal or peripheral younger youth).
The results of evaluations of Paramount's
"Alternative to Gangs Program" indicate that the
attitudes of elementary and middle-school children
about gangs can be changed positively after
exposure to the curriculum--at least based on
questionnaire responses. According to one set of
news accounts, the number of active gang-members
in Paramount has dropped from 1,000 to 200 since
1981 (Schwartz 1988). According to other reports,
there has been an increase in gang cases known to
the police from 286 in 1986 to 396 in 1987
(Donovan 1988). 

In some cases, greater community involvement may
be required. George McKenna, the former principal
of George Washington Preparatory High School in
Los Angeles and superintendent of the Inglewood
Unified School District in Inglewood, California,
modified many student- and parent-involvement
activities to deal with the gang problem. Gangs
had controlled the playgrounds, but under
McKenna's leadership, parents became more active
in school affairs--they even helped monitor
hallways and restrooms. He not only urged parent
participation in daily classroom activities but
pushed for the location of probation, medical, and
human services directly on school premises
(President's Child Safety Partnership 1987, pp.
69, 107; McKenna 1990, pp. 23-29).

One controversial report by the Quality Education
for Minorities Project (1990) recommended massive
restructuring of the Nation's educational system,
resulting in increased dependence upon Federal and
State governments for the care and education of
children. This report recommended an approach to
providing educational opportunities to gang youth
aimed not at changing the attitudes, values, and
even behaviors of gang or at-risk youth directly,
but at restructuring the schools by making
"fundamental changes in the rules, roles, and
relationships in schools." (Quality Education for
Minorities Project 1990, p. 46). Using this
approach, the school becomes a base or a center to
coordinate the social, health, and vocational
services that children and families need, 
including health care, literacy training, day
care, and employment and training (Quality
Education for Minorities Project 1990, p. 54). 

The building of systematic career vocational
bridges between school and work is of special
relevance to committed gang youth who generally
are in their middle or older teen years. Few
American schools have developed these links for
youth who are neither prepared nor desirous of
pursuing further academic education after
graduation from high school. The development of
school-business-industry agreements that establish
links and mutual responsibilities is needed
critically. The schools would make sure that such
students meet attendance and achievement standards
and business and industry employers would agree to
hire preferentially the students so accredited.

In this system of school-work linkage, business
and industry would make clear and precise the
nature of qualifications needed by inner-city
youth, with special attention to gang youth, for
jobs. Schools would relate school performance to
the job, and both schools and industry would
structure attitudinal, classroom, and worksite
training around cooperative learning and
preapprentice or apprentice opportunities for
hands-on learning (Quality Education for
Minorities Project 1990, p. 74).

Employment Strategy

Job opportunities for older youth and young adults
are critical to the reduction of the gang problem.
Older adolescent and young adults tend to remain
in gangs probably long after they are ready to
leave them because adequate job opportunities and
linkages to employment are not available. Many
older gang-youth could be considered at "positive
risk" of leaving gangs under appropriate
conditions of employment and career-development
opportunity. A recent national gang conference
warned that youth are becoming more active in
gangs largely "due to competition for the
lucrative drug trade" (McKinney 1988, p. 1).
Furthermore, intensive prevention programs
(including increased training and job
opportunities) are necessary to keep at-risk youth
from joining gangs and older hard-core gang youth
from using them as vehicles for developing the
drug trade (McKinney 1988, p. 5).

In a recent article, Levitan and Gallo review the
history of governmental policy geared towards
improving the skills of and providing
opportunities for the workforce, particularly for
those who are socially handicapped. The Federal
Government's interest dates back to the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which authorized land grants to
establish schools, and the Morrill Act of 1791,
which established land grants for agricultural and
mechanical colleges. Congress did not enact a
general vocational rehabilitation program for the
handicapped, however, until 1921. The Roosevelt
Administration inaugurated several massive public
employment programs in the 1930's targeted at low-
income or socially handicapped youth. This Federal
commitment continued after World War II. "[T]he
Federal Government has assumed [and continues to
assume] primary responsibility for employment and
training assistance" (Levitan and Gallo 1989,
p. 1).

Poor, jobless, and deficiently educated youth (
including a large majority of gang members and
offenders) have been, only to a limited and
variable extent, targets of Federal employment and
training efforts. The diverse characteristics of
this socially disadvantaged youth group have
required different strategies to "improve their
employability, productivity, and earnings"
(Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 4). Even youth who
have mastered reading, writing, and arithmetic,
but have little labor-market experience may
"benefit from learning basic job-search skills"
(Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 4). Disadvantaged
youth, especially gang youth without adequate
skills, can profit from programs providing a high-
school equivalency degree or vocational training.
Levitan and Gallo suggest that job opportunities
for minority youth may be increased by "partially
subsidizing employers for on-the-job training
costs and by vigorous enforcement of equal-
opportunity laws" (1989, p. 4).

At the same time, the implementation of Federal
initiatives such as the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) has resulted in inadequate targeting
and insufficient inclusion of socially deficient
and handicapped youth in many of the available
skills and employment programs. The "introduction
of cost and job-placement performance standards,
severe restrictions on stipends and support
services, reduced funding, and an expanded
business role have made creaming [or selection of
the most qualified and employable youth] common
under JTPA" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 15).

Remedial education is extremely important to the
career development of these youth. Only limited
interest exists in most programs, however, in the
development of remedial education connected with
skill or job training, sometimes because of lack
of funds. Furthermore, many programs reject
candidates without basic educational achievement.
The Job Corps program, on the other hand, has been
remarkably successful in providing an "equal share
of educational and occupational training" for
socially disadvantaged youth (Levitan and Gallo
1989, p. 15). Levitan and Gallo remind us that
"quality classroom training has a proven track
record for cost [control and] effectively
improving participants' long-term job prospects," 
as indicated by analyses of CETA (Comprehensive
Employment Training Act) and the impact of the Job
Corps (1989, pp. 15-16). We observe, however, that
Job Corps at the present time does not accept
known gang youth with records of violence or youth
currently on probation into their program.

It is important to focus job-training programs on
those who need it most. Recent research concludes
that "training programs can make the greatest
impact by aiding individuals who are relatively
more disadvantaged" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p.
16). Levitan and Gallo believe that more
disadvantaged youth--including gang youth--should
be targeted for and screened into rather than
weeded out of programs such as JTPA (Job Training
Partnership Act). In this way, the effectiveness
of the Federal investment will be increased
(1989).

Furthermore, the social and economic complexity of
job-training and placement opportunities requires
a comprehensive focus--not only on the youth
himself, but also on his family. Social-
intervention and social-opportunity strategies
must be more integrated. Levitan and Gallo suggest
that a case manager could guide the youth's family
to appropriate support services to facilitate the
use of available job-program opportunities for
both the youth and the family (1989, pp. 21-23).

The U.S. Department of Labor has recently
initiated a Youth Opportunities Unlimited
Challenge Program, which attempts to avoid the
pitfalls of conventional, fragmented job-training
programs through comprehensive community-based
demonstration efforts. According to the Federal
RFP's (Requests for Proposals) statements, the
local demonstration programs "must generate an
integrated series of initiatives--including
school-based and second-chance services--which are
designed to address the various needs of each and
every young person in a target area" (U.S.
Department of Labor 1990, p. 1). The challenge
grants are to have the following principal
features:

1. Measurable and attainable community goals, with
positive community impacts, including "reduced
school dropout rate, decreased teenage pregnancy,
increased young-adult employment rates, reduced
drug abuse, increased school attendance, increased
enrollment in post-secondary education, decreased
juvenile delinquency and gang activity, and
reduced criminal activity in the
neighborhood . . . ." (U.S. Department of Labor
1990, p. 1).

2. Focus on a small neighborhood. The idea is to
select "a small enough area so that all youth in
the community will be significantly and positively
affected" (Ibid.).

3. Visible center of activity. "The demonstration
is to have a physical site . . . for example, a
newly established alternative school, a community
learning-center, or a youth construction-corps
center . . . .Services must include assessment,
individual and family counseling, mentorship, drug
prevention, recreation activities, health
services, education, housing . . . job training,
and employment assistance" (Ibid., p. 2).

4. Emphases on integrated multiple services, 
including concepts of core programs such as
alternative schools, community learning-centers,
youth construction corps, and regional work/study
colleges; and complementary programs such as
school-to-apprenticeship programs, teen-parent
centers, summer remediation and employment
programs, middle colleges, and community youth-
centers.

5. Strong State, local, and community roles,
including links with existing programs (such as
JTPA); commitment to extra police protection;
restructured junior and senior high schools; drug-
prevention, sports, and cultural programs; local
advisory groups; and key organizational
participation (Ibid.).

Local Employment

In addition to large-scale, Federal and State
training and employment programs such as
Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, and JTPA, 
which have thus far only peripherally addressed
the employment needs and problems of gang youth,
there have been locally generated and developed
job programs. The widespread assumption is still
that most gang youths would like to be employed
when they reach a certain age (Reddick 1987). In
fact, even many of those gang youths who are
currently involved in drug dealing would "prefer
decent-paying jobs to the gang life, but they lack
the skills and the attitudes to get and hold them"
(Insight 1988, p. 17). There is also some evidence
that gang youths who obtain jobs are less likely
to remain in the gang (Klein 1971; Hagedorn 1988).
Even part-time jobs are viewed as helpful for many
gang youths who are still in school (Williams and
Kornblum 1985).

One locally generated effort that is specifically
addressed to the gang problem is the planned Dane
County Juvenile Court Prevention Program in
Wisconsin. This project is funded with the aid of
the recent U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Juvenile drug-gang initiative. Under the
aegis of the juvenile court, but in cooperation
with the Dane County Youth Conservation Corps, the
project will generate different levels of paid
conservation jobs for gang youths aged 14 to 18
years.

This program, targeted at both core gang members
and youth-at-risk, will involve not only skills
training but also alcohol- and drug-abuse
education. Youth will be matched with job
opportunities and mentors in the private sector (
including small businesses and homeowners in the
Madison County area) and organized into small
groups. Career awareness and skills training also
will be part of the experience. Court programs
will be related to this particular gang-oriented
employment and training project and will include a
variety of housing and camping services as well as
justice system deterrents, including shelter care,
home detention, adventure challenge, and youth
restitution (County of Dane 1989).

A very few locally sponsored programs and small
businesses have addressed the specific interests
and needs of gang youth for jobs. A handful of
these have even provided social support and
controls for the youths to allow them to adjust
satisfactorily to the job. In the 1960's, the YMCA
in Chicago established a special job-support
component for gang youth as part of its detached-
worker youth program. Once the youth was on the
job, the program provided job placement with
sustained counseling and support. The outcome of
this federally sponsored project was not entirely
clear (Caplan 1968), but apparently its success
was quite modest. Another approach was a New York
City court's employment program that formed a
"self-sufficient but supervised company manned by
ex-offenders and gang members. The company's
construction contracts--most of them with the city
of New York--exceed $1 million" (Sampson III 1984,
p. 23).

Ad hoc employment programs of youth agencies or
local businesses have been less ambitious, such as
special youth-agency cleanup or painting projects
(Pearl 1988). Also, the owner of a gas-pipeline
construction business in Los Angeles claims to
have employed gang members successfully over long
periods of time. His approach is based on a
combination of outreach, personal support, and
strong authoritative counseling (Baker 1988b). A
labor-contracting company in Chicago has recently
begun to match low-skilled, unemployed, inner-city
workers (including some gang or former gang
members) with manufacturing jobs in the suburbs.
The contractor provides onsite training, group
transportation, and steady work for pay of $5.00
an hour (Casuso 1989).

None of these local programs has been fully or
carefully evaluated over the long term. One job-
development program reported that more than 1,000
jobs were provided to gang members, delinquents,
and others through the efforts of the El Monte,
California, police community-relations unit and
the Boys' Club of San Gabriel Valley in
collaboration with over 100 local businesses and
community organizations. Some factory employers
even have come to depend on the pool of gang youth
(Spergel and Chance 1990).

Another promising local-community youth-employment
project is the San Jose Youth Conservation Corps
in California. The program, related to the
juvenile court and funded by State and private-
sector grants, provides employment to justice-
system-connected youth aged 18 to 22 who want a
job. Many gang youths have been involved. The
program has a current capacity of 50 job slots;
about 100 youths have already participated. The
court's program participants are required to be
periodically drug-tested and the few program
failures have been drug-related. Local informants
report that good workers in the program quickly
advance to supervisory positions and then leave
for jobs in the regular job market. Plans are
underway to expand the number of job slots and to
include not only youths who are on probation but
also youths who are graduating from local
correctional ranch-programs. Much more involvement
and cooperation by private businesses, however, is
still required and large-scale experimentation
with such approaches is obviously highly
desirable.

----------------

CHAPTER XIII: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
MOBILIZATION

The ideas of community organization, coordination,
and mobilization can be conceptualized on two or
three interconnected levels: governmental
(Federal, State, county, and city government,
involving mainly public agencies), with a further
division of national and local; and grassroots
(local-community or neighborhood efforts involving
mainly citizen or consumer groups and nonprofit or
sectarian agencies, and sometimes representatives
of city government). In this particular
discussion, we exclude networking at the
individual client service level, which is indeed
closely connected to and interactive with the
interorganizational or community-mobilization
approach we recommend. Our focus is at the
aggregate client level with reference to policy
and practice.

Different organizations and agencies within and
across governmental and neighborhood grassroots
levels often address the youth gang problem in
separate, particularistic, and sometimes
contradictory ways. Mobilized and coordinated
approaches can develop when the various levels of
organization have similar perceptions of the
problem and establish closely related or
interdependent policies, programs, and activities.
Agreement needs to occur within the various levels
and across them; for example, State and Federal
agencies, such as Justice, Health and Human
Services, Labor and Education could do a better
job coordinating their programs within and across
departments that bear directly on gang youth.
Local interagency governmental task forces, 
including law-enforcement and local-community
agencies and groups, might coalesce to join, plan,
and operate gang prevention or gang intervention
programs. Local citizen groups need to interact
and coalesce with each other and local government
in the development of antigang programs.

In this section, we deal first with recent State
legislation and policy that attempts to mobilize
mainly public-agency resources and direction;
second, we address traditional local-community
organization efforts and those that are currently
evolving. In a separate volume (Spergel and Chance
1990), we also describe the processes and assess
the results of local efforts at the mobilization
and coordination of antigang control and
intervention programs. Finally, we examine and
cite beginning initiatives by two Federal agencies
to mobilize local community efforts through local
consortia of various types of criminal justice and
community-based agencies as well as grassroots
organizations.

Governmental Mobilization

Councils or legislatures in various cities and
States (including California, Illinois, Florida,
Washington, Minnesota, and Ohio) have recently
completed reports and passed ordinances or laws
related to the gang problem. Concerns have been
expressed over the increase in gang membership,
narcotics selling near or in schools, the use of
beepers by students to distribute drugs, increased
gang-related violence and graffiti, the inadequacy
of information on gangs and gang members within
and across jurisdictions, and the need for more
effective law enforcement and punishment of gang
offenders. Most legislatures have been compelled
to respond to pressures from the media,
prosecutors, police, and some community agencies;
but, thus far, they have been reactive,
fragmentary, and suppressive in dealing with the
gang problem. Most States have already enacted
legislation that limits dispositional alternatives
for repeat, serious, or violent juvenile
offenders--especially through the automatic
transfer of juveniles to adult court. But the
development of legislation directed specifically
to the distinctive problems created by gang
offenders is still in an early stage--except,
perhaps, in California where the most
comprehensive suppression approach in the nation
has evolved.

The stages of action of State legislatures and
executive and judicial bodies have been varied.
The Florida House of Representatives' Committee on
Youth reported that "in 1981, Miami had 4 gangs
with a total membership of 32. It now has an
estimated 60 gangs with 1800 members. Gangs are
spreading from South Florida to other parts of the
State" (Reddick 1987, p. 1). The committee
recommended the development of "a comprehensive
delinquency-prevention act . . . funding of a
multicounty model gang-prevention and intervention
program in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
counties . . . [the development of a feasibility
study for a] statewide gang information-system and
clearinghouse, [and the segregation] of gang
members in commitment programs" (Reddick 1987, p.
1).

The Florida State Legislature created a program
that began to target gang youth and gang problems
in 1988. A proposed amendment to the State penal
code would "allow for sharing confidential
information with school superintendents regarding
juvenile criminal activity" and "restrictions on
the sale, possession, and display of spraypaint
cans to individuals under the age of 18" (Stokes
1988, p. 1). The legislation also would "relate to
the establishment and funding of School Resource
Officers (SRO) in secondary and high schools"
throughout Florida to prevent and control gang
problems (Stokes 1988, p. 2).

Governmental concern with the gang problem is
greatest in California, particularly Los Angeles
County. As yet, considerable governmental action
does not appear to have brought significant
positive results. Speaker Willie Brown of the
California House of Representatives recently noted
that "gangs are increasingly violent despite more
than 80 bills passed by the legislature in recent
years directed at them . . . " (Sample 1988, p.
A3). The Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth
Hahn considered requesting the assistance of the
National Guard to patrol neighborhoods affected by
gang violence, and California Governor George
Deukmajian offered to authorize a $10,000 reward
to encourage victims and witnesses of gang
violence to come forward to press charges and
testify against gang offenders. He also
successfully promoted the passage of legislative
bills to increase the severity of sentences for
such offenders.

Two States, California and Illinois, appear to
have been most active until recently in pioneering
legislation to deal with the gang problem.
California, the State with the most severe and
diverse gang problems, has probably produced more
gang legislation than all the other States in the
country combined. Its recent approach may be
characterized as an innovative, proactive, and
comprehensive community-oriented suppression
approach with some secondary interest in
educational and social-service strategies. The
Illinois approach is more fragmented and is still
largely unimplemented, but its intention until
recently was to pursue social-support and social-
development as well as suppression strategies.

The California approach was initiated and
continues to be driven by the interests of
prosecution and law-enforcement agencies seeking
tough remedies to the gang problem. The California
legislature acted in 1981 to improve the ability
of district attorneys to address gang activity
(California Penal Code, Ch. 35, Sec. 13826, et.
seq). Between 1982 and 1986, the law was amended
to classify law enforcement, probation
departments, school jurisdictions, and community
organizations as eligible for funding, with a
clear mandate to implement a suppression approach.

The California legislature established a Gang
Violence Suppression Program to be administered by
the California Office of Criminal Justice
Planning:

The purpose of this program is to reduce the level
of gang violence in the community and to divert
potentially dangerous gang activity into more
positive and constructive behavior. The program
also strives to keep open lines of communication
between law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors'
offices, community-based organizations, probation
departments, schools, the community and family
members of gang or potential gang members. This is
accomplished by swiftly identifying, prosecuting,
and removing perpetrators from the community and
by preventing incidents of gang violence. This
approach works to incapacitate gang members
already involved in violence and deter other young
people who may be under criminal influence (Office
of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, p. 2).

The legislation directs the California Office of
Criminal Justice Planning to administer all State
and Federal funds for these purposes and
delineates the criteria to be met by each type of
agency or organizational unit receiving funds. A
unique effort, both by the legislature and by the
office administering the programs, is to define
what a gang is, who gang members are, and what a
gang incident is. These definitions, however, are
in the process of ongoing study, interpretation,
and possible redefinition. At present, the
California Office of Criminal Justice Planning has
formulated its definitions as follows:

A known member of a gang is one who, on the basis
of evidence adequate to support the reasonable
exercise of a prosecutor's discretion, is
identified as a part of a group of associating
individuals, which: 

a. Has an identifiable leadership and
organizational structure; and

b. Either claims control over particular territory
in the community or exercises control over an
illegal enterprise; and

c. Enjoys collectively as individuals in acts of
violence or serious criminal behavior (Office of
Criminal Justice Planning 1987, pp. 3-4).

At a minimum, these crimes and criminal behaviors
include homicide, robbery, arson, theft, burglary,
major drug offenses, drive-by shootings, and
extortion. In late 1988, the legislature found
that "the State of California is in a state of
crisis which has been caused by violent street
gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and
commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful
citizens of their neighborhoods" (California Penal
Code 1988, Part 1, Title 7, Chapter II, Section
186.20, p. 3183). A Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act of 1988 was passed (California
Penal Code 186.20). It specified the gang as a
criminal organization:

A "criminal street-gang" means any ongoing
organization, association, or group of three or
more persons, whether formal or informal, having
as one of its primary activities the commission of
one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated . . . [assault with a deadly weapon;
robbery; unlawful homicide or manslaughter; sale,
possession, transportation and manufacture of
controlled substances; shooting at an inhabited
dwelling or occupied motor vehicle; arson; and
intimidation of witnesses and victims] which has a
common name or common identifying sign or symbol,
whose members individually or collectively engage
in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity" (California Penal Code 1988, 186.22, p.
3184).

The California legislation also requires that
criminal justice agencies, schools, and community
organizations work together in planning and
coordinating efforts (especially through local
task forces) under the supervision or guidance of
the prosecutor's office. The roles of the
Department of Corrections and California Youth
Authority, as well as the role of judges and
defense attorneys, are absent from the legislation
and are touched upon only briefly in the
guidelines of the Office of Criminal Justice
Planning. Nevertheless, close collaboration
between and among parole, corrections, probation,
and law enforcement appears to occur and is close
in several local jurisdictions.

Finally, we observe that the amended legislation
of 1985 and 1986 and other recent bills suggest
the possibility of a broader and even more
comprehensive approach providing a significant
role for social intervention and especially
prevention through school programs, beginning at
an early age. For example, the legislature finds,
among other things, that:

There is an increasing percentage of school-age
pupils involved in gang activity . . . . There is
no statewide funded educational program developed
to implement programs designed to prevent youth
from becoming involved in gang activities . . . .
There is evidence that the parents of gang members
lack appropriate parenting skills . . . . There is
evidence that gang members have no contact with
positive role models . . . . There is evidence
that most gang members lack basic educational
skills" (California Penal Code 1988, 13826.1,
Chap. 3.5).

Thus, the California legislation, its implementing
structure, and its funding arrangements indicate
some recognition, but less than full
understanding, of the need for a policy that
emphasizes social intervention and social
opportunities--and even prevention other than for
purposes of suppression. The California model,
unless balanced with strategies other than
suppression, may already be contributing to a
costly process of criminalizing young offenders
and ultimately increasing gang activity--exactly
the opposite of what the legislation fundamentally
intended.

Illinois' legislative approach to dealing with the
gang problem appears, at least initially, to have
been quite different. The approach seems to be
directed to the provision of social opportunities
and social intervention as well as suppression
efforts. Unfortunately, the legislation did not
provide funding or an implementing structure for
the programs envisioned. The legislation, passed
in 1985, called for the Department of Commerce and
Community Affairs to make "grants to community
groups in order to improve the quality of life in low-
 and moderate-income neighborhoods . . . "
(Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 127, Paragraph
3301 et. seq.). Qualified recipients of funds were
required to provide alternatives to juvenile
participation in gangs in one of the following
ways: by creating permanent jobs; stimulating
neighborhood business activity; providing job-
training services; implementing youth recreation
and athletic activities; and by strengthening
community-based organizations whose objectives are
similar to those listed above.

Additional legislation directed the Department of
Children and Family Services to "conduct meetings
in each service region between local youth-
service, police, probation and parole workers to
develop interagency plans to combat gang
crime . . . [and] . . . develop a model policy for
local interagency cooperation in dealing with
gangs" (Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 23,
Paragraph 5034.2). These actions have not yet been
taken, however. One year later, the legislature
broadened its efforts to combat gangs by adding
gang-related responsibilities to two other State
agencies. The State Board of Education was called
on to " . . . enter into contracts for the
establishment of three social group-work
demonstration projects in school districts . . . "
(Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 122, Paragraph
2-3.72). In selecting sites for the projects, the
board was required to consider the need for
reductions in gang crime activity. Companion
legislation called on the Department of State
Police to create an Office of Coordination of Gang
Prevention to "consult with units of local
government and school districts to assist them in
control activities and to administer a system of
grants to units of local government and school
districts which, upon application, have
demonstrated a workable plan to reduce gang
activity in their area . . . ." The department was
also required to "establish mobile units of
trained personnel to respond to gang activities"
(Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 127,
Paragraph 55 a-3,9-4, p. 1926).

Funds for the above programs have not yet been
provided, but a small gang-unit was established
within the Department of State Police, and the
State Board of Education did make a small grant to
the Chicago school system for a study of the
city's gang problem. This latter effort predated
the actual legislation by more than a year
(Spergel 1985).

We also note a law that has received much local
publicity in Chicago: the automatic transfer of a
minor defendant charged with unlawful use of a
handgun on school grounds from juvenile court to
adult court. The law creates "safe school zones in
and around school property and deals severely with
the bringing of firearms, the selling
of . . . hard drugs in and around schools [and]
with adults trying to recruit juveniles
into . . . gangs" (People [Illinois] v. M.A. [A
Minor Appellee] 1988, p. 143). In a court
challenge, the statute was held to be
constitutional because it did not deprive the
defendant of "due process" and "equal protection"
(Ibid., pp. 135-147). To what extent the law has
been used by the Chicago Police Department is not
yet clear.

Since the mid-1980's, the Illinois legislature has
also passed legislation that has "whittled at the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts." The Illinois
Supreme Court recently upheld a law approved by
the legislature that requires "judges to allow a
15- or 16-year-old suspect to be brought to trail
as an adult if prosecutors show a prior finding of
delinquency in Juvenile Court and providing that
the new charges are gang-related" (Grady 1991, pp.
1, 20).

The legislative response to gangs in Illinois has
become increasingly harsh. The Illinois approach
is relatively fragmented, without clear sense of
direction, coordination, or implementing structure
across executive departments. The California
approach is more deliberate and comprehensive, but
highly suppressive and unbalanced. In general,
California has been more successful in mobilizing
a variety of institutions and governmental
agencies to deal with the gang problem, but the
youth gang problem continues to escalate and
spread there until recently at a faster pace than
in Illinois.

Finally, we observe that various calls for
legislation at State and Federal levels to address
the gang problem generally support a suppression
strategy. The Metropolitan Court Judges Committee
of the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges recently requested additional Federal
law to deal with the juvenile gang problem and
interstate drug trafficking. The committee
recommended that the judiciary and law enforcement
"coordinate their efforts to address youth gang
activities, including definition by law that they
are organized crime operating on an interstate
scale" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988,
p. 31). The judges were especially concerned that
Federal legislation should center attention on
adults who recruit juveniles in such interstate
drug-trafficking activities (Metropolitan Court
Judges Committee 1988, p. 31).

Local Community Mobilization

In recent decades, a variety of ad hoc community
efforts (sometimes ephemeral and weakly
organized)--have developed to deal with gang
problems. They are in the classic American
tradition of local organization and community
mobilization to deal with a whole range of human
problems and experience (Tocqueville 1954). In the
current era relevant to the gang situation, they
represent spontaneous citizen efforts to "take
back the streets" from gangs and to meet some of
the youths' social needs so they will not become
gang members. These efforts may be sponsored by or
closely associated with established community-
based organizations. They may also be led by
charismatic individuals or serve the particular
interests of a few local community or aspiring
political leaders. Sometimes these efforts become
the basis for the later development of formal
community-organization or social-agency programs
that elaborate initial antigang tactics, whether
directed to suppression or social development of
gang youth. Sometimes these initial antigang
mobilization efforts veer off or come to focus in
due course on other social or community concerns.

Many of these local efforts arise out of a sense
of fear, anger, or desperation by local citizens
and often result in limited, ephemeral programs
and organization. They may develop in response to
a perceived failure in the missions or programs of
police and social agencies. Representatives of
these sometimes spontaneously formed local groups
may take a militant stand against established
agencies for not providing appropriate services
addressing the gang problem. These local groups
may set up alternate patrol, surveillance, or
recreational activities for youth. At times, they
evolve into broad-scale approaches to dealing with
youth gangs. Almost none of these local-community
efforts has been subjected to systematic
evaluation, so evidence for their success or
failure is largely anecdotal.

Such local mobilization efforts, however, may be
regarded to some extent as variations of a more
general citizen crime-control and prevention
movement,usually directed at crimes against
property and of personal annoyance. A good deal of
recent theory and research exists about such
programs, particularly where there has been
outside stimulus and resource input. The key
objective is to implant more effective systems of
local crime-control. This "implant hypothesis" has
been tested in "Neighborhood Watch" and other
community crime-programs, and the results are not
positive. The focus of many of these programs is a
reduction in the fear of crime rather than in
crime per se.

The evidence indicates that in most high-crime,
usually low-income, mixed racial and ethnic
neighborhoods, local citizens do not participate
substantially in community crime-control
activities planned or carried out for them. In
fact, when mobilization is somewhat successful or
when awareness and participation in dealing with
the problem increases, fear of crime may rise
rather than decrease. The effects on the rates of
crime either are unclear or are not available
(Rosenbaum 1987, 1988). The problems of mobilizing
citizen participation against gangs are
considerably greater when serious violence and
crime such as drug trafficking are the sources of
concern. Intimidation and attacks against local
citizens by gang members are not uncommon.
Consequently, one major program response by law
enforcement in cities with serious gang problems
is witness or defendant protection.

While the risks for citizens' participation in the
fight against gang crime are higher than in most
community crime-programs, the costs of inaction
may be commensurately higher. There are examples
of local groups of mothers, fathers, neighbors,
and even gang or former gang members mobilizing by
themselves or with the aid of established agencies
to control or reduce gang situations or problems.
These groups are especially aroused when their own
property, family members, or they themselves are
attacked or threatened. Local schools and streets
in the neighborhood are usually the scene of
activity of these local groups.

In large cities such as New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, and Los Angeles and in smaller
cities and suburban communities, local groups may
patrol streets and supervise social events such as
house parties, street festivals, and dances to
prevent gang disorders. The local police sometimes
regard these citizens as their "eyes and ears"
(Insight 1988, p. 9). Local groups have taken
credit for "driving gangsters" out of the
neighborhood, but some of these activities have a
vigilante character, involving the destruction of
property belonging to presumed gang members and
shooting them "defensively" (Insight 1988, p. 11).
Local-citizen group activities may include the
patrol of, or intrusion into, school buildings,
the observation and intimidation of teachers and
students suspected of using or selling marijuana,
and the destruction of businesses suspected of
selling weapons to gang members. Some
organizations such as the Guardian Angels and the
Black Muslims may not "shrink from interrupting
drug deals, throwing dealers and buyers up against
the wall, and searching them or surrounding and
detaining them while the police are called"
(Insight 1988, p. 12).

Fagan documents other, less militant, forms of
local-citizen involvement:

Residents in one neighborhood formed an emergency
information-network that served as an early-
warning system when gang conflicts were about to
erupt in violence. Relaying news that one group
was about to set on another, the residents
intervened through mediation and involvement of
law enforcement to diffuse conflict
situations . . . .In another neighborhood,
residents arranged truces and sponsored events
where gang members turned in their weapons and
pledged nonviolence for specific periods during
which turf conflicts and other disputes could be
resolved through negotiation and conciliation. The
authority and neutrality of the neighborhood
organization made possible the trust and
cooperation of gangs who were bitter enemies
(1987, pp. 59-60).

Mothers' groups also have been active in the local
battles against gangs. During 1973 and 1974, the
mothers of gang members in Philadelphia are
reported to have been effective in intervening by
literally interposing their bodies between groups
of youths about to attack and shoot each other.
Mrs. Frances Sandoval recently organized a group
in Chicago, Mothers Against Gangs (MAG), patterned
after Mothers Against Drunk Driving, which now has
chapters in several neighborhoods of Chicago and
other Illinois cities. Ms. Sandoval, a mother
whose son was killed in a gang fight, has
mobilized citizens and other mothers in the
largely Mexican-American Pilsen area of Chicago to
volunteer and provide support to those mothers
whose children have been victimized by gangs.
Visits to court to testify against gang members
are encouraged. Lectures and discussions with
teachers and students at local schools are
conducted. Advocacy efforts include campaigning
for gun-restriction laws, improving safety at
school, and pressuring police and special antigang
youth-programs to be more active. Parents Against
Gangs, an offshoot of MAG, is also a chapter of
Parents Against Murdered Children which was
recently established in Chicago. Another organized
group is Mothers Against Gangs in Communities
(MAGIC) in Los Angeles. It "hopes to overcome
community fear of gangs and even reach the parents
of gang members to turn in their own children [to
the police] to save lives" (Crust 1988, p. A3).

The East Los Angeles Concerned Parents Group,
formed in the early 1970's, is probably the
longest-running organization at the grassroots
level that confronts the youth gang problem. The
organization started as a support group for the
parents of young men who had been killed in gang-
related violence. Brother Modesto Leon, a monk of
the Claretian Order, encouraged the group to
become proactive and communicate with each other
across gang turfs to deal with impending gang
fights and to better control their own children.
The Concerned Parents Group learned to trust the
authorities to call the police when necessary, to
work closely with probation officers and, if
necessary, to have their own children placed in
jail to protect them. These parents have been
involved in mediation meetings to bring about
peace between warring gangs and have organized
mutual support activities to prevent and control
drug-trafficking activities by their own children
and those of their neighbors. This group has
recently inaugurated a program of visitation to
and discussion groups with youths in correctional
institutions, as well as with their parents.

For a period of 10 or more years, these efforts,
along with those of other organizations and
community groups, appeared to contribute to a
significant reduction in gang homicides in the
East Los Angeles community (Spergel and Chance
1990). The area has recently reverted to a pattern
of extremely serious gang violence, setting all-
time gang homicide records. The return to gang
violence may result from several factors including
the presence of a new generation of immigrants and
a renewed fragmentation of local institutional
relationships as well as increase in local poverty
problems.

More common, perhaps, are the efforts of local-
neighborhood organizations concerned with multiple
community issues and development problems.
Periodically, these organizations turn their
attention to youth-crime and gang problems. Their
interest is usually of a broader, preventive
nature. For example, a Neighborhood Watch Group in
Long Beach, California, (a community with a mix of
blacks, Hispanics, whites, Samoans, and others, 
each with its own youth gangs) organized "against
gangs, crime, apathy, and illiteracy" and against
"activities from graffiti to homicide" (Strassman
1988, p. A1). The organization deals with gangs
and associated problems through block-watch,
tutoring, and family-development activities. It is
especially interested in motivating parents to
better support and encourage the proper
development of children (Strassman 1988).

Fagan observes that it is difficult to "motivate
families to participate in the lengthy
developmental process of forming and sustaining an
effective organization against gangs and crime," 
especially when parents are faced with "more
immediate, concrete issues: housing, clothing, and
child care" (Fagan 1987, p. 60). Many of these
groups, if they survive, tend to move on to other
activities that are less threatening, more
feasible, and more generally acceptable to various
elements in the broader community such as
recreation and tutorials for younger children,
especially those who are less delinquent.

It is extremely difficult for a neighborhood group
or citizens organization to deal with an
established or chronic gang problem simply because
the youth gang is usually better organized and
better able to sustain gang interests, e.g., drug
marketing and activities related to turf control.
Adequate, long-term citizen efforts to fight gang
activities are extremely difficult to maintain.
For example, several years ago, two neighborhood
parks were built with Federal grants in Pomona,
California, to provide young people with
alternatives to gang membership. They evolved
into:

 . . . graffiti-covered havens for gang violence
and drug dealing that should be
demolished . . . .The two parks dedicated in
1972 . . . are named for the city's two oldest
Latino gangs . . . .For two decades the two gangs
have exchanged drive-by shootings . . . .Bryant
served his first term on the city council between
1964 and 1973, said he was partly responsible for
the Park's creation . . . .Bryant and a council
colleague [spoke] with members of the two
gangs . . . .They said they wanted a
park . . . the gangs promised in return they'd
knock off the garbage and start acting like
people . . . they never kept their end of the
bargain" (J. Miller 1988, p. 1).

Neighborhood Youth Organizations

Local youth organizations, including youth gangs,
themselves, have sometimes expressed an interest
in and attempted to control or reduce the level of
gang violence and certain types of gang crime in
neighborhoods. They have attempted to control
fights and vandalism, and especially to prevent
disorders at public events such as festivals,
dances, and block parties, and before, during, and
after riots. Sometimes these youth-patrol efforts
have been organized by local youth agencies,
businessmen, or citizen groups. Youth organization
antigang and anticrime crime efforts occasionally
have had the support--and even the sponsorship--of
law-enforcement representatives. One such
federation of youth organizations is the Inner
City Roundtable on Youth (ICRY) in New York City,
which has now been in existence for over 15 years.
It sought to bring "all the gangs in the city of
New York together under one umbrella--together in
terms of talking about training for the future"
(Galea 1982, p. 228). ICRY became a means of
obtaining funding from various sources for small-
business development opportunities, as well.
Prominent public officials and business leaders
sat on its board and apparently both supervised
and facilitated the work of the organization
(Galea 1982).

The Federacion de Barrios Unidos, a federation of
gangs or barrios, was formed in East Los Angeles
in 1971. Its purpose was to control gang violence
and to combat drugs. It used former gang-
influentials as the basis for organizing
community-improvement associations which involved
gang members in such activities as repairing and
painting old buildings, sponsoring a boxing
program, and opening up "opportunities to do
something in the community which met the basic
psychology and needs of the gang-barrio member
(care, acceptance, love, achievement, recognition,
responsibility, self-esteem, and self-
actualization)" (Pineda 1974, p. 42). Reportedly,
the federation was successful in its mediation
efforts between warring gangs, and the California
Youth Authority's Gang Violence Reduction Project
modeled itself after it.

As discussed earlier in chapter VIII, SOCIAL
INTERVENTION, a variety of projects in the late
1960's and early 1970's attempted to use the gang
structure as a basis both for gang-violence
reduction and gang-member rehabilitation, in
addition to community improvement and manpower
development. Apparently, none of these projects
was notably successful in achieving its
objectives--in part because they provoked very
considerable community and particularly police
opposition (Poston 1971; Spergel 1972; Perkins
1987). Youth patrols, sometimes involving gang
members under police supervision, also received a
mixed review during the urban riots of the 1960's.
They were not particularly well-organized,
sustaining, or effective, although they were not
necessarily a base for criminal activity (Knopf
1969).

New Federal Mobilization

The Office of Human Development Services,
Administration for Children, Youth, and Families,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has
developed a Youth gang Drug-Prevention Program.
The agency found that "concerted and comprehensive
efforts are needed at the community and grassroots
levels to prevent and reduce further the
recruitment and involvement of at-risk youth in
gangs" (Federal Register 1989, p. 15108). Emphasis
in this program is based on the "coordination of
city, county, and State services and systems with
those of community-based organizations" (Federal
Register 1989, p. 15108).

The anticipated benefits of this initiative are
expected to be the establishment of "new,
improved, or expanded services or methods of
service delivery. For example, innovative
cooperation and information sharing between law-
enforcement and community-based
agencies . . . .The role of employers and
businesses . . . as full partners in the proposed
activities . . . to increase the self-sufficiency
of at-risk youth . . . [and] the
institutionalization of these activities (Federal
Register, p. 15109).

Recipients of the initial awards have included
State, county, and city government offices
(including manpower, departments of human
resources, school systems, housing authorities,
and recreation departments) as well as a range of
nonprofit agencies such as settlement houses and family-
 and youth-service projects. The Federal share of
project costs for the larger groups of government
and community consortia ranges between $700,000
and $800,000 for the first year, and the
possibility of more than a single year's funding
also exists.

Coordinated public-, voluntary-, and nonprofit-
agency programs may be evolving, although it seems
that little direct grassroots involvement has
occurred, at least at the sponsoring level. In
this particular set of programs, the police,
probation, court, and correctional agencies appear
to be involved only secondarily. The focus is on
prevention and early intervention, parent
education and counseling, and various forms of
youth-outreach counseling and referral such as drug-
 and gang-awareness counseling, pre-apprenticeship
programs, and limited job experiences. The extent
to which programs will reach youth at higher risk
levels is not clear. A great variety of existing
socialization programs, emphasizing recreation and
athletics, will undoubtedly be strengthened.
Purchase of service and case-management techniques
are apparently favored in the projects selected
for funding.

To what extent these programs will be adequately
monitored or evaluated also is not clear, although
a certain amount of in-house research evaluation
may occur in some cases, and a national evaluation
has recently been initiated. Systematic
prospective model-testing has not yet evolved.
Nevertheless, various criteria of successful
process, impact, and effectiveness have been
identified by some of the agencies receiving
funds. Whether these programs will be generally or
meaningfully assessed is uncertain; and we may
learn little from any assessments that are
completed. However, the programs do appear to
represent a positive step in the development of
more organic, cross-agency approaches to combat
the youth gang problem in distinctive local
community ways by Federal agencies.

It is possible that a more comprehensive,
systematic, and sustained set of model
interventions and evaluation efforts may result
from the current research and development efforts
of the U.S. Department of Justice such as the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention's (OJJDP's) National Youth Gang
Suppression and Intervention Program, of which the
present study is a part. The design stages of this
effort include assessment, model development,
technical assistance, and field testing. The
program appears to be broadly focused on the
justice system, youth-service agencies, grassroots
organizations, schools, and employment. The focus
is on younger as well as older youth-gang members
at individual as well as at organizational and
community levels of intervention and involvement.
In recent years, the Federal Government has
established several programs to aid the
development and sponsorship of governmental and
community broad-scale mobilization efforts. These
include the National Youth Gang Suppression and
Intervention program, the newly formed OJJDP
National Youth Gang Information Center, recently
initiated law-enforcement-oriented programs of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National
Institute of Justice, and still other programs of
the Department of Health and Human Services. It
remains to be seen whether these programs will
lead to further steps in the Federal Government's
gang efforts, possibly including the Departments
of Labor and Education and other Federal agencies.


We observe that the three primary objectives of
OJJDP's planned National Youth Gang Information
Center program will be (1) gathering and
disseminating current statistical and descriptive
information on violent youth gangs; (2) gathering
and disseminating information on model programs;
and (3) assisting in the coordination of Federal,
State, and local gang program development and
technical assistance. If these objectives are
achieved, significant data gathering as well as
community mobilization at least at the Federal
level will have occurred.

----------------

CHAPTER XIV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction 

Youth gangs have been a problem in both Western
and Eastern societies for a long time. They exist
currently in socialist as well as free-market
economies, and in developing as well as developed
countries, although they vary in prevalence,
organization, character, and degree of
criminality. Youth gangs were prevalent in urban
centers in the United States prior to the 19th
century and in the early decades of this century.
Nonetheless, various national commissions in the
late 1960's and early 1970's considered youth
gangs to be only a limited aspect of the crime and
delinquency problem. Until very recently, youth
gangs were thought to be a serious problem
confined to a few large urban areas.

Description, analysis, and policy development in
reference to the gang problem have been impeded
because of a lack of adequate data and diverse
definitions about what a gang or a gang incident
is. Information about gangs also tends to be
politicized or serve particular organization or
ideological interests. Scholars have employed
varying definitions of the gang, often without
adequate empirical basis for broad generalization
or utility for policy formulation. Definitions may
determine whether we have a large or a small
problem, whether more or fewer arrests are made,
which agencies receive funds to deal with the
problem, and which methods of confronting the gang
problem are endorsed.

Some of the earlier definitions emphasized benign,
communal, or social-support aspects of gangs. A
few academics still perceive youth gangs to
perform important economic and political
functions. They view the gang as mischievous,
committing mainly minor infractions, and a way
that male youths adapt to a socially deprived
urban environment. Recently, observers have begun
to perceive the gang as participating in more
serious, violent, and criminal behavior, including
drug trafficking. Law-enforcement definitions of
gang incidents focus on high-profile serious crime
and therefore tend to be more narrowly focused
than community-agency or citizen definitions.
However, law-enforcement definitions range from
almost any illegal act committed by a group of
youths to a set of specific criminal activities by
juveniles that grow out of gang motivation or
specific gang circumstances. The issue of whether
a gang is simply any delinquent group or a more
specialized entity has not been resolved. But the
definition of the gang appears to refer
increasingly to juvenile and young adults
associating together for serious, especially
violent, criminal behavior with special concerns
for turf and criminal-enterprise interests.

Scope and Seriousness

Despite extensive media attention, and perhaps
also because of limited research and lack of
consensus on what a gang or gang incident is, the
national scope and seriousness of the gang problem
is not clearly or reliably known. Based on law-
enforcement and media reports, criminal youth
gangs or gang-members are to be found in almost
all 50 States. No region of the country is without
youth gangs. They are present in certain large-
and middle-sized cities, and even in smaller
communities, but may be absent or comprise a less
serious problem in other seemingly similar cities
and communities. Gangs are present in city, State,
and Federal correctional institutions as well as
in various public school systems. Recent studies
indicate that gangs or gang members are present in
67 percent of the State correctional institutions.
All the public high schools of Chicago report the
presence of gangs or gang members, although not
necessarily gang problems.

It is not possible at the present time to estimate
meaningfully the number of youth gangs or gang
members in most cities, schools, prisons, or other
social contexts. While it is clear that gang and
gang problems have spread to many localities and
various parts of the country, and the numbers of
gangs and gang members have increased in many of
those places, there are also reports of a decline
in the number of gangs, gang members, and gang
problems in some cities immediately adjacent to
others with serious problems. Sharp fluctuations
may also occur in estimated numbers of gangs and
gang members in a particular city during a
relatively short period of time.

Nonetheless, there is reasonably good evidence of
a general increase in gang-related violence in
several cities, particularly on the West Coast and
in other rapidly changing and economically
depressed urban areas. Gang members (at least
those with arrest records) are responsible for a
disproportionate amount of violent crime. At the
same time, the proportion of total serious crime
committed by gang members is very low; in a city
like Chicago, it is less than 1 percent, at least
based on its narrow motivational definition.
However, the gang problem lies in its
concentration in certain categories of violent
crime such as homicide and aggravated assault and
in its prevalence in certain neighborhoods. In
recent years, reports of gang homicides (using a
broad or inclusive definition) have ranged from 25
percent to 30 percent as a proportion of all
homicides in the city of Los Angeles. Moreover,
the rate of gang homicides per population may be
even higher in Ponce, Puerto Rico, and in certain
California cities other than Los Angeles. In part,
such variability depends on the nature of the
definition of gang incident employed.

The close relationship between gangs, violence,
and crime is most evident, however, when
delinquent and criminal patterns of gang and
nongang delinquents and their careers are
examined. Juvenile gang membership is associated
with significantly higher levels of official
prevalence and incidence of delinquency. Based on
official statistics, the rate of violent offenses
for gang members may be three times as high as for
nongang delinquents. Self-report data also
indicate that gang members have a higher adjusted
frequency of hidden delinquency than do nongang
delinquents. Gang membership also appears to
prolong the extent and seriousness of criminal
careers.

Drugs and Violence 

The relationship of gangs to drug use and drug
trafficking was usually a source of only passing
interest in the early gang literature. Gang
members were cited as ambivalent in their
attitudes to drug use and often as demonstrating
hostility toward drug dealing--especially
involving hard drugs. In recent years, there has
been evidence that more gang youth are using and
selling drugs. Currently, some youth gangs (more
likely gang cliques or former gang members) are
heavily engaged in the street sale of drugs, if
not also mid-level distribution. However, the
growth of drug dealing by gang or former gang
members is insufficient to account for the greatly
increased sale and use of drugs in many inner-city
communities. Furthermore, while individual gang
members may be involved in violent activities that
are related to drug use or sale, the existence of
a causal relationship between gang-related
violence and drug use and sale is less clear. High
levels of competition for drug markets increase
the likelihood of conflict, but most gang
homicides still appear to be based on traditional
turf conflicts.     

Character of Youth Gangs

Gangs appear to be more highly structured than
delinquent groups, but generally they are viewed
as loosely organized. Gangs are also structured in
a variety of different ways. Some gangs in a
particular locality are based on age divisions
(vertical structure); other gangs located in
different parts of the community, city, or across
States have the same or a similar name (horizontal
structure). Coalitions of different gangs, called
"nations" or "supergangs," exist, but it is
important not to exaggerate the degree of cohesion
or peaceful relationship among gang organizations
in these associations. The size of the gang has
been a source of disagreement. Estimates have
ranged from four or five into the thousands.

The gang consists of different types of members:
core members, including leaders, regulars, and
associates; peripheral or fringe members; and
"wannabes" or recruits. The core may be regarded
as an inner clique that determines the basic
nature and level of gang activity. The extent to
which gang members maintain long-term gang roles
and specific positions is unclear. Some members
join for a short period of time. A youth also may
switch membership from one gang to another for
various reasons. In general, core members are more
involved in delinquent or criminal activities than
fringe members. Leadership may be viewed as either
a group function or a specific position--sometimes
shifting, at times relatively stable.

At the heart of the concept of the gang is the
idea of territoriality or turf--originally control
of physical space but also increasingly of
illegitimate enterprise. In some cities, gangs
have a less well-developed sense of physical
territoriality. In addition, as the gang members
and the gang mature, there tends to be a certain
variable shift to the idea of criminal enterprise,
at least in the current era. Protection or control
of space becomes less important than controlling
access to illegitimate income sources, often drug
markets. A distinctive character of the gang or
gang affiliation remains its commitment to the use
or threat of violence in achieving objectives, 
whatever they may be.

Demographics 

Variables of class, culture, race, and ethnicity
interact with local-community factors of poverty,
social instability, and social isolation to
account for the variety of gangs and gang problems
that exist. Youth gang problems in the United
States currently appear to be found largely in
black and Hispanic (particularly Mexican-American
and Puerto Rican) low-income populations where
they are concentrated primarily in urban areas.
The rate of increase in Asian gangs (especially
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean) appears to be
high, particularly in California, New York, and
the Southwest. White youth gang or gang type
problems, proportionately the lowest, are
increasingly differentiated, including such groups
as Stoners, Skinheads, motorcycle gangs, and
satanic groups. There are significant differences
within and across racial/ethnic or cultural groups
in terms of structure, criminality, violence, and
drug trafficking. Variations exist by region of
the country. There is also some evidence that
black gangs, especially older youth or young
adults related to these gangs, are relatively more
involved in drug trafficking; Hispanic gangs in
physical, turf-related battling; Asian gangs in a
variety of property crimes; and white gangs in
organized property crimes, vandalism, and racism.
In general, violence between gangs remains largely
intraethnic or intraracial.

The age range of gang members appears to have
expanded in recent decades--particularly at the
upper end. Members remain in gangs longer for
increasingly serious criminal-gain oriented
purposes. Extreme gang violence is concentrated in
the older-teen and young-adult age range. The
average age of the gang homicide offender is 19 or
20 years old and the victim a year or two older;
the average age of the arrested gang offender is
17 or 18 years old. The aging of the youth gang
population may be due to many factors--especially
the changing structure of the economy, the loss of
desirable unskilled jobs, and increased access to
street-level drug dealing opportunities requiring
gang background and skills. 

The evidence is overwhelming that males are almost
exclusively responsible for gang-related crime,
especially violent offenses. About 5 percent or
less of reported gang crime appears to be
committed by females. Male gang members are
estimated to outnumber females by 20 to 1, but
half or more of the street gangs may have female
auxiliaries or chapters. Some gangs are mixed-
gender groups; a very small number are
unaffiliated or independent female gangs. Females
are likely to join gangs at a younger age and
leave earlier. Female involvement in gangs is less
substantial; their criminal gang behavior appears
to be related directly or indirectly to that of
the dominant male pattern. Furthermore, despite
myths to the contrary, females are more likely to
make a positive contribution toward
conventionalizing male gang behavior than to
inciting male gang members to violent or criminal
activity.

Membership Experience 

The gang experience is increasingly important for
low-income youth from unstable and sometimes even
stable social environments. The gang provides
certain psychological, social, cultural, and
economic functions no longer adequately carried
out by family, school, and legal employment. Four
sets of precipitating factors have been used to
explain gang-related delinquency and violence: (1)
individual-member need for status or reputation;
(2) group cohesion or solidarity; (3) personality
disturbance or social disability; and (4) economic
advantage. Relationships among gang members may be
viewed as a continuous struggle to manage status
and security needs, as defined and redefined by
the gang over time, in relation to community
opportunities and constraints. 

Under what conditions status-striving is reduced
or enhanced in its contribution to delinquency and
violence, particularly through group activities
and cohesion or solidarity, has been at issue
among researchers. A key unresolved question is
whether gang cohesion or solidarity leads to
delinquency and violence or whether delinquency or
violence precede the development of cohesion. The
time sequence is important for purposes of policy
and programming. Focus can be on preventing the
gang from forming or cohering, or on controlling
specific delinquent situations or acts per se
after the gang is established, through, for
example, individual counseling, family treatment,
supervision, suppression, or environmental "target
hardening" (e.g., property surfaces that cannot be
marred by graffiti). Suppression seems to be the
dominant approach at the present time.

Social/Personal Disability

We know little about the social and personal
disabilities of delinquent gang youth that
distinguish them from nongang delinquents or
differences in personality types among gang youth.
There is some speculation that core members are
more troubled than fringe members. The notions of
megalomania, weak ego, and anxiety are often
introduced in explanations of gang-member
personality. Also, we are not sure how intelligent
the gang member is compared to other nongang
members from the same environment. Gang members
have an exceedingly high rate of school dropout.
Some researchers view the gang member's so-called
personality disturbance and social handicap as
functional to survival in his environment and to
the gang's status system. A distinctive character
trait of the gang member may be his excessive
need, drive, or interest in wielding power,
exercising control over others, and mastering his
social environment through whatever means
available.

Social Context 

The factors of rapid population change, social
disorganization, racism, increasing poverty, and
social isolation contribute to institutional
failures and the consequent development of youth
gangs. The interaction of social disorganization
and lack of access to legitimate resources most
significantly accounts for the development of
serious deviant groups and subcultural phenomena
in a variety of contexts. The family, school,
politics, and organized crime may contribute in a
variety of ways to the formation and development
of individual gang-member behavior and gang
patterns.

Family 

Family disorganization such as single parent
families or parental conflict does not predict
gang membership per se. A variety of other
variables must be associated with weak family
structure to produce a problem gang youth,
including the availability of a peer group that
does not support family, school, and other
normative values. Gang members, however, appear
not to be generally rebellious or hostile to
parents or family members--except, perhaps, among
white gang members. While youth gang membership
may not be explicitly acceptable, it may be
traditional among many inner-city families. The
extent to which some families of gang members
condone or implicitly approve participation in the
gang--particularly if the youth thereby helps to
support the family economically--also may be a
contributing factor.

Schools 

Few schools directly address gang-related
problems. Gang problems are perceived as present
in many inner-city schools, more so by students
than by faculty. Police data indicate that the
gang problem is generally more serious outside
than inside the school. However, gang conflicts
may be planned or started in school and carried
out after class is dismissed. A key problem is
that students who do not adapt well at school and
who do not like school are likely to be attracted
to gangs. Nevertheless, certain schools--even in
the worst gang- and crime-ridden communities--
appear to do a better job than others in
sustaining low rates of gang involvement and
problems by students.

Politics 

A symbiotic relationship has been observed between
politicians and gangs in certain low-income urban
communities, particularly those in process of
considerable demographic or political change.
Political aspirants with a weak or shifting base
of support and shortage of manpower may call on
gangs and gang members to perform a variety of
tasks needed to compete in local politics, such as
obtaining signatures on petitions, putting up or
tearing down election posters, intimidating
voters, and getting voters out to the polling
place. Gangs and gang problems also serve as an
important means for a variety of organizations to
achieve ends not directly related to the problem,
such as increasing newspaper circulation or media
influence, election of "law and order" officials,
expanding youth-serving programs, and augmenting
police personnel and equipment to fight crime
generally. Gangs have been used by a variety of
organizations at times of urban or organizational
disorder to try to control or stimulate disruption
or riot potential, and thus to stabilize or
destabilize social situations. 

Organized Crime 

So-called violent and criminal subcultures have
probably become more integrated in the 1970's and
1980's than they were in the 1950's and 1960's, as
newer minority groups are entering organized
crime. Greater competition among nascent criminal
organizations, the relative increase of older
youth and adults in street gangs, and the expanded
street-level drug market probably have further
contributed to the integration of violence and
criminal-gain activity. Several observers suggest
a close relationship between youth gang members,
street or corner youth, and organized adult crime.
Adult criminals may follow the street reputations
of youngsters and use a process of gradual
involvement to draw youngsters into criminal
networks. Youth gang structures, or cliques within
gangs, increasingly may be considered as subunits
of organized crime for purposes not only of drug
distribution, but also of car theft, extortion,
and burglary.

Strategic Response

Four basic strategies have evolved in dealing with
youth gangs: (1) community organization or
neighborhood mobilization; (2) social
intervention, especially youth outreach or street
work; (3) social and economic opportunities
provision; and (4) gang suppression and
incarceration. Since these strategies are often
mixed, it is possible further to incorporate them
into two general organizational approaches or
ideal types: a conventional, limited bureaucratic
or unidimensional professional approach and a
comprehensive, community-centered approach. The
strategies can be examined in terms of historical
development and from the perspective of specific
institutional or organizational policies and
programs.

The local-community or neighborhood approach of
the 1920's and 1930's was an early attempt to bind
elements of local citizenry, social institutions,
and the criminal justice system together in a
variety of informal, and later, formal ways. The
approach often did not clearly target delinquent
or gang youth, but focused on neighborhood-group
involvement and led to greater socialization
activity by youth agencies and early development
of social intervention efforts. The assumption of
the more sophisticated social intervention
strategy, i.e., outreach or street-work approach
of the late 1940's and 1950's, was that gangs were
relatively "normal" or adaptive and could be
redirected through counseling and group activities
and that the values and norms of gang members
could be changed in the process. This strategy,
while it targeted gang youth better than the
local-community approach, was also unidimensional
and not adequately integrated with other
approaches, such as the suppression of criminal
behavior or the provision of job and educational
opportunities. 

Natural concern with the rising rates of
delinquency, unemployment, and school failure of
inner-city youth in the late 1950's led to a
series of large-scale social resource infusions
and efforts to change institutional structures in
the 1960's. This opportunities-provision strategy
did not specifically target the youth gang
problem. While such programs as Head Start and Job
Corps appeared to have a positive effect on the
reduction of delinquency, it is not clear to what
extent the gang problem was either addressed or
modified by these programs. During the late 1960's
and early 1970's, there was, in fact, evidence of
a rise in the scope and seriousness of the problem
in several cities, such as New York, Philadelphia,
and Chicago. A new strategy emerged: police
suppression and enhanced incarceration of core
gang-offenders; to some extent, this is still the
dominant strategy, although evidence of a more
complex evolving strategy is also present.

Social Intervention

A variety of youth-agency programs to deal with
the delinquency or youth gang problem have been
developed and assessed. The outreach or street-
work "value change" model has persisted over
several decades, but almost all evaluations
indicate its lack of success in delinquency
reduction. Outreach approaches can contribute to
increased cohesion and criminalization of the
gang. Furthermore, if unrelated to law-enforcement
approaches, they can contribute to the
polarization of a community. Recent street-work
crisis-intervention efforts, which are integrated
with suppression and neighborhood mobilization
strategies, have given some promise of success but
have not been evaluated. For the most part, youth-
service agencies with the support of public
officials still continue to emphasize conventional
and limited strategies of social intervention such
as counseling and recreation without adequate
relation to other strategies.

Police

Law enforcement has pursued, with certain
exceptions, a conventional approach to gangs that
is focused almost exclusively on suppression. Law-
enforcement agencies continue to use such tactics
as: surveillance, aggressive patrol and arrest,
followup investigation, intelligence gathering,
and some prevention and community-relations work.
Police have also recently created sophisticated
data or information systems and improved
coordination with other law enforcement. However,
none of the varied police program activities has
been subjected to outcome evaluation. While a "nip
it in the bud" suppression strategy may be
successful in reducing the number of gangs and
violent gang-incidents in smaller communities or
emerging gang cities, for a limited period of
time, an exclusive suppression approach seems not
to be effective and rather is associated with an
increase in gang-related drug trafficking as well,
whether in a large or small, chronic or emerging
gang-problem city.

A modified police suppression approach
incorporated into a community-collaborative set of
strategies, which gives increased attention to
prevention and social-intervention roles may be
promising. A variety of programs and tactics have
been developed by police departments in pursuit of
this more complex approach. Some gang-specialist
officers have directly engaged in counseling, job
referral, school lectures, and community-
organization activities and reported some positive
results. But we still do not know whether this set
of modified suppression and more community-
oriented strategies is any better than a
conventional suppression approach. Some observers
claim that the development of the drug problem may
have reduced the gang-violence problem in some
cities. Others claim that cities with greater
access to social opportunities, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, seem to have less serious gang
problems.

Prosecution

The primary mission of prosecution continues to be
the successful prosecution, conviction, and
incarceration of gang offenders. In many respects,
the recent innovation of vertical or hard-core
gang prosecution, witness protection, and
community-information programs are steps towards,
not only a more specialized but also, a more
comprehensive approach. The evidence is fairly
clear that vertical prosecution has improved the
rate of conviction and incarceration of gang
members. Vertical prosecution focuses on serious
hard-core gang offenders. It is possible to argue
that the effectiveness of the vertical-prosecution
approach could be broadened to include preventive
and social-intervention strategies, particularly
for younger offenders. In addition, constitutional
questions have been raised about the increased
scope of the law and the prosecution of youth
simply because they are members of gangs which are
defined as criminal organizations.

Judiciary

The judiciary has paid relatively little
systematic attention to special approaches for
dealing with gang problems or gang offenders.
Judges attempt to be as objective as possible in
dealing with gang cases, but the tendency for them
has been to emphasize a "get tough" strategy and
to remove the serious juvenile-gang offender from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile and family
courts. While many judges pursue a broader social
and community-based approach for deprived children
and minor offenders, there has been little
consideration of adapting such an approach in
dealing with juvenile-gang offenders.
Increasingly, however, some judges are becoming
concerned that a policy of stiff sentences
contributes to a worsening of the gang problem in
prison as well as in the community when inmates
re-enter society. Some judges try to sentence gang
youth to the few available correctional
institutions and community-agency contexts that
provide opportunities for social support,
training, and jobs, as well as strong supervision.

Probation/Parole 

While a few States and counties have paid special
attention to the youth gang problem, most
supervisory agencies do not target gang members or
make special arrangements to deal with them. Los
Angeles County, San Jose, San Diego, and Orange
are some of the few counties to have developed
specialized probation programs that emphasize
enhanced supervision of gang youth often in
collaboration with law enforcement agencies. A few
probation and parole units, however, have
experimented with combining counseling, social-
service, community-involvement, and increased
surveillance strategies. Philadelphia several
years ago developed a clear-cut probation-
community integrated approach, apparently with
positive results, and the Gang Violence Reduction
Program, a parole project of the California Youth
Authority, successfully combined the use of former
gang members as outreach workers and a strong
community-involvement strategy. The integration of
a variety of justice-system strategies (including
supervision, counseling, community involvement as
well as work opportunities for probationers and
parolees) appears to be particularly promising.

Corrections 

The prison or training school may be regarded as
both a response to but also a facilitator of the
gang problem. Incarceration or incapacitation, 
while a simple, short-term, and often necessary
response, has led to increased gang cohesion and
membership recruitment in many institutions and
may indirectly worsen the problem in the streets.
The development of gangs in prisons has been
attributed, in part, to the mistaken approach of
certain officials who gave recognition to gangs as
organizations and tried to work with them to
maintain institutional control. In most prisons, a
conventional suppression approach still
predominates, including such techniques as swift
reaction to and forceful prevention of gang
activities, special lockup arrangements, and
moving gang leaders from one prison or prison
system to another. 

A community-based, comprehensive approach is more
likely to be developed in a youth-correctional
institution. It provides for close coordination
with a variety of law-enforcement officials
outside the institution, effective communication
between correctional officers and inmates, and
increased social opportunities for positive inmate
development and change, including training and
work programs. Evidence for the beginning
development of more comprehensive and promising
long-term approaches exists in some programs
developed by the California Youth Authority and
Wisconsin's Ethan Allen School for Boys.

Local School Programs 

Schools can be regarded as the best community
resource for the prevention and early intervention
of gang problems, although most schools--
overwhelmed by other concerns--would prefer to
ignore the problem. After the denial subsides, the
first step taken to respond to the gang problem is
often to bring youth-serving organizations, the
police, or probation authorities onto the school
campus. Sometimes probation officers have
established special outreach or school/gang
programs that involve parent education,
counseling, and referral. The development of
special antigang curricula for children in the
early grades, taught by representatives of these
outside agencies, has been of particular
prevention interest in recent years. While there
is some evidence that these curricular efforts are
successful in changing youths' attitudes about
gangs, it is not clear that the behavior of youths
who are already gang members is also changed. In
California and Oregon, a variety of school
antidrug programs that address some gang issues
are currently being tested.

Pilot efforts are presently under way in which the
school proactively reaches out to the community to
involve parent groups, a variety of community-
based agencies, local business as well as criminal
justice agencies in dealing with the youth gang
problem. Agencies may be located in the school and
interact with the school and parent groups, as
part of a team, take responsibility for services
to youth and control of the problem. Special
remedial education and apprentice programs
targeted to gang youth have also been attempted.

Local Community Organizations

In recent years, local-community efforts (
sometimes ad hoc, ephemeral, or social movement-
oriented) have developed to deal with the gang
problem. Some of these projects are variations of
more general citizen crime-control and prevention
programs. It is questionable whether such citizen-
participation programs alone can be effective when
the risks of intimidation by gang members are high
and the community is insufficiently mobilized.
Nevertheless, a variety of proactive and angry--if
not militant--local-citizen groups have formed to
deal with gang problems, sometimes with the aid
and supervision of the local police. Such groups
patrol streets, supervise social events, and
monitor students in school buildings. Some of the
groups have taken on a vigilante character and
have been known to interrupt drug deals, restrain
offenders until the police are called, and
directly retaliate against gang members. On the
other hand, resident groups have attempted to
mediate gang disputes; for example, mothers'
groups in Philadelphia were active in preventing
gang conflict. Recently, in various cities,
mothers' and parents' groups have organized to
press existing law-enforcement or social-service
agencies to take a more active stand against
gangs. Such community groups may supply support
services to victims or general recreational or
tutorial services to youth-at-risk. 

A variety of youth-organization structures, 
including gangs and coalitions of gangs and former
gang members, also have been established to
control gang violence or to assist in controlling
more general types of urban disruption. Some of
these projects have been sponsored by social
agencies, public and voluntary, and sanctioned by
the police. Some youth-organization efforts have
been opposed by the police, especially when they
appear to represent criminal interests. These
efforts to involve gang members in gang-control
and sometimes community development efforts
usually have not been well developed or well
supervised, and often have resulted in community
controversy. There have been some promising
results in East Los Angeles, where local-community
group and youth-organization activities were
integrated as part of social-intervention,
suppression, and social-opportunity provision
strategies.

Employment

Large-scale training and employment projects have
not yet targeted gang youth adequately, although
there is evidence that gang youth would prefer a
decent-paying job to the gang life. Full-time and
part-time jobs are viewed as useful in dealing
with the gang problem. However, gang members
generally lack the skills and attitudes to hold
jobs. A variety of social support, remedial-
education, and supervision strategies appear to be
required to make job- and training-programs
directed at gang youth successful. Some local job-
development projects have been promising such as
the San Jose Youth Conservation Corps experiment,
which is closely connected with the juvenile
court. In the program, gang members are provided
with jobs, closely supervised, and subjected to
regular drug testing. A high rate of success is
reported, thus far, in this program. Another
program in El Monte, California is also viewed as
successful; it involves the Boys' Club, the
police, and business and industry in extensive
job-development and placement efforts for gang
youth. Recent U.S. Labor Department efforts to
develop comprehensive community-based job training
and placement programs targeted at a variety of
socially deprived youth--including gang youth--may
be promising.

Legislative Response

Legislatures in various States have conducted
investigations and passed laws that have addressed
gang problems. California has been the most
active, with scores of bills passed in recent
years. It has also developed the most
comprehensive suppression approach. Legislation in
Illinois appears to be broader in scope, but
fragmentary and largely unimplemented. It promotes
improved educational and job opportunities, child-
welfare agency responsibility, and better police
organization to deal with the gang problem. Other
States, including Indiana, Ohio, Florida, Texas,
Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and Minnesota,
have recently considered or actually passed
special gang-related legislation, mainly of a
suppressive nature.

In 1981, California legislation was concerned
initially with improving the ability of district
attorneys to address gang activity. Between 1982
and 1986, the laws were amended to include law
enforcement, probation departments, school
jurisdictions, and local-community organizations.
A Gang Violence Suppression Program was
established in the California Office of Criminal
Justice Planning to administer all State and
Federal funds allocated for specified gang-related
purposes. In 1989, new legislation created
definitions of a gang, a gang member, and a gang
incident based on the idea of "street terrorism."
California guidelines require that criminal-
justice agencies, schools, and community
organizations work together under the supervision
of the local prosecutor's office to plan and
coordinate community-wide approaches. However, the
main emphasis appears to be on enhanced
supervision and longer sentences for offenders.

Policy Implications

A variety of intervention strategies have evolved,
often without adequate integration. "Softer"
social-intervention youth-development approaches
have alternated with and "harder" law-enforcement
suppression, as predominant, strategies; at times,
these two approaches have clashed. Informed
perspectives, clear definitions, and articulated
intervention models have not yet been adequately
developed or integrated, and certainly not
systematically tested, in most chronic or high-
rate gang problem cities. Prevention or early
intervention strategies, targeted at youths
beginning gang careers, have also not been
adequately conceptualized in emerging cities and
social contexts.

A comprehensive approach, under the sponsorship of
some authoritative agency (such as the probation
department), or directly out of the mayor's or
county supervisor's office, involving cooperation
between public and voluntary agencies and
community groups, should be created and
systematically tested--particularly in cities
where the youth gang problem is chronic, serious,
and entrenched. An early intervention approach
based in the public schools, in collaboration with
community-based youth agencies, the police and
community groups should also be tested,
particularly in emerging gang problem cities or
neighborhoods.

The following general policies therefore are
recommended:

1. To avoid excessive labeling, the definition of
a gang should be restricted to high-profile youth
gangs engaged in serious violence and crime whose
primary purpose for existence is symbolic or
communal in nature, rather than economic. Primary
drug-trafficking or criminal-gain organizations
should not be considered youth gangs. The
definition of a gang incident should be any
illegal act that arises out of gang motivation or
gang-related circumstances. Nevertheless,
information systems should be developed to track
those serious repeat gang offenders when they also
engage in gang-related serious crime as well.

2. Youths who give clear indication of gang
involvement should be the primary targets of early
intervention and comprehensive gang-control
programs. Using this strategy, we assume that a
small number of youths can be targeted for special
remedial and supervisory attention. The tendency
to identify at-risk youth without clear criteria
of potential gang membership should be avoided. 

3. A special comprehensive approach should be
established in chronic gang-problem cities.
Leadership of such efforts should be assigned to
an official agency--such as probation, or possibly
parole or law-enforcement. Alternatively, a
special unit in the mayor or county board's office
could be established to coordinate the program.
All criminal-justice agencies--including police,
probation, parole, judiciary, prosecution, and
corrections--should be part of the new authority
or coordination mechanism, supported by key
voluntary agencies, schools, business and
industry, and local-community groups. Multiple
strategies of social-intervention and suppression,
with emphasis on social opportunities and
community mobilization, should guide the
development of program activities and the roles of
various personnel. While priority should be given
to early intervention programs, special education
and training programs for juveniles and younger
adolescent gang members, programs should also be
targeted to hard-core older gang adolescents and
young adults. A new training and job-development
structure should be established as part of the
authority, concerned primarily with the special
needs of older adolescent and young adult gang
members who comprise the more serious component of
the problem.

4. In emerging and, in some instances, chronic
gang-problem cities or contexts, a local
educational administrative unit should take
responsibility for the development of special
programs in collaboration with youth agencies, law
enforcement, family or juvenile court, other
social agencies, community groups, and local
business. These programs should be directed
towards the social education and social control of
targeted gang youths, especially those between 11
to 15 years old in the middle grades who are
beginning to take on gang roles and are already
engaged in law-violating behaviors. Efforts should
be made to improve the academic performance and
social adjustment of such youths, and provide them
and their parents with outreach counseling,
referral, and opportunity-provision programs.
General antigang-crime curricula, crisis
intervention, and school and community advisory
groups should be established directly by the
special school unit for the development and
implementation of early, school-based, gang-
control programs.

----------------

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