Title: Citizen Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation Series: NIJ Issues and Practices Author: Peter Finn Published: March 2001 Subject: Law enforcement, program evaluation 209 pages 454,000 bytes --------------------------- Figures, charts, forms, and tables are not included in this ASCII plain-text file. To view this document in its entirety, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file available from this Web site or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851- 3420 (877-712-9279 For TTY users). --------------------------- Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Office of Justice Programs World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation by Peter Finn March 2001 NCJ 184430 --------------------------- National Institute of Justice Vincent Talucci Program Monitor Advisory Panel* K. Felicia Davis, J.D. Legal Consultant and Director at Large National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Administrator Citizen Review Board 234 Delray Avenue Syracuse, NY 13224 Mark Gissiner Senior Human Resources Analyst City of Cincinnati Immediate Past President, 1995-99 International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement 2665 Wayward Winds Drive Cincinnati, OH 45230 Douglas Perez, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Sociology Plattsburgh State University 45 Olcott Lane Rensselaer, NY 12144 Jerry Sanders President and Chief Executive Officer United Way of San Diego County P.O. Box 23543 San Diego, CA 92193 Former Chief San Diego Police Department Samuel Walker, Ph.D. Kiewit Professor Department of Criminal Justice University of Nebraska at Omaha 60th and Dodge Streets Omaha, NE 68182 Lt. Steve Young Vice President Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police 222 East Town Street Columbus, OH 43215 *Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their diverse views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should not infer that panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any particular type of citizen review. Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by Abt Associates Inc., under contract #OJP-94-C-007. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. --------------------------- Foreword In many communities in the United States, residents participate to some degree in overseeing their local law enforcement agencies. The degree varies. The most active citizen oversight boards investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend actions to the chief or sheriff. Other citizen boards review the findings of internal police investigations and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings. In still others, an auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's department accept or investigate complaints and reports to the department and the public on the thoroughness and fairness of the process. Citizen oversight systems, originally designed to temper police discretion in the 1950s, have steadily grown in number through the 1990s. But determining the proper role has a troubled history. This publication is intended to help citizens, law enforcement officers and executives, union leaders, and public interest groups understand the advantages and disadvantages of various oversight systems and components. In describing the operation of nine very different approaches to citizen oversight, the authors do not extol or disparage citizen oversight but rather try to help jurisdictions interested in creating a new or enhancing an existing oversight system by: o Describing the types of citizen oversight. o Presenting programmatic information from various jurisdictions with existing citizen oversight systems. o Examining the social and monetary benefits and costs of different systems. The report also addresses staffing; examines ways to resolve potential conflicts between oversight bodies and police; and explores monitoring, evaluation, and funding concerns. No one system works best for everyone. Communities must take responsibility for fashioning a system that fits their local situation and unique needs. Ultimately, the author notes, the talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key participants are more important to the procedure's success than is the system's structure. --------------------------- Acknowledgments I thank the many individuals who patiently answered my questions and sent me materials about their citizen oversight procedures. In particular, I thank the following oversight directors and coordinators: Barbara Attard, Lisa Botsko, Mary Dunlap, Suzanne Elefante, Patricia Hughes, Liana Perez, Melvin Sears, Todd Samolis, Ruth Siedschlag, and Joseph Valu. The following advisory panel members (whose titles are listed on the back of the title page) provided a large number of helpful comments during a 1-day meeting in Washington, D.C., and reviewed the draft report: K. Felicia Davis, Mark Gissiner, Douglas Perez, Jerry Sanders, Samuel Walker, and Steve Young. Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their diverse views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should not infer that the panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any particular type of citizen review. Benjamin Tucker, former Deputy Director of Operations of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and Phyllis McDonald, Social Science Analyst with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), also participated in the board meeting and made important contributions. Pierce Murphy, Community Ombudsman in Boise, Idaho, provided valuable suggestions for improving the report. Vincent Talucci, Program Manager for the project at NIJ, provided wise guidance and constant support. Terence Dunworth, Managing Vice President at Abt Associates Inc., offered numerous suggestions for improving the report, most important, a complete reconfiguration of the executive summary and discussion of program costs. Mary-Ellen Perry and Joan Gilbert carefully produced the numerous report drafts. Peter Finn Associate Abt Associates Inc. --------------------------- Executive Summary Introduction There has been a considerable increase in the number of procedures involving citizen oversight of police implemented by cities and counties in the 1990s. However, many of these procedures have had a troubled history involving serious-even bitter-conflict among the involved parties. Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation is designed to help jurisdictions that may decide to establish-or wish to improve-an oversight system to avoid or eliminate these battles. At the same time, the publication can help oversight planners understand and choose among the many options available for structuring a citizen review procedure. Finally, current oversight staff and volunteers may find it useful to review the publication as a way of learning more about the field. To provide this assistance, Citizen Review of Police describes the operations of nine very different systems of citizen oversight. However, the publication does not promote any particular type of citizen review-or citizen review in general. Rather, the report is intended to help local government executives and legislators, as well as police and sheriff's department administrators, union leaders, and local citizen groups and public interest organizations, learn about the advantages, drawbacks, and limitations of a variety of oversight systems and components. Types of Citizen Oversight There is no single model of citizen oversight. However, most procedures have features that fall into one of four types of oversight systems: o Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff. o Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings. o Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police or sheriff's department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their own findings to the chief or sheriff. o Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the thoroughness and fairness of the process to the department and the public. All four types of oversight are represented among the nine citizen review systems described in this report (see exhibit 1). Each type of system has advantages and drawbacks. For example, oversight systems that involve investigating citizen complaints (type 1) can help reassure the public that investigations of citizen complaints are thorough and fair. However, hiring professional investigators can be expensive, and the investigations model typically has no mechanism for soliciting the public's general concerns about police conduct. Whatever their specific advantages, any type of citizen oversight needs to be part of a larger structure of internal and external police accountability; citizen oversight alone cannot ensure that police will act responsibly. Oversight Costs Exhibit 2 presents the nine oversight systems arranged in ascending order of budget levels along with their activity levels for 1997. As shown, there is a theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems and cost. o Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate allegations and recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint, Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the most expensive largely because professional investigators must be hired to conduct the investigations-lay citizens do not have the expertise or the time. o Type 2 systems, in which citizens review the internal affairs unit's findings (e.g., Orange County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because volunteers typically conduct the reviews. o Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants' appeals of police findings (Portland), can also be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers. o Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff's department's own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the midlevel price range. On one hand, like type 1 systems, only a paid professional has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand, typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is less time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints. In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight operations are not "pure" examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. For example, two jurisdictions have combined two different oversight approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the police bureau's complaint investigation process (type 4); Tucson has both a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and an auditor (type 4). Consequently, the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more or less expensive than the cost of a pure type. Furthermore, each type of oversight system can incorporate features that may increase or decrease its expenses, ranging from providing policy recommendations to a mediation option. The choice of staffing option also will affect expenditures, including using volunteer staff or in-kind services and materials, hiring paid staff, or diverting part of the time of an existing city or police employee to oversight functions. As a result, it is difficult to predict an oversight system's actual costs before determining all its features and activities. Finally, more money may not buy more oversight activity or increase use of the system-that is, boost the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, policy recommendations, reviews, or audits. A variety of cost-insensitive considerations-the public's perception of the system's fairness, the director's impartiality and talent, the level of cooperation from the police or sheriff's department, and restrictions on the kinds of complaints the system will be prohibited from handling or required to accept-can prevent additional funds from resulting in increased use of the oversight system. That said, an oversight procedure that is underfunded will not only have difficulty achieving its objectives, it also may create more controversy surrounding police accountability than it resolves. Conclusions This report suggests at least four other significant conclusions regarding citizen oversight of the police. Local jurisdictions that wish to establish citizen review have to take on the responsibility to make difficult choices about the type of oversight system they should fashion. The tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems described in this report conduct business-and pay for their activities-may seem discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented citizen review features around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. On the positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel obligated to follow slavishly any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, collective bargaining agreements, and pressure groups. Many individuals and groups believe that citizen oversight, despite its serious limitations, can have important benefits. Complainants have reported that they: o Feel "validated" when the oversight body agrees with their allegations-or when they have an opportunity to be heard by an independent overseer regardless of the outcome. o Are satisfied at being able to express their concerns in person to the officer. o Feel they are contributing to holding the department accountable for officers' behavior. Police and sheriff's department administrators have reported that citizen oversight: o Improves their relationship and image with the community. o Has strengthened the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged officer misconduct and reassured the public that the process is thorough and fair. o Has made valuable policy and procedure recommendations. Local elected and appointed officials say an oversight procedure: o Enables them to demonstrate their concern to eliminate police misconduct. o Reduces in some cases the number of civil lawsuits (or successful suits) against their cities or counties. It is sometimes possible to overcome disagreements between oversight operations and police and sheriff's departments. The report identifies many points of conflict between oversight systems and police and sheriff's departments-and with officer unions. However, as illustrated in exhibit 3, there are positions each side can take and explanations it can offer that can sometimes make the system acceptable to everyone involved. A critical step to minimizing conflict is for the police or sheriff's department--and union leadership--to act as colleagues in the planning process. The talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key participants--in particular, the oversight system's director, chief elected official, police chief or sheriff, and union president--are more important to the procedure's success than is the system's structure. The report identifies jurisdictions in which these individuals have worked together cooperatively. An effective procedure for selecting competent and objective oversight investigators, board members, and administrators--and for training them thoroughly--is also critical for the oversight procedure to thrive. Exhibit 4 is a checklist oversight system planners can consult to help identify some of the decisions they will have to make in designing and setting up a new or revised review procedure. The exhibit indicates where in this report's text each decision is discussed. --------------------------- Contents Foreword Acknowledgments Executive Summary Introduction Types of Citizen Oversight Oversight Costs Conclusions Chapter 1: Introduction Key Points What the Publication Is Intended to Do Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review of Police The need for the report Features of the Report Sources of information for the publication Terminology used in the report Types of Citizen Review Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight Potential benefits to complainants Potential benefits to police and sheriff's departments Potential benefits to elected and appointed officials Potential benefits to the community at large Limitations to Citizen Review Notes Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures The Berkeley, California, Police Review Commission: A Citizen Board and the Police Department Investigate Complaints Simultaneously Background The review process Other activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman's Office: An Ombudsman Investigates Selected Citizen Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies Background The review process Other activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority: An Oversight System Investigates and Hears Citizen Complaints Background The complaint process Other CRA activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The Orange County, Florida, Citizen Review Board: A Sheriff's Department Provides Executive Support to an Independent Review Board Background The CRB procedure Other activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The Portland, Oregon, Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee: A City Council, Citizen Advisers, and a Professional Examiner Share Oversight Responsibilities Background Citizen appeals of IA findings Audits PIIAC (city council and mayor) Other activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The Rochester, New York, Civilian Review Board: Trained Mediators Review Citizen Complaints Background Procedure Other responsibilities Staffing and budget Distinctive features The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission: A Police-Managed Board Recommends Discipline Background The review process Staffing and budget Distinctive features San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints: An Independent Body Investigates Most Citizen Complaints for the Police Department Background The complaint filing process Other activities Staffing and budget Distinctive features Tucson's Dual Oversight System: A Professional Auditor and a Citizen Review Board Collaborate Background The independent police auditor Citizen Police Advisory Review Board The relationship between the board and the auditor Distinctive features Chapter 3: Other Oversight Responsibilities Key Points Policy Recommendations The process of developing policy recommendations Examples of policy recommendations Mediation Formal mediation: The process Potential benefits of mediation Drawbacks to mediation Early Warning Systems Oversight involvement in EWS Benefits and drawbacks of EWS Notes Chapter 4: Staffing Key Points Volunteer Board Members Planning decisions Selection of board members Recruitment Training Inservice training Investigators Recruitment Training Executive Director or Auditor Notes Chapter 5: Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight Key Points Outreach Publicity materials Postings Media Neighborhood groups and other agencies Filing locations Referrals by the police Issues of Oversight Mechanics Oversight's legal basis Eligible complainants and cases Subpoena power Other structural issues Minimizing Delays Openness of Oversight Proceedings Politics Conflict among local government officials Agendas on the part of volunteers Notes Chapter 6: Resolving Potential Conflicts Between Oversight Bodies and Police Key Points Preliminary Steps for Minimizing Conflict Police Criticisms of Oversight Procedures Citizens should not interfere with police work Citizens do not understand police work The process is unfair Oversight Criticisms of the Police Working With the Union Historical conflict between most police unions and citizen oversight bodies Approaches to collaboration Time may help but is not the cure-all Notes Chapter 7: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding Key Points Monitoring The intake process Investigators' work Board members' performance Consumer Satisfaction Surveys Evaluating the Citizen Oversight Process Establishing objectives The Albuquerque evaluation Funding The relationship between oversight costs and oversight activity The relationship between cost and oversight type The importance of adequate funding Notes Chapter 8: Additional Sources of Help Key Points Organizations Selected Program Materials Selected Publications and Reports Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police Glossary Appendixes Appendix A: Rochester Internal Affairs Request for Board Member Evaluations of Investigators' Investigations Appendix B: Portland Auditor's Guidelines for Reviewing Internal Affairs Investigations Appendix C: San Francisco Complaint Intake Form Appendix D: San Francisco Policy for Citizen Monitoring of Police During Demonstrations Appendix E: Cost Estimates for Different Modifications to Tucson's Existing Oversight Procedure Index List of Exhibits Exhibit 1. Type and Selected Features of Nine Oversight Systems Exhibit 2. 1997 Oversight System Costs in Relation to Responsibilities and Activity Exhibit 3. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff's Departments-and Union Leaders-Express About Citizen Oversight-and Possible Responses Exhibit 4. Decisions Oversight Planners Need to Make Exhibit 1-1. Sample Tradeoffs Jurisdictions Need to Consider in Choosing an Oversight Procedure Exhibit 1-2. Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight for Police and Sheriff's Departments Exhibit 1-3. Limitations to Citizen Oversight Exhibit 2-1. Selected Features of the Nine Oversight Systems Exhibit 2-2. Additional Features of the Nine Oversight Systems Exhibit 2-3. Citizen Complaint Process in Berkeley Exhibit 2-4. Berkeley Police Review Commission Budget, Fiscal Year 1998-99 Exhibit 2-5. Flint Office of the Ombudsman's Investigation Process Exhibit 2-6. Flint Ombudsman's Office 1998-99 Budget Exhibit 2-7. Disposition of 159 Signed Complaints in 1997 Exhibit 2-8. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority Complaint Process Exhibit 2-9. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority 1998 Budget Exhibit 2-10. The Orange County Citizen Review Process Exhibit 2-11. Steps in the Portland Audit Procedure Exhibit 2-12. Rochester Citizen Oversight Process Exhibit 2-13. Center for Dispute Settlement CRB and Conciliation Budget for Fiscal Year 1998-99--50 Exhibit 2-14. St. Paul Citizen Review Process Exhibit 2-15. Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission 1995 Budget Exhibit 2-16. San Francisco's Oversight Process Exhibit 2-17. Office of Citizen Complaints 1998-99 Budget Exhibit 2-18. Citizen Oversight Process in Tucson Exhibit 2-19. Tucson Independent Police Auditor Budgets for Fiscal Years 1997-98 and 1998-99 Exhibit 3-1. Portland Police Bureau Bulletin on Handcuffing Issued in Response to Auditor's Recommendation Exhibit 3-2. Minneapolis Mediation Program Rules Exhibit 3-3. Mediation Summary and Agreement Form Exhibit 3-4. Potential Benefits of Mediation to Citizens and Police Exhibit 5-1. Oversight Outreach Methods Exhibit 5-2. OCC Incident Information Card Exhibit 5-3. Flier Included in Letter the Portland Police Bureau Sends to Complainants Notifying Them of Their Cases/Findings Exhibit 5-4. Number of Days Each of 10 Complaints Remained at 3 San Jose Police Department Offices Exhibit 6-1. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff's Departments-and Union Leaders Express About Citizen Oversight-and Possible Responses Exhibit 7-1. Minneapolis Consumer Satisfaction Post-Outcome Survey Exhibit 7-2. Costs of Nine Oversight Systems in 1997 in Relation to Responsibilities and Activity Exhibit 8-1. Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police --------------------------- Chapter 1: Introduction This chapter explains the purposes of Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation and reports the benefits and limitations that participants attribute to citizen oversight of the police. The report has seven other chapters: o Chapter 2: nine case studies of citizen oversight. o Chapter 3: three additional responsibilities oversight systems often undertake: policy and training recommendations, mediation, and early warning systems. o Chapter 4: recruiting, screening, and training oversight staff. o Chapter 5: special issues related to citizen oversight, including outreach, structure, openness, and politics. o Chapter 6: resolving potential conflicts between oversight bodies and police. o Chapter 7: monitoring, evaluating, and funding oversight systems. o Chapter 8: organizations, materials, and individuals that can provide assistance with establishing, improving, or evaluating oversight systems. Following a glossary, appendixes provide sample materials from the jurisdictions studied. In addition to the table of contents, readers may locate specific topics of interest from the key points that precede each chapter and from the index. What the Publication Is Intended to Do Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review of Police This report has been written primarily for: o Local government executives, including mayors and city managers. o Local legislators, including city council members and county commissioners. This report will also be of interest to: o Law enforcement administrators, including chiefs, sheriffs, and their management staff. o Union leaders. o Citizen groups and public interest organizations. Oversight directors may find it helpful to ask new oversight investigators or board members to read the publication to learn more about the field. Citizen Review of Police describes citizen oversight procedures in nine jurisdictions. The descriptions are intended to: o Enable jurisdictions that may consider setting up a citizen oversight process to benefit from the experience of communities that have already established procedures. o Enable jurisdictions that already have citizen review to improve their procedures based on the experiences of these nine cities and counties. The publication does not promote any particular type of citizen review--or citizen oversight in general. Rather, it is intended to: o Help jurisdictions decide whether they want to create some form of citizen oversight of police or modify the system they already have. o Help jurisdictions select a citizen oversight system that will best meet their particular needs. Citizen Review of Police does not evaluate the nine citizen oversight systems; rather, it describes their operations and the problems they have faced. The report also does not focus on the activities of police and sheriff's department internal affairs units except insofar as they interact with civilian oversight bodies (see "Larger Law Enforcement Agencies Have Internal Affairs Units to Investigate Allegations of Police Misconduct"). The need for the report There has been a considerable increase in the number of oversight procedures that various cities and counties have implemented in the 1990s (see "A Short History of Citizen Review"). However, many of these procedures have had a troubled history that has involved opposition from concerned citizens and community organizations and from law enforcement agencies and police unions. In many cases, the procedures have been revamped, in some cases litigated, and in at least one city (Washington, D.C.) abandoned. One reason for controversy in many jurisdictions has been the lack of advance planning for an oversight system. The main problem with many citizen review procedures . . . is that they have not had a clear vision of their role and mission . . . . This has usually been the result of a failure of civic leadership. Both community activists and government officials have not taken the trouble to study what other jurisdictions are doing, to borrow the best practices and to learn from their mistakes.[1] [Civilian oversight systems] are often put together quickly and with little thought as to their workability or with much consideration as to how they fit into the review systems already in place.[2] Citizen Review of Police is intended to make it easier to plan an oversight procedure (or decide how to improve an existing procedure) in a thoughtful manner by presenting the options available for structuring a citizen review mechanism. Another reason for conflict regarding citizen oversight is that-even with advance planning-public officials, police and sheriff's department executives, union leaders, police officers, and community activists usually have different expectations of what oversight should and can accomplish. This publication should help these parties identify and agree on reasonable and feasible objectives--and dispel unrealistic fears about what the process may do--so they can try to avoid the battles that many other jurisdictions have experienced. Features of the Report Sources of information for the publication The information presented in this report comes from five principal sources: 1. Literature on citizen oversight of the police (see chapter 8, "Additional Sources of Help"). 2. In-person interviews in Berkeley and San Francisco, California; Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; and Rochester, New York, with oversight staff (directors, board members, auditors, ombudsmen, investigators); complainants; law enforcement administrators, internal affairs investigators, police union leaders, and subject officers; local elected and appointed officials (e.g., city council members, mayors, city managers); and representatives of citizen groups. 3. Telephone interviews with similar individuals in four other communities: Flint, Michigan; Orange County (Orlando), Florida; Portland, Oregon; and Tucson, Arizona. 4. Less comprehensive telephone interviews with other oversight staff across the country (Kansas City, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; San Diego and San Jose, California; and Syracuse, New York). 5. Five members of an advisory board assembled to guide and review the publication (see the back of the title page). The nine jurisdictions studied were selected based on the suggestions of the advisory board. The oversight procedures studied represent a variety of approaches to citizen oversight in different areas of the country and in jurisdictions of varying size and governance (see exhibit 2-1 in chapter 2, "Selected Features of the Nine Oversight Systems"). Terminology used in the report Different law enforcement agencies use different terminology to denote identical or similar activities. To avoid confusion, Citizen Review of Police usually uses the following terms regardless of the local jurisdiction's actual terminology: o Complainant (sometimes called "appellant"). o Board and board member (sometimes called panelist/panel member, commission/commissioner). o Executive director or director (sometimes called "officer" or "examiner"). o Police union (also called federation, association). o Internal affairs (IA) (some departments have renamed their IA units "professional standards"). "Findings That Review Boards and Police Departments Make" identifies and defines the principal terms used to describe possible findings regarding allegations of officer misconduct. A glossary following chapter 8 defines other specialized terms used in the report. Types of Citizen Review According to experts, "There is no single model [of citizen oversight], and it is difficult to find two oversight agencies that are identical."[3] However, most oversight systems fall into one of four types:[4] o Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff. o Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings. o Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police or sheriff's department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their own findings to the chief or sheriff. o Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the thoroughness and fairness of the process to the department and the public. While some oversight procedures represent "pure" examples of these models, many oversight systems are hybrid models that merge features from the four different types into their own unique formulation. For example, the Office of Community Ombudsman in Boise, Idaho, created in 1999, combines the authority to investigate complaints-a type 1 oversight system-with the responsibility to review internal affairs investigations to determine if they are thorough and fair-a type 4 oversight system.[5] Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," any oversight system may undertake three other responsibilities in addition to investigating, reviewing, or auditing citizen complaints: 1. Recommending changes to department policies and procedures and suggesting improvements in training. 2. Arranging for informal or formal mediation. 3. Assisting the police or sheriff's department to develop or maintain an early warning system for identifying potentially problematic officers. To make an informed decision about which type of oversight procedure to adopt and which additional responsibilities to undertake, jurisdictions need to examine tradeoffs inherent in fashioning an oversight system-what they will gain and lose by the approach they select. Only with these tradeoffs in mind can communities select a system that will best meet their local needs, resources, and constraints. Exhibit 1-1 lists some of the tradeoffs jurisdictions need to consider in selecting an oversight procedure. In addition to weighing tradeoffs, selecting oversight features may depend on several criteria: o Which features does the public want? o Which features are most effective in achieving the goals the community expects the oversight procedure to achieve? o Which features may create conflict with the police or sheriff's department or the police union, and which features may disappoint community activists? o How much will the features cost? o How will the new features mesh with existing oversight procedures? Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight Oversight systems have the potential to benefit complainants, police and sheriff's departments, elected and appointed officials, and the public at large. The extent to which benefits materialize depends not only on the type of oversight procedure implemented but also, and critically, on how well these groups work together. The working relationships among the groups in turn depend to a tremendous extent on the personality, talents, dedication, flexibility, and open-mindedness of the principal actors in each group-in particular, the oversight director, the chief of police or sheriff, union leaders, the mayor, city council members, and the city manager. Potential benefits to complainants Citizen oversight can have three benefits for complainants. Oversight can: 1. Help complainants feel "validated" in the minority of instances in which oversight bodies agree with their allegations. I was afraid the investigation would be rush-rush, but it was very thorough. Before the hearing, the investigator was very comforting toward my son, who was only 16 years old, going over the process in detail with him. When I received a letter after the hearing that my son's allegations had been sustained, I was surprised. I didn't have faith in the powers that be to be objective. I was elated that my son had been heard and that the officer had to sit through the entire hearing. My son was happy, too; he didn't think he'd win either. --mother of a juvenile complainant The phenomenon of complainants [who] feel validated because the oversight body agrees with their allegations is only part of the story. As the procedural justice literature suggests, the process is as important as the outcome. People feel validated when they feel they have an opportunity to be heard. Civilian oversight is likely to enhance that feeling by virtue of appearing to be independent of the police department. --Samuel Walker, Professor, University of Nebraska at Omaha 2. Give complainants the satisfaction of expressing their concern in person to the officer when oversight includes a mediation option. Many complainants just want to be able to express their anger or concern face to face with the officer in an impartial setting without being cut off, and that is all they need. --Jackie DeBose, Berkeley Police Review Commission board member 3. Help hold the police or sheriff's department accountable for officers' behavior. I felt I had done my civic duty. This was a young cop [I complained about]. I coach people all the time [at his job], so I wanted this officer to get better supervision and training so that in a similar event he would not engage in the same misconduct. I felt good; the officer got the direction he needed. --a complainant [R]eview [by the Police Review Commission] of this incident [in which the commission exonerated officers of a complaint that their use of excessive force resulted in a man's death] prompted development of a new Berkeley Police Department Training and Information Bulletin regarding the risk of asphyxiation during four-point restraints. Development of this bulletin was a pivotal issue in bringing closure for the family and ensuring that their tragedy had some positive effect. --Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager, Berkeley Potential benefits to police and sheriff's departments As summarized in exhibit 1-2, police and sheriff's department personnel have identified several possible benefits citizen oversight can provide them, depending on the type of oversight procedure adopted. Oversight can: 1. Improve the department's relationships and image with the community by: o Helping to establish and maintain the department's reputation for fairness and firmness in addressing allegations of police misconduct. The board takes a lot of pressure or criticism off IA and the chief because citizens are making the decisions about misconduct and the department can't be accused of a coverup. --an IA commander Oversight makes the department's job easier because, if we couldn't point to the board's sustained rate of 10 percent, we would be criticized and accused of a coverup [because our internal rate would be just as low]. --a deputy chief o Helping reduce or eliminate community concerns regarding specific high-profile incidents of alleged misconduct. Two Rochester police officers arrested two individuals on drug-dealing charges. The mother of one of them claimed the two youths had been innocently walking down the street when the officers approached them. One officer got into a tussle with the mother's son and, the mother said, threw her son through a store window. Some members of the community were outraged at what they felt was police brutality. When the Civilian Review Board [CRB] heard the case, it learned that the two men had drugs in their possession. In addition, the store owner testified that the officers had bent over backwards to be polite to the men--and that the son had pushed the officer into the store window. Because the CRB exonerated the officers, the community calmed down. --Andrew Thomas, Executive Director, Rochester Center for Dispute Settlement We love being able to send cases to the board because we get less pressure from liberal groups about not properly disciplining officers. --an IA commander 2. Increase public understanding about the nature of police work, such as the occasions when officers need to use force. Help the public develop realistic expectations regarding actions officers are allowed to take--or departments have the personnel to take--to abate crime and disorder. 3. Promote the goals of community policing. According to the Berkeley Police Review Commission 1996 annual report: Community Involved Policing, especially its "Problem Solving" method of organizing police work, depends heavily on the involvement of especially those citizens who are demographically and geographically closest to crime and criminals. Therefore, it is undermined by hostility generated in the normal unfolding of police/citizen interactions at precisely the point at which it needs the most support. Some police administrators agree. Community policing is related to citizen review. It's another way to communicate with the public, another source of community input. --Fred Lau, Chief, San Francisco Police Department For community policing to be effective, the integrity of the agency and the community's trust in it are critical. The CRB [Citizen Review Board] contributes to the trust because nonsworn citizens are involved in reviewing the agency. --Kevin Beary, Orange County (Florida) Sheriff 4. Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged misconduct. The board has improved our professional standards' investigative reports because investigators get dressed down and embarrassed at hearings for any sloppiness, such as drawing conclusions on flimsy evidence. As a result, if there is any litigation on the complaint, the report will enhance the agency's position. --Capt. Melvin Sears, Orange County Sheriff's Office administrative coordinator to the Citizen Review Board Informally in discussions after hearings and in the questions board members ask of PSD [professional standards division] investigators during hearings, [board] members have made observations about deficiencies in the investigators' reports that have resulted in improved reporting. For example, board members kept objecting to the way officers and investigators included opinions in their reports, rather than just the facts. --Maj. Karon LaForte, Orange County Sheriff's Office IA commander Investigators do a better job investigating cases because they know that PIIAC [Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee] will be looking at their work product, so they are less likely to take shortcuts in their research and reporting than in the past. --Charles Moose, former Chief, Portland Police Bureau 5. Help reassure the public that the department already investigates citizen complaints thoroughly and fairly. Even when the department is capable of imposing appropriate discipline without citizen review, an oversight procedure can reassure skeptical citizens that the agency is doing its job in this respect. --Douglas Perez, former Deputy Sheriff, Professor, Plattsburgh (New York) State University 6. Help some subject officers feel vindicated. The St. Paul oversight board exonerated an officer after a citizen complained about an allegedly offensive remark the officer had made to a block party. When the officer and Donald Luna, the board chair, happened to meet at a graduation ceremony, the officer said: I want to thank you for the letter to the chief. I'd put in a lot of time and felt I had deescalated a tense situation. I couldn't believe there had been a complaint; I felt I deserved an award. I felt the commission understood me. 7.--Help discourage misconduct (see below). If I live a normal lifespan, I'm a citizen longer than I'm a cop, so I want a system of checks and balances to help prevent police misconduct. --Trevor Hampton, former Chief, Flint Police Department 8. Improve the department's policies and procedures (see chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities"). Potential benefits to elected and appointed officials By establishing or improving a citizen oversight mechanism, local officials can demonstrate their concern to eliminate police misconduct-or publicize a department's existing exemplary police behavior. Officials may also be able to reduce the number of civil lawsuits (or successful suits) against the city or county or the dollar value of successful awards. These suits can be expensive.[6] During a 6-month period alone, deaths and injuries resulting from police shootings resulted in more than 300 civil suits against the Washington, D.C., police department, with nearly $8 million in court settlements and judgments awarded.[7] o Joan Campbell, the chairperson of the Minneapolis City Council Ways and Means Committee, reports that, when citizens sue the city for alleged police brutality, the judge asks if the Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) sustained the case. In many instances in which CRA has not, the council has a stronger case for not settling with the complainant and for expecting the judge to rule in the city's favor. As a result, the city has gone to court on more cases and won most of them. Campbell also believes that CRA has reduced the number of complaints that have gone to litigation because complainants feel they have already had their day in court with the review board. o According to Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager in Berkeley, the Police Review Commission "saved the city at least $100,000 from one potential lawsuit alone." Because they did not trust the police to investigate the matter fairly, family members filed a complaint after a relative died from cardiac arrest in police custody after being put into four-point restraints. The board decided to hear the case en bloc and hired an independent toxicologist to review the medical records and do more testing. The toxicologist, as had the coroner previously, reported that use of force had not caused the person's death-aspiration due to a drug overdose was the cause. The family decided not to sue the city after the board concluded that the officers did not use excessive force. o Merrick Bobb, special counsel to Los Angeles County, reported: "In 1992 . . . the County of Los Angeles had 800 police misconduct cases pending. And the exposure to the taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles was calculated by the County's lawyers as far in excess of $600 million. Today, 5 years later, in 1997, we find the caseload has dropped from 800 cases to a little over 200 cases. We find that the amount of money that is being spent has dropped for the first time to below the 10 million mark in terms of judgments, settlements, and attorneys' fees in such cases. . . . I think this is a testament to the effect of civilian oversight, civilian review" initiated in 1993.[8] o Troubled in part by fatal shootings by Albuquerque police officers (31 in 10 years) and extremely high annual payments for tort claims involving police officers (up to $2.5 million per year), the Albuquerque city council hired two consultants in 1996 to evaluate the city's existing oversight system and recommend alternatives.[9] Potential benefits to the community at large Citizen oversight can benefit the entire community, not just individual complainants. Oversight can: 1. Help to reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being imposed. Even when departments are doing a top-notch job disciplining errant officers, the public may lack confidence in the process. An oversight procedure that provides citizens with a window into how the department operates can change the opinion of these concerned citizens. 2. Help discourage police misconduct. While there is no empirical evidence that oversight bodies can deter police misconduct,10 there are three ways in which citizen review may help encourage officers to act appropriately. o When oversight bodies recommend that an officer be retrained, the officer may learn how to avoid the type of behavior that led to the citizen complaint. o When police and sheriff's departments adopt policy and procedure changes that oversight bodies recommend, officers may have a better understanding regarding how they should perform their job. o Oversight bodies may discourage some officers from engaging in misconduct by reducing their chances for promotion. I was nervous about whether a sustained case might hamper my promotion to lieutenant. The chief had made it plain that an officer with sustained complaints would not be looked at as favorably for promotion as officers with no or fewer complaints. If you look at the people he's passed over, you can see that the officers with complaints have been passed over. --a lieutenant The [review] board influences assignments to [desirable] details. We have supervisors in units now who don't want "cowboys" in their units, so officers with complaints could get passed over. --an officer 3. Increase public understanding of police policies, procedures, and behavior. Complainants learn about police procedures from oversight investigators, board members, and officers during mediation. Board members themselves become better educated about police procedures and can share their understanding with other members of the community. Finally, by holding special public hearings, oversight bodies may be able to defuse tense community conflicts, channeling anger into constructive solutions. Berkeley's charter requires the Police Review Commission (PRC) to hold hearings at the request of board members or voters. PRC held a special public hearing after University of California police officers were accused of using excessive force against students during a campus demonstration. Although contentious, the meeting resulted in recommendations regarding officer conduct during demonstrations--several of which the department implemented--to help prevent future discord. Limitations to Citizen Review As summarized in exhibit 1-3, citizen oversight has several inherent and potential limitations. Citizen oversight systems need to be part of a larger structure of internal and external police accountability; by itself, citizen oversight cannot ensure that police will act responsibly. An evaluation of New York City's oversight system concluded, "In general, civilian complaint review procedures appear to be a necessary but insufficient component of the [New York City Police] Department's approach to controlling officer misconduct."[11] "Supplements to Citizen Oversight" suggests other procedures that, taken together with citizen oversight and an effective internal affairs unit, may improve police accountability in departments in which officer conduct needs improvement. The effectiveness of citizen oversight depends enormously on who the principal parties are. In Minneapolis, there was "a complete turnaround" in the relationship between the police department and the Civilian Police Review Authority after a new chief and a new executive director took over and the new mayor made clear she expected them to cooperate. Supporting this observation, a subject officer in Minneapolis wrote on his anonymous customer satisfaction survey in 1998, "It appears as though there have been some changes in the factfinding process, which resulted in a more satisfactory outcome. In the past I was unable to give a favorable opinion of the Civilian Police Review Authority, but I was pleased with this openness." Oversight bodies in the United States have limited authority. In particular, they do not have the power to discipline officers or establish department policies. In these areas, they are only advisory. Furthermore, oversight bodies have no influence on some police managers or, as a result, many or most line officers. According to one chief, "Boards can't be effective because officers fear IA, not them." Concerns about liability and supervisor criticisms may typically discourage misconduct much more than either citizen oversight or internal affairs investigations. In a related vein, oversight procedures generally focus on individual officers, letting supervisors off the hook in terms of management's responsibility for--and tremendous influence over--line officers' and deputies' behavior. As a result, unless the oversight system includes making recommendations for policy and procedure changes and has the ability to influence their adoption, department supervisory and training practices that may be allowing misconduct to occur will remain untouched. As one commentator observed, "The solution to rotten apples is to fix the police barrel."[12] Some police chiefs and sheriffs agree that they should be held accountable for preventing misconduct, and, if they fail, they should be dismissed. One chief commented, "If IA is not up to snuff, give the chief a chance to fix it, and, if he doesn't, fire him. So the solution [to police misconduct] is to hold the chief accountable." Some complainants who lose their cases (and even some who win) feel dissatisfied with the process, the results, or both. Others are frustrated that they cannot find out what the chief's or sheriff's finding was or whether and what kind of discipline was imposed. According to Jackie DeBose, a member of Berkeley's board, "I have run into several citizens who lost their cases, and they were livid--they felt they had been done an injustice." The Vera Institute of Justice in New York City surveyed a sample of 371 citizens who had filed complaints with the city's Citizen Complaints Review Board.13 The Vera Institute concluded that "the investigative process itself has a significant negative influence" on citizen satisfaction because of how long the process took and the lack of contact with and information about the subject officer and the final outcome. Some complainants, and a small minority of the public, will not be satisfied with any actions oversight bodies take. These individuals may have unreasonable expectations of how the police should behave or unreasonable hopes for what citizen oversight procedures can accomplish. Finally, oversight procedures in some jurisdictions have exacerbated tensions among local officials, police and sheriff's departments and unions, and citizen groups and activists. This worsening of the status quo has occurred for many reasons, such as unrealistic expectations on the part of activists or unrealistic apprehensions by police and sheriff's departments about what the oversight procedure would accomplish; failure to involve all affected parties in the planning process; biased oversight staff; inadequate funding leading to long delays in case processing; and political motives for setting up the procedure on the part of local officials. Despite these limitations, local government officials, law enforcement managers, and citizens in many jurisdictions believe that citizen oversight can be of value. The following chapters illustrate the potential benefits of citizen review as well as its limitations. Notes 1. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief, Occasional Paper Series, no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities & Culture, 1998: 5. 2. Snow, Robert, "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus," Law and Order 40 (December 1992): 51-56. 3. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department," prepared for the Albuquerque City Council, 1997: 121. 4. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1995. 5. An example of an oversight procedure that does not fall into any of these four types exists in Charlotte, North Carolina. The city's Community Relations Committee appoints a staff member to attend the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department's internal hearings of serious allegations against officers. The staff member contributes to the findings of each review panel and can give a minority report to the chief, city manager, and city council (which happened once). 6. "How Much Force Is Enough?" Law Enforcement News 24 (500) (November 30, 1998): 1. "The cost of a civil suit goes beyond expenses incurred by individual police officers. Such factors as the cost of liability insurance, litigation expenses, out-of-court settlements, and punitive damage awards all make civil liability an extremely expensive proposition for police officers, law enforcement agencies, governments, and, ultimately, taxpayers. . . . After several lawsuits are filed, . . . premium prices can skyrocket, or companies may refuse to ensure the department." Gaines, Larry K., Victor E. Kappeler, and Joseph B. Vaughn, Policing in America, 2d ed., Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 1997: 294. 7. "How Much Force Is Enough?", 1. 8. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement conference transcript, October 15-17, 1997, Lanham, Maryland. 9. Luna and Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department." 10. The oversight process lacks two qualities thought to be essential to deter misconduct: certainty and severity of punishment (Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police: The [New York City] Civilian Complaint Review Board, New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1988: 35). Oversight procedures also often lack a third critical element for deterrence: swiftness. 11. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police, 38. 12. Bayley, David, "Getting Serious about Police Brutality," in Accountability for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays, ed. Philip C. Sternberg, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995: 96. 13. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police. --------------------------- Key Points o Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation is written primarily for local government officials and legislators. Union leaders, local citizen groups, and new oversight staff may also find the publication useful. o The publication describes nine citizen oversight procedures to enable these audiences to benefit from the experiences of communities that have already established oversight procedures. o While there is no single model of citizen oversight, most systems fall into one of four types: --Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend findings to the chief or sheriff. --Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings. --Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their own findings to the chief or sheriff. --Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the process' thoroughness and fairness. o Oversight bodies can also: --Recommend changes in department policies and procedures and suggest improvements in training. --Arrange for mediation. --Assist the police or sheriff's department to develop or operate an early warning system for identifying problem officers. o If they wish to implement citizen review, to make an informed decision about which type of oversight procedure to adopt jurisdictions need to examine tradeoffs inherent in choosing a model: Most features of every model have drawbacks as well as benefits. o Citizen oversight has the potential to benefit many groups. o Complainants have reported feeling: --"Validated" when their allegations are sustained--or merely appreciated having an opportunity to be heard by an independent third party. --Gratified they are able to address an officer directly. --Satisfied the process appears to help hold police and sheriff's departments accountable. o Police administrators have said that oversight can: --Improve their relationship and image with the community. --Increase public understanding of the nature of police work. --Promote the goals of community policing. --Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations. --Reassure a skeptical public that the department already investigates citizen complaints thoroughly and fairly. --Help subject officers feel vindicated. --Help discourage misconduct. --Improve the department's policies and procedures. o Elected and appointed officials have indicated that oversight: --Demonstrates their concern for police conduct to constituents. --Can reduce the number, success rates, and award amounts of civil suits against the city or county. o Members of the community at large have suggested that oversight has helped to: --Reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being handed out for misconduct. --Discourage police misconduct. --Increase their understanding of police behavior. o There are serious limitations to what citizen review can accomplish. To be most effective, citizen oversight must complement other internal and external mechanisms for police accountability. --------------------------- Larger Law Enforcement Agencies Have Internal Affairs Units to Investigate Allegations of Police Misconduct Most large police and sheriff's departments have internal affairs (IA) units (sometimes called professional standards units) that investigate allegations of officer misconduct filed by citizens or other officers. In some departments, IA units not only recommend findings to the chief or sheriff, they also recommend the types of discipline (sometimes following guidelines that provide a range of punishments for different types of misconduct). In some departments, officers' supervisors investigate minor alleged misconduct, leaving serious cases to the IA unit. Some departments use supervisory panels composed of command-level staff who, after reviewing IA's investigation results, come to a finding and, if appropriate, recommend discipline. In smaller departments, the chief or sheriff investigates citizen complaints, or the complaints become a command responsibility. In all departments, the chief or sheriff makes the final determination of discipline, although in some jurisdictions an appointed or elected official (e.g., police commission) may overrule the decision. --------------------------- A Short History of Citizen Review The demand for citizen oversight first occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the civil rights movement and the perception in many quarters that law enforcement responded to racial unrest with excessive force. Many of these early review procedures were short lived.[1] Citizen review revived in the early 1970s as urban African-Americans gained more political power and as more white political leaders came to see the need for improved police accountability. Most oversight procedures have come into existence after a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct (usually a shooting or other physical force incident), often involving white officers and minority suspects. Racial or ethnic allegations of discrimination are often at the heart of movements to introduce citizen oversight.[2] By 2000, citizen review has become more widespread than ever before in the United States. As of early 1998, there were more than 90 citizen review procedures. Almost 80 percent of the largest cities had some form of citizen review.[3] However, only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the country had citizen oversight. 1. Snow, Robert, "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus," Law and Order 40 (December 1992): 51-56. 2. Terrill, Richard J., "Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns," in Complaints Against the Police: The Trend to External Review, ed. Andrew J. Goldsmith, Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991; see also Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus, "The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of Police," American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26. 3. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief, Occasional Paper Series no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities & Culture, 1998: 5. --------------------------- Findings That Review Boards and Police Departments Make Review boards and police departments generally use a common set of terms to identify the findings that their investigations can lead to: o Unfounded: The alleged act did not occur, or the subject officer was not involved in the act; therefore the officer is innocent. o Exonerated: The alleged act did occur, but the officer engaged in no misconduct because the act was lawful, justified, and proper (sometimes called "proper conduct"). o Not sustained: The evidence fails to prove or disprove that the alleged act(s) occurred. o Sustained: The alleged act occurred and was not justified (e.g., it violated department policy). Some oversight bodies and police departments come to findings that conclude the subject officer committed an act that was inappropriate but that hold the department responsible for the officer's misconduct: o Policy failure: Department policy or procedures require or prohibit the act (e.g., an officer may not use a cruiser to drive someone to a bus stop whose car was towed). o Supervision failure: Inadequate supervision--the officer's sergeant or lieutenant should have informed the officer not to engage in the act or to discontinue it (e.g., a sergeant asks a supervisor, "Here's what I've got. Is that probable cause to arrest the guy?" and the supervisor gives the officer bad advice). o Training failure: The officer receives inappropriate or no training in how to perform the act properly (e.g., distinguishing an intoxicated person from someone going into diabetic shock). --------------------------- Exhibit 1-1. Sample Tradeoffs Jurisdictions Need to Consider in Choosing an Oversight Procedure o Volunteers versus paid staff. Volunteer participants are lay community members who represent the concerns of the public. Professionals conduct the day-to-day work of citizen oversight, carrying out the public's wishes. On one hand, an oversight procedure involving only paid staff usually will not be as representative of the community as will a system that uses volunteers. On the other hand, the amount of time required to provide adequate oversight can normally be provided only by one or more paid staff who have been hired specifically to dedicate themselves to oversight activities. As a result, many oversight procedures use volunteers and paid staff. o Public hearings versus private hearings. Public hearings may make the community feel it has more control over police misconduct because officers' alleged misconduct is made known. Private hearings are simpler logistically and protect complainants and officers from public exposure. o Investigative authority versus review authority. Investigating complaints can help ensure they are done thoroughly and fairly, but hiring investigators can be expensive. Reviewing cases is less expensive but requires department cooperation in sharing records. Some oversight systems have both responsibilities. o Taking on additional responsibilities-policy recommendations, mediation, or early warning systems: -- Developing policy recommendations may involve a conflict of interest because investigating and reviewing cases requires impartiality, but developing policy recommendations may involve political advocacy. However, providing policy recommendations may expand the oversight body's influence. -- Mediation, usually held in private and kept confidential, may have less "teeth" than a public hearing. However, mediation may encourage citizens to file complaints; save the time and expense of a hearing; and educate officers about the impact of their words, behaviors, and attitudes on the public. -- Early warning systems can help identify potentially troublesome officers and may deter officer misconduct, but they may alienate officers if unsustained cases are included. o Accepting complaints directly versus accepting them only by referral from the police or sheriff's department. Citizens who may be reluctant to file complaints with the department may file with the oversight body, but outreach must be conducted to make citizens aware of this option. --------------------------- Exhibit 1-2. Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight for Police and Sheriff's Departments Law enforcement managers and line officers report that citizen oversight can provide a number of benefits to police and sheriff's departments depending on the type of oversight procedure adopted: 1. Improve the department's relationship and image with the community by: a. Helping to establish and maintain its reputation for investigating alleged officer misconduct with fairness and firmness. b. Helping to reduce community concerns about possible police coverups in high- profile cases. 2. Increase the public's understanding of police work, including the use of force. 3. Promote the goals of community policing. 4. Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged misconduct. 5. Reassure the public that the department's internal investigations of citizen complaints and its process for disciplining officers already are thorough and fair. 6. Help subject officers feel vindicated. 7. Help discourage misconduct among some officers. 8. Improve department policies and procedures. --------------------------- Abolishing Citizen Oversight Will Not Save a Police or Sheriff's Department Money Getting rid of the oversight body will not save the police or sheriff's department money. When the Minneapolis City Council was considering abolishing the Citizen Police Review Authority (CRA), Lt. Robert Skomra, the IA commander at the time, examined the number of cases CRA handled. Skomra determined that, if CRA disappeared, the police department would have to find the funds to at least double and possibly triple the number of existing IA investigators. The department would also have had to find desk space for the new investigators. Minneapolis police Chief Robert Olson agreed: "If the CRA were abolished, I would have to hire additional investigators." --------------------------- Some Police Chiefs Have Established Citizen Oversight Procedures on Their Own Police chiefs have taken the initiative to establish citizen oversight procedures on their own. o When Robert Olson, chief of the Minneapolis Police Department since 1995, was commissioner in Yonkers, New York, he established a civilian oversight program because of the department's poor relations with the African-American community. The review board he established included four civilians nominated by a citizen panel, an officer nominated by the police union, and three other officers Olson selected. He approved all the candidates. The board, which met monthly, reviewed completed IA cases and occasionally pending cases, and it had the authority to direct IA to conduct additional investigations. The board recommended findings, with Olson retaining the ultimate decision to decide caes and impose discipline. o William Finney, chief of the St. Paul Police Department, recommended the Police civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission on his own initiative because he felt the need to gain citizen's perspective on department behavior. (See the St. Paul case study in chapter 2.) --------------------------- Supplements to Citizen Oversight* Several other procedures for maintaining citizen oversight of law enforcement agencies can supplement a citizen review process. One or more of the alternatives listed below can also substitute for citizen review in certain cases of alleged police misconduct. Legislative Control Legislatures can monitor police behavior through investigations, appropriations pressure, oversight committees, and other means. Civil Litigation Complainants may sue police officers in State court and seek common law tort remedies. They may also sue in Federal court for violations of Federal civil rights. Criminal Prosecution Prosecutors at the local, State, and Federal levels can apply applicable criminal statutes to situations involving alleged police misconduct. Federal Government Suits Under a 1994 law, prosecutors may seek changes in the operations of local police departments in Federal courts. Suits by the U.S. Department of Justice can require reform through court-approved agreements in which police departments agree to change the way they track and handle citizen complaints and disciplinary decisions or by installing a Federal monitor to oversee the department's activities in these areas. Supervisor Accountability There are several internal actions police and sheriff's departments can take, if needed, that may make a significant difference in helping to prevent police misconduct, including effective applicant screening, recruit and inservice training, peer review, and, perhaps most important, leadership training. Lt. Bret Lindback with the Minneapolis Police Department emphasizes that chiefs and sheriffs should be given funding to provide: the best leadership training you can find to make supervisors and managers accountable for what their guys do on the street. . . . You need to train them to tell line officers, "You don't do that [misconduct, discourtesy] on my watch." A week's training when you get your sergeant's bar isn't enough. You need ongoing training, two or four times a year, to build good leadership skills. Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC), agrees: We need to review higher-ups' behavior to produce accountability among line officers. Otherwise, the beat officer gets scrutinized and the supervisors are never held accountable, never called to account. OCC addresses supervisors who share responsibility for officers' misconduct by charging them with failure to supervise the accused officer properly. In Banta v. City and County of San Francisco (1998), the presiding judge of the Superior Court dismissed a challenge to OCC's power to add an allegation against a sergeant for failure to supervise. In the last analysis, supervisor accountability extends to the chief or sheriff, who must exercise active responsibility for ensuring that his or her officers and deputies comport themselves appropriately. If the chief executive will not or cannot ensure proper conduct, it is the obligation of the mayor, city manager, or city council to find a new chief and the duty of the voters to elect a new sheriff. *For a more complete discussion of the alternatives, see Perez, Douglas W., Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994: 48-63. --------------------------- Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures This chapter presents brief case studies of nine oversight procedures arranged alphabetically by jurisdiction. The case studies concentrate primarily on the operational procedures of the oversight mechanisms. Details about other aspects of the jurisdictions' procedures are presented in other chapters of the report: o Chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," describes how the jurisdictions develop policy and procedure recommendations, implement mediation, and assist with early warning systems. o Oversight staffing arrangements are discussed in detail in chapter 4. o Chapter 5, "Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight," presents such problematic areas as intake, outreach, and "politics." o Chapter 6 identifies the most common areas of conflict between oversight mechanisms and police and sheriff's departments. o Monitoring, evaluation, and funding issues are addressed in chapter 7. Exhibit 2-1 identifies the location, type of system, principal activities, and paid staff and budget for each oversight mechanism. Exhibit 2-2 summarizes the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, and other pertinent activities each system conducted in 1997, the extent to which its proceedings are open to the public, whether it has subpoena power, and the types of complaints it reviews. As the exhibits illustrate--and the case studies that follow explain--there is enormous variation in the structure and operations of the nine systems. In fact, dissimilarity, rather than similarity, is the rule among the nine systems. In part this is because radically different systems were selected for inclusion in this report to illustrate the diversity in oversight mechanisms from which other jurisdictions can choose if they wish to develop a procedure of their own or modify an existing one. However, the diversity also reflects the fact that local officials have shaped their oversight systems very differently to accommodate unique local pressures (e.g., from activist groups, police unions, or office holders), legal considerations (e.g., with regard to the types of information that can be made public or the provisions of labor-management agreements), funding resources, and honest disagreements about what would work best in their communities. All four types of oversight approaches listed in footnote a in exhibit 2-1 are represented among the nine oversight systems. However, two jurisdictions have combined two different approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the department's complaint investigation process (type 4), while Tucson has a citizen board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and also an auditor (type 4). Other "models" are not pure either; for example, while San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints involves citizens in investigating complaints (type 1), OCC staff also prosecute cases at chief's hearings and before the police commission, a responsibility-and expense-that goes well beyond that of investigating complaints. Similarly, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) not only hires professional staff to investigate complaints (type 1) but its volunteer board members also hold hearings for complaints for which investigators have found probable cause. Furthermore, the CRA executive director prosecutes these cases before the civilian review board. While San Francisco's OCC and Minneapolis' CRA both investigate most complaints in place of internal affairs, Berkeley's Police Review Commission investigates cases simultaneously with internal affairs investigations. The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission and San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints recommend discipline to the chief. The independence of the nine oversight systems also varies considerably. The St. Paul police chief proposed the idea of a review commission, nominates its two sworn members, funds it, and houses it in the public safety building. While San Francisco's OCC operates independently of the police department and is funded by the city, its budget is a line item within the police department budget. The OCC director reports to the San Francisco Police Commission, which tries major discipline cases and ratifies policy and training changes. By contrast, an independent dispute resolution center operates Rochester's Civilian Review Board, appoints board members, and receives funding to staff the procedure directly from the city council. Oversight systems differ in other respects. While most systems may provide policy and procedure recommendations to the local police or sheriff's department, San Francisco's charter requires it to make policy recommendations. In addition, some systems rarely make recommendations, while others are constantly proposing them. Minneapolis and Rochester make considerable use of mediation. Until 1999, Berkeley's mediation system, although required by statute, was dormant, while San Francisco has had difficulty getting complainants to agree to mediation. Other oversight systems offer no mediation option. The number of paid staff among the oversight systems examined ranges from 1 part-time person (St. Paul) to 30 full-time staff (San Francisco). Most systems have between four and five paid staff. Largely reflecting the number of paid staff, the systems' budgets range from almost no special funding in Orange County to $2,198,778 in San Francisco. While four other budgets range from $100,000 to $275,000, St. Paul's is slightly more than $37,000 and Minneapolis' is slightly more than $500,000. Exhibit 2-2 illustrates the significant diversity in the type and extent of oversight activity levels. For example, San Francisco received 1,126 complaints in 1997, and 715 citizens contacted the Minneapolis program. Berkeley investigated 42 complaints. Orange County held 45 hearings in 1997, Berkeley 12, and Minneapolis 3. However, Minneapolis oversight staff also provided other assistance to 715 additional citizens. Exhibit 2-2 shows that the systems' openness to the public also differs widely. At one extreme, Rochester reviews completed investigations in a private, sealed-off room in the city hall basement-even the citizen panelists have no access to internal affairs reports until the panelists meet, and they must surrender the materials before they disband. The panelists' findings are not made public. St. Paul's reviews also are conducted in private. By contrast, Orange County invites 57 media outlets to every board hearing, and the board members' findings are announced. Some systems mix privacy with openness. Flint's ombudsman's office conducts its investigations in private but then provides its detailed findings to the press and the city hall's public archives. The chief's hearings in San Francisco are private, but police commission trials have been attended by as many as 600 citizens and members of the press. Boards in Berkeley, Minneapolis, and Tucson conduct public meetings at which individual citizens can raise general concerns (not personal complaints) about police conduct. The boards then take up the concerns between meetings or at a future meeting. No oversight system publicizes the nature of the specific discipline subject officers receive--many jurisdictions prohibit such disclosure. This tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems conduct business may seem discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented oversight features around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. This diversity forces jurisdictions to take the time to pick and choose among a wide range of alternatives for designing their own oversight systems and to assess the benefits and limitations of each possible component. On the positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel they are obligated to follow rigorously any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, union contracts, and pressure groups. Of course, the choices that are made may have important consequences for how much the oversight system will cost, how much it is utilized, and how satisfied citizens are with the complaint process-considerations that will in turn partially determine which options to select. Although the choices may be daunting, there is expert help available for making them. Key participants in all nine oversight systems have agreed to field telephone calls from interested parties to share information about what works best for them and why. The names and telephone numbers of these individuals follow each case study. Chapter 8, "Additional Sources of Help," identifies other individuals with national experience with oversight systems who are available for consultation. The Berkeley, California, Police Review Commission: A Citizen Board and the Police Department Investigate Complaints Simultaneously Background After allegations of police use of excessive force in clearing street people from a local park, Berkeley voters in 1973 approved a ballot initiative that created by ordinance the Police Review Commission (PRC), the oldest continuously operating citizen oversight agency in the Nation. Citizens filed 42 cases with PRC in 1997. The board conducted hearings in 12 cases, which sometimes included multiple allegations (some of which came from the previous year's filings). The board sustained at least 1 allegation in 2 of the 12 hearings, for a total of 4 sustained allegations. The board did not sustain 30 allegations. The board closed another 34 cases without hearings, either because the case lacked merit or the complainant failed to cooperate. For the first half of 1998, in 5 of the 11 hearings held, there was at least 1 sustained allegation. The review process Exhibit 2-3 illustrates the Police Review Commission's procedures. Intake Citizens may file complaints directly with PRC within 90 days of the alleged misconduct. The ordinance requires PRC to forward complaints to the police department's internal affairs bureau within 30 calendar days. IA and PRC then both investigate the case independently. PRC and the police department have 120 days to communicate their findings to the city manager and for the city manager or chief to determine discipline. Citizens who file a complaint initially with the police department's internal affairs bureau may file the complaint subsequently with PRC within the 90-day limit, after which the parallel PRC and IA investigations occur. The IA investigators give complainants a brochure on the complaint process that mentions PRC, and they tell citizens who express dissatisfaction with the IA investigation about the PRC option. From 1994 through 1998, 53 percent of complainants registered their complaints initially with IA rather than being referred by PRC. Investigations Either Barbara Attard, the PRC officer, or the PRC investigator conducts an investigation of each complaint. Subject officers must appear and answer questions, but they may appear with a union representative or lawyer. Hearings To hear each complaint, PRC staff impanel a board of inquiry consisting of three of the nine board members. The three choose a chairperson from among themselves. One week before the hearing, PRC staff provide the members with a packet containing the results of their investigation along with relevant ordinances, statutes, and department policies and procedures. Attard sends a notice to the chief who, according to the ordinance, must order the involved officer(s) to attend. A lieutenant, the duty command officer for the week, is always present to answer questions about police policy, procedures, and training. As soon as the hearing begins, the chairperson makes clear that the board can offer only recommendations to the city manager and the chief. The hearing then proceeds as follows: 1. The complainant presents the complaint and introduces any witnesses. 2. Board members, and subject officers or their attorneys, may question the complainant and witnesses. 3. Steps 1 and 2 are followed for the subject officer. 4. Each party may make a closing statement. 5. The board deliberates in closed session. 6. The board returns to announce its finding. According to the ordinance, the parties may present evidence "on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs," including hearsay. The chairperson rules on objections, but other board members can overrule the chair. (See "A Hearing by Berkeley's Police Review Commission.") Findings Board of inquiry findings are based on clear and convincing evidence. Possible findings include unfounded, exonerated, not sustained, and sustained. PRC presents its findings to the city manager and the chief. If the IA and PRC findings differ, a designee of the city manager reviews the decision and recommends to the city manager which finding to support. However, because IA has already completed its investigation and recommended a finding to the chief, the chief has typically already ruled on IA's finding and, if appropriate, imposed discipline. Nevertheless, because the city manager has ultimate authority in disciplinary matters, he can overturn the chief's decision after reviewing PRC's finding. In practice, however, the city manager does not try to reconcile different findings; the chief alone decides whether to reverse IA's finding. Appeals Within 15 days after the complainant and subject officer have been sent PRC's finding, either party may petition in writing for a rehearing. There had been no rehearings as of October 1998 because police officers had never requested one and complainants had not been able to document that they had newly discovered evidence. Commissioners and the PRC officer have no regular procedure for learning what IA's dispositions are. California statute (¤832.7) provides that "Peace officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency, . . . or information obtained from those records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery." As a result, the complainant does not learn whether or what kind of discipline, if any, the chief imposes. (See "A Citizen Has Mixed Feelings About the PRC Process.") Other activities PRC performs two additional functions. Public forum for complaints and policy issues At its general meetings held on the second and fourth Wednesday of every month except August, PRC serves as a public forum at which citizens can express concerns about police policies and procedures. The meetings, announced in advance to the press, usually last about 90 minutes and draw as many as 30 residents and media if there is a controversial issue of community concern. An IA investigating sergeant attends every PRC general meeting. At the meetings, the PRC chairperson asks for public comment, subcommittees (e.g., on community outreach) give reports, and new business is taken up. Barbara Attard gives a report on the number of new cases filed since the previous meeting and identifies cases that she recommends be closed administratively. She may invite a police unit (e.g., domestic violence, bicycle) to come to describe its activities. PRC's charter also requires it to hold special public hearings at the request of board members or voters to air controversial matters related to allegations of police misconduct. Policy recommendations Either as a result of a public meeting or because of specific citizen complaints that PRC has heard, board members and Attard recommend changes in department policies and procedures. In the wake of riots in a local park in 1991, which resulted in over 30 complaints to PRC alleging officer misconduct, the city council directed PRC to review and make recommendations on "all aspects of crowd control policies at large demonstrations." After study and deliberation, PRC recommended 12 specific changes that the department later implemented (see chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities"). Staffing and budget Each of the nine city council members appoints one PRC board member. Board members may serve indefinitely until the appointing city council members replace them. Most serve 5 or 6 years; four have served for at least 10 years. Board members select one of their members to a 1-year nonrenewable term as chairperson. The city manager appoints the PRC officer and provides an investigator. Officially, the PRC officer and investigator are the city manager's staff. However, the public sees them as acting as the PRC commissioners' staff. The city manager in effect delegates his role in supervising PRC to the PRC officer. Two office assistants complete the staff. PRC's budget for fiscal year 1998-99 was $277,255 (see exhibit 2-4). Until 1998, the budget declined steadily for several years, along with a reduction in staffing levels from six full-time equivalents (PRC officer, two investigators, three clerical support) in 1992 and 1993 to four full-time staff (two professionals and two clerical support) in 1997. Distinctive features Berkeley's oversight procedure is unusual in that the oversight body and the police department investigate many complaints simultaneously and independently, rather than sequentially. The system has other interesting features. o Because the police department's IA unit and PRC conduct parallel investigations, if a citizen files a complaint with PRC, the case has the benefit-but incurs the expense-of two separate investigations. o Although PRC must refer all complaints that citizens file with the board to the police department for simultaneous investigation, internal affairs does not refer cases routinely to PRC. While the PRC ordinance requires IA to refer all its complaints, State law makes citizen complaints filed with IA confidential. As a result, the PRC officer was trying to develop a referral process that would comply with the statute and the PRC ordinance. o The chief normally reviews IA findings on cases and, as appropriate, hands out discipline before he or the city manager receives PRC's findings. o PRC's twice monthly public meetings make it possible for any citizen to express concerns about police misconduct or policies and procedures. The hearings have resulted in PRC making significant recommendations to the department for changes in policies and procedures. For further information, contact: Barbara Attard Police Review Commission Officer Police Review Commission 2121 McKinley Avenue Berkeley, CA 94704 510-644-6716 Dash Butler Chief of Police Berkeley Police Department 2171 McKinley Avenue Berkeley, CA 94703 510-644-6568 The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman's Office: An Ombudsman Investigates Selected Citizen Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies Background Sweden first incorporated the ombudsman concept in its constitution in 1909 as a means of curbing governmental abuses and protecting citizen rights. Today, an ombudsman typically investigates unlawful or unfair acts on the part of government agencies and complaints about their services. In 1974, Flint voters adopted a new charter establishing an Office of the Ombudsman along with a strong mayoral form of government. Because some citizens felt a stronger mayor would need some checks and balances, the electorate simultaneously voted to include the ombudsman's office in the new charter for a 5-year period. In a 1980 referendum, nearly 60 percent of the residents voted to continue the ombudsman's office indefinitely. The Flint City Charter states that "The Ombudsman may investigate official acts of any agency which aggrieve any person." City departments are required to provide information the ombudsman requests, and the office has the power to subpoena witnesses (including police officers), administer oaths, and take testimony. If elected officials or appointees refuse to cooperate, the charter provides for an obstruction hearing that could result in their forfeiting their jobs. The ombudsman establishes his or her own rules for receiving and processing complaints, conducting investigations and hearings, and reporting findings. In 1996, the ombudsman's office investigated 662 cases, 313 of which (47 percent) involved complaints against police officers. In 1995, 389 of 741 cases (52 percent) involved complaints against the police. The office sustains 2 to 4 percent of citizen complaints against the police annually. The review process Exhibit 2-5 shows the process the ombudsman's office uses to review complaints. Intake People learn about the ombudsman's office from high-profile cases covered by the media or by word of mouth from coworkers. The police department's IA unit does not inform citizens about the ombudsman unless they report they are unsatisfied with the department's answers to their questions. In addition, the ombudsman's preferred response to complaints is to refer them to the appropriate supervisor, accepting complaints primarily when the citizen does not want to file with the police department or is dissatisfied with the supervisor's response, or when the complaint appears to involve the use of excessive force. Citizens who want to file complaints with the ombudsman must agree to be interviewed at the ombudsman's office or at a location of their choosing. The ombudsman assigns the citizens to one of two investigators who specialize in police complaints. Informal resolutions The assigned investigator may telephone the IA commander to resolve the complaint informally, such as clarifying a policy or procedure and then providing the explanation to the complainant. The IA commander may also choose to ask the shift commander of the subject officer to investigate the problem and then explain the officer's behavior to the complainant. About one-quarter of complaints reported to the ombudsman are settled by means of these informal approaches. The ombudsman office investigator's next option is mediation. If both parties agree, the investigator arranges a meeting through the officer's supervisor, if necessary walking the complainant to the police department to talk with the supervisor. The citizen and supervisor meet together alone. If the citizen is not satisfied, he or she then can file a complaint with the ombudsman. Formal investigations When the ombudsman's office accepts a complaint, the investigator sends the chief a letter reporting the complaint and asking for a response to questions from the officer. The chief sends the letter down the chain of command to the subject officer, who usually responds to the questions in writing or, on rare occasions, in an interview. The investigator also interviews the complainant for his or her account of the incident and the names of witnesses. Investigators usually tape the interview. The investigator attempts to contact witnesses by telephone and, where appropriate, sends letters to homes in the immediate area of the incident. As needed, the investigator also takes photos at the scene, secures medical records, and undertakes other pertinent investigatory activities. The ombudsman's office has never subpoenaed a witness. The investigator turns in a report to the chief investigator or deputy ombudsman indicating agreement or disagreement with the citizen's allegation(s). The investigator meets with the deputy or ombudsman to decide on a finding. Findings The ombudsman's office either sustains or does not sustain each allegation, sustaining only if there is clear and convincing evidence. The office sends a complete report of each investigation to the chief and the city council. The office recommends whether there should be discipline but not the type of discipline. When the ombudsman's office concludes the officer did something wrong-which happens 5 to 10 times a year-it sends the officer and the chief a synopsis of its investigation with its conclusion. The chief then conducts his own investigation through IA or the officer's commander and makes a final determination of how to proceed. (See "The Chief's Response to an Ombudsman Investigation.") The chief sends the ombudsman his finding. He does not inform the ombudsman's office about IA's finding, and he has the discretion not to tell the office whether he imposed any discipline. However, on occasion the city council has asked the chief to explain his response to an ombudsman's report. The ombudsman's investigator telephones or writes each complainant to report the chief's decision. The typical case is resolved in 3 weeks. Other activities Because there is no shield of confidentiality in Michigan, the ombudsman's office has considerable latitude in informing the press about its cases and criticizing officers by name. The office routinely sends its case reports to the city clerk as public documents for the city archives. However, the city charter requires that "No report or recommendation that criticizes an official act shall be announced until every agency or person affected is allowed reasonable opportunity to be heard with the aid of counsel." As a result, the ombudsman's office circulates the report on every sustained complaint to everyone named in the report (except the complainant), giving them 5 days in which to challenge its factual accuracy (but not the findings). Staffing and budget By a two-thirds majority of the nine members, the city council appoints the ombudsman for a single 7-year term. A three-quarters majority on the council can remove the ombudsman. At one time, the office had as many as nine investigators, but by 1998 the number had declined to five. Two investigators handle police complaints full time, and the deputy investigator takes on some police complaints as well. The ombudsman appoints a deputy ombudsman and the investigators. The office has an attorney on contract to answer legal questions. There was no ombudsman's office director between August 1995 and the end of 1998. When the previous director was fired in 1995, a court ruled that the city could not hire a new director as long as a civil suit by the fired employee was still pending. The deputy ombudsman or senior investigator ran the office in the absence of a director. In September 1998, a Michigan appeals court ruled that the city could hire a new director. As shown in exhibit 2-6, the ombudsman's 1998-99 budget was $540,744; 91 percent of the budget represented wages and benefits. With two investigators devoting nearly full time to complaints against the police, and the deputy devoting about one-quarter time to police cases, the proportion of the budget devoted to complaints against the police is about $174,000. Distinctive features Few jurisdictions in the country make use of an ombudsman to review police misconduct complaints. o Because the ombudsman serves as a generalized complaint handler for all government agencies, the city cannot be criticized for singling out the police for oversight. o The ombudsman's office provides citizens with an alternative place to file complaints against the police department. o The ombudsman's office helps IA to address complainants' concerns by offering a satisfactory explanation for an officer's behavior that the complainant could not or would not get from the subject officer or patrol desk. o The office can subpoena department heads, including the chief, as well as employees and all case files. It has never used this power. o The office can-and does-criticize officers by name in the media for their behavior. This may serve to deter some misconduct and anger officers. The public has the opportunity to become aware of police misconduct when the press prints the information. o Politics could emasculate the office. Because the mayor appoints the chief and the city council appoints the ombudsman, conflict between the two could stymie the office's leverage if the mayor were to choose to ignore the ombudsman whenever the ombudsman wished to take serious exception to a chief's findings. For further information, contact: Jessie Binian Ombudsman Office of the Ombudsman City of Flint Flint Municipal Center North Building 120 East Fifth Street, Second Floor Flint, MI 48502 810-766-7335 The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority: An Oversight System Investigates and Hears Citizen Complaints Background The Minneapolis city council established the Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) by ordinance in 1990 after African-American community leaders led protests at city hall because officers had killed an elderly African-American couple in a raid and had broken up an apparently peaceful African-American college student party in a Minneapolis hotel. In 1997, the city council and the mayor saw the need to determine whether CRA was providing the appropriate oversight in the most cost-effective manner and if it had the structure and staff to do so. As a result, they appointed a redesign committee that held focus groups, took public testimony, looked at how other jurisdictions configured their citizen oversight procedures, and then recommended changes in how CRA operated, most of which the city council and the mayor adopted. In 1997, 715 individuals contacted CRA with concerns about possible police misconduct. Of these, 114 were satisfied with an explanation of the police department's policies and procedures. Another 87 callers were satisfied when investigators called the subject officers' supervisors to resolve the complaint. In 332 cases, there was no basis for a complaint, the caller was referred elsewhere, or citizens failed to follow up their initial reports. Twenty-three cases were pending. The remaining 159 individuals signed formal complaints (see exhibit 2-7). Of these, the CRA executive director found no probable cause in 46 cases because of insufficient evidence. The executive director exonerated officers in another 54 cases because the facts in the allegations were untrue or, while true, did not constitute misconduct. The executive director dismissed another 30 cases, for example, because the complainant failed to cooperate. Fourteen cases were successfully mediated, and five cases were pending as of the end of the year. Of the 10 cases in which the executive director found probable cause, 9 were sustained, 6 by stipulation (see next section) and 3 at hearings. One case was still pending at the end of the year. The complaint process Exhibit 2-8 is a flow chart that summarizes how CRA processes cases. The following discussion explains each step. Intake When complainants contact CRA or the police department's IA unit, they are told they have the choice of filing with either office but not both. Furthermore, if they are unsatisfied with the finding from one office, they may not then file with the other office. Only IA handles allegations of misconduct that require a criminal investigation, could lead to an officer's being fired, or are high profile. If the complainant files with CRA, the secretary assigns an investigator who sees the walk-in immediately or telephones the caller to set up an appointment to meet at CRA. The investigator fits each charge the complainant alleges into one of eight general CRA types of complaints (e.g., excessive force, inappropriate language). The investigator then identifies the department's policy or procedure that appears to have been violated. The executive director may dismiss the case during this preliminary investigation stage. The investigator sends a letter to the complainant with a copy of the complaint form asking the person to correct any errors and sign and return it within 15 days. The executive director sends a notice of the complaint filing to the officer, deputy chief, and chief. When the investigator wants to take a formal statement from the officer, the chief sends a Garrity warning (see "Glossary") requiring the officer "upon pain of disciplinary action" to make an appointment with CRA to answer questions. CRA investigations The investigator interviews any witnesses the complainant may have identified and does any additional needed leg work, such as confirming visually that a witness had an unobstructed view of an incident from her bedroom window and enough street lighting to see the nighttime activity clearly. Investigators have gone door to door in neighborhoods leaving business cards for potential witnesses. Investigators interview the subject officer last. About half the officers bring a union representative or attorney, who may caucus with the officer but not speak. The investigator sends two copies of a transcript of the taped interview to the officer, one of which the officer signs and returns. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigator forwards the file to the executive director that includes the investigator's conclusion regarding the probable cause for each allegation. If the recommendation is that there is no probable cause, the investigator recommends a finding of either insufficient evidence or exoneration. If there is probable cause, the investigator cites the policy or procedure that the subject officer appears to have violated. Patricia Hughes, the executive director, makes a final determination regarding probable cause. At this stage, but sometimes before the probable cause finding or during or after the prehearing (see next section), the officer and CRA executive director may strike the equivalent of a plea bargain, with the officer stipulating to one or more allegations (that is, admitting guilt) in exchange for CRA dropping one or more other allegations (see "Stipulations Reduce CRA's Caseload"). The complainant is not consulted regarding the nature of the stipulation. If there is no stipulation and no offer and agreement to mediate (see "Other CRA activities" on page 34), the CRA chairperson appoints a three-member panel to hear the case, designating one of the members (including himself, if he so chooses) as the panel chair. The evidentiary hearing The subject officer appears with a union attorney at the CRA office for a half-hour "prehearing" at which the panel chairperson and the CRA executive director agree on the witnesses they will be bringing to the evidentiary hearing and the information and materials that each side will be permitted to introduce, such as the incident report, medical records, and department training manual. The panel chairperson rules on what information may be introduced. The prehearing makes it possible to avoid spending time at the hearing deciding what type of evidence will and will not be admissible. Based on the union attorney's and executive director's schedules, the panel chairperson schedules a hearing 6 to 8 weeks after the prehearing. Panel members (except the chairperson, who has attended the prehearing) know nothing about the case until the hearing begins. Each panel holds a private, audiotaped evidentiary (administrative) hearing lasting from a few hours to, on occasion, several days. Patricia Hughes, CRA executive director and a former assistant city attorney, prosecutes the case, and the police union lawyer defends the officer. CRA does not have subpoena power, but officers must testify under the Garrity ruling. After witnesses are sworn in, each side questions its witnesses, who are then cross-examined by the opposing side (followed by recross). The prosecutor explains why she believes the officer's behavior violates a department policy or procedure. Panel members may question witnesses and usually do. The chairperson rules on any objections raised by the union attorney or executive director. The panel may admit all evidence that furnishes proof of guilt or innocence, including reliable hearsay if it is the type of evidence that "reasonable persons are accustomed to rely on in the conduct of their serious affairs." While the officer remains during the entire hearing, the complainant leaves the hearing after giving his or her testimony because the Minnesota Data Practices Act give employees (e.g., officers) privacy in administrative hearings. The prosecutor may present a final rebuttal to the union attorney's closing statement. Findings The panel deliberates in private, using a clear and convincing standard to sustain or not sustain the complaint(s). The CRA executive director sends a letter to the subject officer and deputy chief presenting the panel's finding. Within 5 days of receiving the panel's finding, the officer or complainant may write to ask the panel to reconsider its finding. About 5 percent of cases are appealed; few appeals are granted. The police department's disciplinary panel reviews CRA's finding and recommends discipline. The officer may appear before the disciplinary panel with a union representative to challenge the offense severity but not to contest the CRA finding. The panel forwards its disciplinary recommendation to the chief for final review. The ordinance requires that the chief decide on discipline based on the results of the hearing and then, within 30 days, provide CRA and the mayor with a written explanation of the reasons for his or her action. The chief may not reverse a CRA finding but has the authority to decide whether to punish the officer and what discipline to impose. (See "A Sample Hearing.") Other CRA activities CRA has three other responsibilities. Monthly CRA meetings The CRA board members and staff hold an open meeting the first Wednesday of every month at 5:00 p.m. in an office building. The executive director keeps the public apprised of CRA's activities, providing updates on the number of cases opened and resolved. The board asks if anyone in the audience wishes to express general concerns about police behavior. Patricia Hughes relates the following story: A few citizens expressed objections at one meeting to the manner in which officers were conducting apartment searches to find suspected drug dealers. In these instances--a tiny minority of all drug searches-the officers had raided the wrong address or the drug dealing had apparently been occurring while the legal tenants were not present. However, because the raids involved no-knock entries with shotguns and orders for everyone in the apartment to lie down at once on the floor (including a woman sleeping in the nude), the tenants had been embarrassed, frightened, and angry. I met with department inspectors to share the public's concerns. The inspectors agreed with my recommendation that the officers, when they fail to find the drug dealer, apologize to the tenants and explain that they had to take severe measures in order to protect themselves from drug dealers who are usually armed and often violent. Mediation After a citizen has filed a complaint against an officer, if both parties accept an offer to mediate, Patricia Hughes sends the case to the Minneapolis Mediation Program, a private, nonprofit organization with which CRA has a $1,500 annual contract to provide unlimited mediation services, typically 40 to 50 sessions a year. Under the terms of the contract, the program must arrange the mediation within 14 days unless there are extenuating circumstances. Mediation program staff telephone the parties to reconfirm they are willing to participate, explain the process, and set a time and neutral place (e.g., a library or neighborhood center) at the parties' convenience. The program informs Hughes whether or not mediation is successful. If mediation is successful, Hughes dismisses the complaint; if it is not, she sends the case back to her staff for investigation. (See chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," for additional information about the mediation process in Minneapolis.) Early warning system The IA unit generates a quarterly report that lists the 10 officers with the most complaints during the quarter and for the previous 12 months. The report distinguishes complaints filed with IA and those filed with CRA. CRA generates the totals for the complaints it receives. Staffing and budget By a majority vote, the city council appoints four board members through a public application process. The mayor nominates three board members as well as a chairperson from among the seven members. While the city council must approve the mayor's nominees, it has never rejected one. All appointments are for 4 years, subject to reappointment. The CRA board hires, supervises, and fires (if necessary) the executive director. The CRA chairperson supervises and evaluates her. He asks other board members to fill out an evaluation on her each year and invites them to sit in on the in-person evaluation. He considers how she has managed the office as well as her litigation skills, public relations work, and timeliness (for example, whether she allowed too many extensions because she failed to supervise the investigators adequately). The executive director hires the three investigators-typically former police officers from other departments-and clerical staff. The CRA's 1998 budget appropriation was $504,213 (see exhibit 2-9). More than three-quarters of the funding is for the salaries and benefits of seven staff: the executive director, three case investigators, a program assistant, and two clerk typists. Distinctive features The Minneapolis oversight system is unusual in that paid staff investigate most citizen complaints, while volunteers conduct hearings that result in findings the chief must accept. The system has several other notable features. o Because the board appoints the executive director, she may be better shielded from political influence than if the mayor or city council appointed her. However, because the board hires the executive director, there could be a tendency on her part to accommodate the board's concerns rather than to act as a check and balance on each other (for example, when the executive director prosecutes cases before the board). o Because most CRA investigators are former police officers, they have a good understanding of the nature of police work (see chapter 4, "Staffing"). At the same time, civilians with no professional experience as sworn officers conduct the hearings. As a result, CRA combines law enforcement and citizen perspectives. o Using former police officers as investigators may result in bias in favor of officers; their use may also reduce the program's capacity for objectivity in the eyes of some citizens and community groups. Using former police officers as investigators may reduce opposition to the process among line officers and union leaders. o Because the complainant may not attend the hearing except to give testimony and hear the attorneys' concluding statements, the complainant does not know why the case was won or lost. o On one hand, offering stipulations reduces the number of cases CRA has to hear, which enables it to hear other cases more expeditiously. On the other hand, in some cases, stipulation can prevent mediation, when mediation might be useful as a procedure for educating the officer and the complainant to each other's points of view. o By reducing the amount of time panelists have to spend at hearings deciding what types of evidence to allow, prehearings speed the process. Prehearings also offer another opportunity for subject officers to agree to stipulate as they reconsider the strength of the case against them. o In its investigatory capacity, CRA is supposed to be a neutral party between the complainant and the police officer. However, if the case goes to a hearing, the CRA executive director prosecutes the officer. This dual role could confuse the public, complainants, and police officers. For further information, contact: Patricia Hughes, J.D. Executive Director Civilian Police Review Authority City of Minneapolis 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 1004 Minneapolis, MN 55415-1424 612-370-3800 Liz Murray Mediator Minneapolis Mediation Program Hyatt Merchandise Mart 1300 Nicollet Mall, Suite 3046 Minneapolis, MN 55403 612-359-9883 Robert Olson Chief Minneapolis Police Department Room 130, City Hall 350 South Fifth Street Minneapolis, MN 55415-1389 612-373-2853 The Orange County, Florida, Citizen Review Board: A Sheriff's Department Provides Executive Support to an Independent Review Board Background In 1992, in response to the nationwide concern about police misconduct generated by the Rodney King beating, the Orange County Sheriff's Office established a process in which citizens could exercise oversight over deputies' use of excessive force and abuse of power. In 1995, the elected Orange County Commission amended the county charter to establish an independent Citizen Review Board (CRB) that effectively replaced the sheriff's board. CRB heard 45 cases involving 67 allegations of misconduct that the sheriff's office investigated in 1997. The board disagreed with three IA findings, exonerating deputies of two allegations of abuse of power that IA had sustained and sustaining one abuse of power allegation in a case in which IA had exonerated the deputy. The CRB procedure Exhibit 2-10 and the following discussion explain the citizen oversight procedure in Orange County. Intake Most citizens call the sheriff's office's internal affairs unit to file complaints, but others call the Citizen Review Board's number. The CRB's telephone number rings at the sheriff's Research and Development Unit, which has a dedicated line. The switchboard operator answers, "Citizen Review Board." When citizens call, the secretary mails out the CRB complaint form, which complainants return by mail or in person at the CRB office, located at the sheriff's office. The CRB secretary turns cases over to the sheriff's office IA unit for investigation and disposition. Melvin Sears, a captain with the Research and Develop-ment Unit and the CRB administrative coordinator, provides board members with all completed investigations a month before the cases are to be heard. The cases are complaints of alleged use of excessive force (including all discharges of a firearm, even if there has been no citizen complaint) and abuse of power (using one's official position for personal gain or privilege or for avoiding the consequences of illegal acts). These types of cases are automatically slated for a future agenda. (See "A CRB Hearing Through the Eyes of a Deputy Sheriff.") Complaints that are questionable as to whether they fall within CRB's purview are given to the chairperson, and he decides if they are appropriate for board review. CRB hearings CRB meets once a month in public session in a county administration building meeting room. During the first part of the meeting, members approve the minutes of the previous meeting and hear any reports from the chairperson, vice chairperson, and Sears. The members then review cases in accordance with a published agenda that has been circulated in advance to the public and 57 media outlets. The board hears about four cases at each meeting. The IA investigating deputy is present at the hearing to answer questions about his or her investigation. Sears advises on policy issues and provides administrative support. The board has subpoena power, and county legislation provides for a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for up to 60 days for anyone convicted of ignoring a CRB subpoena. However, the board has never subpoenaed anyone because the sheriff has issued a standing order requiring deputies to appear when called (but not requiring them to testify). The Central Florida Police Benevolent Association provides interested deputies with representation, but most deputies choose not to be represented because either they have decided not to answer questions or, more commonly, having already been cleared by IA, they feel they have nothing to fear. Finally, a criminal attorney, hired by the county on a retainer basis, comes to every hearing to answer questions on points of law, such as the proper interpretation of the State statute on assault. Any board member may make a motion to place a complaint on a "consent agenda" if he or she feels that IA's findings are appropriate and no further review or meeting time is needed to discuss the merits of the complaint. Any member may also have a complaint removed from the consent agenda and subject to a full CRB review. The meeting minutes for the August 1998 meeting show, for example: Motion was made by Mr. Mills, seconded by Mr. Rankin and unanimously agreed upon, to place this case on the consent agenda, thereby concurring with the findings of the Professional Standards investigation that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the following violations were sustained [the complaint and violation of policy followed]. Hearings follow Robert's Rules of Order. For each hearing, the following individuals, in this order, give a statement and answer questions from board members: o The complainant. o Any witnesses for the complainant (although they rarely appear). o The sheriff's investigating agent. o The subject deputy. o Any other sheriff's employees present whom the chair chooses to recognize. o The complainant again (to rebut the testimony presented by others). At its discretion, the board may allow direct conversations among the parties. Findings The board spends 15 to 20 minutes deliberating each case in open session. The chairperson calls for a vote, and each member explains his or her decision. A majority rules, but almost all cases are unanimous. Decisions are based on a preponderance of the evidence. The board chairperson signs a form letter that Melvin Sears sends to each complainant after each hearing. There is no appeal. CRB does not provide findings; rather, it sends a form memo to the sheriff agreeing or disagreeing with the IA finding in each case. The board agrees with IA findings 80-90 percent of the time. The board's decision is only advisory to the sheriff. On rare occasions, the sheriff overrules the board: A robbery detective on a stakeout fired a shotgun at a robber's car as it fled the scene, blowing out a tire. Because the sheriff's office prohibits firing at automobiles, IA determined that the deputy had violated department policy. The CRB, however, exonerated the deputy because members did not want to see deputies' hands tied so stringently-they wanted to provide deputies with more latitude in the use of firearms. Nevertheless, the sheriff supported the IA finding and disciplined the deputy. Other activities The board may recommend fitness-of-duty evaluations, additional training, and other measures for officers whose cases come before it. CRB also has the authority to hire an investigator to conduct its own investigations. However, when members feel more investigation is needed, they ask IA to do so and bring back the case. The board has recommended several policy and procedure changes that the sheriff has implemented (see the examples in chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities"). Staffing and budget Each of the seven members of the Orange County Commission nominates a single board member subject to confirmation by the rest of the commissioners. The sheriff selects two members of the board-always choosing civilians. Board members serve for 2 years and may be reappointed for a total of 4 years. The members elect a chairperson for a year, who chairs every hearing. The county commission requires the sheriff to assign a captain and a secretary unaffiliated with internal affairs to devote about 20 percent of their time to providing administrative support to CRB. Melvin Sears schedules CRB meetings and training sessions, informs complainants about the meetings, lines up the meeting hall, sends the IA case investigation materials to members, and prepares the annual CRB report. Sears keeps track of the board members' attendance on a spread sheet so he can report excessive absences to the county commissioners. The secretary records each hearing and provides the minutes. Sears' and his secretary's CRB work amount to a $20,000 contribution by the sheriff's office (20 percent of their combined salaries). The sheriff also pays for all the direct costs associated with the board's work, such as postage and duplication. The sheriff pays for publishing CRB's brochure and letterhead stationary. CRB's attorney submits a bill to Sears--typically $200-$250 per month--who approves it and forwards it to the county for payment. Distinctive features An unusua