Title: National Evaluation of Weed and Seed.
Series: Research in Brief
Author(s): Terence Dunworth and Gregory Mills
Published: National Institute of Justice, June 1999
Subject(s): Drug law enforcement, drug abuse prevention and education,
community policing, crime mapping, police manpower deployment,
problem oriented policing
20 pages
49,000 bytes

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

National Institute of Justice
Research in Brief 
Jeremy Travis, Director
June 1999

National Evaluation of Weed and Seed
by Terence Dunworth and Gregory Mills

-------------------------------

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: The National Evaluation of Operation Weed and
Seed, a strategy to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related
crime in targeted areas and to provide a safe environment for residents to
live, work, and raise their families. From the initial three grant sites in
1991, Weed and Seed has grown to include 200 sites nationwide. The
Weed and Seed programs in eight sites--Hartford, Connecticut; Manatee
and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas,
Nevada; Akron, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; and
Seattle, Washington--were selected for the national evaluation of their
implementation and measurable effects on crime and public safety.

Key issues: Weed and Seed strategically links concentrated and enhanced
law enforcement efforts to identify, arrest, and prosecute violent offenders,
drug traffickers, and other criminals operating in the target areas (weeding)
and community policing with human services--including afterschool,
weekend, and summer youth activities; adult literacy classes; and parental 
counseling--and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter
further crime (seeding). The eight evaluation sites were selected because
they provide examples of different aspects of Weed and Seed in
application. In each site, the evaluation focused on one or two Weed and
Seed target areas. Although each site had its own distinctive crime
problems, they all shared high rates of violent crime related to drug
trafficking and drug use. Most sites had serious gang-related crime
problems.

Key findings: The effectiveness of weeding and seeding activities 
varied across the eight sites. The evaluation found:

o Preexisting community features may make Weed and Seed easier or
more difficult to operate effectively. Important factors included the
strength of the social and institutional infrastructure (an established
network of community-based organizations and community leaders), the
severity of crime problems, geographical advantages favoring economic
development, and transiency of the community population.

o The mix of weeding and seeding activities and the sequencing of these
components appear to be important factors in gaining community support
for the program. Important positive factors included early seeding,
sustained weeding, high-level task forces combined with community
policing, and an active prosecutorial role.

o Sites appeared to have greater success if they concentrated their program
resources on smaller population groups, especially if they could similarly
channel other public funds and also leverage private funds.

o A less tangible ingredient that seemed to characterize the more
successful programs was the active and constructive leadership of key
individuals.

o The most effective implementation strategies were those that relied on
bottom-up, participatory decisionmaking approaches, especially when
combined with efforts to build capacity and partnership among local
organizations.

The full cross site analysis and the eight case studies are also available.
Target audience: Congressional representatives and legislative staff;
Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials; State and local
government officials; and criminal justice practitioners and researchers. 

-------------------------------

Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious Federal, State, and local
effort to improve the quality of life in targeted high crime areas of
America's cities. First launched by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
in 1991, the program attempts to control violent crime, drug trafficking,
and drug-related crime and to provide a safe environment for residents to
live, work, and raise their families.

These are, by themselves, conventional law enforcement goals. What
makes the Weed and Seed concept distinctive and innovative is the means
by which these goals are achieved: Community-focused human services
programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives are strategically
linked with intensified, geographically targeted law enforcement efforts by
police and prosecutors. Weed and Seed is essentially a coordination
strategy; funding is only one tool among many to achieve the program's
objectives. (See "What is Weed and Seed?")

Weed and Seed is administered by the Executive Office for Weed and
Seed within DOJ's Office of Justice Programs. As exhibit 1 shows, from
the initial three grant sites--Kansas City, Missouri; Trenton, New Jersey;
and Omaha, Nebraska--in 1991, Weed and Seed has grown to include 200
sites nationwide. Until recently, cities were funded either as demonstration
sites, which generally received between $500,000 and $750,000 annually
over 4 consecutive years, or officially recognized sites, which received
much smaller amounts ($35,000 in some cases). Most sites currently
(1999) receive about $225,000 annually.

The Weed and Seed programs in eight sites were selected for the national
evaluation of their implementation and measurable outcomes related to
crime and public safety: Hartford, Connecticut; Manatee and Sarasota
Counties, Florida; Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; Akron,
Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Seattle,
Washington. These sites were selected by DOJ as examples of different
aspects of Weed and Seed. In each of them, the evaluation focused on one
or two Weed and Seed target areas. (See exhibit 2.) Although each site had
its own distinctive crime problems, they all shared high rates of violent
crime related to drug trafficking and drug use. Most sites had serious
gang-related crime problems.

The effectiveness of weeding and seeding activities varied across the eight
sites. 

The evaluation found significant favorable effects of Weed and Seed on
key outcome measures for some sites and time periods. The evidence is
modest in terms of its statistical significance, but the indicators
consistently point in favorable directions. At the same time, the evaluation
has pointed out a number of weak links in the chain, most noticeably the
limited and tenuous role that many local prosecutors played in the weeding
process. A number of local prosecutors reported they simply lack the
funding and personnel to conduct enhanced prosecution of the target area
caseloads generated by more aggressive policing activities. Although
difficult to measure with precision, the effect of this constraint almost
certainly has been to limit the removal of offenders from target areas.

Setting up Weed and Seed at the local level

The eight sites differed substantially in how they organized their Weed
and Seed programs, due, in large part, to the unique law enforcement and
social needs and existing organizational infrastructure and resources
available in each site. (See "Study Methodology.") In general, the sites
were organized along these lines: 

Grantee organization. The grantees included mayors' offices, local police 
departments, and local nonprofit 501(c)(3) organizations. The staff
assigned to the Weed and Seed effort and their ability/authority to operate
cohesively in conjunction with community representatives were among the
most important factors in successful program implementation at the eight
evaluation sites. In general, an adequate supply of dedicated staff
resources, from both grantees and other participating agencies, produced
positive results in program implementation, oversight, and cohesion. In
most sites, the role actually played by the grantee was dynamic, as key
participants changed, programs and roles evolved, and community and
interagency relationships developed.

The U.S. Attorney's role. The U.S. Attorney is asked to play a central role
in organizing the steering committee and bringing together community
organizations and other Weed and Seed participants. A basic Weed and
Seed premise is that the U.S. Attorney's Office provides Federal oversight
and coordinates Federal, State, and local law enforcement and
prosecutorial activities, as well as general DOJ oversight of the Weed and
Seed strategy. Through such coordination, some sites effectively used
Federal law in weeding strategies and mobilized resources for seeding
programs from a variety of Federal agencies. In other sites, however,
Weed and Seed was managed and operated by a city agency (e.g., a police
department), and the role played by the U.S. Attorney was much more
limited.

Police and prosecutors. Additional law enforcement resources are brought
to bear on targeted areas. Police and prosecutors concentrate their efforts
to identify, arrest, and prosecute criminals, especially those engaging in
drug trafficking and violent crime. By providing more effective crime
detection and response, speedier investigations and trials, and the stricter
sentences available through Federal prosecution, police and prosecutors
seek to get drug dealers and other criminals off the street. The goal of
these activities is to build trust and support with the residential and
business communities. Police and prosecutors can then engage area
residents and business people as problem-solving partners, who, through
their cooperation, will promote further arrests and prosecutions. 

Steering committee. The role and composition of steering committees
varied among sites, with some dominated by public-sector representatives
and others more heavily represented and guided by community residents. 
In general, the committees established goals and objectives, provided
guidance and oversight on key program design and implementation issues,
and integrated weeding and seeding at the policy level. In most sites, the
steering committee played a critical role in coordinating efforts across
agencies, sectors, and jurisdictions. For several sites, the steering
committee or Weed and Seed community organizations provided a critical
means of resident participation in program decision- making. Across all
eight sites, steering committee members included key public agency
representatives and local government officials and various social service
providers, community-based organizations, and residents.

Interorganizational linkages. Increased interagency collaboration was a
central component of most weeding strategies. Such efforts included
monthly meetings between Weed and Seed officers and probation/parole 
officers to catch parole violators, frequent joint Federal and local special
narcotics operations, and the creation of formal interagency Weed and
Seed law enforcement task forces, such as in Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota
Counties, and Pittsburgh. In Salt Lake City, Weed and Seed worked
closely with the existing Metro Narcotics Task Force, which focused on
high-level drug dealers.

The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to build their seeding programs
around existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. For
example, Hartford Weed and Seed integrated seeding efforts with the
existing U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Family Investment Center, and the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program
built on the Comprehensive Communities Program. Extensive partnerships
and collaborations were created through Weed and Seed in the public and
private sectors, with most of the private-sector partnerships with nonprofit
and community-based organizations. In Shreveport, for example, Weed
and Seed arranged for existing services to come to the target area,
including free immunizations for children provided by the State
Department of Public Health, a library bookmobile, and free computer
training from a local university. In Seattle, the Washington Insurance
Council joined Weed and Seed to establish the Seattle Neighborhood
Action Program as a public/private partnership to help revitalize a Weed
and Seed neighborhood.

Seeding program partners and providers who were interviewed
emphasized how Weed and Seed increased coordination and
communication links among neighborhood groups and other agencies.
Almost all respondents said they felt more connected to the community
and service providers. A director of a youth service organization in 
Shreveport said:

Establishing partnerships is the key to Weed and Seed--cooperation on
projects and working together to bring the community together. [You] can
touch more people as a group of organizations than as a single entity.

Building trust and community capacity

Several of the evaluation sites encountered early community resistance to
Weed and Seed because residents were concerned about an exclusive 
focus on enforcement or the potential for targeted harassment. The clear 
lesson from these experiences was the importance of involving residents
early in Weed and Seed planning, providing residents with substantial
program authority, and nurturing higher levels of interaction and trust
between public-sector representatives and those they serve. The seeding
component and community policing were typically the intended means for
building community trust and encouraging participation. In the initial
concept, it was assumed these elements would follow intensified
enforcement. In practice, it became apparent to many Weed and Seed
organizers that the target areas had to become involved at the outset and a
comprehensive strategic plan was needed to bring this about.

Even when target areas had strong preexisting community organizational
infrastructures, considerable resources were needed to effectively catalyze
resident participation and increase the organizations' scope of operations
and outreach. Weed and Seed sites that employed a bottom-up, grassroots 
approach tended to build trust among residents and community-based
leaders and enhanced community capacity for crime prevention and
reduction and social development.

Weed and Seed also provided a forum for leadership development among
residents. In Salt Lake City, for example, a resident took the lead in the
initial Weed and Seed grant application and played an instrumental role 
in early program implementation. In the North and South Manatee target 
areas, charismatic individual leaders emerged who essentially ran the safe
havens as volunteers and directed a variety of community activities. For
all sites, it remained a central organizational challenge to continuously 
develop and broaden leadership to implement and sustain the Weed and
Seed strategy.

Approach to law enforcement

Most sites developed and implemented coherent law enforcement
strategies that responded to local conditions and incorporated stronger
patrols at the street level with some degree of higher level interagency
cooperation. Law enforcement approaches across the target areas typically
included increased police presence through additional staffing and
overtime, with the majority of sites assigning officers dedicated to the
target area, and increased special operations for targeted law enforcement,
especially for drug-related and violent crime.

Multiagency task forces. The sites developed varying degrees of increased
local, State, and Federal coordination, whether in targeting offenders,
narcotics operations, prosecution, or probation/parole. Local responses
ranged from increasing communication through monthly meetings to
creating formal interagency and multijurisdictional task force operations
housed at the same facility. Although multiagency task forces 
concentrated on the target area, they pursued drug cases across
jurisdictional lines. Consequently, the benefits of these efforts extended
beyond the target areas, particularly when the focus was on high-level
drug dealers who controlled large operations. Task force missions varied
primarily according to the nature of crime in the target areas and
preexisting law enforcement operations, so the Weed and Seed task forces
complemented existing efforts.

The community policing bridge. The implementation of Weed and 
Seed enabled most sites to expand or strengthen community policing
efforts or institute new programs; better concentrate, coordinate, and
integrate efforts within police departments; and increase integration of law
enforcement with seeding type activities. Community policing initiatives
such as nuisance abatement, landlord programs, graffiti eradication, code
enforcement, and neighborhood cleanups helped improve property
maintenance and neighborhood environments. Officers participated in a
wide range of youth recreation and education programs in the target areas.
Such activities engaged local youths in constructive activity, provided
positive role models for the youths, and built community relations.

The assignment of dedicated officers to the Weed and Seed target areas
was important in building relationships with residents and in aiding
enforcement through better knowledge of the neighborhood, better
intelligence, and the ability to operate proactively. In Shreveport, for
example, many residents knew the four dedicated "bumble bees"--the
bicycle patrol officers in their yellow shirts and black shorts--and, in
Pittsburgh, residents lobbied to keep one of their Weed and Seed officers
from being reassigned to another district. One police lieutenant in Las
Vegas would find jobs for gang members, and, occasionally, he would
drive them to their jobs or check with their supervisors to see how the
youths were doing on the job. Although weeding has typically involved
less resident participation than has seeding, communication between
residents and the police seems to have increased across sites. 

In addition to enhancing community policing efforts, Weed and Seed 
provided a vehicle for mobilizing residents to participate in crime
prevention and, in some cases, for creating effective structures for
community authority and leadership. Responses ranged from increasing
neighborhood watches, to community meetings, to a citizens' advisory
committee that provided guidance on law enforcement priorities.

The U.S. Attorney's role. At the Federal level, the U.S. Attorney's two 
potential roles were to serve as:

o A coordinator or "people mover" for Weed and Seed operations. For 
example, when the U.S. Attorney chaired steering committee meetings and
used resources of the Office of the Attorney General in the process, this
served as a stimulus to other partners.

o A key player in multijurisdictional task forces when the focus was on
high-level drug distribution and sales. This helped to integrate, coordinate,
and focus local and Federal enforcement efforts.

In Las Vegas, for example, the U.S. Attorney's Office played both roles
during the early stages of program implementation. The role played by the
U.S. Attorney in each area might be strong or weak, depending on the
personalities and motivations of the partners involved. 

Prosecution. Overall, prosecution has been a relatively weak link in Weed
and Seed due to various institutional, political, and judicial issues. In the
majority of sites, there was no special Federal or local prosecution or
tracking of Weed and Seed cases except for efforts conducted by joint
Federal/State/local task forces. In general, district attorneys operate with
limited resources and in politicized environments that act as barriers to the 
provision of the additional resources needed for local prosecution of Weed
and Seed cases. Some local prosecutors said although weeding activities
generated more criminal complaints, their office budget was not increased
to hire new prosecutors or to cover the operating costs that would be added 
by enhanced prosecution of Part II or quality-of-life offenses. 

At the local level, police departments and prosecutors often work through
different political systems. Most police departments are city based and 
receive their local and Federal funding through their city council. That
process is fairly well defined in most cities. Prosecutors, on the other hand,
often are county based and receive their funding from the county. This
funding process often encompasses multiple municipal priorities and 
other competing political considerations. The role of Federal prosecution
also varied from no or few Federal prosecutions to substantially increased
Federal, State, and local cooperation. 

Approach to seeding

One of the greatest challenges for the sites was to develop an appropriate
seeding strategy with community members that targeted Weed and Seed
resources most effectively and leveraged existing public and private 
resources. Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding
programs, such as safe havens, in itself was more difficult for most sites
than implementing their weeding programs, with some sites initially
stumbling at this level of program execution.

Seeding was inherently a broader and more complex task, both in
development of goals and strategies and from a practical organizational
standpoint. Seeding efforts involved engaging participation and
commitment from public- and private-sector organizations, whereas
weeding had a relatively clearer mission, operating within more
established hierarchical structures of law enforcement and criminal justice
organizations. Due to the broader and less defined nature of seeding,
relatively more time was needed for planning, relationship building, and
gaining consensus and commitment from the wide range of participants
who shaped this domain. Seeding, by its nature, is resistant to short-term
fixes designed to produce observable, overnight results. 

The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to build their programs around
existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. Seeding
program partners and providers who were interviewed emphasized how
Weed and Seed increased coordination and communication links across
neighborhood groups and other agencies. Weed and Seed sites reflected
different emphases in funding local seeding programs--with varying
degrees of program breadth, depth, and duration. In several sites,
providing communities with a voice in the seeding grant award process
was critical to gaining community participation and trust. 

Seeding initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites can be clustered as
follows, in order of predominance:

o Prevention and intervention programs for youths that included
afterschool programs, safe havens, recreation and sports programs, skills
and employment training, job development, and health and substance
abuse-related programs.

o Neighborhood restoration, such as neighborhood cleanups and code
enforcement.

o Community building and community development initiatives.

o Adult employment and economic advancement programs, such as
computer, Internet, and educational training.

o Family support services targeted to adults.

o Community economic development.

Impact on crime trends

Across the evaluation sites, crime patterns varied widely. As exhibits 
3a and 3b show, in nine target areas available data allowed a comparison
of the number of Part I crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) in the year prior to program
implementation to the second year of Weed and Seed. Six of these areas
showed declines: Stowe Village in Hartford, 46 percent; Crawford-Roberts
(one neighborhood within the Hill District) in Pittsburgh, 24 percent;
North Manatee, 18 percent; the Shreveport target area, 11 percent; the
Central District in Seattle, 10 percent; and West Las Vegas, 6 percent.
Three target areas experienced increases in Part I crimes: South Manatee,
2 percent; Meadows Village in Las Vegas, 9 percent; and Salt Lake City,
14 percent. A comparable estimate was not possible for the Akron target
area due to insufficient data.

During this same time period, in seven target areas--Hartford, Pittsburgh
(Crawford-Roberts), North Manatee, South Manatee, Shreveport, West
Las Vegas, and Salt Lake City--Part I crime rates declined more or
increased less than in the rest of the city or county.

A relationship appears to exist between crime trends and the concentration
of program resources in sites that had the largest increases or decreases in
crime. Hartford, for example, has the smallest target area in terms of
population and area, while Salt Lake City has the largest single target area
in square miles and, along with Akron, the smallest level of Federal Weed
and Seed funding. (See exhibit 2.)

Finally, changes in the drug arrest rates appear to follow the same general
pattern as the changes in the Part I crime rate. For example, among those
six target areas for which there are arrest data, the four with decreases 
in Part I crime from the year prior to Weed and Seed through the second
year of implementation (i.e., Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and
Shreveport) all experienced initial high rates of drug arrests--suggesting an
initial period of intense weeding activities--followed by declining drug
arrest rates. Assuming the level of enforcement as measured by police
presence has remained somewhat constant, this trend reflects success in
reducing drug activity. However, the Salt Lake City target area and South
Manatee both experienced large increases in the number of drug arrests in
1997 compared with 1996, suggesting perhaps these sites had not yet
succeeded in reducing the level of drug activity in the target areas. In the
case of Salt Lake City, an influx of gang activity is an important
contextual factor, raising the question of whether the crime rate would
have been even higher there without Weed and Seed.

Assessing the Weed and Seed strategy

The evaluation investigated two major questions: What factors appeared to
help or inhibit successful implementation of Weed and Seed; and did
detectable changes in outcome measures take place as a consequence of
Weed and Seed?[1]

Effects on crime and public perceptions

Regarding the specific survey-reported pattern of residents' perceptions of
crime, public safety, and police performance, the target areas cluster into
three groups:

o North Manatee and Pittsburgh exhibited substantial evidence of changes
in residents' perceptions across multiple outcome measures, including the
severity of crime and police effectiveness in controlling crime.

o Akron, Hartford, and Seattle exhibited some evidence of changes in
residents' perceptions on selected crime dimensions, either drug-related
crime (Akron and Seattle) or violent and gang-related crime (Hartford).

o Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, and Shreveport exhibited little evidence of
changes in residents' perceptions of general public safety or the severity of
specific types of crime in the neighborhood.

Based on the pattern of findings on the rate of Part I crimes as well as 
responses to crime-related survey questions, the target areas fall into four
categories, first according to the evidence of reduced Part I crimes and
then (within each category) according to the evidence of improved public
perceptions:

o Pittsburgh and Hartford showed strong evidence of reduced Part I crimes
and improved public perceptions on crime-related measures (e.g.,
reduction of fear of crime, public safety).

o Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport showed substantial
evidence of reduced Part I crimes. (North Manatee also showed improved 
public perceptions on multiple crime-related measures.)

o Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), and Manatee/Sarasota
(South Manatee) showed some evidence of reduced Part I crimes. (Akron
and Seattle also showed improved public perceptions.)

o Salt Lake City and Las Vegas (Meadows Village) showed no evidence
of reduced Part I crimes. 

Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed

Of course, these findings must be interpreted in terms of local
circumstances and program approaches. What factors appear to have
promoted successful implementation of the program and thus have
promoted the achievement of the program's intended results? To address
this question, the evaluation considered site characteristics and program
features.

Community setting. Preexisting community features may make Weed and
Seed easier or more difficult to operate effectively. Important factors
included the strength of the social and institutional infrastructure (an
established network of community-based organizations and community
leaders), the severity of crime problems, geographical advantages favoring
economic development, and transiency of the community population. The
last factor is particularly important. Rapid turnover, as in the case of
Meadows Village in Las Vegas, undermines the crime-fighting effect of
community policing and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to generate
the ongoing community involvement that is a key element in the Weed
and Seed concept.

Program design. The mix of weeding and seeding activities and the
sequencing of these components appear to be important factors in gaining
community support for the program. Important positive factors included
early seeding, sustained weeding, high-level task forces combined with
community policing, and an active prosecutorial role.

Concentration of funds. As is to be expected, sites appeared to have
greater impact on crime rates if they concentrated their program resources
on smaller population groups, especially if they could similarly channel
other public funds and also leverage private funds. The important factors
included funding "intensity" (applying funding to a narrowly targeted
group of residents in a small geographical area) and channeling and
leveraging other funds.

Leadership and partnership. A less tangible ingredient that characterized
the more successful programs was the active and constructive leadership
of key individuals. By its very nature, Weed and Seed places a great
premium on effective coordination of groups with different organizational
missions, responding to different constituencies. To establish effective
working relationships among these organizations required personal energy
and initiative and an organizational structure that facilitated interaction.
For example, those sites that based weeding and seeding staff in the same
facility tended to develop better cooperation and coordination between the
two program components.

The most effective implementation strategies were those that relied on
bottom-up, participatory decision-making approaches, especially when
combined with efforts to build capacity and partnership among local
organizations. This required a long-term perspective about the program
and its potential to bring about community change. Such sites, including
some that achieved substantial crime reductions within the time period
analyzed, have established a stronger foundation and more sustainable
basis for further community-targeted initiatives.

Policy implications

In charting the future direction of Weed and Seed, policymakers have a
number of strategic choices to make. These include designating sites for
continued funding, selecting sites for new awards, and allocating funds
among participating sites over time. (See "Where is Weed and Seed
going?") The key policy question is how to use program funds most
effectively in ways that make the greatest long-term contributions to
controlling crime and promoting a safe living environment for residents.
Other nonfunding considerations include improved coordination among
Federal, State, and local public and private partners.

The experience of the eight sites evaluated suggests Weed and Seed has
affected the target areas through either (or both) of two avenues. The first, 
program effectiveness, relates to the specific initiatives that focus on law
enforcement and crime prevention. These activities, both on the weeding
and seeding sides, appeared to have varying degrees of success in reducing
crime and improving perceptions of public safety. The second, community
mobilization, is the process in which Weed and Seed provides a catalyst
for greater involvement of neighborhood residents and community-based
organizations. As mentioned earlier, some sites were more predisposed
than others to participatory problem-solving arrangements by virtue of
their preexisting infrastructure and active leadership by respected
individuals and established organizations.

These two mechanisms of change are clearly interrelated. The experience 
of the sites studied here showed:

o The Weed and Seed program has been a strong stimulant to community
coalition building. Public and private organizations came together, for the
first time in a number of sites, to develop interventions that would have a
broad base of support. It seems clear these developments would not have
occurred in the absence of Weed and Seed influence. To maximize impact
on crime rates, Weed and Seed should seek the highest feasible
concentration of funds in the program sites. Given the annual funding
constraint of the congressional appropriations process, this implies a more
selective process in choosing sites to receive new awards and/or limiting
the number of years that ongoing sites receive program funding. Having a
concentrated and focused strategic effort is also an important means of
increasing the intensity of the intervention. Increasing coordination with
other Federal funding sources is another key element. Furthermore, the
evaluation finds that Weed and Seed funding has acted as a significant
catalyst for general community revitalization efforts and that most target
area communities have undertaken programs and created beneficial
community organizations that likely would not have come into existence
without Weed and Seed.

o In selecting sites for new program funding, Weed and Seed should place
its funding priority on sites with geographically small target areas and with
favorable community settings and program designs. This is more likely to
produce demonstrable successes. In turn, this should increase potential
spinoffs from the Weed and Seed target area to other areas in the site.

o The Executive Office for Weed and Seed should expand its provision of
technical assistance to the funded sites. The lessons learned from the more
successful sites--and the less successful ones--on these issues are, to a
large degree, widely applicable. New sites should receive the benefit of
this experience. This seems especially important in promoting the
partnership arrangements that have characterized the more successful
programs examined in this research.

Note

1. The most rigorous means of establishing the counterfactual is an
experimental design in which the intervention, in this case Operation
Weed and Seed, is not implemented among a randomly selected set of
subjects, in this case the sites. Such a design was infeasible in this context.
Another approach would have been to match each evaluation site with a
comparison site of similar baseline characteristics. At an earlier stage of
this evaluation, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Institute for 
Social Analysis identified such comparison sites and included them in the
1995 survey of community residents and other baseline data collection
efforts. Soon thereafter, however, NIJ and Abt Associates concluded the
comparison sites were not sufficiently comparable to their corresponding
target areas in demographic characteristics and crime trends. The matched
site approach was not pursued further. See Terence Dunworth, et al.,
Overview of Institute for Social Analysis National Evaluation Baseline
Data and Implications of the Data for the Weed and Seed Impact
Evaluation, Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., January 1996.

-------------------------------

What is Weed and Seed

Weed and Seed is a strategy to mobilize and coordinate resources in the
targeted communities rather than simply a program or mechanism to fund
local activities that share no collective aim. Weed and Seed is an
"incubator for social change" to stabilize the conditions in high crime
communities and to promote community restoration.[a] The key
components of this strategy are as follows:

o Enhanced coordination--Coordinated analysis and planning of local
problems and strategies to address them.

o Weeding--Concentrated and enhanced law enforcement efforts to 
identify, arrest, and prosecute violent offenders, drug traffickers, and other
criminals operating in the target areas. The objective is to remove
criminals from the target areas.

o Community policing--Proactive police/community engagement and
problem solving in which police officers are assigned to specified
geographic locations. By gaining the growing trust and support of the
community, police and prosecutors engage residents and businesses as
problem-solving partners in the law enforcement effort. This effort is the
bridge between weeding and seeding.[b] 

o Seeding--Human services--including afterschool, weekend, and summer
youth activities; adult literacy classes; and parental counseling--and
neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter further crime.

The Federal oversight responsibility for each participating site rests with
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the corresponding district. This
decentralized arrangement was intended to reinforce local participation
while at the same time providing a more hands-on Federal role--in
particular, to enable Federal prosecutorial action to be more responsive to
local law enforcement initiatives. Other components of each local
organization's structure generally include:

o The Weed and Seed steering committee, which establishes operational
goals, designs and develops programs, guides implementation, and
assesses program achievements.

o The weeding committee, which plans and monitors the law enforcement
efforts, including interdiction and prosecution.

o The seeding committee, which plans and monitors the prevention,
intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration efforts.

o The Weed and Seed program staff, who operate and maintain daily
program activities.

Each site is required to create at least one "safe haven," a highly visible
and accessible multiservice center where youths and adults can receive
needed services, develop relationships, enhance personal skills, and 
find opportunities to be productive and successful.[c] Special effort is
made to keep these safe havens secure from drug trafficking and other
criminal activities.

The full National Evaluation Research Report is available in print and
online. The eight case studies are available online.

Notes

a. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Operation Weed and Seed,
Implementation Manual, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, Executive Office for Weed and Seed: 1-3 and
1-4.

b. The Executive Office for Weed and Seed regards community policing
as "increasing police visibility and developing cooperative relationships
between the police and citizenry in target areas." The associated
techniques include foot patrols, police ministations, nuisance abatement,
victim referrals to support services, and community relations activities, in
which the community is encouraged to undertake such initiatives as
neighborhood watches, citizen marches and rallies, drug-free zones, and
graffiti removal. See Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Operation
Weed and Seed, Implementation Manual: 9-6.

c. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Weed and Seed Fiscal Year 1998
Program Guide and Application Kit for New Sites, Attachment 2,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Executive Office for Weed and Seed, 1998: 2-1. In its literature, the
Executive Office for Weed and Seed describes safe havens as an integral
part of a "risk factor and protective factor" approach to crime prevention.
This is viewed as the counterpart to comprehensive community-based
disease prevention programs, which have operated effectively in the public
health arena. In the Weed and Seed context, risk factors, those that make
an individual susceptible to criminal behavior, must be identified and
addressed. At the same time, protective factors, those that serve to counter
or neutralize risks, must be enhanced.
 
-------------------------------

Study Methodology

The National Evaluation of operation Weed and Seed was designed to gain
the perspective of target area residents in eight sites, to assess the trends in
arrests and crime in those areas, and to draw from the personal experiences
of participants in the seeding programs. The evaluation included a wide
variety of activities at each site as follows:

o A review of funding applications and other significant program
documents. 

o Individual interviews with key program administrators, senior law
enforcement staff, managers of seeding organizations and activities,
service providers (both current and former), and community leaders. 

o Analysis of automated, incident-level crime and arrest records provided
by the local police departments. 

o Group interviews with seeding program participants. 

o Resident surveys in target areas, conducted in June 1995 by the Institute
for Social Analysis and in December 1997 by Abt Associates Inc. 

Resident surveys. To a large extent, both surveys focused on the same
issues--resident perceptions of crime, public safety, police performance
and activities, quality of life, and awareness of the Weed and Seed
program. There were, however, some differences in the methods used in
the two surveys. The 1995 survey consisted of 1,531 in-person interviews,
while the 1,995 interviews in 1997 were conducted by telephone. In
addition, the 1997 survey consisted of fewer questions than the 1995
survey. The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a
shorter questionnaire was based on the difficulties experienced in 1995 in
completing the targeted number of interviews per site.

To analyze arrest and crime patterns in the 10 Weed and Seed target areas,
the research team requested computerized incident-level data from law
enforcement agencies, including basic facts about each arrest, crime (e.g.,
when and where the crime was committed), and associated criminal
charges. Because the primary interest was in arrests that were made and
crimes that occurred in the target areas, procedures were developed to
identify those arrests and crimes from data files provided by each
jurisdiction. In most cases, the procedures involved geocoding the address
where the arrest was made or where the crime was committed.

The focus has also been on the seven Part I crimes--homicide, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Although
these crimes account for only one segment of the overall crime problem
(ignoring, for example, order maintenance and other crimes closely
associated with quality-of-life issues), there are standard definitions of
these crimes that all law enforcement agencies follow, thus allowing for
site-to-site comparisons. Given that controlling drug trafficking and
drug-related crime is one of the key Weed and Seed objectives, the
researchers also focused on drug arrests. 

Onsite observation of programs. Interviews were conducted with seeding
program participants in each site (excluding Akron, Ohio) to gain their
perspectives. Evaluation staff visited 4 to 6 programs in each of the sites
and conducted interviews with groups of 7 to 10 people. These interviews
were not intended to measure outcomes of the programs that were visited;
rather, they were designed to learn the perceived benefits and drawbacks
of the programs from the individuals who participated in them. Long-term
effects of these programs on the lives of the program participants cannot
be deduced from the interviews conducted.

The seeding programs that were visited fall under four general categories:
youth recreation and education, community building, employment and
training, and violence prevention. Programs visited included Police
Activities (or Athletic) Leagues, Boys and Girls Club Athletic Programs,
Safe Haven After-School Programs, and Youth Enrichment Programs.
Based on the comments of the participants interviewed, the seeding
programs appeared to provide services that would otherwise not have been
available in the target areas. Most of the interviewees also indicated
participation in the seeding programs has been a positive experience that
helped them feel more secure emotionally, physically, or both. The general
themes that emerged focused on providing additional structure and
discipline in the lives of target area youths and providing opportunities and
assistance for adults to work toward personal and professional growth.

-------------------------------

Where Is Weed and Seed Going?

Beginning in 1996, the Weed and Seed program altered its paradigm and
approach to site longevity and funding levels. After funding 36 sites as
part of a 3-year demonstration at approximately $750,000 per site, funding
was extended to additional sites at a lower level. By 1997, Weed and Seed
funding was offered to almost 120 sites, typically at $250,000 per year. At
this new, lower annual funding level per site, Weed and Seed appropriated
funds to 176 sites in 1998. In 1999 the program grew to approximately
200 sites, despite a drop in total national funding.

In fiscal year 2000, new policies will require the original 36 sites to submit
comprehensive reapplications to be eligible for funding. Subsequently,
every site must reapply after 5 years of continuous funding. This new
approach is consistent with the basic Weed and Seed strategy of pursuing
effectiveness through coordination and leveraging of additional public and
private resources (in many cases, several times the amount of Weed and
Seed funding).

Additional resources sites are urged to investigate include other U.S.
Department of Justice funding streams (e.g., Local Law Enforcement
Block Grants, Byrne Formula Grants, Juvenile Justice Formula Funds,
Asset Forfeiture Funds, COPS hiring awards) as well as other Federal,
State, local, and private resources. The long-range objective is for
recipient sites to use the Weed and Seed funds to develop successful,
self-sustaining community-based interventions.

Consistent with the program's emphasis on flexibility and customer
orientation, sites are given considerable latitude to develop programs with
the Executive Office for Weed and Seed grant funds and to request
training and technical assistance. Increasingly, experienced sites are asked
to provide peer-to-peer training to show new and developing sites what to
do and what to avoid to develop successful local programs. Sites are
encouraged to organize regional training sessions to facilitate these
exchanges and coordinate with other Federal agency partners.

In addition to providing funding directly to sites, Weed and Seed supports
many multisite activities. For example, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy
Drug Demand Reduction Task Force and other military partners, Weed
and Seed supports the implementation of the Drug Education for Youth
(DEFY) program in Weed and Seed communities. Weed and Seed DEFY
sites increased from 3 in 1996 to 60 in 1999.

-------------------------------

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of
the U.S. Department of Justice. 

-------------------------------

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D., is managing vice president and project 
director at Abt Associates Inc. Gregory Mills, Ph.D., is a senior 
associate at Abt Associates Inc. The research for this study was supported
under grant number 95-DD-BX-0134 by the National Institute of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

-------------------------------

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

-------------------------------

This document, the full cross site analysis, the eight case studies, and other
NIJ publications can be found at and downloaded from the NIJ Web site
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).

NCJ 175685