Title: National Evaluation of Weed and Seed Cross-Site Analysis. Series: Research Report Author(s): Terence Dunworth, Gregory Mills, Gary Cordner, and Jack Greene Published: National Institute of Justice, July 1999 Subject(s): Drug law enforcement, drug abuse prevention and education, community policing, crime mapping, police manpower development, and problem oriented policing 86 pages 206,000 bytes ------------------------------- This is an ASCII plain-text file. To view this document in its graphic format, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file available from this Web site or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851-3420 (877-712-9279 for TTY users). ------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice National Evaluation of Weed & Seed Cross-Site Analysis Research Report ------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Janet Reno Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher Associate Attorney General Laurie Robinson Assistant Attorney General Noel Brennan Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jeremy Travis Director, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij ------------------------------- National Evaluation of Weed & Seed Cross-Site Analysis Terence Dunworth Gregory Mills Gary Cordner Jack Greene July 1999 NCJ 176358 ------------------------------- National Institute of Justice Jeremy Travis Director Steven Edwards Program Monitor Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by Abt Associates Inc., under contract #95-DD-BX-0134. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. ------------------------------- The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. ------------------------------- Foreword Weed and Seed represents a collaborative effort of Federal, State, and local government agencies and private organizations to improve the quality of life in targeted high-crime areas of American cities. Begun in 1991, the Weed and Seed strategy appears to be deceptively simple but is, in reality, extremely complex and ambitious: drug trafficking, gang activity, and violence are carefully targeted for intervention and enforcement and community policing activities, human services programs, and neighborhood improvement initiatives are introduced to infuse new life into the community and deter future lawbreaking. As the research branch of the Department of Justice, NIJ is charged with evaluating major federally sponsored crime control initiatives. As this report makes clear, evaluating programs such as Weed and Seed poses its own set of challenges. The goal is to provide independent, objective data that communities can use to modify programs or create new approaches. At the same time, NIJ seeks to understand the nexus of crime in its community context, expanding the knowledge base in this critical area. Building on an initial evaluation of the program's implementation, NIJ then set out to assess the impact of a variety of interventions in a variety of communities with a variety of measures. Evaluators asked basic questions such as: How well did the overall Weed and Seed strategy live up to program expectations? What elements were strongest, where did they succeed or fail, and what lessons can we learn from the experience over the life of the program? Equally important, the evaluation sought to shed light on how cities and communities institutionalized their Weed and Seed programs--to what extent can communities continue the programs, interagency task forces, and organizational partnerships that were developed once official Weed and Seed funding ends? To help other communities who may want to adopt a similar strategy, evaluators asked more questions: What are the indicators of whether Weed and Seed might take root in a community? Conversely, what are the factors within a community that discourage successful implementation of Weed and Seed? Most important, the study sought to measure what impression, if any, Weed and Seed left on the program participants and community residents, the intended beneficiaries of the program. To find answers, eight cities were chosen for the national evaluation of the Weed and Seed strategy. This document synthesizes the research findings and lessons of the eight case study cities (which are available separately). As expected, the findings vary from city to city and from target site to target site (even within the same city or community). Each Weed and Seed site had its own successes. Every site had political, institutional, situational, and funding challenges to overcome. These experiences, taken together, suggest avenues for both the program and researchers to explore and ideas about how to create more successful sites in the future. These research findings provide us with reason for optimism about a comprehensive community-based approach to neighborhood safety. They will serve as guideposts to future programs designed to prevent crime and revitalize communities. Jeremy Travis Director National Institute of Justice Acknowledgments This cross-site report draws heavily on the eight companion case studies for Akron, Hartford, Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Shreveport. Consequently, a considerable debt is owed to those whose cooperation and support made the case studies possible. Too numerous to name here, they include U.S. Attorneys and staff, FBI personnel, city officials, and police department command and line officers. Perhaps most important were the Weed and Seed staff in each city and the neighborhood organizations whose efforts give community revitalization a fighting chance. We also appreciate the assistance of contributing staff and their skills in producing this report. Those individuals include: George Bridges, Timothy Bynum, Scott Decker, Jennifer Frank, Kristen Jacoby, Zachary Johnson, Ryan Kling, Thomas Rich, and Cheryl Roberts. Throughout the evaluation, we have benefited from the support and understanding of the two Federal agencies that we consider our partners as well as our clients. Steve Rickman and Bob Samuels, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Executive Office for Weed and Seed, were unflagging in their willingness to provide information, respond to questions, critique observations, comment on reports, and generally smooth our path to the Weed and Seed sites. At NIJ, Jeff Ross and Steve Edwards were constant supporters and facilitators of our work. Of course, none of these people bear any responsibility for whatever flaws this work may have. We were able to manage that aspect of things without help. Table of Contents Executive Summary Organizational roles and community engagement Grantee organization Steering committees Building trust and community capacity Approach to law enforcement Approach to seeding Crime trends Community survey Participant interviews Conclusions Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed Community setting Program design Concentration of funds Leadership and partnership Strategic choices Note Chapter 1 Background and Objectives of Operation Weed and Seed The Weed and Seed strategy Organizational structure The U.S. Attorney's Office The Weed and Seed steering committee The weeding committee The seeding committee Weed and Seed program staff Number of sites and Federal funding Design of the National Weed and Seed evaluation Evaluation sites Akron, Ohio Hartford, Connecticut Las Vegas, Nevada Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Salt Lake City, Utah Seattle, Washington Shreveport, Louisiana Evaluation activities Notes Chapter 2 Program Implementation Program framework Grantees and funding levels Program goals Demonstration sites Hartford Las Vegas Manatee/Sarasota Pittsburgh Seattle Shreveport Officially recognized sites Akron Salt Lake City Organizational roles, community engagement, planning, and evaluation Role of the steering committee and other key decisionmaking bodies Public agency participation at the steering committee level Community participation at the steering committee level Role of the grantee organization Grantee institutional issues Police department Mayor's office Community-based organizations Engaging the community in building capacity Building community capacity Program planning and local evaluation Outside technical assistance and resources Data collection by the program External local evaluation Approach to weeding and community policing Multiagency task forces Prosecution Community policing and resident involvement in law enforcement and crime prevention Approach to seeding Developing a seeding strategy Seeding program partnerships Seeding funding strategies Types of programming Prevention and intervention programs for youths Neighborhood beautification Community building/community development initiatives Adult employment/economic advancement programs Family support services targeted to adults Community economic development facilitation Notes Chapter 3 Analysis of Law Enforcement Data Arrest trends in the target areas Crime trends in the target areas Possible contributing factors Crime trends in nontarget areas Preexisting crime trends in the target areas Program intensity Arrest volume Notes Chapter 4 Perceptions of Community Residents and Program Participants Distribution of respondents by age and length of neighborhood residence Personal safety and neighborhood satisfaction Severity of neighborhood crime Victimization in the neighborhood Police effectiveness and responsiveness Awareness of Weed and Seed General neighborhood quality of life General assessment Participant interviews Youth recreation and education programs Community-building programs Employment and training programs Violence prevention programs Participant suggestions for program improvement Summary overview Notes Chapter 5 Assessing the Weed and Seed Strategy Possible overstatement of program results Possible understatement of program results Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed Community setting Strength of the social and institutional infrastructure Severity of crime problems Locational advantages favoring economic development Transiency of the community population Program design Concentration of funds Funding "intensity" Channeling and leveraging other funds Leadership and partnership Notes Chapter 6 Policy Implications Program effectiveness and community mobilization Selecting sites and allocating funds Appendix 1 1995 Community Survey: Basic Interview Data Questionnaire Appendix 2 1997 Community Survey: Basic Interview Data Questionnaire Appendix 3 Significant Differences Between 1995 and 1997 in Survey Results for Nonelderly, Long-Term Residents Exhibits 1.1 Operation Weed and Seed: Number of Sites and Annual Funding 1.2 Target Area Characteristics for the Evaluation Sites 2.1Funding Designation for Weed and Seed Sites 2.2 Disposition of Hartford Weed and Seed Arrests 3.1 Part 1 Arrests Before and During Weed and Seed 3.2 Drug Arrests Before and During Weed and Seed 3.3 Part 1 Crime Before and During Weed and Seed 3.4 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: Target Areas 3.5 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: Non-Weed and Seed Areas 3.6 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: Target Areas 3.7 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: Non-Weed and Seed Areas 4.1 Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age and Length of Residence in Target Area 4.2 Survey Responses on General Neighborhood Quality of Life Evidence of Intended Changes in Measurable Crime-Related Outcomes Executive Summary Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious Federal, State, and local attempt to improve the quality of life in targeted high-crime areas of America's cities. First launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1991, the program is designed to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime and to provide a safe environment in which residents can live, work, and raise their families. These are, by themselves, conventional law enforcement goals. What makes Weed and Seed distinctive and innovative is that it couples community-focused human services programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives with intensified geographically targeted law enforcement efforts. Weed and Seed is administered by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed within the U.S. Department of Justice. Weed and Seed is considered a strategy, not a program. That is, Weed and Seed is a means to mobilize resources in coordinated efforts, not simply a mechanism to fund local activities that share no collective aim. The key components of this strategy are as follows: o Weeding--law enforcement efforts to remove violent offenders, drug traffickers, and other criminals from the target areas. o Seeding--human services and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter further crime. o Community policing--proactive police-community engagement and problem solving, in which police personnel are accountable for specified geographic locations, regarded as "the bridge between weeding and seeding." The number of sites served by Weed and Seed has grown rapidly since the program's inception and currently stands at 200 sites. Eight sites participated in this national evaluation: Akron, Ohio; Hartford, Connecticut; Las Vegas, Nevada; Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; and Shreveport, Louisiana. Each of these sites had distinctive crime problems. However, they all shared high rates of violent crime related to drug trafficking and drug use. The national evaluation incorporated a wide variety of activities that included a review of funding applications and other significant program documents; individual interviews with key program administrators, senior law enforcement staff, managers of seeding activities, service providers (both current and former), and community leaders; analysis of automated, incident-level records provided by the local police departments on crimes and arrests; group interviews with participants in seeding programs; and two surveys of residents in target areas conducted in 1995 by the Institute for Social Analysis and in 1997 by Abt Associates Inc. Organizational roles and community engagement Grantee organization. The grantee and its staff assigned to the Weed and Seed effort were among the most important factors in successful program implementation at the eight evaluation sites. Sites without sufficient dedicated staff resources, from both grantees and other participating agencies, suffered in program implementation, oversight, and cohesion. Steering committees. The role and composition of steering committees varied among sites. Some steering committees were dominated by public-sector representatives, whereas others were more heavily represented and guided by community residents. For several sites, the steering committee or Weed and Seed resident bodies provided a critical means of resident participation in program decisionmaking. Building trust and community capacity. Several of the evaluation sites encountered early community resistance to Weed and Seed because residents were concerned that the exclusive focus would be on enforcement or targeted harassment. The clear lesson from these experiences was the importance of involving residents early in Weed and Seed planning, providing residents with substantial program authority, and earning their trust. The seeding program component was typically the means through which community trust was built and participation fulfilled. To implement Weed and Seed, considerable resources were devoted to effectively catalyze participation and increase capacity--even when sites had a strong preexisting community organizational infrastructure. Weed and Seed sites that employed a bottom-up, grassroots approach built trust among residents and community-based leaders and enhanced community capacity. Approach to law enforcement Law enforcement approaches across the eight sites typically included: o Increased police presence through additional personnel hours and overtime, with the majority of sites assigning dedicated officers to the target area. o Increased special operations for targeted law enforcement. o Varying degrees of increased local, State, and Federal coordination, whether in targeting offenders, narcotics operations, prosecution, or probation/parole. Local responses ranged from increased communications via monthly meetings to the creation of formal interagency and multijurisdictional task force operations housed at the same facility. o Greater concentration, coordination, and integration of efforts within police departments than before Weed and Seed and increased integration of law enforcement with seeding-type activities. o Expanded or strengthened community policing efforts or instituted new programs. o Mobilized residents who participate in crime prevention, in some cases creating effective structures for community authority and leadership. Responses ranged from increasing neighborhood watches, holding community meetings, and receiving guidance on law enforcement priorities from a citizens' advisory committee. Although weeding typically involves less resident participation than seeding, communications between residents and the police seem to have increased across sites. Overall, prosecution has been a relatively weak link in Weed and Seed due to various institutional, political, and judicial issues. In the majority of sites, there was no special Federal or local prosecution or tracking of Weed and Seed cases. In many sites, however, communication and coordination between law enforcement personnel and prosecutors improved. Approach to seeding Among the greatest challenges for Weed and Seed sites was to develop an appropriate seeding strategy with community members that effectively used Weed and Seed resources and leveraged existing community resources. Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding programs, such as safe havens, were more difficult for most sites than implementing weeding programs, with some sites initially stumbling at this stage. Seeding was inherently a broader and more complex task, both in the development of goals and strategies and in practical organization. Seeding efforts required engaging participation and commitment from numerous types of organizations, whereas weeding had a relatively clearer mission, operating within the more established hierarchical structures of law enforcement and criminal justice organizations. Due to the broader and less defined nature of seeding, more time was needed for planning, relationship-building, and gaining consensus and commitment from the wide range of participants who shaped this domain. The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to build their programs around existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. Seeding program partners and providers emphasized how Weed and Seed increased coordination and communication links across neighborhood groups and other agencies. Weed and Seed sites reflected different emphases in funding local seeding programs--with varying degrees of program breadth, depth, and duration. In several sites, providing communities with authority in the seeding grant award process was critical to gaining community participation and trust. Youth programs were the primary focus of seeding activity, followed by basic neighborhood beautification efforts. Seeding initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites can be clustered in the following order of predominance: o Prevention/intervention programs for youths, with a strong mix of programs. o Neighborhood beautification, such as community cleanups and code enforcement. o Community building and community development initiatives. o Adult employment and economic advancement programs. o Family support services aimed at adults. o Community economic development facilitation. Crime trends Across the eight sites, crime patterns varied widely. In comparing the number of Part 1 crimes in the year prior to Weed and Seed implementation with the second year of Weed and Seed, five target areas had double-digit percentage decreases (Stowe Village in Hartford, 46 percent; Crawford-Roberts in Pittsburgh, 24 percent; North Manatee, 18 percent; the Shreveport target area, 11 percent; and the Central District in Seattle, 10 percent).[1] One target area (West Las Vegas) had a single-digit decrease (6 percent), and three target areas experienced increases in Part 1 crime (South Manatee, 2 percent; Meadows Village in Las Vegas, 9 percent; and Salt Lake City, 14 percent). During this same time period, in six of nine target areas--Hartford, Pittsburgh (Crawford-Roberts), North Manatee, South Manatee, Shreveport, West Las Vegas--the Part 1 crime rates improved more than in the rest of the city or county. Also, Part 1 crimes in the Salt Lake City target area and South Manatee decreased in 1997, the latest reporting period. Although it is not possible to state definitively the extent to which different factors contributed to the observed changes in crime, a number of factors appear to have a strong correlation with these changes. For example, Hartford and Pittsburgh, which experienced the largest Part 1 crime decreases in nontarget areas, are the same two sites whose target areas achieved the largest Part 1 crime decreases. At the same time, the site with the largest Part 1 crime increase in its target area--Salt Lake City--also exhibited the largest Part 1 crime increase of all target areas. A relationship also appears to exist between crime trends and the concentration of program resources in sites that had the largest increases or decreases in crime. Hartford, for example, has the smallest target area in terms of population and area, while Salt Lake City has the largest single target area in square miles and, along with Akron, the smallest level of Federal Weed and Seed funding. Finally, changes in the drug arrest rates appear to be associated with changes in the Part 1 crime rate. For example, among the six target areas for which arrest data are available, the four reporting decreases in Part 1 crime from the year prior to Weed and Seed through the second year of implementation (Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and Shreveport) all experienced initial high rates of drug arrests--suggesting an initial period of intense weeding activities--followed by declining drug arrest rates. Assuming the level of enforcement as measured by police presence has remained somewhat constant, this trend reflects success in reducing drug activity. The Salt Lake City and South Manatee target areas both experienced large increases in the number of drug arrests in 1997 compared to 1996, suggesting that perhaps these sites had not yet succeeded in reducing the level of drug activity in the target areas. Thus, across these six sites, the changes in drug arrest volumes follow the same general pattern as the changes in Part 1 crimes. Community survey To understand the perspective of community residents, a survey of target area residents was conducted for all eight sites at two separate time intervals--in 1995 and 1997. The objective of the survey data collection was to measure changes in residents' perceptions of public safety, crime, police performance, general neighborhood quality of life, and awareness of the Weed and Seed program. To the extent possible, the same methodology was used in both surveys. There were, however, some notable differences. The 1995 survey consisted of inperson interviews, while the 1997 interviews were conducted by telephone. In addition, the 1997 survey consisted of fewer questions than the 1995 survey. The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a shortened instrument was based on the difficulties experienced in 1995 in completing the targeted number of interviews per site. The methodological differences between the two surveys, combined with underlying population changes in the evaluation sites, led to a shift between 1995 and 1997 in the demographic profile of respondents in each surveyed target area. A decision was made to focus the survey analysis on a demographically comparable subset of respondents: nonelderly, long-term residents. The sites appear to fall into three groups with respect to the overall pattern of survey findings comparing 1995 and 1997 among nonelderly, long-term residents. o Manatee and Pittsburgh exhibited substantial evidence of changes in residents' perceptions across multiple outcome measures, including severity of crime and police effectiveness in controlling crime. o Akron, Hartford, and Seattle exhibited some evidence of changes in residents' perceptions of selected crime dimensions, either drug-related crime (Akron and Seattle) or violent and gang-related crime (Hartford). o Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, and Shreveport exhibited little evidence of changes in residents' perceptions of general public safety or the severity of specific types of crime in the neighborhood. Participant interviews To gain the perspective of community residents whom the seeding programs were intended to benefit, interviews were conducted with seeding program participants. These interviews were not intended to measure outcomes of the programs that were visited; rather, they were designed to learn the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the programs from the individuals who participated in them. Long-term effects of these programs on the lives of the program participants cannot be deduced from the interviews. The seeding programs that were visited fall into three general categories: (1) youth recreation and education; (2) employment and training; and (3) violence prevention. Based on participants' comments, the seeding programs appeared to provide services that otherwise would not have been available in the target areas. Most of those interviewed also indicated that participation in the seeding programs was a positive experience that helped them feel more secure emotionally, physically, or both. The general themes that emerged focused on providing additional structure and discipline in the lives of target area youths and opportunities and assistance for adults to work toward personal and professional growth. Conclusions The experience of the eight participating Weed and Seed sites raised two questions: Are sites achieving the intended changes in measurable outcomes? What factors appear to promote successful implementation of the program and thus promote achievement of the intended results? Based on the pattern of findings with respect to the rate of Part 1 crimes and crime-related survey questions, one can group the sites into four categories, first according to the evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes and then (within each category) according to the evidence of improved public perceptions: o Hartford and Pittsburgh showed strong evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes and improved public perception of crime-related measures. o Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport exhibited substantial evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes. o Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), and Manatee/Sarasota (South Manatee) exhibited some evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes. o Salt Lake City and Las Vegas (Meadows Village) showed no evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes. Those sites in the first group (Hartford and Pittsburgh) stand out among the rest, with strong evidence of favorable outcomes with respect to both crime and public perceptions of crime. Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed What factors appear to have promoted successful implementation of the program and achievement of the program's intended results? To address this question, one needs to consider the site characteristics and program features that appear to distinguish the target areas as categorized above, according to their measurable crime-related outcomes. Community setting. There are preexisting features of the program setting that may make Weed and Seed easier or more difficult to operate effectively. Important factors included the strength of the social and institutional infrastructure, the severity of crime problems, locational advantages favoring economic development, and transiency of the community population. Program design. The mix of weeding and seeding activities and the sequence of component implementation appear to be important factors in gaining community support for the program. Important factors included early seeding, sustained weeding, high-level task forces combined with community policing, and an active prosecutorial role. Concentration of funds. Sites appeared to have greater success if they concentrated their program resources on smaller populations, especially if they could similarly channel other public funds and leverage private funds. The important factors included funding intensity along with channeling and leveraging other funds. Leadership and partnership. Finally, a less tangible ingredient that seemed to characterize the more successful programs was the active and constructive leadership of key individuals. By its very nature, Weed and Seed places a great premium on effective coordination among groups with different organizational missions, responding to different constituencies. To establish effective working relationships among these organizations required personal energy and initiative. The most effective implementation strategies were those that relied on bottom-up participatory decisionmaking approaches, especially when combined with efforts to build capacity and partnership among local organizations. This required a longer term perspective about the program and its potential to bring about community change. Such sites--including some that achieved substantial crime reductions within the time period analyzed here--have established a stronger foundation and more sustainable basis for further community-targeted initiatives. Strategic choices The strategic choices now faced by policymakers in charting the future direction of Weed and Seed revolve around issues of designating sites for continued funding, selecting sites for new awards, and allocating funds among participating sites over time. The experience of the eight sites studied in the this evaluation suggests that Weed and Seed has affected the target areas through either (or both) of two avenues. The first, termed program effectiveness here, relates to the specific initiatives that focus on law enforcement and crime prevention. The second, called community mobilization here, is the process in which Weed and Seed provides a catalyst for greater involvement of neighborhood residents and community-based organizations. In the interest of program effectiveness and successful community mobilization, the following inferences can be drawn from site experiences: o Weed and Seed should seek the highest feasible concentration of funds in the program sites. Given the annual funding constraint provided by the congressional appropriation, this implies a more selective process in choosing sites to receive new awards and/or some shortening in the number of years that ongoing sites receive program funding. o Weed and Seed should place its funding priority on sites with geographically small target areas and with favorable community settings and programmatic designs when selecting new program sites--i.e., with features favoring successful implementation, as described in chapter 5. o Weed and Seed should consider additional effort in providing technical assistance to the funded sites, given the importance of institutional capacity-building and infrastructure development. The lessons learned from the more successful sites--and the less successful ones--on these issues can be generalized to a large degree, and new sites should receive the benefit of this experience. This seems especially important in promoting the partnership arrangements that characterize the more successful programs examined in this research. Note 1. Part 1 crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Chapter 1 The U.S. Department of Justice launched Operation Weed and Seed in 1991 as an initiative to control violent and drug-related crime and to make communities safe for residents and businesses. The premise was simple: use law enforcement tactics and resources to "weed" criminal activities from targeted high-crime areas and "seed" those neighborhoods with human services and revitalization projects to prevent and deter further crime. This distinctive collaboration between law enforcement and human services relied on effective community policing--officers who not only removed criminals from the streets, but who also engaged residents in crime deterrence efforts and encouraged their participation in "seeding" programs. The organization with which this was accomplished varied among the eight sites evaluated. Background and Objectives of Operation Weed and Seed Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious attempt to improve the quality of life in targeted high-crime areas of America's cities. First launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1991, the program is designed to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime and to provide a safe environment in which residents can live, work, and raise their families. These are, by themselves, conventional law enforcement goals. What makes Weed and Seed distinctive and innovative is the means by which these goals are achieved--by coupling community-focused human services programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives with intensified, geographically targeted law enforcement efforts. Weed and Seed is administered by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The program now operates in 200 sites. Current annual funding (for fiscal year 1999) is $49 million, including asset forfeiture money. The Federal oversight responsibility for each participating site rests with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the corresponding district. This decentralized arrangement (versus one orchestrated from Washington, D.C.) was intended to reinforce local control while providing a more hands-on Federal role--in particular, to enable Federal prosecutors to be more responsive to local law enforcement initiatives. The Weed and Seed strategy Those who federally administer Operation Weed and Seed consider it a strategy, not a program. That is, Weed and Seed is a means of mobilizing resources in coordinated efforts, not simply a mechanism to fund local activities that share no collective aim. The key components of this strategy are as follows: o Weeding--law enforcement efforts to remove violent offenders, drug traffickers, and other criminals from the target areas. o Seeding--human services and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter further crime. o Community policing--proactive police-community engagement and problem solving, with police personnel accountable for specified geographic locations, regarded as "the bridge between weeding and seeding."[1] Each of these three strategic components was viewed as a necessary element for program success. Program effectiveness also required close coordination among all three. EOWS characterizes Weed and Seed as an "incubator for social change" to stabilize the conditions in high-crime communities and thus promote community restoration.[2] In brief, the process by which the program seeks to effect such change is as follows: o Additional resources for law enforcement and concentrated efforts of police and prosecutors on targeted high-crime areas can more effectively identify, arrest, and prosecute criminals, especially those engaging in narcotics trafficking and violent crime. o More effective crime detection and response, speedier investigations and trials, and stricter sentences serve to put drug dealers and street criminals out of action. Additionally, others may be discouraged from criminal behavior. o Awareness of the results of heightened law enforcement among community residents and businesses means they will more readily cooperate with community-assigned police and prosecutors, further promoting arrests and prosecutions. By gaining the trust and support of the community, police and prosecutors engage residents and businesses as problem-solving partners in the law enforcement effort. o Human services programs, especially ones aimed at youths, address the school, family, or peer group risk factors associated with criminal behavior. Afterschool, weekend, or summer youth activities; adult literacy classes; parental counseling; and similar programs improve the conditions that might otherwise lead to the use of drugs or violence. o Reduced incidence of crime and enhanced perceptions of public safety, along with improved housing, stronger schools and other public services, and heightened community involvement in neighborhood beautification improve the climate for economic development. Organizational structure The coupling of human services with heightened law enforcement distinguishes Weed and Seed from other location-specific crime-reduction strategies. The program's local organizational structure is distinctive and has the following features: o The U.S. Attorney's Office provides Federal oversight and coordinates Federal, State, and local law enforcement and prosecutorial activities, as well as general DOJ oversight of the Weed and Seed strategy. o The Weed and Seed steering committee establishes operational goals, designs and develops programs, guides implementation, and assesses program achievements. The steering committee is headed by the U.S. Attorney and includes the mayor (or elected county official); the district attorney; the chief of police; other appropriate elected or appointed Federal, State, or local officials (who control the allocation of resources potentially available to serve the program's objectives); private-sector representatives; and target area residents. The steering committee is further organized into separate weeding and seeding components. o The weeding committee plans and monitors the law enforcement efforts, including interdiction and prosecution. o The seeding committee plans and monitors the prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration efforts. o Weed and Seed program staff are responsible for operating program activities. Normally, a Weed and Seed program director has overall management responsibility. Day-to-day program activities are operated by a weed coordinator (usually a supervisory member of the local police department) and a seed coordinator. Another organizational element found in virtually all Weed and Seed sites is the safe haven, defined by EOWS as "a multiservice center where a variety of youth and adult services are coordinated in a highly visible, accessible facility that is secure against crime and illegal drug activity" and "a place where youths and other residents can access needed services, develop relationships, find opportunities to be productive and successful, and enhance skills."[3] Indeed, EOWS requires all new Weed and Seed sites to have at least one safe haven.[4] Number of sites and Federal funding The number of sites served by Weed and Seed has grown rapidly since the program's inception. Initial grants were awarded in fiscal year (FY) 1991 to Kansas City, Missouri; Trenton, New Jersey; and Omaha, Nebraska; another 17 sites were added in FY 1992, 1 in FY 1993, 15 in FY 1994, 52 in FY 1996, 30 in FY 1997, 58 in FY 1998, and 24 in FY 1999. None were added in FY 1995. Until very recently, funded sites were either officially recognized sites or demonstration sites. Officially recognized sites qualified for initial program funding in annual amounts of less than $250,000 by having previously implemented Weed and Seed-like initiatives in their designated target areas. Demonstration sites qualified for full program funding in the range of $500,000 to $750,000. Currently, most funded sites receive $225,000 annually. Total program funding for Weed and Seed rose rapidly in its early years, from $11.5 million in FY 1992 to $31.5 million in FY 1994. Over the succeeding 4 years, funding increased further by more than one-third, reaching $42.5 million in FY 1998 and $49 million in FY 1999, as shown in exhibit 1.1. (The exhibit includes funds provided to the program from several sources--primarily from the Weed and Seed Program Fund, but also from the Byrne Discretionary Grant Fund and the Asset Forfeiture Fund.) Design of the national Weed and Seed evaluation This report is the first multisite evaluation of Weed and Seed to include findings on both the implementation of the program and measurable outcomes related to crime and public safety. As early as 1993, single-site local evaluations have been conducted in many participating sites. (Starting in 1994, EOWS required sites to use some of their funding to support local evaluations.) In addition, the implementation of the program in the first 19 sites to receive Weed and Seed funding was studied under the National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed.[5] However, this earlier evaluation did not analyze any data on crime rates or perceptions of public safety. Evaluation sites Eight sites participated in this evaluation as identified in exhibit 1.2. These sites were selected by the U.S. Department of Justice as examples of different aspects of Weed and Seed. For each site, the evaluation focused on one or two Weed and Seed target areas, as follows:[6] Akron, Ohio: The West Side neighborhood has the largest population-- nearly 24,000--among the target areas included in the evaluation, with a mix of both renter- and owner-occupied housing (one-third of which is considered substandard) and several retail districts. Unlike the other participating areas, the area's crime rate is somewhat below the corresponding citywide average. This site was unfunded at the time of its designation for the national impact evaluation. Hartford, Connecticut: Stowe Village, one of the city's most impoverished neighborhoods, is a public housing development in its northeast neighborhood. This densely populated, multiracial community consists of 550 housing units in 31 two- or three-story buildings. This site was selected for funding on the basis of the 1994 competitive solicitation. Las Vegas, Nevada: Meadows Village is a small and shrinking community at the north end of the tourist district. It is populated primarily by transient, foreign-born, primarily Spanish-speaking residents who make or seek their livelihood in low-skilled service jobs related to the city's entertainment industry. This site was also selected for funding on the basis of the 1994 competitive solicitation. West Las Vegas, located further north and separated from the downtown area by a major interstate highway, is a larger and less transient area than Meadows Village. It has a predominantly black population, an active commercial district, and established social infrastructure. This site was added in 1995. Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida: This is a multijurisdictional site, selected for funding through the 1994 competitive solicitation and for participation in the Weed and Seed National Performance Review project. Weed and Seed was implemented in six local target areas, two of which were studied in the impact evaluation. North Manatee has a predominantly minority population; more than three-fourths of the residents are black. More than one-third of the residents are elderly, and nearly half of the adult residents did not graduate from high school. One-fourth of the residents receive public assistance. South Manatee consists primarily of low-income duplex rental housing. Compared to North Manatee, this area has a younger and more transient population with a smaller percentage of minority and elderly residents. Nearly one-half of the households contain children, many with single parents. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Hill District is located between the city's main business center and its educational/cultural district. Historically a center for black culture, commerce, and entertainment, this community has experienced a dramatic population decline during recent decades. The area consists of six separate neighborhoods, some experiencing unemployment rates approaching 50 percent. This site was selected for funding in 1992 and for participation in the Weed and Seed National Performance Review project in 1994. Salt Lake City, Utah: The West Side includes three neighborhoods (Glendale, Poplar Grove, and a large section of Fairpark) that together make up a larger geographical area (6.3 square miles) than any of the other evaluation sites. Housing conditions and socioeconomic characteristics vary greatly across these communities. Overall, most of the housing is owner-occupied, but some areas have high concentrations of vacant or boarded buildings. Some neighborhoods are relatively stable, working-class areas; others are more transient and poverty-ridden. This site was selected for funding and participation in the National Performance Review in 1994. Seattle, Washington: The Central District is a highly congested section east of downtown, consisting of eight separate neighborhoods with both residential and retail areas. The diverse population includes both university students and low-income families, with poverty rates in some neighborhoods approaching 50 percent. This site was initially selected for funding in 1992. Shreveport, Louisiana: The Highland-Stoner Hill area, the least densely populated of the evaluation sites, is one of the city's oldest neighborhoods. Economic difficulties in the oil and gas industry have contributed to a decline in the community's business sector, declining property values, and a deterioration in housing. This site was selected for funding in the 1994 competitive solicitation, and it also participated in the Weed and Seed National Performance Review project. Although each of these areas had distinctive crime problems, they all shared high violent crime rates related to drug trafficking and drug use. Most also had serious gang-related crime problems. These sites were selected for the national evaluation during the fall of 1994. Pittsburgh and Seattle were chosen from among the first 19 Weed and Seed demonstration sites, which received their initial demonstration funding in FY 1992. Hartford, Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota, and Shreveport were chosen from among the sites to receive their first demonstration funding in FY 1994. Akron and Salt Lake City were officially recognized sites in FY 1995 (and then subsequently became demonstration sites). Evaluation activities The national evaluation incorporated a wide variety of evaluation activities at each site that included a review of funding applications and other significant program documents; individual interviews with key program administrators, senior staff within law enforcement agencies, managers of seeding activities, service providers (both current and former), and community leaders; analysis of automated, incident-level records provided by the local police departments on crimes and arrests; group interviews with participants in seeding programs; and two surveys of residents in target areas, conducted in 1995 and in 1997. Based on these activities, a separate case study was first prepared for each of the eight evaluation sites. There are numerous challenges to evaluating a comprehensive, locally targeted initiative such as Weed and Seed. In the end, it is impossible to reach any definitive conclusion about Weed and Seed's effectiveness; what is most important, there is no reliable basis on which to determine what would have happened in these sites in the absence of Weed and Seed. Nonetheless, it is possible to examine carefully the manner in which the program was implemented and to consider the changes in measurable outcomes that occurred following implementation. One cannot attribute such changes to Weed and Seed alone, but one can draw from the experience of these sites to suggest those factors that appear to have favored successful implementation of the Weed and Seed strategy and that appear to have promoted achievement of the intended results. Notes 1. EOWS regards community policing as "increasing police visibility and developing cooperative relationships between the police and citizenry in the target areas." The associated techniques include foot patrols, police ministations, nuisance abatement, victim referrals to support services, and community relations activities, in which the community is encouraged to undertake such initiatives as neighborhood watches, citizen marches and rallies, drug-free zones, and graffiti removal. See Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Executive Office for Weed and Seed: 1-3, 1-4. 2. Ibid., 9-6. 3. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Weed and Seed Fiscal Year 1998 Program Guide and Application Kit for New Sites, Attachment 2, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Executive Office for Weed and Seed, 1998: 2-1. 4. In its literature, EOWS describes safe havens as an integral part of a "risk factor and protective factor" approach to crime prevention. This is viewed as the counterpart to comprehensive community-based disease prevention programs that have operated effectively in the public health arena--for example, in combating heart disease. In the Weed and Seed context, risk factors, those that make one susceptible to criminal behavior, must be identified and addressed. At the same time, protective factors, those that serve to counter or neutralize risks, must be enhanced. 5. Roehl, Janice A., et al., National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed, Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1996, NCJ 16124. 6. Several of these eight sites, including Las Vegas and Pittsburgh, have implemented Weed and Seed in additional target areas not mentioned here. However, because this additional experience has been relatively recent, we have focused this report on the target areas noted, for which substantial postimplementation data have been collected. ------------------------------- Chapter 2 The most successful Weed and Seed efforts required the full cooperation of human services programs, community buy-in, and, perhaps most important, systemic commitment beginning with police officers on the street and extending through the areas' political structure and prosecutors' offices. The initiatives also relied on strong seeding programs, including prevention and intervention programs for youths, neighborhood beautification, community building and development efforts, adult employment and economic advancement programs, family support services, and general community economic development. Together, these elements were to achieve three key program objectives: o Coordinate, concentrate, and integrate public and private resources in target areas. o Empower residents to solve neighborhood problems. o Increase investment and commitment from the private sector. Program Implementation The Weed and Seed strategy had three key objectives: o Coordinating, concentrating, and integrating public and private resources in target areas. o Empowering residents to assist in solving neighborhood problems. o Increasing private-sector investment and commitment. Although the eight sites successfully implemented elements from the weeding, community policing, and seeding program components, each site had distinct local contexts which shaped its approach and community responses.[1] Program framework Grantees and funding levels. Exhibit 2.1 shows Weed and Seed grantee organizations and funding awards for the eight evaluation sites. Grantees included mayors' offices, local police departments, and local nonprofit 501(c)(3) organizations. Among the demonstration sites, the Pittsburgh program began first, in April 1992, followed by Seattle in January 1993. The remaining demonstration sites were awarded their first grants in Federal fiscal year 1994, implementing their programs in late 1994 or early 1995. Salt Lake City and Akron became officially recognized sites in FY 1995 but did not receive significant funding until FY 1996 and FY 1997, respectively. As a result of the timing of its funding, the Akron Weed and Seed program operated as an officially recognized but unfunded site at the time of the evaluation. Among the demonstration sites, program duration and target area size and population, all of which affect the breadth and intensity of the Weed and Seed intervention and implementation strategies, need to be considered. At the two extremes, Hartford received about the same amount of funding for 1,300 people in a 0.1-square-mile target area as did Manatee/Sarasota for 33,641 people in 6 noncontiguous target areas spanning more than 40 square miles. Program goals. Having been selected to participate in Weed and Seed, the eight sites shared the fundamental goals of eliminating violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime and providing a safe environment for residents. The sites also set goals according to the other major Weed and Seed components which included drug abuse prevention, especially activities for youths; expansion of community policing efforts, including strengthening community-police relations and increasing resident and business owner participation in crime prevention; and neighborhood restoration, such as code enforcement, improving housing stock, and attracting new investment. The following summarizes some of the variations in local goals. Demonstration sites Hartford. Because the Stowe Village target area was a city center for narcotics and gang activity, improving public safety was the site's primary goal. Program goals included reducing youth violence, narcotics trafficking, and violent crime; reducing fear and reenfranchising youths into the community; and returning community control to law-abiding citizens. Key objectives included supplementing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Family Investment Center and other existing social services with youth and family support programs, prevention activities, and employment-related training, as well as mobilizing residents to participate in crime prevention and seeding activities. Las Vegas. Suppressing high-level drug crime and youth gangs were key goals for the two Las Vegas target areas, with the objectives of: (1) targeting and eliminating the 50 most disruptive and violent offenders, and (2) increasing community support for law enforcement. Seeding goals included increasing child and family health care, strengthening youth development and resiliency, and improving housing stock and property appearance. In the Meadows Village target area, which had a more transient population and a relatively high proportion of immigrants, objectives included reducing legal and language barriers of residents, developing a shared computer-based information system in the safe haven to enhance the availability and effectiveness of health care, education, and human services; and establishing a neighborhood association to promote the identification and resolution of common community problems. Manatee/Sarasota. Law enforcement goals were to reduce street-level drug dealing (and the open-air drug markets), reduce violent and property crimes, increase citizen participation in neighborhood action teams, and implement and integrate a community policing program in Manatee County, where one previously did not exist. The seeding focus was on youth-oriented or crime prevention programs, including education, job training, and recreation, as well as the establishment of safe havens. A central seeding component of the Manatee/Sarasota program was community empowerment, including leadership development and providing the community authority over nonenforcement domains of the program. Pittsburgh. A key weeding goal was to eliminate open-air drug trafficking, whereas seeding goals included integrating and expanding economic development strategies, providing employment and job training opportunities, and improving housing conditions. Pittsburgh's program focused on building stronger community-level organizations to enable communities to address their problems by obtaining resources through community and economic development. The key strategies employed to achieve the operational goals were: (1) providing training to community members and Weed and Seed participating organizations, and (2) systematically increasing the community's access to information. Seattle. In addition to controlling street-level gang-related drug and violent crimes, goals included developing an effective managerial approach to neighborhood problem solving involving community and business groups, extending the partnership concepts to include agencies at the State and Federal levels, and mobilizing residents to work with police in problem solving. Seattle focused on youth antiviolence enforcement and youth-oriented or crime prevention projects, as well as supporting broader community efforts promoting employment (skills training and business development), education, and health care. A collective decisionmaking process among community groups, residents, and participating public agencies provided a broad foundation for the program. Shreveport. In addition to reducing drug trafficking, law enforcement goals included reducing weapons violations, property crimes, and gang influence; targeting and removing repeat offenders; increasing community education on police services, crime prevention, and drug awareness; and increasing participation in and effectiveness of the neighborhood watches. Prevention goals centered on youth risk factors and education, and neighborhood restoration focused on vigorous code enforcement with resident participation. A key seeding emphasis was establishing safe havens and afterschool programs (which were sorely lacking in the target area), as well as coordinating existing public and private services and resources to make them available to residents. Officially recognized sites Akron. This city received little funding during most of the national evaluation period. Although Akron had not yet implemented its program, strategies had been developed. Law enforcement goals included eliminating drug markets and crack houses and reducing burglaries and prostitution. Special community policing goals included restoring neighborhood pride and achieving a higher percentage of high school graduates. Seeding goals built on an existing program, the Crouse Caring Communities Project. Goals included developing a model for integrated service delivery to children and families, working with the city's public schools to increase achievement and decrease counterproductive behavior, building employment skills of residents, improving housing, and further developing the business district. Salt Lake City. In its first year as an officially recognized site, the city's goal was to extend technical assistance for community mobilization activities in the three target neighborhoods and to empower the community by providing small grants to fund high-priority projects for residents. With increased recognition-level funding, law enforcement goals included reducing levels of violent crime related to gang and drug activities, focusing on high-level drug cases for Federal prosecution, and increasing the implementation of community policing efforts, including problem solving with the community and the integration of community- oriented police officers with beat officers. Seeding goals included increasing the coordination and planning around economic development and addressing risk/protective factors for youths and families, including intensive case management and community assessment. Salt Lake City was already a recipient of a major Comprehensive Communities Program grant and intended to use Weed and Seed to build on those efforts. Organizational roles, community engagement, planning, and evaluation Among the eight sites, there were substantial variations in the role of the steering committee, the role of the grantee organization, how the community was engaged in capacity building, and the role of planning and evaluation in the implementation of the Weed and Seed program. Role of the steering committee and other key decisionmaking bodies In general, the steering committees played an important role in: (1) establishing goals and objectives, (2) providing guidance and oversight on key program design and implementation issues, and (3) integrating weeding with seeding at the policy level. At most sites, the steering committee also played a critical role in coordination across agencies, sectors, and jurisdictions. Across all eight sites, steering committee members included key public agency representatives and local government officials; variations occurred around inclusion of social service providers, community-based organizations, and residents. Although some steering committees were dominated by public-sector agencies, others were more heavily composed of and guided by community residents. Public agency participation at the steering committee level. Participation and commitment among the public-sector steering committee members varied considerably by site. The following illustrates the range of public officials' involvement on the steering committee. At one site, a central problem was a lack of participation by key agency officials, who sent delegates who had no decisionmaking authority to committee meetings and did not bring to bear the resources of their agencies on behalf of Weed and Seed. In this program, the mayor, U.S. Attorney, and district attorney had relatively limited program involvement. As one might imagine, with a lack of prosecutorial commitment at the highest levels, prosecution remained a serious problem for this site, with no Federal prosecutions and no special State attention for Weed and Seed cases. At this same site, however, community participation and leadership in the steering committee were strong, as were the leadership and capabilities of the Weed and Seed program staff. These two factors enabled successful implementation of many program elements, in spite of the lack of participation of relevant agency heads. Conversely, another Weed and Seed site demonstrated too much involvement and ownership by agency heads, such that conflict developed between grantees and other agencies over the direction and implementation of the program. The U.S. Attorney at this site was highly involved in most aspects of the program but did not share the same vision for the program as the local grantee organization. This conflict between the two key leaders caused considerable disruption in the management of the program and seems to have inhibited local ownership of the program.[2] Although the role of the U.S. Attorney varied, the U.S. Attorney's Office in a majority of the evaluation sites struck a balance between the two more extreme cases described above. (See the section, "Approach to weeding and community policing," in this chapter, for a discussion of Federal prosecution issues.) Community participation at the steering committee level. For some sites, the steering committee and Weed and Seed neighborhood bodies provided the primary means of formal community participation in program decisionmaking. Other sites incorporated resident participation at the subcommittee level for weeding and seeding. The following illustrates the range of community participation in key Weed and Seed decisionmaking bodies: Seattle set up two primary governing bodies: (1) the steering committee, which included the relevant agency heads with some social service organizations, and (2) the Citizens Advisory Committee, consisting of residents and community organizations. The steering committee provided policy-level guidance and program oversight, while the Citizens Advisory Committee provided program direction for both weeding and seeding activities. A collective decisionmaking process among community groups, residents, and participating public agencies provided a broad foundation for the program. In Manatee/Sarasota Counties, the neighborhood action teams had substantial program authority, guiding most of the nonenforcement efforts in the target areas. There were six neighborhood action teams--one for each target area--consisting of residents and representatives of organizations, businesses, and law enforcement operating in the target area. In addition, there was one overall steering committee for seeding and one for weeding; the seeding committee comprised elected representatives from the different neighborhood action teams, whereas the weeding committee comprised law enforcement representatives. Shreveport provides an example where community participation in decisionmaking was achieved primarily through its steering committee. The steering committee included representatives of relevant public agencies, but residents and community and nongovernmental organizations accounted for more than half of the membership. The program relied on its steering committee for policy-level guidance and oversight, with program staff providing day-to-day management of weeding and seeding program components.[3] In Las Vegas, the steering committee--with representatives from law enforcement and social service groups--functioned as the key decisionmaking body for the first 2 years of the program. Later, a smaller executive committee made up of executives or designees of some key agencies was established as a first-line management structure. In spite of a strong executive committee, decisionmaking remained decentralized for weeding and seeding, with residents helping to guide seeding and community policing activities.[4] In Hartford, the steering committee predominantly comprised public agency officials and service providers. Attempts were made to foster greater participation from the tenants' association and residents, but the tenants' association was relatively inactive, and there was a lack of community-based organizations in Stowe Village. Steering committee meetings were, however, open to the public. The steering committee typically made strategic decisions, although program staff were more responsible for program management and implementation. The Seattle and Manatee/Sarasota program organizations show a more bottom-up approach, with residents granted high decisionmaking authority through formal resident bodies. Hartford, on the other hand, lies closer to the other end of the spectrum, where public agency representatives were primary decisionmakers. The remaining six sites fell somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. Role of the grantee organization The grantee and its staff assigned to the Weed and Seed effort were probably the single most important factors in successful program implementation among the evaluation sites. The capabilities, vision, and commitment of Weed and Seed program staff and the grantee institution were more important factors in program implementation than the type of grantee organization. To implement the Weed and Seed strategy, it was necessary for sites to have sufficient dedicated staff resources to guide the program, engage resident participation and ongoing community leadership, build the necessary network of relationships in the public and private sectors, oversee implementation, and provide technical assistance to the communities. Sites without sufficient dedicated staff resources, from both grantees and other participating agencies, suffered in program implementation, oversight, and cohesion. Structuring and setting in motion a comprehensive and coordinated strategy was the principal challenge for sites. Effective program staff leadership enabled implementation success in spite of serious obstacles, and staff problems (including inadequate staff, lack of competencies for the given role, and misunderstanding of the mission) severely impeded program implementation. Even in such cases, however, some program elements succeeded due to the leadership of other Weed and Seed participants or to changes in staff. In keeping with the concept of Weed and Seed as a strategy, the organization, staffing, and method of implementation evolved over time at different sites. Weed and Seed was not a static program structure, and lessons were often incorporated as the process unfolded. Shreveport, for example, initially had inexperienced and insufficient staff, which led to a long delay in implementing seeding programs and resulted in the failure of the first afterschool program associated with Weed and Seed. One problem was that the seed coordinator was a volunteer whose full-time job was to run a large afterschool program. This person was not prepared for these dual roles, nor were there appropriate Weed and Seed management and accountability structures in place. Eventually a full-time seed coordinator was hired, and the Weed and Seed program director was replaced. With strong staff leadership and community participation, implementation occurred smoothly, with considerable accountability. Consistent with the philosophy of building community capacity, Weed and Seed programs also had to find the right balance between providing needed assistance to communities and challenging them to mobilize more community resources. The Manatee/Sarasota Weed and Seed effort reorganized its initial program structure to reduce the number of staff involved with neighborhood coordination. Although neighborhood coordinators were initially helpful in mobilizing residents, too much staff assistance decreased community initiative and was not an effective use of resources. Grantee institutional issues The Weed and Seed evaluation sites demonstrated how different grantee institutions can bring different institutional strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities to the program and thus affect its design and operations. Although the capabilities of the Weed and Seed program staff and leaders are more important than the type of grantee institution, the latter is a key factor in structuring a balanced program. The following discusses these potential strengths and weaknesses. Police department. Since public safety and law enforcement are central to Weed and Seed, it is important to encourage a high level of commitment from police departments. Having a police department as grantee can facilitate the engagement of greater police department resources and ongoing department commitment. However, a police department as grantee can also create distinct disadvantages. Police departments, for example, are less equipped to handle the social services programming and community consensus-building process than other types of grantees (given the more hierarchical structure of police departments). For example, the Shreveport police department, as grantee, initially encountered difficulties of this nature but later adapted well. Furthermore, placing Weed and Seed in a police department also tends to identify the program more strongly as a law enforcement initiative, at least until seeding is implemented. In Seattle, where the community policing department was the grantee, Weed and Seed tried to overcome this perception by giving the seeding component to the city Department of Housing and Human Services. This arrangement probably facilitated community acceptance and broader integration of seeding initiatives in the city.[5] Given this concern about a focus on enforcement, it is interesting to note in sites where the police department was the grantee that there was no evidence of disproportionate focus and spending on law enforcement efforts. In fact, Seattle and Hartford spent far more of their budgets on seeding programs than on weeding. Mayor's office. Importantly, the mayor's office can bring the strength of a city's full resources to the program and can translate program successes in the target area to the city at large. The mayor as grantee can also facilitate governmental capacity building and broadly strengthen collaboration with citizens and community organizations. Pittsburgh provides an example of these strengths. At one site, having a mayor as grantee placed the program within a volatile political environment; the program became dominated by individual political concerns and turf wars. Further, changes in administration reduced program commitment in one city, while at another it signaled the beginning of a more focused and productive effort.[6] A mayor's office, however, brings both the assets and liabilities of political office, which vary by city and shift over time. Community-based organizations. Among the eight evaluation sites, only Manatee/Sarasota Counties had a nonprofit organization as grantee. The grantee was Drug Free Communities, Inc., a nonprofit organization created by the mayor. Although it was unusual for a Weed and Seed grantee to be anything other than a police department, mayor's office, or similar government agency, this approach seems to have worked well for Manatee/Sarasota. As a practical matter, because the Manatee/Sarasota Weed and Seed program stretched over two counties, it would have been difficult for any single local government agency to serve as effectively as the grant-receiving entity. In addition, Drug Free Communities already had established strong grassroots organizational and political support in Manatee County and had received a significant Federal grant from the Center for Substance Abuse and Prevention (CSAP). Although based on limited data, the Manatee/Sarasota experience suggests other community-based organizations might effectively serve as future Weed and Seed grantees and can bring distinct strengths, including community trust. It would be important, however, for such organizations to have had a broad-based community constituency and positive experience working with local governmental organizations, in addition to a demonstrated capacity to manage Federal grants.[7] Engaging the community in building capacity Two central tasks of the Weed and Seed strategy are to engage residents in problem solving from a comprehensive view and to gain commitment from community members and key partners to construct and implement an integrated strategy. Several evaluation sites encountered early community resistance to Weed and Seed due to resident concerns of exclusive focus on enforcement or concerns of targeted harassment. o When the city of Seattle proposed applying for funding from the Weed and Seed program in the spring of 1992, many community groups expressed public opposition, fearing the proposed weeding programs would be measures to harass and control persons living in the target area. After heated public debate, the mayor organized and held meetings with community coalitions and representatives from the public agencies involved with the proposal. These meetings culminated in revisions to the city's proposal which increased the operational role of the Citizens Advisory Committee, composed of residents and community organizations within the Weed and Seed area. o In the first 2 years of the Las Vegas Weed and Seed program, there was negative publicity and organized opposition over concern that its enforcement efforts would target young minority males. Eventually, as the seeding component gained momentum and genuinely involved grassroots community groups, these concerns were mitigated. o In Pittsburgh, in the first 2 years of Weed and Seed, the program focused primarily on enforcement and rarely involved residents in program decisionmaking. Residents had expected to see community development initiatives, not just crackdowns, and had become alienated and angry about perceived broken promises. Subsequently, the program was radically restructured to focus on community capacity building, with substantial seeding program authority given to residents. According to leaders of community organizations and residents, Weed and Seed sites that employed a bottom-up grassroots approach built trust among residents and community organizations. As one community leader said, "There's a trust level that had been developed with local people.... This gives [the program] a chance to mushroom." The clear lessons from these experiences were the importance of involving residents early in Weed and Seed planning, providing residents with substantial program authority, and earning their trust. The seeding program component was typically the means through which community trust was built and participation fulfilled. Citizen willingness to participate in law enforcement was sometimes contingent on the trust built and demonstrated through the investments in seeding. Building community capacity. Preexisting community organizational infrastructures varied across target areas. In sites such as Meadows Village in Las Vegas, a lack of social infrastructure made program implementation difficult. Even when sites had strong community organizational infrastructures, considerable resources were needed to effectively catalyze participation and increase capacity to implement Weed and Seed. Pittsburgh and Manatee/Sarasota, for example, focused on community capacity building and devoted considerable ongoing resources to these efforts. The following are examples of positive effects of such investment: o One Manatee community-based leader emphasized the importance of Weed and Seed's work with the neighborhood action teams to "put programs into action" that met community needs. He said, "I feel good about what I'm doing because we [the community] do this for ourselves." He said that for too long, the approach was to go after a quick fix and do what benefited the provider more than the community. Outsiders were brought in to "fix them up," only to take their funds and leave the community worse off. o Another community leader said, "We didn't bring anyone into the community ... We did it ourselves in the community not with outside services. This gives empowerment to the community; it shows our youths the good example of seeing leaders active in their own community." Weed and Seed also provided a forum for leadership development among residents. In Salt Lake City, for example, a resident took the lead in the initial Weed and Seed grant application and played an instrumental role in early program implementation. In the North and South Manatee target neighborhoods, there emerged charismatic individual leaders who essentially ran the safe havens as volunteers and directed a variety of community activities. For all sites, it remained a central organizational challenge to continuously develop and broaden leadership to implement and sustain the Weed and Seed strategy. Program planning and local evaluation Sites employed a variety of methods to improve their strategic planning, including outside technical assistance, data collection by the program, and external local evaluations. In general, sites would have benefited from more technical assistance early in the Weed and Seed planning process. Some demonstration sites felt they were not sufficiently prepared when they received the grant money and would have benefited from a more rigorous planning process, including technical assistance and hiring a local evaluator, before receiving the full grant award.[8] Weed and Seed goals and strategies needed to be focused--especially on the seeding side--with clear criteria as to how resources should be allocated and progress measured.[9] Sometimes this was achieved, sometimes not. Strategic focus also needed to be integrated with other goals, such as community participation and capacity building. Outside technical assistance and resources. Several sites engaged outside technical assistance or resources to aid program planning. The following are illustrations of some initiatives: o In the second year of the Shreveport program, the Communities That Care strategic planning process provided a clear focus for Weed and Seed planning and programming, especially on the seeding side. A total of 70 people participated in a process that identified several key community issues and risk factors. Subsequent subcontract requests for proposals (RFPs) and the local evaluation focused on these issues and risk factors. Although this process proved to be time-consuming, it built consensus and strengthened program coherence for both seeding and community-oriented policing. Prior to that, there were no established criteria from which to select seeding programs and on which to build consensus among community groups represented on the steering committee. Consensus building was particularly important for this site because the target area encompassed two diverse neighborhoods in which community-based organizations did not share the same visions of community change; otherwise, program efforts may have been more diffuse and fragmented. o Manatee/Sarasota Counties also benefited from the Communities That Care process, except technical assistance came rather late in the program, and community members thought the process too academic. Manatee also employed a process of "asset mapping" the communities' strengths that was used to build upon the Weed and Seed efforts.[10] This process drew from the work of John Kretzmann and John McKnight of Northwestern University's Neighborhood Innovations Network.[11] o In Pittsburgh, community organizations received training under the Communities That Care program. The Pittsburgh program also received technical assistance from the National Congress on Community Economic Development to assess the status of community economic development and to provide training to communities. o Salt Lake City used its National Performance Review Laboratory grant to refine local planning to improve the city's chances for being selected as a Weed and Seed site, as well as to aid communities to clearly identify local resources that might be drawn into crime reduction planning and community improvement efforts.[12] Assessing community strengths and needs with its members led to effective use of resources and helped to build program coherence and consensus. Appropriate technical assistance can help grantees with methodology and provide an objective outside perspective; this may be particularly important for grantees lacking experience in this kind of planning and consensus-building process. A partially funded 6-month to 1-year planning period might be beneficial for some sites. Data collection by the program. Some sites undertook systematic data collection efforts as part of their ongoing program planning and management and made such information available to target area residents. In Manatee/Sarasota Counties, for example, Weed and Seed staff conducted community surveys and maintained a demographic database on the target areas, which groups accessed for grant applications. The site also maintained a community resource library and provided ongoing technical assistance to a variety of community groups, with an average of 15 requests per month. External local evaluation. Half of the national evaluation sites--Shreveport, Seattle, Las Vegas, and Hartford--undertook external local evaluations. In three of the sites, the local evaluation played a constructive role in program assessment. Shreveport Weed and Seed provides an example in which the local evaluation played a central role in program planning and assessment. Officials there felt that having a local evaluator was a critical factor in successful program implementation. The firm they hired had experience in evaluating comprehensive community initiatives and built a collaborative relationship with program staff by using quarterly evaluation information to guide program improvement.[13] Shreveport officials' major regret was that the program was nearly 2 years old before a local evaluator was hired, and they believe better decisions could have been made--especially on the seeding side--if evaluation information had been available sooner.[14] Approach to weeding and community policing Most sites developed and implemented coherent law enforcement strategies that responded to local conditions and incorporated stronger street-level patrols with some degree of higher level interagency coordination. Weeding approaches across the eight sites typically included: o Increased police presence through additional officer hours and overtime, with the majority of sites assigning officers dedicated to the target area. o Increased special operations for targeted law enforcement, especially for drug-related and violent crime. o Greater concentration, coordination, and integration of efforts within police departments than before Weed and Seed. o Varying degrees of increased local, State, and Federal communication and coordination, whether in targeting offenders, narcotics operations, prosecution, or probation or parole. The assignment of dedicated officers to the Weed and Seed target areas was important in building relationships with residents and in aiding enforcement through better knowledge of the neighborhood, better intelligence, and the ability to operate proactively. In Shreveport, for example, many residents knew the four dedicated "bumble bees," the bicycle patrol officers in yellow shirts and black shorts; and, in Pittsburgh, residents successfully lobbied to keep one of their Weed and Seed officers from being reassigned. Most sites executed intensive initial weeding efforts, focusing on drug enforcement and special joint operations.[15] At many sites, such as Hartford and Las Vegas, drug enforcement efforts targeted major offenders; other sites, including Pittsburgh and Manatee, focused more on street-level dealers. The strategy depended in part on preexisting law enforcement operations and, in some cases, concerns of residents. Pittsburgh and Manatee already had other operations under way that focused on the major dealers, and the weed task forces collaborated with these efforts. Drug enforcement and suppression tactics typically included use of informants, undercover operations (such as buy-and-bust tactics and reverse sting operations), execution of search warrants, saturation patrols, and surveillance. The Shreveport weed officers also employed a "zero tolerance" approach, sometimes setting up checkpoints in problem areas. In addition to drug-related crime, property crimes were a major concern in Shreveport and Manatee; early weeding efforts concentrated on improving this situation.[16] Both sites have also focused more on quality-of-life issues, especially as crime levels have been reduced.[17] Increased interagency collaboration was a central component of most weeding strategies. Such efforts included monthly meetings between weed officers and probation/parole officers to catch parole violators, frequent joint Federal and local special narcotics operations, and the creation of formal interagency Weed and Seed law enforcement task forces, like those in Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota Counties, and Pittsburgh.[18] Multiagency task forces Although multiagency task forces concentrated on the target area, they pursued drug cases across jurisdictional lines. Consequently, the benefits of these efforts extended beyond the target areas, particularly when the focus was on high-level drug dealers who controlled large operations. Task force missions varied according to the nature of crime in the target areas and preexisting law enforcement operations, so Weed and Seed task forces complemented existing efforts. Examples of task forces include: o In Las Vegas, the Joint Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department-FBI (LVMPD-FBI) Task Force focused on relatively high-level drug distribution in the West Las Vegas target area. The U.S. Attorney and FBI organized the task force and helped foster Federal commitment to the program. In an approximately 2-year period, the task force was responsible for 137 arrests for State crimes and 40 Federal arrests and prosecutions. o In Manatee/Sarasota Counties, the cornerstone of the weeding strategy was the creation of a multijurisdictional interagency Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF), which focused on street-level drug dealing and violent crimes in the six target areas.[19] Coordinated by the FBI, VCTF included the four local law enforcement agencies, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U.S. Marshal's Service, and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The task force involved the full-time commitment of personnel by all participating agencies--Federal, State, and local--and the officers all worked from a central location.[20] Between October 1994 and March 1997, the task force made 2,766 arrests in both counties, including 54 Federal cases. In the North and South Manatee target areas, VCTF produced 231 cases during this period.[21] o The Pittsburgh Weed and Seed task force, coordinated by the narcotics division of the Pittsburgh Police Department, focused on street-level narcotics traffic in the target areas, while working collaboratively with an established multijurisdictional task force that focused on major violent drug traffickers in the Pittsburgh area. Prosecution Overall, prosecution has been a relatively weak link in Weed and Seed due to various institutional, political, and judicial issues. Although interagency communications often increased as a result of Weed and Seed, in the majority of sites, there was no special Federal or local prosecution or tracking of Weed and Seed cases.[22] Shreveport provides an example of a site with no Federal prosecution and no special efforts for local prosecution or sentencing; there, program officials and residents were extremely dissatisfied with the "revolving door syndrome," with repeat offenders often released on parole.[23] Manatee and Sarasota Counties, on the other hand, appear to be one of the few sites in which prosecution and cooperation with Weed and Seed has been vigorous at both the Federal and local levels. At the local level, although the district attorneys typically did not allocate special resources to Weed and Seed, several sites specially stamped cases, and communications often increased and improved between law enforcement personnel and prosecutors. Although there was usually no formal preference given to Weed and Seed cases ("a serious case is a serious case," as one State attorney's office representative said), law enforcement officials felt that such communication improved the focus on important Weed and Seed cases. In Las Vegas, prior to 1996, Weed and Seed cases did not receive special "fast track" attention in the prosecutor's office. However, since that time, all Weed and Seed task force cases have been screened and presented to the district attorney by task force personnel. This has resulted in fewer of these cases being dropped. As an illustration of varying local philosophies, the district attorney at a Weed and Seed site with strong prosecution felt the biggest benefit of Weed and Seed was its ability to concentrate resources in the worst areas and to focus on quality-of-life crimes. Conversely, a district attorney at a site with extremely poor prosecution felt, politically, that his office could not give any more attention--show favoritism--to one geographic area over another. In general, the political environment in which district attorneys operate, as well as limited resources, constrained special local prosecution of Weed and Seed cases. At the Federal level, the U.S. Attorney's participation and Federal prosecution was also uneven. Shreveport and Seattle processed no Federal prosecutions for Weed and Seed cases, and Akron Weed and Seed cases were prosecuted at the local and State levels. In Pittsburgh, Weed and Seed participants initially attempted to take more cases federally, but there was resistance from Federal judges. In Shreveport, where drug cases typically did not have enough weight to qualify for Federal guidelines, the U.S. Attorney's Office was unwilling to lower Federal guidelines to make the case.[24] However, for drug cases that did not meet normal Federal prosecution standards in Manatee and Sarasota Counties, the U.S. Attorney sometimes lowered the Federal drug-level requirements to pursue Weed and Seed cases.[25] In Las Vegas, Weed and Seed task force cases received strong Federal prosecution. The Hartford Weed and Seed program, which had great success in arrests of major gang narcotics traffickers, illustrates some criminal justice challenges. As illustrated in exhibit 2.2, as of June 1997, more than half of the Hartford Weed and Seed's 612 State-level cases were dismissed, with only 18 percent of arrests resulting in incarceration. For felony arrests which resulted in incarceration, 39 percent received a sentence of less than 2 years; the disposition distribution for felony drug arrests was nearly identical to that for all felony arrests. Hartford did have important Federal-level prosecutions of key gang leaders, however, resulting in strong sentencing. One factor to consider is that Weed and Seed provides substantial resources for law enforcement to generate more arrests, but the criminal justice component often did not receive additional resources to pay for any additional staffing or reorganization. Prosecutorial cooperation depended primarily on politics, preexisting institutional capacities, and individual dispositions. In several cases, Weed and Seed increased prosecutorial cooperation--through increased communication or leadership of the U.S. Attorney at the Federal level. Nonetheless, the criminal justice component generally did not occur as envisioned in the original Weed and Seed concept.[26] Community policing and resident involvement in law enforcement and crime prevention Weed and Seed enabled most sites to expand or strengthen community policing efforts or to institute new programs. Although some sites, such as Seattle, already had well-established, proactive community policing programs, others had difficulty integrating community policing with traditional law enforcement to adopt a problem-solving approach; in a majority of sites, Weed and Seed advanced the process of integration. Manatee County, for example, had a highly traditional police department and had not yet embraced community policing methods; participation in Weed and Seed enabled the county to launch its first community-oriented policing program.[27] As they got to know the neighborhoods, the community police officers also became key informants for the Weed and Seed Violent Crimes Task Force. Community policing initiatives at various sites, including nuisance abatement, landlord programs, graffiti eradication, code enforcement, and neighborhood cleanups, helped improve property maintenance and neighborhood environments. Officers also participated in a wide range of youth recreation and education programs in the target areas; such activities engaged local youths in constructive activity, provided positive role models for youths, and built community relations. In addition to enhancing community policing efforts, Weed and Seed provided a vehicle for mobilizing residents to participate in crime prevention, in some cases creating effective structures for community authority and leadership. In Seattle, the Weed and Seed Citizens Advisory Committee determined weeding priorities; and in Manatee County, where community policing was new, the Weed and Seed Neighborhood Action Teams provided a structure for citizens to work with community policing officers. For many sites, neighborhood watches became an increasingly important means of citizen participation in crime prevention. Weed and Seed led to more neighborhood watches and invigorated participation at many sites; watch participants reported high satisfaction with their participation and police support. At these sites, Weed and Seed seems to have improved police enthusiasm for neighborhood watches, as well. Although weeding has typically involved less resident participation than has seeding, communications between residents and the police increased across sites through enhanced community policing efforts, public training and education projects, regular neighborhood meetings, and increased police participation in seeding-related programs. Law enforcement personnel reported getting more information from residents and increased responsiveness and cooperation in enforcement and crime prevention. The nature of resident involvement in law enforcement also was influenced by preexisting organizational structures and cultures in both the police departments and communities. For example, in Seattle, where the Citizens Advisory Committee exerted authority over weeding, there was a strong culture of citizen participation and a long history of community policing. A key strength of the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program was its effective mobilization of residents in law enforcement and crime prevention. Through the Comprehensive Communities Program, Salt Lake City had already established an extensive network of mobile neighborhood watches, with more than 800 participating residents and community action teams that engaged in neighborhood problem solving. Weed and Seed built on and strengthened this network. Such organizational infrastructure facilitated citizen participation in crime prevention and law enforcement. For a majority of sites, police substations in central community locations provided focal points for police contact with the community and furthered program integration. For example, Hartford created a substation in Stowe Village, and Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Manatee created substations at their safe havens. Having a central location for the weeding and seeding also helped some sites integrate the program and provided a focus for community engagement. Shreveport, for example, had a dedicated Weed and Seed site, which housed the weeding and seeding staff and served as a community center and focal point for community participation and response. In Manatee/Sarasota, the grantee, Drug Free Communities, was co-located at the Police Athletic League with the Weed and Seed multiagency Violent Crimes Task Force. Although Weed and Seed generally seemed to increase resident involvement and improve community-police relations, achieving a partnership with community authority is an ongoing and more difficult process than selective participation. Such participation and communications, however, are critical steps in building that partnership. Weed and Seed advanced the dialogue significantly. Approach to seeding Seeding typically was the gateway to community participation and engendered the most community support. In many sites, providing communities with authority in the seeding grant award process was critical to gaining community participation and trust. In Seattle and Manatee/Sarasota, neighborhood bodies (the Weed and Seed Citizens Advisory Committee and the Neighborhood Action Groups) chose programs to fund. An executive of a national youth program in Manatee/Sarasota said Weed and Seed makes it clear to providers that the neighborhood makes the decisions, and the programs must justify themselves to the neighborhood. She said Weed and Seed tries to involve communities to accomplish community-determined needs. She described it as a grassroots program, where Weed and Seed staff listen to what the community says and try to figure out how to make it happen. Pittsburgh took the approach of giving community boards authority over a substantial portion (35-40 percent) of the seeding budget, with the community body responsible for issuing RFPs, making program selections, and managing contracts and projects. Shreveport more broadly involved the community in the initial planning phase via a public strategic planning process to determine the seeding strategy and establish community participation on the steering committee responsible for approving seeding programs. Shreveport issued RFPs, with staff making initial program recommendations to the committee. At many sites, the RFP process provided valuable experience for participating community-based organizations and for neighborhood review committees. Las Vegas used the RFP process as an opportunity to train potential seeding providers through a 2-day workshop in grant preparation and management. Pittsburgh and Manatee/Sarasota also provided technical assistance in grant writing to community-based organizations. In Hartford, no RFPs were issued because the steering committee generally knew which programs it wanted to fund. In their own ways, sites had to balance issues related to strategic coherence of the program with goals of providing authority to residents and engaging their participation in solving neighborhood problems; this was where staff and community leadership played critical roles. Developing a seeding strategy Among the greatest challenges for Weed and Seed sites was developing an appropriate seeding strategy with community members to most effectively target and leverage existing community resources. Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding programs, such as safe havens, in itself was more difficult for most sites than implementing their weeding programs. Seeding was inherently a broader and more complex task, both in the development of goals and strategies and from a practical organizational standpoint. Seeding efforts required securing participation and commitment from numerous types of organizations, whereas weeding had a relatively clearer mission, operating within more established hierarchical structures of law enforcement and criminal justice organizations.[28] Due to the broader and less defined nature of seeding, relatively more time was needed for planning, relationship building, and gaining consensus and commitment from the wide range of participants who shape this domain. It is difficult to compare and assess seeding strategies across sites because they arose from local context--the existing resources and programs, capacities, cultures, and needs. Since sites varied widely in contexts and preferences, the purpose of the seeding effort was to unite people in a process that would build momentum toward neighborhood restoration, creating a multiplier effect over time. Implementation during Weed and Seed was only the beginning of this process, which has a longer time horizon. Seeding program partnerships The eight Weed and Seed sites built their programs around existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. For example, Hartford Weed and Seed integrated seeding efforts with the existing Department of Housing and Urban Development Family Investment Center, and the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program built on the Comprehensive Communities Program. Extensive partnerships and collaborations were created through Weed and Seed in the public and private sectors, with most of the private-sector partnerships with nonprofit and community-based organizations. In Shreveport, for example, Weed and Seed arranged for public services to come to the target area, including free immunizations for children from the State department of public health, a library bookmobile, and free computer training from a local university. In Seattle, the Washington Insurance Council joined Weed and Seed to establish the Seattle Neighborhood Action Program as a private/public partnership to help revitalize a neighborhood.[29] Seeding program partners and providers emphasized how Weed and Seed increased coordination and communication links between neighborhood groups and other agencies. Almost all respondents said they felt more connected to the community and service providers. A director of a youth service organization in Shreveport said, "Establishing partnerships is the key to Weed and Seed--cooperation on projects and working together to bring the community together. [You] can touch more people as a group of organizations than as a single entity." Many providers said working with Weed and Seed enhanced their organizational capacity and enabled them to receive other grants to continue their efforts. There were some former providers, however, who said they accomplished their goals with Weed and Seed funding but, when that funding ended, they were unable to sustain the same level of services.[30] While it is too early in implementation to know which program elements will be sustained, these observations reinforce the importance of using Weed and Seed to build community partnerships and capacity rather than as a primary means to fund services. Seeding funding strategies Sites reflected their different priorities by funding seeding programs with varying degrees of breadth, depth, and duration. For example, Shreveport concentrated on funding five afterschool and summer youth programs that previously did not exist in the target area, combining substantial reach with intensity. These programs will receive about 2 years of Weed and Seed funding before providers have to find replacement funding. (It appears they may be successful through a combination of city and private resources.) Conversely, Seattle initially funded more than 20 different programs, mostly related to prevention and education activities for youths and employment training, spreading funding more thinly across a variety of organizations. In a later stage of the program, funding was concentrated on a few key programs. Similarly, Salt Lake City initially provided partial grants to numerous organizations but later chose a smaller number of core programs to support. Manatee/Sarasota, which also emphasized youth programs, focused on program sustainability by providing only partial funding for programs and requiring programs to develop partnerships and other funding sources.[31] In the two Manatee target areas, funding allowed new community-based organizations to form, others to expand existing programs, and innovative programs to be tested. In the Hill District, Pittsburgh funded a broader range of projects, using money to establish and strengthen community organizations but avoid creating competing structures. Training also has been a central component of Pittsburgh's strategy, teaching and assisting communities to develop greater self-reliance. In addition to funding a strong mix of programs for youths, the Hartford Stowe Village program provided a range of family support services. Types of programming Seeding initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites can be clustered as follows, according to predominance: Prevention and intervention programs for youths. Sites focused most heavily on prevention-oriented programs, with a strong mix of afterschool programming and safe havens, recreation and sports, skills and employment training, job development, and health/substance abuse-related programs. By concentrating on this program dimension, many sites achieved both significant reach and intensity among this segment of residents. Neighborhood beautification. Sites also incorporated neighborhood beautification efforts, such as neighborhood cleanups and code enforcement. Shreveport used Weed and Seed funds to pay for a full-time city code enforcer for the target area; this site also organized numerous neighborhood cleanup efforts, which relied upon community groups, the Shrevecorps service youths, and prison community-service workers. South Manatee had a strong community leader who led code enforcement and cleanup efforts. Residents and program staff expressed great satisfaction with results of such beautification efforts. Community building/community development initiatives. Initiatives specifically aimed at community development were underused in some programs, given the importance of this dimension in the Weed and Seed strategy. Of course, community development is both a process objective and a desired outcome. Furthermore, community building occurs as a byproduct of working together on common goals, such as various community groups undertaking a neighborhood cleanup initiative. Nonetheless, some sites developed initiatives that had community capacity building as the central goal. Pittsburgh, in particular, made this a key program strategy, funding or organizing a variety of programs, which included: o Workshops on community development through the Community Technical Assistance Center. o Neighborhood technology centers. Weed and Seed organized an effort to create and maintain a community computer network, bringing together partners that had not previously worked together, including public schools, universities, libraries, neighborhood organizations, and the city. Recently, the police department provided the community network with Internet access to its new crime data mapping system. o A community development reference manual. With Weed and Seed and other funds, the Center for the Community Interest developed a manual to assist Pittsburgh community organizations in addressing neighborhood problems. Hartford hired a professional community organizer for Stowe Village, but that effort did not succeed in mobilizing residents as intended. A resident building captain program is now being implemented to increase resident capacity for self-governance. Across the sites, the safe havens and community centers supported by Weed and Seed provided a focal point for residents and community organizations. Regular outreach by Weed and Seed staff, including safe haven coordinators at some sites, played a vital role in increasing community awareness and gaining participation in neighborhood activities. For example, Shreveport Weed and Seed published a monthly calendar of events and programs in the target area. Adult employment/economic advancement programs. Hartford, Seattle, and Pittsburgh undertook training initiatives for adults, as well as youths. Computer programs were often well-received by the neighborhoods, including Seattle's Mid-town Commons Advanced Computer Training Project, which provided residents with Internet training and access. Hartford Weed and Seed installed a computer lab, which became very popular among Stowe Village residents who received computer and educational training and Internet access. Family support services targeted at adults. Hartford employed more family support service interventions than most sites because approximately 95 percent of its resident population was unemployed. Similarly, Las Vegas undertook relatively more family support initiatives, particularly in the Meadows Village target area, which had a relatively transient population and a high concentration of recent immigrants. Community economic development facilitation. Although staff at some Weed and Seed sites participated in economic development initiatives, this program component usually received the least attention, particularly in the beginning, when more basic neighborhood concerns needed to be addressed. Pittsburgh was one of the few sites that focused on economic development in any systematic way. In Pittsburgh's Hill District, located near the business center, the Weed and Seed umbrella brought various parties together around economic development issues. The Hill District had already received a major urban revitalization grant, and community organizations were active in economic development planning. Weed and Seed facilitated and advanced these efforts. Conversely, economic development prospects were far different in Pittsburgh's Hazelwood target area--a former mill town--which was less geographically desirable for investors. Economic development, part of the neighborhood restoration phase of Weed and Seed, was a program area that was difficult to define for most sites. Of course, the principal goal of Weed and Seed was to improve conditions to make economic development possible. One needs to consider the short timeframe covered in this discussion of program implementation--only 2 to 4 years--when economic development is the program component least under the control of a small target area and most dependent on a variety of prerequisites. The implementation of such Weed and Seed elements, as discussed above, provided target neighborhoods with positive steps in the direction of community restoration. To assist in this implementation, EOWS provided technical assistance to a number of sites. Notes 1. Please refer to the case studies for a more indepth review of each site's program. 2. The steering committee has an inherently complicated management structure because the U.S. Attorney is its designated head, yet the grantee is the organization responsible for fiscal management and day-to-day program operation. The Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual suggests that the primary role of the U.S. Attorney, as leader of the steering committee, is to bring Federal resources to the program-- particularly in the area of criminal justice--and to use the authority of that office to advance consensual program goals. 3. Shreveport also held and publicized monthly neighborhood Weed and Seed meetings. Weed and Seed program officials found initially that their steering committee membership was overly large (30 members), and participants did not understand the magnitude of the commitment involved. Eventually, however, a core group of 18 that met monthly operated more effectively. 4. Five seed committees were formed--grants, community empowerment, planning and strategies, youth focus, and budget administration. 5. Conversely, dividing Weed and Seed across city departments could potentially increase program fragmentation and lead to a lack of integration of weeding and seeding, without coordination. Having a program in one place creates a synergy that otherwise may be harder to achieve, depending upon preexisting relationships and program leadership. 6. Such political changes affected not only the role of the mayor's office but also other participants including the U.S. Attorney. 7. On the other hand, potential weaknesses of community-based organizations include lack of resources (as compared with a city grantee) and less power to institutionalize changes citywide. With less institutional authority, community-based organizations must rely more on consensus building. 8. In addition to strategic planning, sites also must prepare for Federal grant management and the required fiscal reporting; at least two cities had difficulties setting up the necessary accounting systems. 9. In a site such as Hartford's Stowe Village, where Weed and Seed funding per capita was greatest, a variety of programs could be funded with significant reach and intensity while funding lasted; it is unclear, however, how this will be sustained. For sites with larger populations and multiple neighborhoods, careful planning and targeting became even more important. 10. The Manatee/Sarasota program continues to advance this process as it makes the transition from a demonstration to a training site. 11. Kretzmann, John, and John McKnight, Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward Finding and Mobilizing Community Assets, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Neighborhood Innovation Network, 1993. 12. Pittsburgh Weed and Seed used NPRL funds to hire a consultant to assess the training needs of the community-based organization in the first and second Weed and Seed locations. The program also used the funds to automate financial recordkeeping and to enhance the technology project that provided community residents with greater access to information. Program participants had anticipated the NPRL funds would enhance the city's access to other Federal funds--this leveraging did not occur because the participation of other Federal agencies in this effort was minimal. The Shreveport Weed and Seed program decided to decline its NPRL grant award after the site was unable to get clear Federal NPRL program guidelines. 13. Incorporating the risk factors strategic approach into the evaluation criteria, the evaluation firm relied upon a community survey, interviews with project participants, and program documentation. Evaluation staff also helped Weed and Seed staff review and assess proposed new seeding programs. 14. In Shreveport, the first evaluation firm was dismissed because it could not recognize and diagnose significant initial implementation problems; the evaluator painted a false, rosy picture instead of providing constructive analysis and feedback. 15. Shreveport did not begin with a major crackdown but rather with the permanent assignment of a small number of additional officers to the target area. 16. In its preweeding effort, Manatee initially focused on reducing property crime. 17. For example, Shreveport has recently focused on such issues as truancy, public drinking, and loitering. 18. Salt Lake City Weed and Seed worked closely with the existing Metro Narcotics Task Force that focused on high-level drug dealers. 19. The Manatee/Sarasota program decided the most appropriate strategy for the area was to target six noncontiguous neighborhoods simultaneously. Law enforcement officials believed they could have a much greater impact through a simultaneous, coordinated effort so that crime would not simply be displaced from one neighborhood to the other. Displacement problems would otherwise have been exacerbated by having four different local law enforcement agencies that did not coordinate their activities prior to Weed and Seed. Additional factors in having the six target areas included the desire to rely on greater leveraging of resources and issues of fairness. 20. While the agencies funded the core positions, a second law enforcement position and enforcement overtime were funded by Weed and Seed; Weed and Seed also paid for Violent Crimes Task Force overhead, including rent, equipment, and training. 21. Violent Crimes Task Force report, June 1997. 22. Exceptions include the Las Vegas Weed and Seed task force and the Hartford Police Department, which track Weed and Seed cases. 23. Typically, cases would get plea bargained with a sentence of probation, often with probation on top of probation for repeat violators. The Weed and Seed steering committee, not including the U.S. Attorney, eventually wrote letters to judges expressing the community's concern about the probation problem; the letters were received positively by the majority of judges, and several judges met with the steering committee to discuss this and related issues. In response to this sentencing problem, Weed and Seed officers also met monthly with State probation and parole officers to catch people in violation of parole, which leads to mandatory sentencing. 24. Other complicating factors for sites such as Shreveport included inadequate court capacity and judicial dispositions toward sentencing that were beyond the control of Weed and Seed. 25. Manatee/Sarasota Counties already had strong prosecution and sentencing prior to Weed and Seed; cooperation increased for Weed and Seed cases, however. 26. As outlined in the Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual. 27. Weed and Seed led to Manatee County's COPS grant award, which paid for its community policing staff. 28. Of course, with community-oriented policing, the boundaries expand more. 29. This was one of the few examples of a substantial business-sector partnership established in the Weed and Seed sites. 30. One provider indicated a year of funding was not enough time to integrate a new service into her program. 31. Program staff also bartered services. ------------------------------ Chapter 3 Throughout the program, Weed and Seed officials targeted criminal activity within the target areas, focusing specifically on seven Part 1 crimes--homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The reduction of these crimes was generally viewed as one of the most important Weed and Seed goals and a key indicator of its success. Results were generally positive. However, there was some variation by site according to preexisting crime trends and the concentration of program resources. Analysis of Law Enforcement Data To analyze arrest and crime patterns in the Weed and Seed target areas, researchers requested computerized incident-level data from law enforcement agencies in each of the eight Weed and Seed sites, including basic facts about each arrest and crime (for example, when and where the crime was committed) and each criminal charge associated with each arrest and crime. Because the primary interest was in arrests that were made and crimes that occurred in the target areas, procedures were developed to identify those arrests and crimes in the jurisdictionwide files. In most cases, the procedures involved geocoding the address where the arrest was made or where the crime occurred.[1] The focus was also on the seven Part 1 crimes. Although these crimes account for only one segment of the overall crime problem (ignoring, for example, order maintenance and other crimes closely associated with quality-of-life issues), there are standard definitions of these crimes that all law enforcement agencies follow, thus allowing for site-to-site comparisons. Given that controlling drug trafficking and drug-related crime is one of the key Weed and Seed objectives, researchers also focused on drug arrests.[2] Finally, researchers analyzed annual changes in these arrests and crimes. More detailed analyses focusing on monthly trends are contained in the case study reports on each site. Arrest trends in the target areas Chapter 2 discussed how the evaluation sites implemented the weed component of their Weed and Seed strategy. In general, the approaches included some form of increased law enforcement presence in the target areas. One indicator of the degree of success in weeding is the number of arrests made, which is examined in this section.[3] Exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 show, respectively, annual figures for arrests for Part 1 crimes and for drug arrests.[4] "Weed and Seed years," rather than calendar years, are shown in the exhibits. In both exhibits, the annual total number of arrests, the annual number of arrests per 1,000 residents, and the percentage change in arrests from the preceding year are shown for both the Weed and Seed target area and for the remainder of the jurisdiction. With the exception of Salt Lake City, only complete (12-month) years are shown.[5] Salt Lake City is presented differently because only 5 months of arrest data were available prior to the start of its Weed and Seed program in August 1995.[6] Thus, to have any basis for comparison to the period prior to Weed and Seed, year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City were based only on data from March through July. Annual arrest rates are therefore not shown for Salt Lake City. Figures for Las Vegas and Akron also are not shown in these exhibits--felony arrest data from Las Vegas were not available, and less than 2 complete years of arrest data from Akron were provided. The annual arrest rates illustrate some differences across the sites and between individual target areas and the remainder of each site's corresponding jurisdiction. Hartford consistently has the highest Part 1 and drug arrest rates per 1,000 persons across the evaluation sites. Hartford's rates, in particular, are about 10-15 times higher than drug arrest rates in any of the other sites. Ignoring Hartford, the Part 1 arrest rates are fairly similar, although Pittsburgh's and Seattle's drug arrest rates are about twice those in the other sites. In comparing the target areas to the rest of their jurisdictions, in four of the six sites (North Manatee, South Manatee, Seattle, and Shreveport), the target area Part 1 arrest rate is comparable to the rate in the remainder of the jurisdiction. All of the target areas have significantly higher drug arrest rates than their surrounding corresponding jurisdictions. In interpreting year-to-year changes in arrest rates, one might expect to find high arrest rates during the first year or so of Weed and Seed implementation, reflecting an initial intense level of weeding. If these initial weeding activities were successful, then, as implementation continues into later years, one might expect a decline in the number of arrests, assuming there was a fairly constant level of enforcement in the target area. Exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 show this occurred in most of the Weed and Seed sites. For example, drug arrest rates declined in five of the seven target areas--Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and, to a lesser extent, Seattle and Shreveport. Drug arrest rates in both Salt Lake City and South Manatee had not yet shown any decline. Changes in Pittsburgh are especially significant. Prior to Weed and Seed, the Crawford-Roberts area had a drug arrest rate four times higher than the rest of the city, but 4 years after Weed and Seed began, the target area's drug arrest rate was about the same as the rate for the rest of the city. Rates for Part 1 arrests also declined in Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee, South Manatee, and Seattle. Crime trends in the target areas A reduction in crime is generally viewed as one of the most important goals of Weed and Seed. Thus, the extent to which crime was reduced in the target areas is an important indicator of Weed and Seed's overall success, recognizing, of course, that a variety of factors unrelated to Weed and Seed can affect crime rates. Exhibit 3.3 shows annual Part 1 crime statistics for the Weed and Seed target areas and for the remaining non-Weed and Seed part of the jurisdiction. The format of this exhibit is the same as the Part 1 arrest and drug arrest charts shown in exhibits 3.1 and 3.2. As was the case with arrest data, Salt Lake City is presented differently because only 5 months of crime data were available prior to the start of its Weed and Seed program in August 1995. The annual number of Part 1 crimes in the target areas shown in exhibit 3.3 highlights the significant differences across the target areas--there is roughly a 10-fold difference in the number of Part 1 crimes between the target areas in the low range (Hartford and North Manatee) and those in the high range (Seattle and Shreveport). The Part 1 crime rates per 1,000 residents vary less, with about a threefold difference between the smallest (Akron and North Manatee) and largest (Meadows Village and Shreveport) rates. A primary area of interest in exhibit 3.3 is the difference between the target area crime rates before and after the start of Wee