National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed.


Series: NIJ Research in Brief
Published:October 1996
30 pages
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Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Research in Brief: A national
process evaluation of the U.S. Department of
Justice's Operation Weed and Seed demonstration
program. The study, sponsored by the National
Institute of Justice, gathered information on Weed
and Seed program implementation and activities in
19 sites through the end of 1993.

Key issues: The initiative was launched in 1991 as
a comprehensive, coordinated effort to control
crime and to improve the quality of life in
targeted high-crime neighborhoods. Approximately
$1.1 million was provided to each of the 19 sites
selected for the 18-month demonstration period.
Each city, working from a blueprint provided by the
U.S. Department of Justice, customized a program to
meet the needs of its targeted communities.
"Weeding" generally involves law enforcement and
prosecution efforts against criminals. "Seeding"
entails prevention and revitalization programs.

Key findings: Grant funds were used more often to
support weeding efforts and community policing than
seeding programs. Among the evaluation's findings
were:

o The weeding emphasis in most sites was on
drug-related, gun-related, and violent crimes. A
majority of cities targeted street-level dealing,
but a few directed resources toward curbing drug
trafficking and high-level operators.

o Interagency cooperation was reported to be
stronger among law enforcement agencies than among
prosecution offices in a majority of sites.

o The most common seed programs involved primary
prevention for children and intervention strategies
for older youths. Safe Havens -- multiservice
centers that offered a variety of youth and adult
services -- were established in each site and were
integral parts of seeding.

o People who ordinarily did not consult with one
other, such as prosecutors, area residents, police
officers, and social service personnel, were able
to coordinate their efforts, share resources, and
solve problems.

Implications for the future include:

o The program's Federal funding levels and
permissible uses should be clear from the start,
but guidelines should continue to permit
flexibility to meet neighborhood needs.

o To enhance coordination, interagency task forces
should be developed, the critical role of local
prosecutors should be recognized, and key
representatives from the district attorney's office
and participating neighborhoods should be included
in planning the local program.

Target audience: Federal, State, and local
policymakers; criminal justice professionals and
practitioners; and community leaders.

------------------------------

National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and
Seed

by Janice A. Roehl, Robert Huitt, Mary Ann Wycoff,
Antony Pate, Donald Rebovich, and Ken Coyle

The U.S. Department of Justice launched Operation
Weed and Seed in 1991 to demonstrate that a large
array of resources can be mobilized in a
comprehensive, coordinated effort to control crime
and drugs and to improve the quality of life in
targeted high-crime neighborhoods. The initiative's
name was drawn from its two-pronged strategy: to
"weed out" violent offenders through intensive law
enforcement and prosecution and to "seed" the
neighborhood with prevention, intervention,
treatment, and revitalization services. An integral
part of this strategy involves community policing,
which is designed to bridge the gap between weeding
and seeding.

Despite differences in the size and nature of
target neighborhoods and in the severity of crime
and drug problems, each of 19 cities was awarded
approximately $1.1 million for an 18-month
demonstration period.[1] The programs were
initiated between April and December 1992, and the
national process evaluation, supported by the
National Institute of Justice, began in early 1993
to gather information on program implementation
activities through the end of that year. Its
purpose was to document and assess the
implementation and activities of the 19 Weed and
Seed demonstration projects.

The primary data collection methods were:

o Two site visits to each project to interview key
staff, steering committee members, and community
representatives.

o A review and content analysis of program
materials, including grant applications, progress
reports, steering committee meeting minutes, and
policy memorandums.

o Surveys of program staff to gather uniform
cross-site information on the key elements of
program and target area characteristics, law
enforcement tactics and arrests, prosecution
tactics and case processing, community policing
activities, and seeding efforts.

This Research in Brief summarizes the findings of
the national process evaluation by offering an
overview of how the sites structured and operated
their programs and by discussing the implications
of their efforts for future programs of this type.

A comprehensive, multifaceted program

Goals and objectives. Based on a research and
experiential history of innovative approaches to
crime prevention and control (see "Background of
the Weed and Seed Initiative"), the goals of
Operation Weed and Seed are simple and ambitious:

o To eliminate violent crime, drug trafficking, and
drug-related crime from targeted high-crime
neighborhoods.

o To provide a safe environment, free of crime and
drug use, where law-abiding citizens can live,
work, and raise families.

Underlying these goals is the premise that they are
interdependent and inseparable. Often described as
a strategy, not just a grant program, the essential
and defining characteristic of Weed and Seed is its
emphasis on collective and coordinated action (see
"Weed and Seed Objectives").

Federal level management. The U.S. Department of
Justice did not require the selected Weed and Seed
sites to implement specific strategies or programs.
Instead, each site had to develop its own approach
to the central program elements of weeding,
including prosecution; the "bridge" of community
policing; and seeding, including prevention,
intervention, treatment, and neighborhood
restoration.

Within the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Executive Office for Weed and Seed and the Bureau
of Justice Assistance (BJA) have been the lead
agencies in administering this program at the
Federal level. BJA and the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys (EOUSA) supplied 19
demonstration sites with grant funds totaling more
than $20 million. The U.S. Department of Justice
also has worked hand-in-hand with other Federal
agencies to provide guidance, technical assistance,
and Federal funding to participating Weed and Seed
sites because coordinated mobilization of resources
from numerous government agencies is one of the
central tenets of the program.

Overview of the demonstration sites. The 19 cities
with Weed and Seed demonstration sites reflect a
wide range in population size and density. Although
most cities chose to concentrate Weed and Seed in
one area, five cities selected two localities, one
site designated three sections, and two sites
targeted four neighborhoods. While the average
population of single target areas was 11,200, they
ranged from a one-block public housing development
with 717 residents (Philadelphia) to a 15-square
mile section with 38,770 residents (Fort Worth).

The racial and ethnic composition of the
demonstration cities also varied. In four sites
African Americans constituted more than 50 percent
of the population (Atlanta, Richmond, Washington,
D.C., and Wilmington); in three cities Hispanics
made up more than or nearly 50 percent of the
population (Chelsea, Massachusetts; San Antonio;
and Santa Ana, California); and four areas had
predominately non-Hispanic white populations
(Madison, Omaha, Pittsburgh, and Seattle). Although
the target areas also varied widely in their racial
and ethnic composition, on the whole they tended to
have relatively high concentrations of minorities.

Many of the demonstration cities have struggled
with crime, poverty, social disorganization, and
urban decay for a long time. Others, however, have
only recently had to contend with these problems.
At the extremes were Madison, which reported 770
violent crimes in 1991, and Atlanta, a city with
twice the population of Madison, which reported 21
times as many violent crimes. Crime rates in the
target areas also varied and were generally
substantially higher than the corresponding
citywide rates. All the target sites have suffered
from relatively high rates of substance abuse, drug
trafficking, and drug-related crime and violence.
Gang activity has been prevalent and implicated in
the drug trade in many of the sites.

Local management and structure. Weed and Seed
grantees included mayoral and city manager offices,
local police departments, State law enforcement
agencies, and one nonprofit organization.
Local steering committees were established to guide
program development and policy setting as suggested
by the Weed and Seed Implementation Manual
developed by the Office of Justice Programs. The
steering committees typically were chaired by U.S.
attorneys, who were accorded a key role by the
Justice Department. They were often responsible for
making the Weed and Seed concept known locally and
for organizing the application process. In many
sites, the U.S. attorneys remained acknowledged
leaders of local programs. In others, U.S.
attorneys played small roles and avoided major
involvement in what they saw as essentially
community-based projects.

Other officials frequently found on steering
committees were the chief of police, district
attorney, mayor, law enforcement coordinators in
U.S. attorney's offices, Federal law enforcement
agency representatives (e.g., from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Agency;
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; or
Immigration and Naturalization Service), police
officers, and community representatives.

Putting weeding policies and strategies into daily
operations was typically the responsibility of weed
committees. They generally were composed of
high-ranking local and State law enforcement and
prosecution officials and regional representatives
of Federal agencies (e.g., the special-agent-in-charge,
or SAC, of the FBI) with decisionmaking and policy-
setting authority. The U.S. attorney or his or her 
representative often chaired these committees. 
Representatives from the FBI and Drug Enforcement 
Administration were typically involved, and 
representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
and U.S. Postal Service were included in sites with 
crime problems appropriate to these agencies' missions.
State law enforcement agencies were less frequently
involved.

Most sites also had a seed committee, composed of
government agency and community representatives,
responsible for implementing seeding activities.

Each site was typically staffed by a Weed and Seed
coordinator; often there were separate coordinators
for each phase. While some of these coordinators
were newly hired, full-time staff, others devoted a
portion of their time to the coordination of Weed
and Seed activities while working at other
positions.

Allocation of funds. At each site, the Weed and
Seed grant funds were used to support community
policing (an average of $457,352) and weeding
($434,145) more than seeding ($273,177). These
averages, based on data available from 13 of the 19
programs, conceal the diversity among the sites.
The amounts shown do not include the sizable
in-kind and leveraged resources that also were
devoted to Weed and Seed activities. Police
overtime and other law enforcement personnel costs
were the major grant expenditures for weeding and
community policing. Seeding funds were used to
support staff, provide prevention and treatment
services, and develop a variety of community
activities, often through minigrants.

The law enforcement half of weeding

The weeding component of Weed and Seed consists of
linked law enforcement and prosecution strategies.
The central features of the law enforcement portion
of weeding are interagency cooperation, targeting
of specific crimes, and development of enforcement
strategies.

Interagency cooperation. The Federal, State and
local agency members of the weed committees
developed specific strategies of crime and drug
enforcement. In many sites, a smaller working group
was created early in the program or evolved over
time to direct day-to-day operations following the
weeding committee's overall guidelines. The
membership of these working groups was often
dominated by local police department command staff
and appropriate Federal agency representatives.

Interagency cooperation in law enforcement strategy
was reported to be strong in the vast majority of
sites. Some sites solidified good local-Federal
partnerships that existed prior to the Weed and
Seed program; others formed new alliances. Joint
strategy development and information sharing were
the major benefits of interagency cooperation.
Although local police departments received
substantial portions of the Weed and Seed program
funds, which were used to cover overtime and
equipment, they also contributed large quantities
of personnel time. In-kind contributions from
Federal agencies in the form of agent time,
undercover agents, key informants, and buy money
also were substantial -- estimated to amount to
hundreds of thousands of dollars in many sites.

Crimes targeted. The nature and severity of crime
in Weed and Seed neighborhoods determined the
specific focus and form of the weeding efforts; in
most cases the emphasis was on drug-related,
gun-related, and violent crimes. Most sites focused
on street-level dealing of relatively small amounts
of drugs, primarily crack cocaine and, in several
northeastern sites, heroin. A few directed their
attention to drug trafficking and high-level
operators. State and Federal agents were more
likely to be involved in weeding strategies
directed toward higher level dealers and organized
operations.

Enforcement strategies. Police-based weeding
activities generally consisted of traditional drug
enforcement and investigation tactics that were
enhanced by interagency collaboration, targeted
enforcement, additional personnel, and coordinated
direction. Some noteworthy innovations included:

o Cross-training of patrol officers in narcotics
strategies, including search warrant preparation,
high-risk warrant tactics, surveillance operations,
buy/bust operations, and the use of confidential
informants.

o Use of civil remedies, problem solving, and
community resources to close drug houses, evict
dealers, and mitigate hot spots.

o Application of state-of-the-art technologies of
crime analysis, drug market mapping, offender data
bases, and video surveillance in investigations.

o Inclusion of probation/parole officers on weeding
teams.

Investigations also were helped by data provided by
task force members and through "word-on-the-street"
information brought by community police officers
and residents.

Immediate effects of law enforcement weeding

Weeding activities most often were welcomed by
citizens in the targeted neighborhoods who had felt
ignored and besieged for some time and were
heartened that the police were beginning to step up
the response to their concerns. In interviews with
program officials and community leaders, few
reported any significant backlash resulting from
the implementation of weeding.

In several sites, however, the mere announcement of
the weeding initiative initially elicited negative
reactions from citizens, particularly residents of
the target areas, as well as from community and
civil rights groups. They viewed weeding's
significant law enforcement component as "targeted"
at predominantly minority neighborhoods. In
response, certain sites greatly increased the
involvement of residents in the planning process,
lowered their attention to weeding, and enhanced
the program's seeding components.

Arrest data. Arrest statistics cannot serve as
comparable outcome measures across sites because of
differences in the nature and magnitude of problems
addressed, in target area size and composition, and
in policies and intensity of weeding activities.
The sites also shared neither a common definition
of "Weed and Seed" arrests nor a baseline measure
of arrest activity in target areas that could have
been used to indicate how the number and type of
arrests were affected by weeding activities.

Sixteen of the 19 sites, however, reported arrest
data for June 1992 through December 1993. A total
of 38,863 arrests were reported, an average of just
over 2,400 per site over the 18-month period.
Arrests ranged from 149 in Omaha to 8,477 in
Philadelphia.[2]

Prosecution: The other half of weeding

Prosecution in the Weed and Seed initiative
involved the coordinated efforts of the offices of
U.S. attorneys, local prosecutors, and State
attorneys general. The objectives of these
agencies, as designed by the U.S. Department of
Justice, were to remove "the worst offenders" from
the target neighborhoods for as long as possible
through pretrial detention and incarceration.

Interagency cooperation. The nature and strength of
interagency cooperation in prosecution varied, but
it was generally weaker than the cooperation and
coordination among law enforcement agencies.
Interagency cooperation for effective prosecution
occurred on two different planes: among the three
central prosecution agencies (and primarily between
the U.S. attorney's offices and local district
attorney's offices) to determine strategies and
criteria for prosecuting at the Federal or State
level, and between prosecutors and law enforcement
officers to work together on case preparation and
investigations.

Strong preexisting relationships between the
district attorney's and U.S. attorney's offices
were positively correlated to the level of
cooperation between these offices in regard to the
Weed and Seed initiative in nearly half the sites.
In several others, the Weed and Seed initiative
facilitated interagency cooperation that had not
been a potent force earlier. In some sites,
however, effective cooperation was not achieved
even though some progress was reported over time.

In sites with low levels of interagency cooperation
among prosecution agencies, key obstacles appeared
to be:

o The exclusion of the district attorney's offices
from planning and subsequent decisionmaking
processes.

o The absence of Weed and Seed grant funds to
support district attorney staff, even though 92
percent of the Weed and Seed cases were prosecuted
by them.

o District attorney resistance to differential
handling of cases from a specific geographical
area.

o Issues surrounding the U.S. attorney's leadership
role.

In sites with effective interagency cooperation,
district attorneys were "brought to the table"
early, remained involved in policy setting, and
often received grant funds to support at least one
prosecutor dedicated to Weed and Seed cases.

Strategy. Although the Executive Office for Weed
and Seed repeatedly provided the sites with written
definitions of a Weed and Seed case (see
"Definition of a Weed and Seed Case"), prosecutors
differed in how they applied the definition and how
they handled Weed and Seed cases. Some sites
targeted these cases for enhanced penalties and
expedited prosecution; others handled them no
differently from any other cases. A few sites had
dedicated Weed and Seed prosecutors for vertical
prosecution of cases.

Cases involving large quantities of drugs,
firearms, defendants with prior convictions, and
criminal enterprises typically were funneled to the
U.S. attorney's offices, although selection
criteria varied substantially among the sites. U.S.
attorneys applied existing and specialized
initiatives to Weed and Seed cases, such as
Operation Triggerlock,[3] but the extent of their
application is unknown.

Effects of prosecutors' weeding activities

Signs of successful interagency cooperation. In
several sites police-prosecutor cooperation
contributed to successful prosecution of Weed and
Seed cases. In Santa Ana, for example, the
assistant district attorney in charge of Weed and
Seed cases often participated in the planning and
execution of undercover buys, and the police
instituted careful video recording of buys, thus
providing the prosecution with solid evidence.

One positive sign of the effect of interagency
cooperation of prosecutors in Operation Weed and
Seed has been expansion of community prosecution
activities by local district attorneys. In many sites,
local prosecutors and, to a lesser extent, U.S. attorneys, opened lines of dialog with
neighborhood residents, 
improving community-prosecutor awareness and 
relations in both directions. Prosecutors obtained 
information about community needs and concerns that
assisted them in establishing short- and long-term
prosecution priorities and in turn benefited from
community residents' improved willingness to assist 
with investigations and to serve as witnesses.

Supporting data. Data collected by EOUSA provide
some information on prosecution outcomes, although
these data are affected by variations in case
definitions, law enforcement outcomes, and
prosecution approaches. Of the 35,523 defendants
charged during the first project period (as
reported to EOUSA), 92 percent were prosecuted by
local district attorneys or prosecutors. There were
not large differences in the types of cases handled
by Federal and local prosecutors, although the
majority of the cases that involved a continuing
criminal enterprise and violation of racketeering
laws were handled by U.S. attorneys' offices.

Local prosecutors reported a 21 percent conviction
rate at the end of 18 months, with a large number
of cases, 69 percent, pending. Delays in reporting 
may account for some of the pending cases. At the 
Federal level, almost 60 percent of the cases resulted 
in convictions, with 37 percent pending. More than 
90 percent of Federal cases ending in conviction led
to prison sentences, compared to 53 percent at the 
State level.

Role of community policing

There was substantial similarity across cities in
the general approach to community policing.
Officers were assigned to the target areas to
develop relationships with residents and promote
joint efforts to address neighborhood concerns. In
some sites, community policing was a new
experience; in others it was a familiar one where
existing community policing programs were able to
expand the number of personnel. Most community
police officers were not assigned to respond to
dispatched calls for service; instead they focused
on nonenforcement activities such as community
contacts, problem solving, and youth projects.

The number of dedicated officers ranged from 1 in
each of 6 neighborhoods in Madison to 22 officers
and 2 sergeants in Chicago who covered 3 shifts.
Other sites assigned teams of between 3 and 12
officers to the targeted neighborhoods. Community
police officers often worked in pairs or teams, and
they typically were linked to or supplemented by
others, such as probation/parole officers, social
workers, nurses, narcotics officers, truancy
officers, and Federal agents.

A few sites did not differentiate weeding from
community policing functions. In these sites,
community police officers conducted enforcement
activities as routine parts of their work, although
their participation in undercover investigations
was limited. In many sites, community police
officers concentrated on community contacts and
problem solving, but they participated in
enforcement activities as needed. Most police
officials did not see any contradiction in
community police officers wearing two hats, nor did
the majority of community leaders interviewed.
Community police officers were generally lauded by
community leaders and residents, and their presence
was said to contribute to reducing tension between
citizens and police, solving social order problems,
and mitigating some of the public's distrust of
weeding.

Seeding

Seeding is arguably the most diverse and complex
element of the Weed and Seed concept. The target
neighborhoods have deeply rooted social and crime
problems, and the majority contain a large
percentage of residents whose income is at or below
the poverty line.

Local management. Most sites found that a dedicated
seed coordinator was needed. Every site except one
established a seed committee to plan and oversee
seeding strategies, although their authority and
activity varied. Many seed committees were unable
to function effectively in the first project
period, and they often were dominated by local
agency representatives from the police, city
agencies (e.g., community development, social
services), large nonprofit organizations (e.g.,
United Way), and the mayor's office. (Federal seed
agency representatives were active in just two
sites.) In some sites, community leaders and
citizen representatives were underrepresented and
given little decisionmaking authority.

The stronger, more active seed committees began
with or evolved into a membership comprising
substantial numbers of community representatives
with decisionmaking authority over seeding funds.
Although two sites formed Federal agency seed
committees comprising representatives from the
Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Labor, and Health and Human Services, Federal
seeding agencies were usually not involved in the
program since they did not have funds allocated for
Weed and Seed target areas and had no mandate to
give the areas priority in existing grant funds.

Seeding strategies. An inclusive, neighborhood-
specific view of seeding activities was adopted.
The two broad categories of seeding strategies were:

o Prevention, intervention, and treatment services.

o Neighborhood revitalization and economic
development.

Seeding activities and programs aimed at
prevention, intervention, and treatment were more
prevalent in the target areas than revitalization
and economic development strategies, and Weed and
Seed grant funds more often were allocated to them.

Prevention, intervention, and treatment encompass a
wide range of services, including substance abuse
programs, alternative activities for youths, health
and nutrition services, improved access to
services, personal and family development and
education, victim assistance and protective
services, and community crime prevention. Primary
prevention for children and intervention strategies
for older youths were most common. Treatment
services were not expanded by Weed and Seed, with
the exception of one site.

Safe Havens, founded in each site through a major
grant given to Cities in Schools, Inc., were
integral parts of seeding. These centers,
originally planned as facilities within schools but
founded in a variety of community settings, are
multiservice centers where a variety of youth and
adult services are located together in a safe
neighborhood facility.

Neighborhood revitalization and economic
development encompass jobs and job training;
homeownership programs; and renovation,
rehabilitation, and redevelopment. Where these
strategies were under way, most had existed prior
to the Weed and Seed initiative. Planning for
physical revitalization and economic development,
including strategies for leveraging and raising
funds for support of these plans, was common,
particularly among agency-dominated seed
committees.

Funding for seeding activities. Some activities
viewed as seeding were funded directly by grant
funds, in whole or in part; some were coordinated
by seeding staff or committees; and some were
already present in the target area and were
incorporated as part of the Weed and Seed program.
Approximately one-third of the seeding funds were
distributed to local organizations. Federal funds
supported several seeding initiatives directly,
including Safe Havens; Boys and Girls Clubs; and
the Race Against Drugs, Wings of Hope, and Step-Up
programs.

Many local, State, and Federal programs continued
to support existing services and resources covered
by the seeding umbrella. Examples include HUD
renovation projects, D.A.R.E.(registered trademark)
(Drug Abuse Resistance Education) programs, Police
Athletic Leagues offered by local police departments,
VISTA volunteers, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, and Job Training Partnership Act positions.

Consequences of Federal funding. Although there
were no new Federal agency seeding funds
specifically allocated to the Weed and Seed sites,
the early announcements of the program and
pronouncements of Federal officials led site
residents to believe that significant funding for
prevention and treatment services, alternatives for
youth, and neighborhood revitalization would be
forthcoming. The consequences of this
misunderstanding included community feeling that
this might be just "another Federal program,"
decreased support from the community and grassroots
organizations, decreased citizen participation, and
difficult situations for regional representatives
of Federal agencies that were involved with
existing seeding programs.

Alterations in Federal asset forfeiture policy
financially benefited several target communities.
The U.S. Department of Justice ruled that real
property, forfeited according to Federal law
because of connections with illegal activity, could
be transferred to private nonprofit organizations
for use in support of Weed and Seed programs.
Ownership of several buildings was transferred to
community organizations in several sites; the
facilities now serve as permanent locations for
such seeding services as Safe Havens and
victim/witness centers.

The sites' allocation of an average of 25-30
percent of their budgets to seeding meant this
money (from $100,102 to $566,758, an average of
$273,177) had to cover coordinator salaries and
community projects. Pursuing major neighborhood
revitalization and economic development strategies
could take place only through a variety of
optimizing strategies involving partnerships,
leveraged funds, and interagency coordination. Most
programs thus completed the planning phase only.

Implications

Working from a common blueprint drawn by the U.S.
Department of Justice, each of the 19 Weed and Seed
sites customized a program to meet each target
community's needs. Communities varied in such
dimensions as size and severity of crime and drug
problems and in their city's history of interagency
cooperation, community policing, and neighborhood
empowerment. Yet, each site was given essentially
the same amount of Federal funding. Despite these
differences across sites and, in some instances,
because of them, a number of important lessons can
be distilled from the Weed and Seed demonstration
programs (see "Additional Research Needed").

Implementation issues. Most of the programs had
slow and rocky beginnings for a number of reasons,
including:

o Problems with the organizational infrastructure,
such as complex city government bureaucracies and
elaborate contracting rules.

o Phasing problems, such as the need to complete a
storefront or other facility and reliance on the
implementation of Safe Havens to provide seeding
programs.

o Differences of opinion with BJA about how funds
could be used, particularly the initial limitations
placed on the percentage of Federal funds that
could be allocated toward seeding.

Good management and leadership, with experienced,
effective, and well-regarded individuals in major
management positions, helped mitigate these
problems. The experience suggests that in the
future, the program's Federal funding levels and
permissible uses should be clearly stated and
consistent from the start. Guidelines should
continue to be structured with enough flexibility
to enable communities to do what they think is
needed within their neighborhoods.

Interagency cooperation. Through steering
committees, community policing, community
prosecution, weed task forces, and seed committees,
groups of people who ordinarily did not communicate
with each other (e.g., prosecutors and neighborhood
residents, police officers and recreation
directors) came together to coordinate their
efforts, share resources, and solve problems. The
reasons and capacity for getting together existed
prior to Weed and Seed, but the motivation and
vehicles for doing so resulted from the program's
implementation. Contributions of time and resources
from agencies, community organizations, and
individuals undoubtedly exceeded the Federal grant
funds allocated for the program.

It is critical to bring the right people "to the
table" from the start. Future endeavors should
include key representatives from district
attorney's offices and the target neighborhoods as
well as from Federal law enforcement and municipal
agencies. The U.S. attorney's office is an
appropriate leader, although this does not preclude
individual circumstances where other local
officials might be equally effective. Consideration
should be given to having separate weed and seed
coordinators with substantial experience and
established working relationships with other key
people.

Effective weeding. The extent to which the program
succeeded in removing the most violent and
problematic offenders from target neighborhoods is
unknown. Of the tens of thousands of Weed and Seed
arrest cases prosecuted, the majority were reported
as pending at the end of the demonstration period.
Over 92 percent were prosecuted by local district
attorneys, many of them in locations in which jail
caps and prison overcrowding may limit the length
of sentences even where convictions were obtained.
Yet it is also certain that a number of serious
criminals were convicted under Federal law and
sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

For effective weeding, the formation of interagency
task forces consisting of all relevant Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies should be
considered. Future efforts should include
recognition of and support for the critical role of
local prosecutors. They should participate from the
outset on interagency task forces and be granted
additional resources to address the increased
caseloads and community involvement promulgated by
Weed and Seed.

Community policing. The Weed and Seed program
helped spread and reinforce the idea of community
policing, which was a positive experience for both
the community and police agencies. It also helped
demonstrate that enforcement can be enhanced by
close contacts with the community and that
enforcement and service are not necessarily
incompatible policing functions.

Community policing principles and practices should
be advocated and supported by police departments
and city governments, with appropriate recognition,
compensation, and room for advancement for
officers. Model efforts should include training for
both citizens and police, means for officers to
possess a sense of "ownership" of the area they
serve, and substantial coordination among service
providers and enforcement personnel.

Effective seeding. Federal seeding coordination and
funding were much less than Federal weeding
support, and seeding services became the primary
responsibility of city agencies (in cities with
financial problems, the target areas received very
little). Yet despite the problems in Federal
funding of seeding activities, several communities
discovered the resources within themselves to
launch a number of significant prevention and
restoration efforts. It is unlikely that they would
have done this so quickly without the focus and
coordination offered by the Weed and Seed program.
It cannot be determined by the national process
evaluation if the "right" seeding activities were
supported or if enough seeding was activated. But
generally, given the seriousness of the target
neighborhoods' drug and social problems, extent of
physical deterioration, and severe economic
problems, the seeding activities could not have
overcome them, especially in the limited time
allotted.

The dual approach of prevention and revitalization
within seeding should be continued, and training
and technical assistance for citizens in
leadership, planning, and program development and
management are recommended.

One of the important messages delivered by the U.S.
Department of Justice in its design and shepherding
of the Weed and Seed initiative was that a
community's crime and drug problems are best
addressed in a comprehensive fashion. In the
context of the current policy debate over whether
to provide funding for enforcement and
incarceration or prevention, the Weed and Seed
programs serve as a demonstration that the sensible
answer is both. Seeding is necessary to rebuild and
sustain a safe and vital community; at the same
time, seeding cannot occur -- community
participation cannot be achieved, businesses will
not invest, and young people cannot be deterred
from the economic attractions of drug dealing -
- until weeding results in a basic level of
security.

------------------------------

Background of the Weed and Seed Initiative

The roots of the Weed and Seed initiative can be
traced to several programs initiated in
Philadelphia: the Violent Traffickers Project, a
Federal-State multiagency task force for drug
enforcement; the Federal Alternatives to State
Trials (FAST) program involving collaboration
between the district attorney's and U.S. attorney's
offices; and two projects implemented in the Mantua
and Spring Garden neighborhoods which involved
Federal, State, and local government agencies,
community organizations, and neighborhood
residents.

Development of Weed and Seed also was guided by the
results of a number of research studies and practical
experiences.

Research results on the effectiveness of vigorous
police drug enforcement efforts have been mixed.
Although crackdowns have been shown to be effective
deterrents in the short term and to have some
residual effects,[4] this evidence has been coupled
with reports of unwanted side effects, including
displacement and increases in certain violent
crimes.[5] These findings suggest that intensive
law enforcement strategies need to be supplemented
by other measures, particularly citizen-based
anti-drug efforts[6] and community policing.[7]
Other research has pointed to the additional
advantages of prosecutorial collaboration across
agencies, government levels, and jurisdictions;
cooperative investigation; vertical prosecution;
and the application of a full range of Federal,
State, and local criminal and civil laws.[8]
Finally, the importance of multiagency,
private/public collaborations has been indicated by
research on community partnerships for crime and
drug control and prevention.[9]

------------------------------

Weed and Seed Objectives

Weed and Seed objectives focus on a strategic,
coordinated approach to crime prevention and
control:

o To develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy
to control and prevent violent crime, drug
trafficking, and drug-related crime in targeted
high-crime neighborhoods.

o To coordinate and integrate existing as well as
new Federal, State, local, and private-sector
initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human
services and to concentrate those resources in the
project sites to maximize their impact on reducing
and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and
drug-related crime.

o To mobilize residents in the targeted sites to
assist law enforcement in identifying and removing
violent offenders and drug traffickers from their
neighborhoods and to assist other human service
agencies in identifying and responding to service
needs in the target areas.

------------------------------

Definition of a Weed and Seed Case

The U.S. Attorney's Office defined Weed and Seed
reportable cases as:

(1) Any felony or misdemeanor relating to the
distribution or possession of drugs and/or firearms
within the confines of the Weed and Seed target
area.

(2) Aiding/abetting or causing such felonies and
misdemeanors in (1).

(3) Conspiracy to sell or possess drugs and/or
firearms within the area.

(4) Commission of other felony offenses within the
area.

(5) Felonies or misdemeanors, not committed in the
target area, which directly affect the area or have
a significant connection thereto.

------------------------------

Additional Research Needed

To continue to evaluate Operation Weed and Seed
initiatives, uniform data collection should be
required and monitored, and impact assessments of
the overall program and individual components
should be conducted to guide program development.
The national process evaluation of Operation Weed
and Seed also pointed to specific areas requiring
further research and analysis:

o Innovative enforcement efforts reported as
particularly effective by the sites.

o The overall quality of arrests, final disposition
of cases, community response to weeding, and
protection of individual rights.

o Prosecution strategies, rates of convictions in
these prosecutions, types and lengths of sentences
ultimately served by Weed and Seed offenders,
offender recidivism, and overall community impact.

o Different forms of community policing, including
those in which community police officers are
responsible for the full range of police services,
with the exception of answering dispatched calls.

o Effectiveness of strategies to support
prevention, intervention, treatment services, and
neighborhood restoration, particularly redirecting
existing and leveraged Federal, State, local, and
private funds to target neighborhoods that most
need them.

------------------------------

Impact Evaluation Under Way

As this Research in Brief indicates, an impact
evaluation is necessary to gain a full
understanding of the effects of Weed and Seed
programs. The National Institute of Justice is
supporting a multipart impact evaluation conducted
by Abt Associates.

The evaluation -- examining in detail Weed and Seed
programs in Akron, Hartford, Las Vegas, Pittsburgh,
Salt Lake City, Sarasota, Seattle, and Shreveport -
- consists of the following four approaches:

o Residential and business surveys. Approximately
6,400 telephone surveys are being conducted to
assess views about Weed and Seed efforts.

o Analysis of police and prosecutor records.
Records that predate Weed and Seed funding are
providing a baseline for the weeding evaluation;
records collected since funding began are measuring
the impact of weeding activities.

o Onsite assessment of community-based programs.
Working with Weed and Seed offices and with
community service providers, researchers are
conducting an intensive examination of seeding
activities.

o Regular and systematic offsite contact. Frequent
contact with Weed and Seed participants is being
maintained to foster a high level of cooperation
and collaboration throughout the evaluation.

------------------------------

Notes

[1] Federal funds were provided in two stages:
$613,000 in spring 1992 and $487,000 in early 1993.
In mid-1994, the demonstration sites received an
additional $750,000. This Research in Brief does
not discuss program activities and progress during
this second grant period.

[2] A quarter of the arrests were for felony drug
crimes, 19 percent were for violent crimes, 16
percent were for possession of narcotics, 4 percent
were for firearms violations, and 35 percent were
for "other crimes." Just 47 arrests were made for
organized drug trafficking under RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) and similar
Federal laws.

[3] A Department of Justice project, Operation
Triggerlock uses a task force approach, with
extensive involvement of State and local law
enforcement, to capture and incarcerate violent and
repeat offenders (career criminals) who violate
Federal firearms statutes.

[4] Sherman, L.W. (1990). Police crackdowns: Initial
and residual deterrence. In M. Tonry and N. Morris
(eds.), Crime and justice: A review of research,
Volume 12, pp. 1-48. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

[5] See Moore, M.H. (1988). Drug trafficking. Crime
File Study Guide. Washington, D.C.: National
Institute of Justice (NCJ 104555) and Reuter, P.,
et al. (1988). Drug use and drug programs in the
Washington metropolitan area. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corp.

[6] Skogan, W.G. (1989). Communities, crime and
neighborhood organization. Crime and Delinquency,
35(3), 437-457. See also Davis, R.C., A. Lurigio,
and W.G. Skogan (1991). Community responses to
crack. Report to the National Institute of Justice.
New York: New York City Victim Services Agency.

[7] See, for example, Greene, J.R., and S.D.
Mastrofski, (eds.) (1988). Community policing:
Rhetoric or reality? New York: Praeger and
Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.) (1994). The challenge of
community policing: Testing the promises. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

[8] Coldren, J.R., and M.J. Sabath (1992).
Multijurisdictional drug control task forces, 1988-
1990: Critical components of state drug control
strategies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. Chaiken, J.,
M. Chaiken, and C. Karchmer (1990).
Multijurisdictional drug law enforcement
strategies: Reducing supply and demand. U.S.
Department of Justice: National Institute of
Justice. Schlegel, K., and E.F. McGarrell (1991).
An examination of arrest practices in regions
served by multijurisdictional drug task forces.
Crime & Delinquency, 37(3), 408-426.

[9] Botvin, G.J. (1987). Prevention Research. In
Drug abuse and drug abuse research: The second
triennial report to Congress from the Secretary,
Department of Health and Human Services. Rockville,
MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Cook, R., J.
Roehl, C. Oros, L. Saunders, C. Andrews, T.
Arrington, R. Hersch, G. Wisdom, R. Huitt, and J.
Trudeau. (1993). National evaluation of the
Community Partnership Demonstration Program: Third
annual report. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Substance Abuse Prevention, DHHS.

------------------------------

This project was supported under award 92-DD-CX-
K044 from the National Institute of Justice, Office
of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, to
the Institute for Social Analysis (ISA), Police
Foundation, and American Prosecutors Research
Institute (APRI). The principal researchers were
Janice Roehl, Ph.D., president, and Robert Huitt,
Ph.D., associate, ISA; Mary Ann Wycoff, senior
research associate, Police Executive Research
Forum; Antony Pate, senior research associate,
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida
State University; Donald Rebovich, Ph.D., director
of research, APRI; and Ken Coyle, Ph.D., former
research analyst with APRI. For additional
information, see National Process Evaluation of the
Weed and Seed Initiative: Cross-Site Summary (Part
I), NCJ 160140, and Case Studies (Part II), NCJ
160141. These documents are available from the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service through
interlibrary loan or for a fee. Call 800-851-3420.
Points of view in this document are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the
official position of the U.S. Department of
Justice.

------------------------------

Selected OJP Publications 

Listed below are some recent, relevant Office of
Justice Programs (OJP) publications related to the
Weed and Seed program; they concern issues of law
enforcement, community policing, prosecution, crime
prevention, and neighborhood revitalization. These
publications are free, except as indicated, and can
be obtained from the National Criminal Justice
Reference Service: telephone 800-851-3420, e-mail
askncjrs@ncjrs.org, or write NCJRS, Box 6000,
Rockville, MD 20849-6000.

These documents also can be downloaded through the
NCJRS Bulletin Board System or at the NCJRS
Anonymous FTP site in ASCII or graphic formats.
They can be viewed online at the Justice
Information Center World Wide Web site. Call NCJRS
for more information.

Please note that when free publications are out of
stock, they are available as photocopies or through
interlibrary loan.

Community Involvement

Evaluation of Boys and Girls Clubs in Public
Housing, NIJ Research Preview, 1995, FS 000100.

Innovative Community Partnerships: Working Together
for Change, OJJDP Program Summary, 1996, NCJ
147483.

Kelley, Patricia, M.P.P., Mark H. Moore, Ph.D., and
Jeffrey A. Roth, Ph.D., Violence in Cornet City: A
Problem-Solving Exercise, NIJ Issues and Practices,
1995, NCJ 154258.

Matrix of Community-Based Initiatives, OJJDP
Program Summary, 1996, NCJ 154816.

McGillis, Daniel, Beacons of Hope: New York City's
School-Based Community Centers, NIJ Program Focus,
1996, NCJ 157667.

Taylor, Ralph B., and Adele V. Harrell, Physical
Environment and Crime, NIJ Research Report, 1996,
NCJ 157311.

Rising Above Gangs and Drugs: How to Start a
Community Reclamation Project, OJJDP, 1995 (third
printing), NCJ 133522.

Sampson, Robert, Ph.D., Communities and Crime: A
Study in Chicago, NIJ VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ
156924, U.S. $19, Canada and other foreign
countries $24.

Responses to Youth Violence and Delinquency

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National
Juvenile Justice Action Plan, OJJDP Report, 1996,
NCJ 157105; OJJDP Summary, 1996, NCJ 157105.

Curfew: An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency and
Victimization?, OJJDP Bulletin, 1996, NCJ 159533.

Evaluation of Violence Prevention Programs in
Middle Schools, NIJ Update, 1995, FS 000094.

Gang Suppression and Intervention: Community
Models, OJJDP Research Summary, 1996, NCJ 148202.

Gang Suppression and Intervention: Problem and
Response, OJJDP Research Summary, 1996, NCJ 149629.

Harrell, Adele, Ph.D., Intervening with High-Risk
Youth: Preliminary Findings from the
Children-at-Risk Program, NIJ Research in Progress
Research Preview, 1996, FS000140. Also available as
a VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153270, U.S. $19, Canada
and other foreign countries $24.

Intensive Aftercare for High-Risk Juveniles: A
Community Care Model, OJJDP Program Summary, 1996,
NCJ 147575.

Intensive Aftercare for High-Risk Juveniles:
Policies and Procedures, OJJDP Program Summary,
1996, NCJ 147712.

Community Policing

Community Policing and D.A.R.E.: A Practitioner's
Perspective, BJA Bulletin, 1995, NCJ 154275

Community Policing Strategies, NIJ Research
Preview, 1995, FS 000126.

Sadd, Susan, and Randolph M. Grinc, Implementation
Challenges in Community Policing: Innovative
Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Eight Cities, NIJ
Research in Brief, 1996, NCJ 157932.

Sherman, Lawrence W., Ph.D., Reducing Gun Violence:
Community Policing Against Gun Crime, VHS
videotape, 1995, NCJ 153730, U.S. $19, Canada and
other foreign countries $24.

Skogan, Wesley, Ph.D., Community Policing in
Chicago, Fact or Fiction?, NIJ Research in Progress
Research Preview, 1995, FS000105. Also available as
a VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153273, U.S. $19, Canada
and other foreign countries $24.

Law Enforcement

Policing Drug Hot Spots, NIJ Research Preview,
1995, FS 000128.

Rich, Thomas F., The Use of Computerized Mapping in
Crime Control and Prevention Programs, NIJ Research
in Action, 1995, NCJ 155182.

Prosecution and Courts

Bourque, Blair B., Roberta C. Cronin, Daniel B.
Felker, Frank R. Pearson, Mei Han, and Sarah M.
Hill, Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: An
Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration
Programs, NIJ Research in Brief, NCJ 157317. 

Anderson, David C., In New York City, a "Community
Court" and a New Legal Culture, NIJ Program Focus,
1996, NCJ 158613.

Finn, Peter, The Manhattan District Attorney's
Narcotics Eviction Program, NIJ Program Focus,
1995, NCJ 153146.

Johnson, Claire, Barbara Webster, and Edward
Connors, Prosecuting Gangs: A National Assessment,
NIJ Research in Brief, 1995, NCJ 151785.