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TARGETING AUTO THEFT WITH A REGIONAL TASK FORCE AND MAPPING TECHNOLOGY

APRIL 1998

San Diego
ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS

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FINAL REPORT

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ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT: Responding to rising motor vehicle thefts during the late 1980s and early 1990s, officials in the San Diego region formed the Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT). RATT was designed as a proactive approach to the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of auto thieves; particularly those involved in major countywide vehicle theft operations (i.e., rings). During the first two years of RATT operation, the fact that data were fragmented along jurisdictional boundaries constrained investigations. There was a need for automated and integrated auto theft information. The Criminal Justice Research Division of the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) received funds from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to assist RATT and evaluate the effectiveness of the task force. The project involved the development of a computer system to enhance the crime analysis and mapping capabilities of RATT. Following the implementation of the new technology, the effectiveness of task force efforts was evaluated.

This report presents the process involved in conducting the project, as well as study findings and recommendations. The assessment provides support for the value of the task force approach and use of covert operations in the reduction of motor vehicle theft. The results of the project also provide valuable information regarding implementing new technology and conducting research in the field. The design and application of new technology in the field are challenging. The issues faced during this grant highlight areas to be addressed in future projects.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of rising motor vehicle thefts during the late 1980s and early 1990s, San Diego's Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT) was formed in July 1992 as a proactive approach to the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of auto thieves, particularly those involved in major countywide vehicle theft operations (i.e., rings). An innovative method for funding the program is administered by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). A $1 assessment on vehicle registrations provides the necessary monies for the salaries of RATT staff. RATT includes entities other than traditional law enforcement organizations. The task force is comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Attorney, U.S. Customs, California Highway Patrol (CHP) - Border Division, and all ten local police agencies. RATT represents an extension of the traditional task force approach, by not only including the aforementioned government agencies, but also the private sector (i.e., the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB)). The local prosecutor (i.e., the San Diego County District Attorney) provides legal guidance in warrant preparation and evidence requirements, as well as vertical prosecution of cases (i.e., the same District Attorney handles the case from initial hearing through final disposition).

During the first two years of RATT operation, investigations were limited by the lack of integrated auto theft information available through an automated system. The ability of this multi-jurisdictional task force was hampered because data were fragmented along jurisdictional boundaries. The Criminal Justice Research Division of the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) received funds from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to develop a computer system to enhance the crime analysis and mapping capabilities of RATT and evaluate the effectiveness of task force efforts following the implementation of the new technology.

Consistent with process and impact evaluations, the research design for the study involved a variety of methods. Task force activities were observed to identify the RATT information needs and strategies used to combat auto theft. Interviews were conducted with RATT staff and management to further isolate data needs and document RATT activities. The information obtained was used in the development of the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS), as well as to identify successful strategies implemented by RATT detectives. Follow-up interviews were conducted following CAMS implementation to assess staff perception of the impact of the new technology.

In order to describe the scope of the local auto theft problem and assess the impact of RATT relative to other law enforcement efforts, data were compiled from official records on cases investigated by RATT, as well as through the traditional law enforcement response. A random sample of 823 comparison cases was compared to 194 cases investigated by RATT. The comparison group was selected from a computer database, containing operational countywide information on all crimes reported to the police.

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RATT cases involved multiple charges, many of which were not related to vehicle theft, indicating that RATT targets (e.g., auto theft rings) are involved in other types of criminality (e.g., possession of weapons).

- During the study period, RATT effectiveness was enhanced through increased resources and improvements in the availability of regional automated data (i.e., the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS)). Prior to CAMS implementation, RATT staff and management indicated a need for more computer data and mapping capabilities. After CAMS was operational, interviews with RATT staff and management revealed that these data needs had been fulfilled. However, the mapping capabilities of CAMS were not fully utilized by detectives in their investigations.

- Though many successes were mentioned during interviews with RATT staff and management, areas were also noted for improvement. Specifically, lack of cooperation between outside agencies, staff turnover, and bureaucracy (e.g., lengthy procedures required prior to utilizing a confidential informant) were mentioned as impacting the task force. In addition, a decline in staff morale was noted during the study period. Since the interviews were conducted, RATT has undergone significant reorganization, which may have improved this situation.

- According to the case studies involving three different RATT strategies, arrest and conviction information indicated that the undercover sting operation was the most successful strategy employed by RATT. The undercover sting involved the investigation of 73 suspects. Of these suspects, 68 were arrested, and ***all*** arrests resulted in a conviction. The other two strategies examined (i.e., follow-up on local law enforcement leads and surveillance) were more limited in scope and resulted in minimal success (e.g., few number of motor vehicle thefts reported, autos recovered, and arrests made).

FINDINGS RELATED TO RESEARCH IN THE FIELD

- The source database for CAMS (i.e., the Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS)) did not always have complete information, which limited the crime analysis and mapping capabilities. For example, the location of a theft or recovery was often missing or inaccurate. As with any database, the value of the information is dependent upon consistent and complete reporting and data entry. Future plans utilizing automated field reporting will include methods for improving data accuracy in ARJIS (e.g., inhibiting the submission of a report until all fields are complete, including edit checks to ensure that each item is accurate).

- Successful implementation of a crime analysis system requires a thorough understanding by all parties regarding the benefits and limitations of such information. If officers do not perceive automated databases as an enhancement to investigations, they will be less inclined to use them.

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Partnerships between researchers and practitioners require clear communication regarding roles, responsibilities, and the purposes of the project. The research team could have been more clear regarding the link between CAMS, its association to auto theft investigations, and the evaluation, as well as the role of each member of the partnership (i.e., software designers, crime analyst, RATT staff, and researchers) in completing the research project. The research project would have had a better chance of being implemented as designed with a more clear understanding by all participants.

According to a summary of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Conference (Wagner, 1996), a number of steps are essential for the successful implementation of new technology. Other practitioners and researchers could benefit from the lessons learned in this project by incorporating the following guidelines from Wagner (listed in bold) into their implementation plans.

- **A specific problem must be solved by the new technology. Therefore, a needs assessment should be conducted prior to technology development to ensure that implementation will be useful.** Through the preparation of the grant proposal to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the researchers listened to RATT management regarding the problems, limitations, and needs faced by the task force. The primary needs had to do with access to regional auto theft information rather than having the data fragmented by jurisdiction, and access to a crime analyst equipped with a computer to assist officers in compiling data. The mapping capabilities were also of interest, though not an overwhelming need. Based upon the information gathered, the research design included the development of the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) as a solution to the problems faced by RATT. A formal needs assessment following the grant award would have been helpful in assuring that the uses for the mapping system were directly related to specific RATT activities.

- **The technology must be understandable to law enforcement personnel.** With a focus on auto theft rings, the primary strategy used by RATT was the covert operation, utilizing the development of confidential informants. The usefulness of the CAMS technology in this type of investigation was never realized, and may not even be appropriate. By providing RATT staff with a thorough understanding of the applicability of the mapping system to their day-to-day operations, the research and CAMS development team could have improved the utilization of the technology.

- **Continual training and monitoring of staff on the appropriate use of the technology is required**. As has been noted in the literature, the ability to reduce crime depends on the ability to pull together and interpret accurate information about a specific problem (i.e., auto theft). The use of high-tech tools is not enough (Block, 1992). While the crime analyst who produced the maps was trained on how to create them, no training was ever provided to law enforcement personnel on the use of these maps. Thus, additional training for the crime analyst regarding methods for producing geographic information relevant to RATT tactics would have been beneficial, as well as training for RATT staff in ways to apply the information on the maps to their investigations.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

In 1994, the Criminal Justice Research Division of the San Diego Association of Governments received funds from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to enhance the crime analysis and mapping capabilities for a regional task force targeting motor vehicle theft in the San Diego region and to evaluate the effectiveness of task force efforts after receiving better information regarding the auto theft problem. This report presents the findings from the project. Before examining the impact of the crime analysis and mapping system, the issues related to the study are addressed in this chapter, followed by an overview of the local criminal justice response to auto theft. Chapter 2 reviews the methods used to complete the study. In Chapter 3, the stage is set for the development of the crime analysis and mapping system with an in-depth assessment of the auto theft problem in the San Diego region. Chapter 4 outlines the data system developed for targeting police efforts regarding vehicle theft. The impact of the data system on law enforcement tactics is examined in Chapter 5. The report concludes with a summary of major findings and recommendations for future efforts in Chapter 6.

MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PROBLEM

Nationwide, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1997) reported almost 1.4 million vehicle thefts in 1996, with a 14 percent clearance rate. The clearance rate is a measure of crimes solved, while the recovery rate illustrates when stolen vehicles were found though information about the suspect could be completely unknown. The total estimated value of stolen vehicles was approximately $7.6 billion nationwide. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, an average of over 35,000 carjackings occur each year (Rand, 1994). These are robberies involving the use or threat of violence to obtain vehicles.

During the 1980s, motor vehicle thefts rose rapidly in the San Diego region. From 1984 through 1989, motor vehicle thefts rose 151 percent. The highest rate of auto theft occurred in 1989 (17.1 vehicles per 1,000 residents). Since 1989, the rate of vehicle theft has decreased, with annual substantial declines since 1993 (i.e., from 1993 to 1994, there was a 14% drop, from 1994 to 1995, auto theft rates fell 19%, and from 1995 to 1996, the decrease was 13%). Despite these declines, these crimes continue to represent a significant loss to individuals and insurance companies. In 1996, the value of vehicles stolen in the San Diego region exceeded $132 million, representing 59 percent of the value of all stolen property (Pennell, et. al., 1997). Only a small proportion of reported auto thefts are solved through arrest or identification of a suspect. For example, in 1996, six percent of the motor vehicle theft cases were solved (Pennell, et. al., 1997).

The California Highway Patrol (CHP) reports that 235,282 vehicles were stolen in 1996 statewide (1997). The total dollar loss statewide, based upon the average replacement value established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was approximately $1.2 billion. CHP data show that the San Diego region was second only to Los Angeles in the number of vehicles

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nnually by the State Department of Motor Vehicles, which pays for the salaries of 21 investigators from several police agencies, three deputy district attorneys, and three support staff. The funds are administered by the County District Attorney's office. In addition, five FBI agents and one agent from the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) are assigned to the task force, for a total of 27 investigators. FBI informant and undercover money is available to the task force, as is $240,000 from the Safe Streets Act, to be used for overtime and equipment.

RATT includes entities other than traditional law enforcement organizations, which is consistent with other programs to combat auto theft across the country (Northwestern University Traffic Institute, 1994; Illinois Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Council, 1994). Specifically, sixteen federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies participate in RATT. The federal partners are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Attorney, and U.S. Customs. The California Highway Patrol (CHP) - Border Division is the state agency. All ten local police agencies are represented. The task force represents an extension of the traditional task force approach, by not only including a variety of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, but also including the private sector (i.e., the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB)). The local prosecutor (i.e., the San Diego County District Attorney) provides legal guidance in warrant preparation and evidence requirements, as well as vertical prosecution of cases (i.e., the same District Attorney handles the case from initial hearing through final disposition). The task force is operated under a Memorandum of Understanding, with an Executive Board consisting of police chiefs from five local law enforcement agencies, the Chief of the CHP - Border Division, the District Attorney, the FBI Special Agent in Charge, and a member of the County Board of Supervisors. The nvestigative Operations Committee (IOC) consists of representatives of these same organizations who are responsible for the on-going management and operation of the task force. Appendix A provides a specific listing of task force and committee members.

In addition to traditional enforcement strategies (e.g., surveillance, search warrants, arrest warrants, sting operations using covert warehouses as "chop shops," and videotaped buy-busts), RATT detectives apply the following four investigative techniques in their work:

1. **theft analysis** by tracking locations and types of vehicles stolen and monitoring known "chop shops" (i.e., operations specializing in breaking down stolen vehicles into component parts for sale)

2. **maintenance of an intelligence database** by utilizing data from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System, the National Crime Information Center, and National Insurance Crime Bureau

3. **active liaison with all local law enforcement agencies** to provide more information

4. **recruitment, development, and careful supervision of informants** to infiltrate car theft rings using informants and undercover tactics (Casey, 1995).

LIMITATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE EFFORT: DATA NEEDS

During the first two years of RATT operation, detectives discovered that automated regional information on motor vehicle thefts was somewhat limited. The ability of this multi-jurisdictional approach to combat the activities of thieves crossing jurisdictional boundaries was

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Despite limited data access, detectives believed that they were experiencing success through undercover, covert operations by purchasing stolen cars from players at all levels in auto theft rings. The fact that multiple thieves had been apprehended and convicted through a single operation was their evidence of success. To provide more systematic measures of success, this project sought to measure the impact of RATT relative to regular auto theft investigations by comparing RATT cases to vehicle theft reports handled in the traditional manner for a one-year period. In addition, the effectiveness of specific RATT strategies was examined. The methods used in the evaluation will be explained in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODS

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RESEARCH METHODS

The primary goal of the research project was to examine the effectiveness of the Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT) in reducing auto thefts relative to the traditional law enforcement response. In addition, the use of enhanced crime analysis information for targeting RATT investigations was assessed. Finally, public education and prevention efforts to reduce motor vehicle thefts were explored. The following research tasks were used to accomplish these goals.

- Determine the factors associated with successful investigations and prosecutions in vehicle theft cases investigated by RATT.
- Assess the characteristics of areas where vehicles are stolen and recovered.
- Identify factors that impede or enhance the effectiveness of enforcement strategies.
- Develop an automated geographic-based information system, containing detailed data on motor vehicle thefts, salvaged cars, tow companies, salvage yards, and other related data, to be used to analyze crime problems and target investigations and public education campaigns.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of using enhanced crime analysis information to target task force enforcement efforts in specific areas in terms of reported incidents, arrests, prosecutions, and vehicles recovered in these areas.
- Test the effectiveness of public education and prevention programs to reduce motor vehicle thefts.
- Provide recommendations regarding effective strategies to reduce motor vehicle thefts to assist other jurisdictions in implementing programs to successfully address vehicle thefts.

The following questions were addressed through the aforementioned objectives.

- What are the characteristics of vehicle theft rings in San Diego, and how are the stolen vehicles and/or parts used/transported/distributed?
- What types of vehicles are targeted by vehicle theft rings and what is the modus operandi of suspects?
- What is the extent of violence involved in motor vehicle theft incidents in general, and in thefts associated with vehicle theft rings?
- What is the relationship between the locations of vehicle thefts and recoveries?

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In addition, during the first quarter of 1995, initial interviews were conducted with task force members and management, with follow-up interviews conducted approximately one year later. The following issues were addressed during these interviews:

- task force goals
- targets
- methods of identifying targets
- differences between RATT strategies and the traditional law enforcement response to auto theft
- strategies employed
- geographic concentrations of auto theft
- factors that enhance or impede investigations
- opinions regarding effective approaches
- coordination among agencies
- suggestions for improving task force operations
- characteristics of auto theft as distinguished from other types of crime
- characteristics of auto theft rings
- training received
- resources and information needed
- measures of success
- suggestions for public education efforts.

Twenty-one (21) staff members were surveyed in 1995, representing 12 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Of the 22 officers interviewed one year later, eight had been interviewed previously, ten were replacements (i.e., new team members filling a position vacated by someone from their agency), and four represented new members (i.e., individuals from agencies added as task force participants since the initial interview). These individuals had been with RATT for an average of two years (the range of tenure was from 5 to over four years) and also represented 12 agencies at the local, state, and federal level.

Initial interviews were completed with nine members of the management group (i.e., the Investigative Operations Committee (IOC)) during the first quarter of 1995, and follow-up interviews were completed with eight members during the fourth quarter of 1996. At both times, two individuals were interviewed from the Chula Vista Police Department, two from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and one each from the El Cajon Police Department, San Diego Police Department, the Sheriff's Department, and the District Attorney's Office. Additionally, a representative of the Oceanside Police Department was initially interviewed. Of the eight individuals interviewed at follow-up, three represented new members, three were replacements, and two were the same.

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Table 2.2

DATA ELEMENTS

Case-Based Data

- Length of investigation
- Number of vehicles involved
- Number of suspects
- Type of case (theft, recovery)
- Intelligence gathering techniques
- Law enforcement agencies involved

Vehicle-Based Data

- Date vehicle stolen
- Location of theft of vehicle
- Vehicle make
- Vehicle model
- Vehicle year
- Vehicle color
- Recovery status (yes/no)
- Other property recovered (yes/no)
- Recovering agency
- Date vehicle recovered
- Location of recovery of vehicle
- Vehicle identification number (VIN) status after recovery
- License number status after recovery
- Number of recoveries by type (total versus parts)
- Vehicle condition after recovery
- Use of vehicle by suspect

Defendant-Based Data

- Race/ethnicity
- Age
- Gender
- Arresting agency
- Date of arrest
- Highest arrest charge
- Other arrest charges
- Arrest disposition
- Date court case filed
- Highest charge filed
- Other charges filed
- Prosecutor disposition
- Number of conviction charges
- Date of disposition
- Highest conviction charge
- Other conviction charges
- Sentence
- Time ordered
- Plea (yes/no)
- Vertical prosecution (yes/no)
- Date of final court action

DATA LIMITATIONS

Data compiled on police strategies were limited to information available in arrest and investigation reports. In some cases, detectives may not have reported information on incidental strategies, such as observation. Also, detectives are protective of confidential informants, and data on use of informants were not always available unless informant information was used to support a search warrant. Also, the term "informant," when used in the context of a search warrant, referred to a citizen or an offender who provided information related to activity at a specific address or location. Therefore, data could not be obtained based upon the more traditional police definition of a confidential informant (i.e., a person who provides information with the expectation of receiving a reward, including monetary rewards and consideration of the informant's assistance in the processing of a pending criminal case). These types of informants are handled differently than citizen informants.

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Table 2.3

CAMS DATA ELEMENTS
All Auto Theft and Related Incidents

ARJIS Data

- Agency
- Incident number
- Crime code
- Type of vehicle stolen (auto, truck/bus, other)
- Vehicle make
- Vehicle model
- License plate
- Color
- City
- Name of victim(s)/suspect(s)
- Location of incident (address, x-y coordinates)
- Beat
- Date of entry into ARJIS
- Date of occurrence
- Time of occurrence
- Case status (cleared by arrest or exception, open)
- Dollar value when stolen
- Recovery status (recovered/not recovered)
- Condition of vehicle at recovery
- Dollar value when recovered
- Recovery agency
- Location of recovery

Data Entered by Hand

- Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) (obtained through CLETS[1])
- Salvage yard locations
- Tow company locations

[1] *California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, State Department of Justice*

The intention of the research design was, through CAMS geographic analysis, to identify targets (i.e., areas with relatively high auto theft and related problems) and develop strategies to combat the problem through a collaborative effort by RATT investigators, a crime analyst funded through the grant, and the researchers. The reality of implementing such a methodology included numerous roadblocks, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5. The other research tasks involved in this project provide valuable study findings regarding the effectiveness of a task force targeting auto theft, issues involved in developing a crime analysis and mapping system, the challenges involved in implementing advanced technology in police investigations,

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CHAPTER 3

AUTO THEFT IN SAN DIEGO

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AUTO THEFT IN SAN DIEGO

This chapter presents findings from the study related to the following objectives:

- Determine the factors associated with successful investigations and prosecutions in vehicle theft cases investigated by RATT.
- Identify factors that impede or enhance the effectiveness of enforcement strategies.

The problem of motor vehicle theft and the law enforcement response to this crime was assessed for the San Diego region through interviews with RATT staff members and management. Interviews were conducted during the first quarter of 1995, and then follow-up questions were asked during the fourth quarter of 1996. Additional information was obtained from official records regarding both RATT investigations and the traditional law enforcement response to motor vehicle theft. Before examining the criminal justice response to the auto theft problem, the responses from RATT staff interviews regarding the extent of the problem and the best methods for combating auto theft are presented to provide a context within which to interpret the findings gleaned from the official record data. Following the discussion of findings from data obtained through official records, opinions from interviews about the success and effectiveness of RATT, as well as factors impeding success and areas for improvement, are examined.

AUTOMOBILE THEFT IN THE SAN DIEGO REGION

To gain a perception of automobile theft in the San Diego region, RATT staff were asked on an initial interview to characterize automobile theft rings in the region, describe areas where vehicles are frequently stolen and recovered, compare automobile thieves to other types of thieves, describe useful approaches to reducing vehicle theft, outline the role of citizens in prevention efforts, and describe how the community could best be educated. Additionally, members interviewed at follow-up were asked separate questions regarding characteristics of ring members, the size of theft rings, the types of cars which are targeted by these rings, high theft areas, frequent theft times, the level of violence associated with these thefts, and RATT's role in crime prevention efforts. Because these follow-up questions were presented in a different format (open-ended versus close-ended), they are presented separately.

Characteristics of San Diego Automobile Theft Rings

As Table 3.1 shows, 100 percent of respondents agreed that automobile theft rings target specific locations in the region. This opinion provided the impetus for the development of the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS), which was designed to identify specific geographic concentrations of auto theft activity. Respondents also characterized auto theft rings as being organized (90%), having a small number of "players" (85%), rarely using force (80%), targeting newer models of cars (75%), targeting cars with valuables left in them (70%), stealing cars at all

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Table 3.2

CHARACTERISTICS OF SAN DIEGO AUTOMOBILE THEFT RINGS
RATT Staff Follow-up Interview, 1996

Suspect Ethnicity	
Varies	64%
Black	27%
Asian	5%
Hispanic	5%
Suspect Gender[1]	
Male	80%
Varies	20%
Suspect Age[2]	
Varies	52%
30 years old or younger	48%
Ring Size	
Small (< 5)	73%
Varies	18%
Large (> 5)	9%
Car Type Targeted	
Sports utility	55%
Varies	41%
Japanese models	36%
Newer models	27%
Rental vehicles	9%
Large cars	5%
Other types	5%
When Cars Stolen[2]	
At night	43%
Varies	43%
All day	14%
Use of Violence	
No violence	50%
Sometimes	45%
Yes	5%
Other Characteristics[3]	
Commit other crimes	33%
Opportunists	22%
Varies, but the same	22%
Do purely for profit	11%
Strip the vehicle where it is parked	11%
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	**9 - 22**

[1] Ten individuals answered this question.
[2] Twenty-one individuals answered this question.
[3] Nine individuals answered this question.

NOTE: "Don't know" and blank responses not included. Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

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utomobile thieves are more sophisticated (26%), while others felt they are less violent (21%), are frequently narcotic users (16%), have an affinity for the merchandise they steal (16%), are harder to infiltrate (10%), are more adventurous (5%), are more sophisticated (5%), show little remorse (5%), and work with smaller (5%) or larger (5%) groups of individuals (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4

HOW AUTOMOBILE THIEVES DIFFER FROM OTHER THIEVES
RATT Staff Initial Interview, 1995

No difference	32%
More sophisticated	26%
Less violent	21%
Frequent narcotic users	16%
Affinity for the merchandise they steal	16%
Hard to infiltrate/more secretive	10%
More adventurous	5%
More sophisticated	5%
Show little remorse	5%
Smaller group of individuals	5%
Work in large groups	5%
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	**19**

NOTE: "Don't know" and blank responses not included. Percentages based upon multiple responses.

OPINIONS REGARDING AUTO THEFT REDUCTION STRATEGIES

Criminal Justice Efforts

RATT staff and members of the Investigative Operations Committee (IOC) (i.e., the management level of RATT) were asked two close-ended questions regarding the best approaches that could be taken by the criminal justice system and private citizens for reducing automobile theft in the region.

As Table 3.5 shows, 87 percent of RATT staff and IOC members initially interviewed agreed that stiffer penalties for offenders would be a useful step in reducing vehicle theft, with others noting the importance of citizen awareness and education (83%), stolen vehicle recovery tracking (70%), and having more computer data available (63%). Fewer than one-half agreed that publicizing the high recovery rate, more visible patrols, and other approaches would be successful approaches.

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How to Educate the Community

When asked how the community could be most effectively educated regarding vehicle theft prevention, individuals initially interviewed noted that information should be broadcast by the media (86%), shared at neighborhood meetings in high theft areas (81%), shared at crime prevention meetings (71%) and publicized in crime prevention brochures distributed with vehicle registrations (71%) (not shown). An additional 19 percent noted other methods such as involving insurance companies to a greater degree, posting flyers and posters, working with cargo companies, and having booths at fairs and other local events.

The Role of RATT in Crime Prevention Efforts

Staff members were asked during the follow-up interview to described RATT's role in crime prevention and education, as well as to offer their input in how this role should change in the future. Despite the fact that crime prevention and education are seen as important components of reducing automobile theft, 32 percent of those interviewed felt that RATT has no role in crime prevention and education, with an additional 41 percent characterizing this role as very small or sporadic (not shown). Others characterized their responsibilities as including public education (32%), sharing information with the media (27%), educating other law enforcement officers (14%), and attending crime prevention meetings (9%).

While 41 percent of respondents felt the nature of this crime prevention role should not change, 36 percent said that it should, 14 percent that it should be modified slightly, and ten percent said hey were not sure of the role or whether it should be changed. Of the 11 individuals who felt some amount of change was necessary, six felt that the amount of crime prevention the task force does should be reduced, four felt that one specific spokesperson should be designated, three felt there should be more public service advertisements, and one felt that an 800-number should be set up (not shown).

COMPARISON OF RATT WITH TRADITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

A sample of motor vehicle thefts reported during FY 1993-94 was selected through the Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS). This random sample of 823 cases investigated through the traditional law enforcement response was compared to all automobile theft cases (194) investigated by the RATT team in the same time period. There were a total of 338 vehicles and 209 suspects involved in RATT cases (i.e., an average of 1.75 vehicles and 1.08 suspects per case). Over one-half of these cases (56%) involved automobile theft, 35 percent the recovery of a vehicle only, and ten percent other types of vehicle-theft situations (e.g., theft of vehicle parts). For the comparison group, there were 845 vehicles and 1,005 suspects involved (i.e., an average of 1.03 vehicles and 1.24 suspects per case). These comparison cases were primarily composed of automobile thefts (98%), with one percent of the sample involving the recovery of a vehicle only, and less than one percent dealing with other types of situations (not shown). The fact that RATT cases involved an average of more cars per case reflects their focus on "rings." This focus is not evident in average suspects per case because many cases are referred by other agencies with few leads, which lowers the chances for suspect identification.

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Vehicle Characteristics. With respect to the type of vehicle stolen, it is interesting to note that for both RATT and comparison cases, older vehicles (i.e., those with a model year of 1980 or prior) were the least likely to be involved in either RATT or comparison cases during the time period investigated (14% and 20%, respectively) (Table 3.8). These data are based upon the number of stolen vehicles involved rather than the number of cases. RATT cases were significantly more likely to involve stolen vehicles with more recent model years. That is, 27 percent of the stolen vehicles involved in RATT cases had model years of 1990 through 1994, compared to only 21 percent of the stolen vehicles in comparison cases. In addition, 41 percent of the stolen vehicles in RATT cases had model years between 1985 and 1989, while only 34 percent of the stolen vehicles in comparison cases fell into this category. This finding contradicts the information obtained during interviews with RATT management and staff, illustrating the value of analysis.

Table 3.8

AGE OF STOLEN CAR BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

Model Year	RATT	Comparison
1990 or newer	27%	22%
1985 – 1989	40%	34%
1980 – 1984	18%	24%
Older than 1980	14%	20%
TOTAL	**336**	**845**

NOTE: Differences significant at .05 level. Cases with missing information excluded. Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Case Investigations

Case Identification. As expected, the process of identifying cases for investigation differed remarkably from the RATT approach compared to more traditional law enforcement methods (Table 3.9). For the RATT cases, investigations usually originated within the team, either through referrals (49%) or through detectives on the team (27%). Other sources of information involved in RATT case investigation included private citizens (14%) and confidential informants (10%). On the other hand, comparison cases were identified primarily through general investigation following the report of a stolen vehicle by a citizen (88%), with other identification sources including patrol officers (8%), private citizens (2%), RATT referrals (1%), and other methods (less than 1%).

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Table 3.10
INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
San Diego Users Network (SUN) database	83%	90%
California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS) database	58%	98%
Cameras/photographs	45%	8%
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database	42%	3%
District Attorney's (DA) database	28%	<1%
Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS) database	23%	6%
National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) database	19%	0%
Surveillance	18%	1%
Marshal database	14%	1%
Utilizing informants	13%	<1%
Other databases[1]	12%	6%
Arrest warrants	11%	1%
Consensual searches	11%	2%
Financial/business records	9%	<1%
Body wires	7%	<1%
Citizen complaint	7%	1%
Controlled buy(s)[2]	7%	<1%
Fourth amendment waiver searches	7%	<1%
Search warrants	7%	<1%
Video cameras	7%	<1%
Business inspections	3%	0%
Undercover inquiry	3%	0%
Other strategies	19%	9%
TOTAL	**193**	**823**

[1] *Other databases include criminal history, traffic, probation, adult institutions, and California Identification (Cal-ID), an automated database of fingerprints.*
[2] *Includes controlled buys of vehicles and vehicle parts for RATT cases and controlled buys of drugs for comparison cases.*
NOTE: Cases with missing information are excluded. Percentages based upon multiple responses.

Agency Involvement. In the course of an investigation, a number of different agencies in the region may play a role throughout the investigation. Other agencies may arrest suspects, recover vehicles, refer cases for further investigation, search probationers or parolees, serve search warrants, or provide background information. As Table 3.11 shows, a number of different agencies, both within and beyond the San Diego region, coordinated with the RATT team. In addition, a variety of agencies were also involved in the case investigated by the comparison group, including the San Diego Police Department, San Diego County Sheriff's Department, Escondido Police Department, and Oceanside Police Department. However, the proportion of cases involving coordination with an outside agency was greater for RATT than the comparison group.

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Table 3.12

RECOVERY STATUS BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
Released	60%	66%
Stored/impounded	39%	34%
Destroyed	1%	<1%
TOTAL	**265**	**726**

NOTE: Cases with missing information are excluded. Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

For the RATT cases, 73 percent of recovered vehicles were actually found by the RATT team, with the Sheriff's Department recovering eight percent and the San Diego Police Department recovering seven percent (Table3.13). This information is based on the number of stolen vehicles involved rather than cases. For the comparison cases, the law enforcement agencies most frequently responsible for the recovery of the vehicle were the San Diego Police Department (39%), Sheriff's Department (21%), and Oceanside Police Department (11%).

Table 3.13

RECOVERY AGENCY BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
RATT	73%	<1%
Sheriff's Department	8%	21%
San Diego Police Department	7%	39%
El Cajon Police Department	3%	2%
Oceanside Police Department	3%	11%
California Highway Patrol	2%	4%
Chula Vista Police Department	2%	4%
Coronado Police Department	1%	1%
La Mesa Police Department	1%	7%
National City Police Department	<1%	2%
Other Agencies[1]	<1%	3%
Agency outside the county/state/country	0%	6%
TOTAL	**304**	**775**

[1] *Other agencies include the Carlsbad Police Department, U.S. Customs, U.S. Border Patrol, and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).*

NOTE: Cases with missing information are excluded. Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

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Table 3.15

SUSPECT VEHICLE USE BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
Sale of vehicle/parts	61%	6%
Parts/accessories	44%	6%
Personal use	33%	51%
Commit another offense	18%	44%
Other	2%	2%
TOTAL	**206**	**188**

NOTE: Based upon multiple uses. Cases with missing information are excluded.

Arrest of a Suspect. For cases in which a suspect had been identified, the likelihood of an arrest being made was significantly greater when the RATT team targeted the case. Specifically, while 59 percent of the RATT cases resulted in the arrest of a suspect (118), only 46 percent of the comparison cases did (432). Further, while RATT cases involved an average of 4.18 charges against the suspect, comparison cases only involved 3.21. In addition, while a suspect was identified in each of the RATT cases, no suspect was identified in 23 percent of the comparison cases. RATT and comparison cases were similar with respect to the proportion of arrests with at least one drug-related charge (17% for RATT and 19% for the comparison group) or weapons offense involved (5% for RATT and comparison cases). The proportion of suspects with at least one auto theft charge involved at arrest was significantly higher for the comparison group (96% of 407 cases), compared to RATT investigations (73% of 116 cases) (not shown). These differences are indicative of the fact that RATT attempts to reduce the activity of auto theft rings that can involve other types of criminal activity in addition to stealing vehicles (e.g., possession of weapons).

The majority of arrests for RATT cases were made by the RATT team (46%), with 19 percent being made by the San Diego Police Department, and nine percent by the Sheriff's Department (Table 3.16). For the comparison cases, the Sheriff's Department was the most frequent arresting agency (35%), followed by the San Diego Police Department (18%) and Oceanside Police Department (16%).

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Table 3.17

HIGHEST ARREST CHARGE BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
Felony theft	64%	49%
Motor vehicle theft	11%	31%
Felony narcotics	9%	3%
Burglary	4%	5%
Felony weapons	3%	0%
Other misdemeanor[1]	3%	2%
Other felony[2]	3%	1%
Felony parole/probation violation	2%	0%
Robbery	0%	5%
Felony assault	0%	4%
TOTAL[3]	**116**	**407**

[1] *Other misdemeanor includes miscellaneous traffic violations, other theft, joy riding, marijuana and other drug charges, driving under the influence, and assault and battery.*
[2] *Other felony includes homicide, assault, sexual assault, forgery, escape, kidnapping, and arson.*
[3] *Does not include cases arrested by or transferred to out-of-county agencies.*

NOTE: Cases with missing information are excluded. Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Filing of Charges. In addition to differing in terms of whether or not an arrest was made, the comparison groups also varied in whether or not the charges were filed and in how many charges were filed. Specifically, while charges were filed in 82 percent of RATT cases (mean number of charges 8.12), only 39 percent of the comparison cases involved charges being filed (mean number of charges 3.38). The inclusion of prosecutors on the RATT team is probably responsible for the higher filing rate. There was little difference in the percentage of cases which involved filing at least one drug charge (13% in RATT versus 16% in comparison cases) or at least one weapons offense (9% in RATT versus 6% in comparison cases). However, filings with at least one auto theft charge were significantly more likely to occur in the comparison group (92%) compared to RATT cases (69%) (not shown).

As Table 3.18 shows, "felony theft" was the most frequent highest filed charge (in addition to being the most frequent charge at arrest) for both types of cases (73% for RATT and 52% for comparison cases). However, while 18 percent of cases in the comparison group resulted in "motor vehicle theft" listed as the high charge, this was only true for four percent (4%) of RATT cases.

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Table 3.19

HIGHEST CONVICTION CHARGE BY CASE TYPE
RATT Evaluation, San Diego Region, FY 1993-94

	RATT	Comparison
Motor vehicle theft	43%	52%
Felony theft	37%	18%
Burglary	8%	7%
Felony narcotics	7%	3%
Felony weapons	2%	1%
Felony assault	1%	3%
Other misdemeanor[1]	2%	9%
Other felony[2]	1%	<1%
Robbery	0%	4%
Total	**103**	**254**

[1] *Other misdemeanor includes vandalism, mischief, trespassing, miscellaneous traffic violations, assault and battery, other theft, joy riding, marijuana and other drug charges, and driving under the influence.*
[2] *Other felony includes kidnapping.*
NOTE: Cases with missing information are excluded.

Differences were also found between the two types of cases in the time convicted defendants were ordered to serve, with RATT defendants ordered to serve an average of 20.30 months compared to the defendants in the comparison group who were ordered to serve an average of 15.6 months. However, these differences were not statistically significant.

PERCEPTION OF RATT SUCCESS

Given the previously-discussed findings from official record data, the success of RATT in combating auto theft is explored further through opinions provided by RATT staff and management regarding reasons for success, impact of RATT activities on vehicle theft, effectiveness of the team, factors impeding success, and areas for improvement.

Reasons Why a Task Force is More Effective Than More Traditional Responses

During initial interviews, individuals were asked a close-ended question regarding why they felt that a multi-agency task force approach is more effective than traditional law enforcement (Table 3.20). One hundred percent (100%) of respondents agreed that a task force approach is more aggressive and proactive, making it more effective than the typical law enforcement response. In addition, 90 percent or more noted the greater availability of resources, the role of the District Attorney in compiling a case, vertical prosecution, collaborative efforts between prosecutors and detectives, greater availability of manpower, shared common goals, better communication, and igher arrest, prosecution, and conviction rates as benefits of the task-force approach.

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Table 3.21

PERCEPTION OF THE IMPACT OF RATT
RATT Staff and IOC Initial and Follow-up Interviews, 1995 and 1996

	Initial[1]	Follow-up[2]
More defendants prosecuted	1.13	1.20
Increased law enforcement coordination	1.17	1.47
Other areas	1.17	1.00
Fewer "chop shops"[3]	1.22	1.52
Fewer motor vehicle thefts	1.33	1.23
Fewer vehicles crossing the border	2.23	2.35
Increased citizen awareness	2.43	2.30
Increased car manufacturers awareness	2.55	2.52
Fewer vehicles stripped	n/a	2.03
Fewer rings	n/a	1.70
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	**6 - 30**	**2 - 30**

[1] *Respondents on the initial interview were asked how likely each outcome was on a 3-point scale, with 1 being "most likely," 2 "less likely," and 3 "least likely." These data reflect the mean response.*
[2] *For the follow-up interview, respondents were asked what areas had been impacted on a 3-point scale, with 1 being "most impacted," 2 "less impacted," and 3 "least impacted." These data reflect the mean response.*
[3] *Only IOC respondents were asked to rate this item on the initial interview.*

The Effectiveness of RATT

RATT staff were asked both initially and at follow-up to rate RATT on a variety of characteristics on a 5-point scale, with 1 designated as "very good," 2 as "good," 3 as "fair," 4 as "poor," and 5 as "very poor." As Table 3.22 shows, the RATT components which garnered the highest ratings initially included the effectiveness of investigations (95%), the effectiveness of arrests (90%), the effectiveness of convictions (90%), the effectiveness of prosecutions (90%), the location and set-up of the office (86%), and RATT staff morale (86%). Areas with low ratings included the deterrence capabilities of the task force, training opportunities, and mapping capabilities.

Comparing the results of the follow-up interview with responses at the beginning of the study shows that individuals expressed greater satisfaction with the availability of computer databases, mapping capabilities, and other resources as time passed. However, on the negative side, only 36 percent of respondents, compared to 86 percent of those interviewed initially, now rated staff morale as high. In addition, the effectiveness of arrests, investigations, and convictions were also noted as being very good or good, though the percentage noting the effectiveness of prosecutions dropped somewhat.

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Table 3.23

FACTORS IMPEDING SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM
RATT Staff Initial and Follow-up Interviews, 1995 and 1996

	Initial	Follow-up
Equipment shortage	67%	18%
Lack of cooperation with outside agencies	62%	55%
Upper management/leadership/bureaucracy	57%	54%
DA changing policies concerning motor vehicle theft arrests	52%	45%
Personality conflicts	52%	36%
Personnel turnover	48%	50%
Insufficient "buy" money	43%	4%
Information not available from databases	38%	9%
Efforts duplicated in outside agencies	33%	23%
Lack of cooperation with other in-house teams	33%	41%
Manpower shortage within team	32%	9%
Manpower shortage within task force	29%	41%
Insufficient information sharing between teams	24%	45%
Other factors	24%	23%
Lack of goal or mission	19%	14%
Not working as a team	19%	32%
Limited evidence for court hearings	10%	9%
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	**21**	**22**

NOTE: Percentages based upon multiple responses.

For the initial interview, the ARJIS system was most frequently cited by RATT staff as a database with insufficient information (7), followed, by CLETS (4), and Department of Motor Vehicles (4). During follow-up interviews, only two individuals noted inadequate information available from databases as impacting their efforts to reduce auto theft.

Other concerns voiced by respondents during the initial interview included the lack of a mapping system, in-house policies, the need for vehicle color in the databases, the difficulty of tracking recovered vehicles across different jurisdictions, and insufficient information. For the follow-up interview, other problems which were discussed included the lack of training for new detectives, the inflexible work hours, the fact that officers were not held accountable for their actions, and that funds were not available for officers to work overtime.

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Because both RATT staff and management team members were asked identical questions initially and at follow-up, comparisons can be made between the two groups (not shown). The IOC members placed a much greater emphasis on making the task force known to the public and providing more crime prevention and education activities. RATT management may want to clarify their priorities for staff to deal with this discrepancy in views.

SUMMARY

Based upon input provided by RATT staff and management during interviews by the research team, auto theft rings in the San Diego region target specific geographic locations, are generally small in number of members, and typically do not involve violence. Further, their activity is not restricted to any specific time of day, and a variety of vehicle types are targeted. These opinions provide justification for the development of the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) which was designed to pinpoint geographic concentrations of motor vehicle thefts. However, interview respondents also indicated that auto thefts were fairly evenly distributed geographically across the region. The applicability of CAMS to RATT investigations will be examined further in Chapter 5.

Useful approaches for reducing auto theft specified during interviews included not only stiffer penalties for offenders, but also citizen awareness and education, the ability to track the recovery of stolen vehicles, and greater availability of computer data. This grant was originally designed to improve the last two approaches by developing the Computer Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) and examining the relative effectiveness of different enforcement strategies, including crime prevention, through an experimental design. However, interview results also indicated that RATT has ***no*** or ***a very limited*** role in crime prevention and public education and that this role should ***not*** change. This view curtailed the experimental phase of the grant in that the impact of crime prevention strategies could not be tested. The management group of RATT placed greater emphasis on the value of crime prevention and public education, indicating a need for clarification in priorities by management for staff.

The examination of RATT investigations compared to cases handled through traditional law enforcement channels revealed that RATT cases were more likely to involve Caucasians and suspects over the age of 35. In addition, it appeared that vehicles in comparison cases were generally recovered in better condition, compared to vehicles involved in RATT investigations. For example, stolen vehicles investigated by the RATT team were significantly less likely to be driveable and also more likely to have had their ignition altered. This information, coupled with the fact that more vehicles, on average, were associated with RATT cases, reflects the fact that RATT's primary target is the organized theft ring, which is composed of more sophisticated "career" criminals.

Analyses of outcome measures showed that an arrest of a suspect was significantly more likely to occur in RATT cases and that the number of arrest charges per suspect was also significantly greater. As the cases flowed through the criminal justice system, this pattern remained constant, with the probability of charges being filed significantly greater for RATT cases. These differences could be related to the fact that prosecutors are integral members of the RATT team and provide guidance in collection of evidence throughout the investigation. However, while vertical prosecution was utilized more frequently in RATT cases, the difference in conviction rates and

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CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIME ANALYSIS AND MAPPING SYSTEM (CAMS)

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIME ANALYSIS AND MAPPING SYSTEM (CAMS)

This chapter addresses the following research objective: **develop an automated geographic-based information system, containing detailed data on motor vehicle thefts, salvaged cars, tow companies, salvage yards, and other related data, to be used to analyze crime problems and target investigations and public education campaigns.**

The Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) was developed by SANDAG staff using ArcView2, designed by ESRI (Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc.), which is an easy-to-use desktop mapping and geographic information system that can access existing data from multiple external source files (e.g., database managers, spreadsheets, ASCII files) and across networks from different systems. This PC-based software package was used to ensure that this system was portable and available for use by other law enforcement jurisdictions.

To the extent possible, data for CAMS were obtained from existing databases to avoid duplicate ntry. The Automated Regional Information System (ARJIS) provides countywide information on vehicle thefts reported, as well as vehicles recovered. This information was downloaded into CAMS through the ARJIS Crime Analysis Statistical System (CASS). The geographic data maintained by the Regional Urban Information System (RUIS) and originally designed by SANDAG provided the backdrop for the information downloaded from ARJIS through CASS. Information regarding salvage yards, tow companies, and other related businesses was manually entered into CAMS. Updated information on vehicle identification numbers (VIN), condition of vehicle upon recovery, and type of cargo stolen was entered into CAMS on an as-needed basis. The data elements included in CAMS were presented in Table 2.3, Chapter 2.

SYSTEM CAPABILITIES

The original functionality of ArcView2 was expanded in CAMS to include the following capabilities: mapping of auto theft and recovery locations, conducting cluster analysis, connecting thefts and associated recoveries, providing detailed information regarding incidents on the maps (e.g., reporting agency, type of vehicle, make, model, license plate, color, city, victim information, location of theft and/or recovery, suspect information, date and time of occurrence, recovery status, and recovering agency), and importing new data into the system. Each of these functions is described below.

Series mapping allows incidents to be viewed based upon selected criteria (e.g., jurisdiction, date/time, vehicle characteristics).

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Further time period problems occurred because the downloading of data was not complete for each incident. For example, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, when data are imported into CAMS for April and May of 1996, vehicles stolen prior to April 1, 1996 will not be part of the data set, even though the recovery for that vehicle may appear since it occurred during the time period. This problem has implications for the linking function because the thefts and recoveries cannot be linked unless they are captured in the data set.

Figure 4.1

TIME PERIOD ISSUE

		<---------- Data Set ---------->		
	Theft	Recovery		
<--- 2/96 --->	<--- 3/96 --->	<--- 4/96 --->	<--- 5/96 --->	<--- 6/96 --->

- As with all new technology, the CAMS system developed problems periodically which the design team addressed with additional training, modest revisions to the software, and recommendations for future versions of the software.

In addition, training needs regarding the capabilities of a geographic mapping system were underestimated. After the system was installed, the crime analyst hired through the grant was trained on the mechanics of each function within CAMS. As maps were generated following this training, it became evident that additional training was needed in the relevance of each function to RATT investigations. For example, as the analyst generated maps, there were complaints that multiple incidents at a single location (e.g., a shopping mall) were displayed as a single point on the map. The cluster analysis function of CAMS is designed to highlight concentrations of incidents. By educating the analyst about how to identify concentrations of incidents through the cluster function, the maps became more meaningful.

KNOWLEDGE, USE OF, AND SATISFACTION WITH CAMS

Despite these limitations, the CAMS system was completed in December 1995. Follow-up interviews with RATT staff and management included questions regarding this new database. Specifically, individuals were asked if they were aware of this database, if they had previously requested any maps from the system (staff only), how the maps were used, how useful the maps were, and if they had used the system for any other types of data.

Of the 20 RATT staff who were aware that this database was available (two were unaware), more than one-half (11) had requested maps from the system in the past. When asked why they had requested this information, six said they were interested in seeing patterns in vehicle theft in he area, four said it aided them during an investigation, three said it confirmed information for them, two said they used it to give public presentations, and one each said they used it to gather

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CHAPTER 5

ASSESSMENT OF TASK FORCE TACTICS

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ASSESSMENT OF TASK FORCE TACTICS

This chapter examines the following research objectives.

- Determine the factors associated with successful investigations and prosecutions in vehicle theft cases investigated by RATT.
- Assess the characteristics of areas where vehicles are stolen and recovered.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of using enhanced crime analysis information to target task force enforcement efforts in specific areas in terms of reported incidents, arrests, prosecutions, and vehicles recovered in these areas.
- Test the effectiveness of public education and prevention programs to reduce motor vehicle thefts.

  Identify factors that impede or enhance the effectiveness of enforcement strategies.

Within the context of the operational challenges previously discussed in Chapter 2, three target sites were chosen to preserve the intention of the evaluation (i.e., assess the effectiveness of alternative RATT strategies in combating auto theft). The discussion that follows presents the results of these case studies. The effectiveness of the strategies implemented in the target areas is discussed, including a process evaluation documenting the strategies employed and an impact assessment of the effects of each strategy on motor vehicle related crimes, arrests, and vehicle recoveries.

TARGET AREA ONE: OPERATION HOTWHEELS

The original grant intended that target areas would be identified for evaluation purposes through the Crime Analysis Mapping System (CAMS). However, Operation Hotwheels began as a result of a local agency requesting the assistance of RATT. During the summer of 1995, officers at the Chula Vista Police Department contacted RATT regarding a disproportionate number of vehicles recovered with missing parts, indicating potential "chop shop" activity and possible operation of an auto theft ring(s) in the area. RATT teams frequently utilize anti-fencing tactics (e.g., undercover sting operations) to target and prosecute motor vehicle thieves because such tactics have been associated with identification of offenders with lengthy criminal histories who often escape police attention, high conviction rates, overall crime reductions, and return of property to original owners (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1979).

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nclusion of the project. However, when suspects boasted about involvement in other types of criminality, posing a danger to the community, arrests were made immediately.

Buy/Patrol or Traffic Stop: Following contact with a suspect or purchase of a stolen vehicle by an undercover police officer or informant, a patrol or traffic stop is made with the purpose of conducting a field interview and obtaining a current detailed description of the suspect. Operation Hotwheels frequently utilized this tactic to officially identify suspects for future use in apprehending the suspects for prosecution.

Controlled Buys: A controlled buy involves multiple purchases of stolen items from the same suspect. This tactic was favored during Operation Hotwheels to solidify evidence for prosecution.

Follow-Up Investigation and Arrest: Several automobile thieves selling vehicles to undercover officers boasted about being involved in additional criminal activity. Each event was later investigated and verified. Suspects were immediately arrested, if the arrest didn't jeopardize the overall project. When RATT officers believed the covert operation would be compromised, arrests were postponed until the case was brought before the Grand Jury, as long as the criminal activity did not pose an immediate threat to the community. One thief admitted to involvement in armed robberies, another individual sold undercover detectives a sawed-off shotgun, and another seller bragged about a vehicle being taken during a residential burglary. These additional arrest charges, frequently resulting in longer and stiffer sentences, suggest the benefits of overt operations.

Informant Buy: While under surveillance by police, an informant is used to buy a vehicle from a suspect. In Operation Hotwheels, this approach was used when police believed that the suspect was more likely to trust the informant than a stranger (i.e., the undercover police officer).

Officer Buy: An undercover police officer buys a vehicle from a suspect, while under surveillance by other officers. For Operation Hotwheels, officers at the undercover house purchased most vehicles.

Prosecution: RATT includes prosecutors as part of the team. Deputy District Attorneys guide investigations with respect to evidence collection and the most effective methods for prosecuting each case. In attempting to curtail auto theft rings, it was determined that group prosecution was the most effective strategy. Therefore, the Grand Jury was utilized. Throughout the project, officers gathered information and evidence in order to present the final case to the Grand Jury. All evidence, suspects, witnesses, and other aspects of a case must be presented before the Grand Jury for a trial date to be set. The same district attorney prosecutes these cases from the beginning through final disposition to streamline the process and increase the likelihood of conviction. This technique is referred to as vertical prosecution.

Public Education: The area of public education and crime prevention is new for RATT. With respect to Operation Hotwheels, the media was the vehicle for public education efforts. At the termination of Operation Hotwheels, RATT distributed press packets to all media, outlining the task force and this specific project. These packets were followed by a press conference to inform the public about enforcement efforts and discourage thieves from future auto theft activity.

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.easures of Success

This section reveals the results of the impact assessment. In general, the data support the assertion that RATT positively impacted the community by recovering stolen vehicles, as well as arresting and convicting suspects. Table 5.1 reflects the measures of success related to Operation Hotwheels.

Table 5.1

MEASURES OF SUCCESS
Operation Hotwheels, September - November 1995

Suspects Contacted	73
Recoveries	105
Arrests	
Adults	63
Juveniles	5
Convictions	68
Conviction Rate	100%

SOURCE: RATT

During Operation Hotwheels, undercover investigators purchased 105 stolen vehicles from 73 defendants (Table 5.1). The purchased vehicles were stolen from areas throughout the San Diego region. Thus, the potential impact of Operation Hotwheels on the community could be greater than the city in which the undercover house was located. Intelligence information gathered during undercover buys suggests that each defendant stole at least one automobile per week, with an estimated $17,520,000 impact on the region (not shown). This figure does not take into account collateral financial losses incurred by the victims and insurance companies. Through the early morning "round-up," all but five suspects were apprehended. All of the individuals arrested were also convicted (68). These data indicate the effectiveness of this type of covert operation in apprehending suspects identified (93%) and obtaining convictions (100%). The high conviction rate is attributed to membership of the prosecutor in the task force through provision of on-going guidance regarding evidence collection, as well as vertical prosecution efforts (i.e., the same attorney prosecuting the case from initial hearing through sentencing).

The impact of this type of tactic on the overall community is much more difficult to decipher. This operation was initiated at the request of a local police agency, rather than through CAMS. The problem identified did not focus on a specific geographic area beyond an entire city. Measuring the impact of this tactic, based upon the area in which the operation was located, is deceiving because officers identified suspects who stole vehicles throughout the region. Thus, the regional changes in auto theft may be more indicative of Operation Hotwheels' success. Throughout the San Diego region, motor vehicle thefts declined eight percent, based upon the ree months following Operation Hotwheels compared to the three summer months prior to opening of the undercover house. However, this regional change could also be due to a number of other factors (e.g., increased use of anti-theft devices by car owners).

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

MAP 5.1
San Diego County: Clustering
10/01/95 - 11/30/95
10 or More Recoveries Within .3 Radius

- Recovery
- Freeways
- Beats
- City Boundaries
- County

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anned Tasks Not Implemented

Originally, two confidential informants were to be sent into the target area to assist in identification of suspects. However, the RATT detective in charge of this project was unable to identify any acceptable informants. The primary purpose in developing a relationship with a confidential informant was to assist in establishing a covert operation similar to Operation Hotwheels. As mentioned in the Operation Hotwheels discussion, other agencies are utilized by RATT for technical assistance. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides funding for the task force in establishing covert operations. The key potential informants identified did not meet the FBI requirements. Therefore, a location to conduct buys of stolen cars from individuals identified by confidential informants was not set up in the target area.

The detective in charge of the operation suspected that gang members were involved with vehicles recovered in the target area. Therefore, he planned to obtain gang intelligence from the North County Gang Task Force to assist in addressing the problem. However, other workload demands precluded meeting with gang task force members. Further, prevention efforts mentioned above were also to include articles in City of Oceanside and Oceanside Police Department newsletters, distribution of auto theft prevention pamphlets in the target area, and signs located in the target area regarding prevention. However, beyond the aforementioned presentations, no further follow-up regarding prevention occurred due to workload constraints.

The primary reason the original plan was not fully implemented is rooted in the realities of ·orking in the field. That is, the detective in charge of the project was alerted to more pressing ..uto theft problems, redirecting the efforts of the team. Specifically, the North Team detective at RATT noticed an unusually high number of Toyotas stolen in the Tri-City area based upon "hot sheet" information provided by the Oceanside Police Department. The Tri-City is defined as the general area where the cities of Carlsbad, Oceanside, and Vista meet. In addition to this information, local patrol and detectives began notifying the North Team detective at RATT of suspicious activity in this same area. The suspicious activity required immediate follow-up before the suspects relocated their activity. Therefore, the original project was abandoned. In an effort to evaluate the activities of RATT, the research design was modified to encompass these new activities by the North Team of RATT.

Identification and Implementation

In March 1996, the Oceanside Police Department distributed a "hot sheet" highlighting an unusually high number of stolen Toyota vehicles. Even though the RATT North Team was centering their efforts in the identified "hot spot" in downtown Oceanside, calls from patrol officers were directing the team to other areas of high auto theft activity. Specifically, in April 1996, patrol officers began telling RATT officers that Toyota thefts in the North County Tri-City area were on the rise. Though there was some fluctuation, increases in thefts of Toyotas were observed into the month of May. Responding to this situation, RATT conducted a project focusing in the Tri-City area for two months (May and June 1996).

Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is a process for approaching persistent community problems .at require an approach focusing on the problem and creative solutions rather than a stereotypical law enforcement response. RATT detectives utilized the POP philosophy as applied by

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.eld Interview: After suspects are observed engaging in suspicious activity, they are stopped by a patrol officer and questioned about their behavior. For example, during a surveillance, suspects were observed circling a stolen vehicle. They were stopped and interviewed for further intelligence.

Fourth Amendment Waiver Searches: When offenders are on probation or parole, they are required to waive their Fourth Amendment Rights as a condition of supervision. For cases in which the suspects were under criminal justice supervision, RATT utilized this waiver to conduct searches of suspects' residences to collect evidence without a warrant.

Observation. Police observe violations during routine patrol and enforcement activities. For example, officers observed a vehicle with missing license plates with several suspects standing near the vehicle. As the officers drove closer to the scene, the suspects began to watch the officers nervously. Further investigation and computer checks revealed that the vehicle was stolen. RATT detectives were called in to interrogate the suspects for further information and potential participation as confidential informants.

Public Education: Though the original plan included public education on auto theft prevention, the redirection of the team in the Tri-City area did not warrant prevention efforts. That is, the focus was solely on identification and apprehension of suspects.

Traffic Stop. Suspects are stopped after a traffic violation is noticed in order to initiate further ıvestigation in another case. For example, an undercover officer purchases a stolen vehicle ırom a suspect. The suspect leaves in another vehicle with a friend. The undercover officer requests that the suspect be stopped and interviewed. Another member of the team follows the suspect until a traffic violation occurs and then stops the suspect for questioning and/or identification.

Surveillance: RATT North Team detectives and local patrol officers focused surveillance tactics on observing suspects at their residences to confirm illegal activity and gather evidence to support a search warrant.

Use of Confidential Informants: As previously mentioned, the procurement of confidential informants resulted from leads by patrol officers. After patrol officers informed RATT detectives about suspects involved in auto theft, RATT detectives would interrogate the suspects and follow-up on information provided in exchange for possible monetary compensation and/or consideration regarding the current charges.

Termination of the Operation

The Tri-City project was conducted for approximately two months. By mid-June, there was only one outstanding suspect identified through the project. Further, Toyota thefts had decreased to only two in the Tri-City area, compared to the high levels detected at the beginning of the project.

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ARGET AREA THREE: EAST COUNTY RETAIL PARKING LOT EFFORT

The research project attempted to identify a target area within the geographical jurisdiction of each RATT team (i.e., North, South, and East). Target identification in the East Team area was particularly challenging. The areas identified through cluster analysis in CAMS did not suggest dense hot spots of auto theft or recoveries. Parameters used in the cluster analysis for other areas of the region (e.g., ten or more incidents within a .3 mile radius) produced no hot spots due to the relatively low volume of documented auto theft and related activity in the East Team jurisdiction. Therefore, the parameters were expanded (e.g., a smaller number of incidents, a larger radius). However, this expansion resulted in clusters covering relatively large geographic areas, resulting in limited tactical alternatives to address the problems. During this process of target identification, a crime analyst at a local police department produced data on auto thefts surrounding a retail warehouse chain operating in eight locations within the region (Table 5.3). During the first quarter of 1995, the top two locations occurred in the eastern and southern areas of the region, accounting for over one-half of the thefts at locations of this retail warehouse chain. Though these thefts occurred one year prior to actual target identification and strategy implementation, the eastern location was chosen as the target site for intervention and the southern location as the comparison area (with the traditional law enforcement response) in an effort to evaluate the activities of the task force involving cooperation between law enforcement and businesses.

Table 5.3

AUTO THEFTS FROM LOCAL RETAIL WAREHOUSE CHAIN
San Diego County, January - March 1995

Location	Number of Thefts
Bayside	18
East County	25
Mid-Inland	31
Mid-Town	16
North Inland	9
South Bay	49
South City	2
South Inland	9
Total	**179**

Description of Target Area

The most active day for auto theft at this location was Saturday. The majority of the vehicles were older, with only 31 percent having 1990 or more recent model years. Chevrolets and Fords ·ere the most popular vehicles to steal at this location, with 27 percent and 24 percent stolen, .espectively. Pickups were the type of vehicle stolen in 38 percent of the cases. Just over one-half of the vehicles stolen were recovered (53%).

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gh Visibility Patrol: Both sworn police officers and members of the Senior Volunteer Patrol increased patrol of the target area parking lots in marked vehicles.

Public Education: This project involved meetings with managers of retail outlets at the site to inform them about the on-going auto theft problems and enforcement efforts.

Rolling Surveillance: Several investigators in separate vehicles roam parking lots. The first surveillance was conducted at the beginning of the project (Tuesday, April 16, 1996) because the most recent theft occurred on the Tuesday of the prior week. In addition, this early surveillance provided an illustration of RATT's commitment to the project for the local officers. If a suspect was observed attempting to steal a vehicle, the plan was for observation to continue until sufficient evidence was available for an auto theft conviction. During this early surveillance, no auto thefts were attempted. The second surveillance occurred on Tuesday, April 10, 1996, with the third on Saturday, May 4, 1996 (the most frequent day for auto thefts at the target location). During the Saturday surveillance, one vehicle with two suspects seemed to be casing the parking lots. However, no vehicle thefts were attempted during the surveillance period.

Undercover Surveillance: Officers act like employees retrieving shopping carts. This method was considered for the current project. However, prior use of this tactic did not produce successful results, so it was not utilized in this project.

Termination of the Operation

n the final day of the project, two vehicles were stolen from the target site. However, the project was not continued because the total number of vehicles stolen was relatively low.

Measures of Success

Table 5.4 shows the reported stolen vehicles, arrests, and recoveries for the period prior to the project, during the project, and for a subsequent period. Due to the erratic nature of thefts in the target and comparison sites, the data presented are not compelling with respect to the success or failure of the project. Though thefts were reduced in the target area, the comparison site experienced a decrease as well. The small number of incidents limits the analysis.

Of the vehicles stolen during the case study, three were not recovered. All of the stolen vehicles were Ford pickups. Each theft was accomplished within a short time period (from 15 to 45 minutes). Therefore, it seems that thieves acted quickly.

No arrests were made in the target area during the time periods studied. The small numbers do not provide for substantive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the effort. Information on car prowls was also initially tabulated, with equally inconclusive results.

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CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter fulfills the final objective of the evaluation: to provide recommendations regarding effective strategies to reduce motor vehicle thefts through a coordinated approach to public education, prevention, and law enforcement to assist other jurisdictions in implementing programs to successfully address vehicle thefts.

FINDINGS RELATED TO THE TASK FORCE

- This research project began by identifying characteristics of the local auto theft problem. Through this process, it was discovered that auto theft rings were targeting specific locations, and that these geographic concentrations were not uniformly distributed across the San Diego region.

- Useful approaches for reducing auto theft indicated by RATT staff and management included obtaining stiffer penalties for offenders through vertical prosecution, educating the public regarding crime prevention, utilizing the ability to track the recovery of stolen vehicles, and using automated data. The role of RATT in each of these approaches was clear except with respect to prevention. Many staff members believed that RATT had ***no*** or ***a very limited*** role in auto theft prevention and that this role should ***not*** change, while individuals in management were more likely to see the need for RATT to be involved in prevention efforts.

- The examination of RATT investigations compared to cases handled through traditional law enforcement channels revealed that vehicles in comparison cases were generally recovered in better condition, compared to vehicles involved in RATT investigations. That is, vehicles involved in RATT cases were more likely to be disassembled for parts to be sold for a profit. Further, more vehicles, on average, were associated with RATT cases, indicating a pattern of auto theft for these offenders (e.g., a career). These findings suggest that RATT successfully targeted the intended population: organized motor vehicle theft rings, composed of sophisticated, professional criminals.

- Coordination and cooperation among different levels of government and the private sector were more often evident in RATT cases than for the comparison group. The unique composition of the task force enabled RATT to achieve collaboration among agencies that was not available to detectives isolated within the traditional law enforcement response.

- An arrest of a suspect was significantly more likely to occur in RATT cases. The number of arrest charges per suspect was also significantly greater. The probability of charges being filed was also significantly greater for RATT cases. However, conviction rates and the rate of plea-bargaining were similar for the two groups.

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RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE TASK FORCE

- Since geographic concentrations of auto theft were not evenly distributed countywide, division of workload by geographic boundaries (i.e., north, south, and east) may be less efficient. RATT may want to examine the geographic distribution of motor vehicle theft revealed through CAMS and redistribute the workload accordingly.

- The priorities of RATT should be reviewed on a regular basis and discussed among the members of the Investigative Operations Committee (IOC) (i.e., the management level of RATT) with input from RATT supervisors and line staff. For example, should RATT take a proactive role in educating citizens and crime prevention? And, if so, how should such an objective be operationalized?

- To ensure that the Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) is utilized, on-going staff training regarding the benefits of the technology to RATT investigations is necessary. For example, successes related to prior use of the system could be shared at weekly staff meetings. Further, a feedback system could be implemented in which detectives would provide input regarding ways to improve the system based upon output provided by CAMS and used in investigations.

- Though RATT has reorganized since interviews were conducted with management and staff, issues raised during interviews regarding staff turnover, bureaucracy, and morale may require continued examination. The management of staff employed by the variety of agencies participating in the task force is challenging. Standards for recruiting and training RATT staff should be reviewed and consistently maintained. Clear expectations regarding performance and specific training related to RATT activities, for new detectives in particular, could assist in raising staff morale.

- Due to prior successfulness, RATT should continue to utilize undercover sting operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO RESEARCH IN THE FIELD

The results of this evaluation raise many issues with respect to conducting research that implements new technology in the field.

- As is often the case when conducting applied field research, particularly when the cooperation of practitioners is required, flexibility is key. The original research design for this project was adjusted to be more compatible with RATT workload. The initial study design involved an "experiment" with target and control sites. The goal was to simultaneously implement strategies in each area designed to combat auto theft and rotate these strategies between the sites to control for geographical variability. However, the reality of RATT workload limited the efforts of task force detectives related to the research effort. Therefore, the design was modified to include case studies rather than an experimental design.

- Maintaining focus on the objectives of the research project is also critical to successful evaluations. While the methodology was modified during the course of this project, the evaluation team continued to focus on the original research objectives and questions.

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Standardized policies and procedures regarding the use and purpose of the technology should be in place prior to implementation. To date, these policies and procedures are yet to be delineated. In hindsight, the necessity of outlining these components prior to implementation is clear. If all the partners in this project (i.e., software designers, researchers, crime analyst, and RATT staff) were in agreement regarding the use and purpose of CAMS, the technology could be more fully utilized.

Attention to the preceding guidelines may have created an environment in which CAMS could have been implemented more completely within task force operations. As a result, a more thorough evaluation of the impact of CAMS could have been conducted.

CONCLUSION

This evaluation of the Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT) has produced valuable information regarding the implementation of new technology and conducting research in the field. The design and application of new technology in the field are challenging. The issues faced during this grant highlight areas to be addressed in future projects. The qualitative assessment of specific strategies designed by a multi-agency task force to combat vehicle theft provides support for use of covert operations in auto theft investigations. Finally, the comparative analysis between RATT cases and a comparable group of auto thefts investigated through the traditional law enforcement response illustrates the value of the task force approach to the reduction of motor vehicle theft.

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REFERENCES

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

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RATT PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND COMMITTEES

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

California Highway Patrol – Border Division

Carlsbad Police Department

Chula Vista Police Department

Coronado Police Department

El Cajon Police Department

Escondido Police Department

La Mesa Police Department

National City Police Department

Oceanside Police Department

San Diego Police Department

San Diego County Sheriff's Department

San Diego County District Attorney's Office

U.S. Customs Service

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Attorney

National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB)

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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS COMMITTEE (IOC)

William D. Gore
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Captain Mike Shirley
Oceanside Police Department

Chief Richard P. Emerson
Chula Vista Police Department

Captain Chuck Wood
San Diego County Sheriff's Department

John P. Massucco, Jr.
Chief District Attorney

Captain Hank Olias
San Diego Police Department

Captain James Davis
El Cajon Police Department

SSA Richard Sibley
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Captain Jim Zoll
Chula Vista Police Department

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APPENDIX B

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January, 1995

RATT RIDE ALONG

Officer Name: _____

Strategy(s): _____

Date: _____

SANDAG Staff: _____

The San Diego Association of Governments is conducting ride alongs with law enforcement officers as part of a federally-funded evaluation of enforcement and crime prevention efforts in response to motor vehicle theft.

1. How did this target come to the attention of RATT?

2. In this investigation have you used any other intelligence gathering techniques prior to this one?

_____ Utilizing Informants
_____ Serving Search Warrants
_____ Wiretaps
_____ Sell-bust
_____ Use of body wires
_____ Controlled Buys
_____ Surveillance
_____ One time buy-bust
_____ Searching financial records
_____ Other (please specify) _____

3. Are you planning to use any other intelligence gathering techniques to complete this investigation or what other efforts will take place?

_____ Utilizing Informants
_____ Serving Search Warrants
_____ Wiretaps
_____ Controlled Buys
_____ Surveillance
_____ One time buy-bust

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8. What makes RATT more successful than regular motor vehicle investigations?

9. Is there anything you would like to see included in the SANDAG evaluation? (issues/ideas)

_____ yes (what?)

_____ no

Please write a brief description of the event.

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APPENDIX C

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ɔuary, 1995 ID Number _ _ _ _ _

RATT INTERVIEW
RATT Staff

Interviewer Initials _____

Agency _____

Rank/Title of Respondent _____

Date of Interview _____

The San Diego Association of Governments is conducting interviews with law enforcement officers as part of a federally-funded evaluation of enforcement and crime prevention efforts in response to motor vehicle theft in coordination with the Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT). The issues addressed include methods used for identifying investigation targets, data available to investigators, strategies employed for specific types of cases, and the means of evaluating the success of an operation. Your responses will be confidential, and will not be ɜntified by name.

1. Please rank the following goals of RATT in order of importance: (NO SPACE SHOULD HAVE THE SAME NUMBER)

   ____ Decrease auto theft
   ____ Provide community awareness about auto theft
   ____ Locate stolen autos quicker before stripped, burned or resold
   ____ Recover property, other than vehicles
   ____ Punish the offender
   ____ Deter auto theft
   ____ Provide community safety
   ____ Other (please specify) _____

2. Which <u>one</u> of the following is the **primary** target of RATT?

   ____ The motor vehicle thief
   ____ The distributor of the stolen vehicles/parts
   ____ The buyer of the stolen vehicles/parts
   ____ Auto theft rings (includes all of the above)
   ____ Other (please explain)_____

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Using the frequencies below, please indicate how often you conduct the following activities. (READ RESPONSES AND PUT NUMBER IN EACH SPACE)

1 = Daily
2 = Weekly (1-6 per week)
3 = Monthly (1-3 per month)
4 = Less than once per week
5 = Less than once per month
6 = Never

____ Responding to out-of-county requests
____ Utilizing informants
____ Informing and educating residents about motor vehicle theft
____ Conducting controlled buys (more than 1 buy)
____ Serving search warrants
____ Serving arrest warrants
____ Wiretaps
____ Surveillance
____ Use of body wires
____ Searching financial records
____ Searching various data bases
    ____ SUN
    ____ County
        ____ DA
        ____ Criminal History (SR31)
        ____ Marshal
        ____ Traffic
        ____ Revenue and Recovery
        ____ Probation
        ____ REGIS
        ____ JURIS
        ____ Adult Institutions
    ____ ARJIS
    ____ CLETS
    ____ DMV
    ____ NICB
    ____ USINS System
    ____ RATT In-house PC's
    _____
____ 4th waiver searches
____ Business investigations
____ Other (please specify) _____

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Of the factors listed, which, if any, **IMPEDE** the division's ability to reduce motor vehicle theft (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

1. ___ Lack of a goal or mission
2. ___ Manpower shortage within task force
3. ___ Manpower shortage within team
4. ___ Lack of cooperation with other in-house teams
5. ___ Lack of cooperation with vehicle theft divisions in outside agencies
6. ___ Equipment shortage
7. ___ Insufficient sharing of information among different teams
8. ___ Inadequate information available from databases
    - ___ SUN
    - ___ County
        - ___ DA
        - ___ Criminal History (SR31)
        - ___ Marshal
        - ___ Traffic
        - ___ Revenue and Recovery
        - ___ Probation
        - ___ REGIS
        - ___ JURIS
        - ___ Adult Institutions
    - ___ ARJIS
    - ___ CLETS
    - ___ MV
    - ___ NICB
    - ___ USINS System
    - ___ RATT In-house PC's
9. ___ Limited evidence for court hearings
10. ___ Insufficient "buy" money
11. ___ Duplication of efforts among outside agencies
12. ___ DA charging policies concerning motor vehicle theft arrests
13. ___ Personality conflicts
14. ___ Personnel turnover
15. ___ Upper management/leadership/bureaucracy
16. ___ Not working as a "team"
17. ___ Other (please specify) _____

9. For those noted above, which (one) is the most important in **impeding** the effectiveness of your division? (READ RESPONSES TO QUESTION 8)

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Why is a multi-agency task force approach to enforcement and crime prevention efforts in response to motor vehicle thefts more effective than traditional law enforcement? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

1. ____ Access to more data bases
2. ____ More resources
3. ____ More manpower
4. ____ More training provided for officers
5. ____ Stiffer punishment for the offender
6. ____ All work at same location
7. ____ Work as a team, same goals and mission
8. ____ Vertical prosecution
9. ____ Work with district attorney so case does not fall through the cracks
10. ____ Personal dynamics of staff
11. ____ Better communication
12. ____ More effective in arrest, prosecution and conviction
13. ____ More aggressive/proactive
14. ____ A deterrent to future auto thieves
15. ____ DA and law enforcement work closely together
16. ____ Strong leadership
17. ____ Other (please specify) _____

____ Not more effective (why?)

11a. Referring to the choices listed above, please rank the **top three** responses that best describe how RATT is more effective than traditional law enforcement.

12. Are there ways that RATT operations could be improved or modified to be more effective? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

____ More manpower
____ More funding
____ Work more with outside agencies
____ Coordinate with local police in auto theft investigations
____ A more definite chain of command
____ Make task force more known to public
____ Provide officers with more training
____ Have more resources (supplies) available
____ More computer database information available
____ More crime prevention, education activities
____ Computer mapping capabilities available
____ Have less staff turnover
____ Other (please specify) _____

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What are the best ways for citizens to reduce auto theft in San Diego County? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

1. ___ Locking their car
2. ___ Using the club
3. ___ Car alarm
4. ___ Car cover
5. ___ Neighborhood Watch
6. ___ Parking in well lit area
7. ___ Not leaving valuables in car
8. ___ Parking in garages and off the street
9. ___ Kill switches
10. ___ Other (please specify) _____

16a. For those noted above, which (one) is the most important way citizens can reduce auto theft?

17. Of the options listed, which, if any, are characteristics of auto theft rings in San Diego (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

___ Organized
___ The rings have a chain of command
The number of players are:
___ small in size (less than 5 key players)
___ large in size (more than 5 key players)
___ Central chop shop/warehouse location
Thieves are:
___ 15-24 yrs. in nature
___ 25 yrs.-up in nature
Cars targeted are:
___ older models
___ newer models (late 80's to present)
___ Cars with unique features (seats, doors, tires, etc.)
___ Specific locations are targeted in which to steal autos
Autos are stolen:
___ during the day
___ at dawn/dusk
___ at night
___ all of the above
___ Thieves will attack victim and take auto
___ Thieves will threaten victim and take auto
___ Thieves will use no force
___ The autos stolen often have items of value left in them
___ Other (please specify) _____

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ank you for participating in the study. Would you like to receive a copy of the final report when it is available?

___ yes (Please complete information below)
___ no

Name _____

Address _____

_____

_____

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nuary, 1995 ID Number _ _ _ _ _

RATT INTERVIEW
IOC

Interviewer Initials _____

Agency _____

Rank/Title of Respondent _____

Date of Interview _____

The San Diego Association of Governments is conducting interviews with law enforcement officers as part of a federally-funded evaluation of enforcement and crime prevention efforts in response to motor vehicle theft in coordination with the Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT). The issues addressed include methods used for identifying investigation targets, data available to investigators, strategies employed for specific types of cases, and the means of evaluating the success of an operation. Your responses will be confidential, and will not be identified by name.

1. Please rank the following goals of RATT in order of importance: (NO SPACE SHOULD HAVE THE SAME NUMBER)

   ___ Decrease auto theft
   ___ Provide community awareness about auto theft
   ___ Locate stolen autos quicker before stripped, burned or resold
   ___ Recover property, other than vehicles
   ___ Punish the offender
   ___ Deter auto theft
   ___ Provide community safety
   ___ Other (please specify) _____

2. Which <u>one</u> of the following is the **primary** target of RATT?

   ___ The motor vehicle thief
   ___ The distributor of the stolen vehicles/parts
   ___ The buyer of the stolen vehicles/parts
   ___ Auto theft rings (includes all of the above)
   ___ Other (please explain)_____

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In which areas of the county do most of the RATT motor vehicle thefts investigations occur?

5a. In which areas of the county are most motor vehicles recovered?

6. Which of the following characteristics of the auto theft market are likely to be impacted by RATT's activities? Please rank each with 1, 2 or 3, where 1 is the most important, 2 less important, and 3 the least important. (READ RESPONSES AND PUT A NUMBER IN EACH SPACE)

___ Fewer motor vehicle thefts
___ More defendants prosecuted
___ Fewer automobiles going across the border
___ Increased citizen awareness of motor vehicle theft prevention
___ Increased car manufacturers awareness of motor vehicle theft prevention
___ Increased coordination of law enforcement agencies to investigate cases
___ Other (please explain) _____

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Why is a multi-agency task force approach to enforcement and crime prevention efforts in response to motor vehicle thefts more effective than traditional law enforcement? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

1. ____ Access to more data bases
2. ____ More resources
3. ____ More manpower
4. ____ More training provided for officers
5. ____ Stiffer punishment for the offender
6. ____ All work at same location
7. ____ Work as a team, same goals and mission
8. ____ Vertical prosecution
9. ____ Work with district attorney so case does not fall through the cracks
10. ____ Personal dynamics of staff
11. ____ Better communication
12. ____ More effective in arrest, prosecution and conviction
13. ____ More aggressive/proactive
14. ____ A deterrent to future auto thieves
15. ____ DA and law enforcement work closely together
16. ____ Strong leadership
17. ____ Other (please specify) _____

____ Not more effective (why?)

9a. Referring to the choices listed above, please rank the **top three** responses that best describe how RATT is more effective than traditional law enforcement.

10. Are there ways that RATT operations could be improved or modified to be more effective? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

____ More manpower
____ More funding
____ Work more with outside agencies
____ Coordinate with local police in auto theft investigations
____ A more definite chain of command
____ Make task force more known to public
____ Provide officers with more training
____ Have more resources (supplies) available
____ More computer database information available
____ More crime prevention, education activities
____ Computer mapping capabilities available
____ Have less staff turnover
____ Other (please specify) _____

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14. What are the best ways for citizens to reduce auto theft in San Diego County? (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

1. ___ Locking their car
2. ___ Using the club
3. ___ Car alarm
4. ___ Car cover
5. ___ Neighborhood Watch
6. ___ Parking in well lit area
7. ___ Not leaving valuables in car
8. ___ Parking in garages and off the street
9. ___ Kill switches
10. ___ Other (please specify) _____

14a. For those noted above, which (one) is the most important way citizens can reduce auto theft?

15. Of the options listed, which, if any, are characteristics of auto theft rings in San Diego (READ RESPONSES AND CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

___ Organized
___ The rings have a chain of command
___ Small (less than 5 key players) in size
___ Large (more than 5 key players) in size
___ Central chop shop/warehouse location
___ Thieves are young (15-24 yrs) in nature
___ Thieves are older (25yrs-up) in nature
___ Specific makes and models of cars targeted
___ Older model cars targeted
___ Newer model cars targeted
___ Cars with unique features (seats, doors, tires, etc.)
___ Specific locations are targeted in which to steal autos
___ Autos are stolen during the day
___ Autos are stolen at night
___ Autos are stolen at dawn/dusk
___ Thieves will attack victim and take auto
___ Thieves will threaten victim and take auto
___ Thieves will use no force
___ The autos stolen often have items of value left in them
___ Other (please specify) _____

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APPENDIX D

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SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS
RATT TRACKING FORM
1995

ID _ _ _ _ _ _

COMPLETION CHECKLIST

RATT FILE	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
CRIME REPORT	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
ARREST REPORT	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
INVESTIGATION REPORT	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
SCREENS	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
COURT INFORMATION	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
QUALITY CONTROL	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
REVIEW/FINAL CHECKS	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
QUESTIONS/PROBLEMS/TO-DO LIST	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____

NOTES

_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____
_____	INITIALS: _____	DATE: _____

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GENERAL CASE INFORMATION

ID No. __ __ __ __ __ __ 6

Record # 0 1 8

Record Type 0 1 10

(RATT only) Date case opened: __ __-__ __-__ __

(RATT only) Date case closed: __ __-__ __-__ __ 22

(SANDAG date) Date case opened: __ __-__ __-__ __

(SANDAG date) Date case closed: __ __-__ __-__ __ 34

__ __ Total # of general vehicle information sheets
36

__ __ Total # of suspects in case
38

____ Type of case (ONE RESPONSE)

1 Auto theft

2 Recovery only

3 Non-vehicle

4 Other _____

Intelligence Gathering Used (ALL THAT APPLY)

____ Utilizing informants
40

____ Undercover inquiry

____ Conducting controlled buys (one car only)

____ Conducting controlled buys (more than one)

____ Controlled buy of vehicle parts

____ Controlled buy of drugs

____ Controlled buy of weapons

____ Controlled buy of other _____

____ Search warrant

____ Arrest Warrant

____ 4th waiver searches

____ Consent search

____ Business inspection

____ Citizen complaint

____ Video camera

____ Surveillance

____ 35mm camera/photos

____ Use of body wires

____ Searching financial/business records
58

Searching various databases

____ SUN
County

____ DA

____ Criminal history (SR31)

____ Marshal

____ Traffic

____ Revenue and recovery

____ Probation

____ REGIS

____ JURIS

____ Adult institutions
68

____ ARJIS
69

____ CLETS

____ DMV

____ NICB

____ USINS system

____ Cal ID
74

____ Other _____

____ Unknown
76

Agencies	Involvement
CHP	___ 77
Carlsbad	___
Chula Vista	___
Coronado	___
El Cajon	___
Escondido	___
La Mesa	___
National City	___
Oceanside	___
San Diego	___
Sheriff	___
Customs	___
FBI	___
Border Patrol	___
RATT	___
NICB	___
District Attorney	___
INS	___
Marshall	___
Out of county LE Agency	___
Out of state LE Agency	___
Out of country LE Agency	___
Other _____	___ 99

Other property impounded (not in vehicle)

1 = Yes 2 = No 9 = Unknown

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Recovery Status (ONE RESPONSE) _____ 123

1 Stored/impounded

2 Released

3 Disposed according to agency

8 Other _____

9 Unknown

Vehicle Condition (ALL THAT APPLY)

1 Wrecked 124

2 Vandalized

3 Stripped

4 Burned

5 Same condition as when stolen

6 Engine/transmission stripped

7 Body metal stripped

8 Unknown

9 Other _____

10 Not applicable 134

Vehicle Driveable: 1=Yes 2=No 9=Unknown 10=Not applicable

Ignition Altered: 1=Yes 2=No 9=Unknown 10=Not applicable

Use of Vehicle/Parts by Suspect(s) (ALL THAT APPLY)

1 Parts/accessories 139

2 Sale of vehicle/parts

3 Used to commit another offense

4 Personal use

8 Other _____

9 Unknown 144

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APPENDIX E

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RATT CAMS
User's Documentation
General Release 1.1

MARCH 1996

San Diego
ASSOCIATION OF
GOVERNMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The San Diego Regional Auto Theft Task Force (RATT) Crime Analysis and Mapping System (CAMS) was developed as part of the research study entitled A Coordinated Response to Motor Vehicle Thefts: Evaluation of Enforcement and Crime Prevention Efforts. This two-year study will evaluate the effectiveness of using enhanced crime analysis techniques to target the efforts of a regional, multi-agency task force to increase arrests and successful prosecutions of offenders and reduce motor vehicle thefts. The Criminal Justice Research Division of the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) is the overall project lead. Sixteen federal, state, and local agencies work together as RATT to arrest and prosecute major auto theft rings.

RATT CAMS is a geographic information system (GIS) which allows crime analysts to query, manipulate, summarize, and map regional databases associated with vehicle thefts and recoveries. SANDAG's Research and Information System Division developed RATT CAMS using ArcView, a PC GIS product developed by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) of Redlands, California.

RATT CAMS functionality was developed as an addition to the original functionality of ArcView. As the user becomes more familiar with RATT CAMS and ArcView, the user can make use of all the original menus, buttons, and tools.

Baseline data for a random sample of motor vehicle thefts was collected in the initial phase of the research to identify information needed by investigators and to analyze crime patterns associated with major vehicle theft rings. During the second phase, RATT CAMS was developed and implemented in collaboration with the San Diego Police Department Crime Analysis Section. The third phase will include providing crime analysis information to detectives and identifying target and control areas for enforcement and crime prevention strategies. Finally, the effectiveness of the strategies employed will be tested by comparing pre- and post-test measures of arrests, convictions, prosecutions, the level of reported incidents, and vehicle recoveries. In addition, the evaluation will include a descriptive analysis of RATT operations before and after the implementation of CAMS, based on observation, baseline and post-test data and pre- and post-test interviews with RATT detectives.

ArcView Overview

ArcView is a Windows GIS application, with most tasks accomplished using one or more buttons or menu bar items accessed with a mouse.

There are five document types associated with an ArcView project. A project is a file which stores information related to a particular task. For example, a project does not store data, but stores "pointers" to where the data reside on the computer. The five document types are:

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COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS AND INSTALLATION

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COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS AND INSTALLATION

Computer Requirements

Although ESRI has a minimum hardware and software recommendation for running ArcView, SANDAG staff have found the following configuration is needed to run ArcView and RATT CAMS effectively:

Computer:	80486 or higher microprocessor, 66 MHz or higher, hard disk, and 1.2 megabyte or higher capacity flopping disk drive.
Hard Disk:	To install ArcView, approximately 30 megabytes of space is needed for program and tutorial files. The RATT CAMS application requires an additional 90 megabytes of available space. You should have at least 12 megabytes of space free above this to be available for temporary storage (swap space).
RAM:	16 megabytes of RAM ("memory").
Operating System:	MS-DOS 5.0 or higher, Microsoft Windows 3.1 or higher.
Monitor:	Super Video graphics adapter (SVGA), 800x600 resolution, 16K color depth, Windows accelerator strongly recommended, 2 MB of video RAM is also recommended.
Mouse:	Mouse is required.

Installation

Consult the *ArcView Installation Guide* or related documents for more information on installing ArcView 2.1.

The RATT CAMS beta version was installed by laptop computer and all files were restored to original directories on the *C:* drive. The general release 1.1 is distributed on diskette since many of the larger database files were not reconstructed since the beta release.

The process for installing these files is included with the diskettes. Future updates will be distributed on diskette.

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4. OBTAINING TECHNICAL SUPPORT: Click on Tech Support to find out how to contact ESRI, other training and support services, etc.

5. HOW TO GET HELP: Click on How To to learn how to use the Help features.

6. ABOUT ArcView: Click on About to show registration information, version number, etc.

NOTE: You may print out the help information by using the FILE menu of the Help window and clicking on PRINT TOPIC.

We suggest loading ArcView and running the tutorial before venturing on to RATT CAMS. This serves two purposes: (1) you will ensure that ArcView is installed properly, and (2) you'll begin to familiarize yourself with ArcView functionality.

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RATT CAMS OVERVIEW

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RATT CAMS OVERVIEW

This section describes the general functionality of RATT CAMS. Details on how to use the custom buttons and tools are documented in the next section *Getting Started.*

RATT CAMS functionality was developed as an addition to the original functionality of ArcView. As the user becomes more familiar with RATT CAMS and ArcView, the user can make use of all the original menus, buttons, and tools.

Five functions were developed: 1) Series Mapping using the RATT Query Form, 2) Cluster Analysis Mapping, 3) Drawing Links between thefts and recoveries, 4) Identifying and listing information about a theft or recovery; and 5) Importing new data.

Series Mapping

This function allows the crime analyst to view incidents based on selected criteria. Incident characteristics are input into the RATT Query Form, then selected by using the View Query button. Crime analysts can make a selection based on jurisdiction of reported incident, date/time, and vehicle characteristics. The vehicle characteristics include: year, make, model, and type. Recovery incidents can be selected by condition. Theft incidents can be selected by violation charge code. The RATT Query Form can also be used to analyze sub-sets of selected incidents.

Cluster Analysis Mapping

This function identifies clusters of selected incidents by grouping incidents according to their proximity to one another. The crime analyst enters an incident number (threshold) and radius.

Link

This function identifies the relationship between where vehicle thefts occurred and where the vehicle was recovered by drawing lines between selected thefts and/or recoveries. This function is also referred to as inter-connectivity.

Import

This function is used to import new incident data into RATT CAMS after it has been downloaded from CASS. Eight ASCII data files must first be downloaded into the *xfer* sub-directory under *c:/ratt*. Currently, the system imposes an 8,000 record limit on each ASCII text file. This should be sufficient to permit loading two months worth of data. Data file formats can be referenced in the Appendix.

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GETTING STARTED

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GETTING STARTED

Starting RATT CAMS

Once the ArcView and RATT CAMS software have been installed, from the Windows Program Manager double-click the RATT CAMS icon to open it. Loading will take a few seconds (we've found that during this time, the icon disappears, but this is OK.)

The RATT CAMS icon.

Two windows will appear, the RATT Query Form and the ArcView application window.

The RATT Query Form.



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from the view. The fifth button is the Import button. It imports the eight ARJIS/CASS ASCII data files into ArcView.

The RATT CAMS Identify tool.

The RATT identify tool gets RATT information about theft or recovery incidents and displays the data in tabular form on the screen.

The RATT Query Form (QRATT)

The RATT Query Form creates a logical query. After the query is created, it is executed by clicking the Q on the RATT CAMS view button bar.

RATT Query Form Menu Bar.

Save, Load, and Exit from the **File** menu are currently disallowed. These menu options are included in anticipation of future enhancements to the system.

Query from the **View** menu displays the contents of the current logical query in a pop-up window.

SubQuery from the **View** menu has options for displaying the sub-queries described below.

About from the **Help** menu displays information about RATT CAMS, including the version number.

Query Type.

Select the type of incident by clicking the **Theft, Recovery,** or **Both** button.

Jurisdiction.

Select the reporting agency of the incident by scrolling the **Agency** list and clicking on the agency code. The **Agency** title bar is highlighted pink if any agency codes have been selected. Unselect an agency by clicking it again. Multiple agencies can be selected. The default is to select all agencies. The first item on all list is "(clear)". Click it to clear all selections made for that field.

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type by clicking it again. Multiple vehicle types can be selected. The default is to select all vehicle types.

Select the vehicle make by scrolling the **Make** list and clicking on the vehicle make code. The **Make** title bar will be highlighted pink if any vehicle make codes are selected. Unselect a vehicle make by clicking it again. Multiple vehicle makes can be selected. The default is to select all vehicle makes.

Select the vehicle model by scrolling the **Model** list and clicking on the vehicle model code. The **Model** title bar will be highlighted pink if any vehicle model codes are selected. Unselect a vehicle model by clicking it again. Multiple vehicle models can be selected. The default is to select all vehicle models.

Warning: The software does not check for illogical selections. For example, selecting Toyota Accord will create an empty set of incidents.

Query Set.

Select the set by clicking the **Define Set** or **Select From Set** radio button. The Define Set option reduces the data pool to just those incidents meeting the criteria specified on the query form. The Select From Set option runs the query against the existing data pool and selects those incidents which meet the criteria specified.

View.

Select the map extent the software will zoom to by clicking the **Current Zoom, Auto Zoom, Region, North, South,** or **East** button. The zoom occurs automatically after the query is executed.

Current Zoom. The view window will not change.
Auto Zoom. The view will zoom to the extent of the selected incidents.
Region. The view will zoom to the entire region.
North. The view will zoom to the north part of the region.
South. The view will zoom to the south part of the region.
East. The view will zoom to the east part of the county.

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Series Mapping Example

The following example will select and display both thefts and recoveries which were reported by the Escondido Police Department on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

To perform Series mapping, take the following steps:

1. Make the RATT Query Form **QRATT** active with the *ALT* and *TAB* keys.

2. For the Query Set, click the Define Set button.

3. For Query Type, click the **Both** button.

4. For the Jurisdiction, from the **Agency** list, single-click **ES**.

5. For Day of Week, click the **F**, **Sa**, and **Su** boxes.

6. For View, click the **Auto Zoom** button.

7. Click OK to exit the RATT Query Form.

8. Make the RATT CAMS view active by clicking on the RATT CAMS view title bar.

9. Click the Query button to execute the query entered in the RATT Query Form.

10. If Necessary, click the boxes adjacent to the Theft and Recovery themes to make them visible in the View window.

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Import New Data Example

The following example assumes a new data set of the eight standard files has been copied to the *c:\ratt\xfer* sub-directory.

1. Make the RATT CAMS view active by clicking on the RATT CAMS view title bar.

2. Click the Import New Data button.

3. Do you want to continue? Click Yes.

4. Wait for the IMPORT Windows application window to finish.

5. Do you want to continue? Click Yes.

6. Wait for Information Box "Data Import Complete". Click OK.

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APPENDIX

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3/6/96

RATT CAMS
DATA FILE FORMAT

File: ACTIVITY.TXT

Description: The law enforcement action related to vehicle reporting and investigations.

Attributes:

VARIABLE	TYPE	LENGTH	COLS	DESCRIPTION
AGENCY	CHAR	2	1-2	Agency code
ACTTYPE	CHAR	2	4-5	Activity type code CC = Crime Case (Theft) RC = Recovery
ACTSEQNO	CHAR	10	7-16	Activity sequence number
FROMDATE	DATE	8	18-25	Starting date of occurrence
FROMTIME	INTEGER	4	27-30	Starting time of occurrence
FROMDAY	INTEGER	1	32	Starting day of week of occurrence
TODATE	DATE	8	34-41	Ending date of occurrence
TOTIME	INTEGER	4	43-46	Ending time of occurrence
TODAY	INTEGER	1	48	Ending day of week of occurrence
ACTGROUP	CHAR	1	50	ARJIS component type
ACTSTAT	CHAR	2	52-53	Activity status code
UPT_DATE	DATE	8	55-62	Date entered into ARJIS
END	CHAR	3	63-65	End of Record

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RATT CAMS
DATA FILE FORMAT

File: CONDTN.TXT

Description: Reported condition of the vehicle related to a law enforcement activity.

Attributes:

VARIABLE	TYPE	LENGTH	COLS	DESCRIPTION
AGENCY	CHAR	2	1-2	Agency code
ACTTYPE	CHAR	2	4-5	Activity type code
RC = Recovery				
ACTSEQNO	CHAR	10	7-16	Activity sequence number
FROMDATE	DATE	8	18-25	Starting date of occurrence
VEHCODE	INTEGER	2	27-28	Vehicle condition code
END	CHAR	3	29-31	End of Record

Examples:
Stripped
Damaged
Wheels removed
Contents missing

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RATT CAMS
DATA FILE FORMAT

File: LOCATION.TXT

Description: Reported place of occurrence of a law enforcement vehicle activity.

Attributes:

VARIABLE	TYPE	LENGTH	COLS	DESCRIPTION
AGENCY	CHAR	2	1-2	Agency code
ACTTYPE	CHAR	2	4-5	Activity type code CC = Crime Case (Theft) RC = Recovery
ACTSEQNO	CHAR	10	7-16	Activity sequence number
FROMDATE	DATE	8	18-25	Starting date of occurrence
BEAT	INTEGER	3	27-29	Beat
CENBLOCK	CHAR	5	31-35	Census Block
CENTRACT	INTEGER	6	37-42	Census Tract
COMMCODE	CHAR	2	44-45	Community code
CSTNAME	CHAR	20	47-66	Cross street name
CSTPRE	CHAR	2	68-69	Cross street prefix
CSTTYPE	CHAR	2	71-72	Cross street type
APTNO	CHAR	5	74-78	Apartment number
LOCTYPE	CHAR	1	80	Location type
ZIPCODE	INTEGER	5	82-86	Zip Code
STDENOM	CHAR	1	88	Street denominator
STNAME	CHAR	20	90-109	Street name
STNO	INTEGER	6	111-116	Street number
STNUMER	CHAR	1	118	Street numerator
STPREDIR	CHAR	2	120-121	Street prefix
STTYPE	CHAR	2	123-124	Street type
COORDX	INTEGER	7	126-132	Mapping 'X' coordinate
COORDY	INTEGER	7	134-140	Mapping 'Y' coordinate
END	CHAR	3	141-143	End of Record

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RATT CAMS
DATA FILE FORMAT

File: SUSPECT.TXT

Description: Report action by the suspects related to a law enforcement activity.

Attributes:

VARIABLE	TYPE	LENGTH	COLS	DESCRIPTION
AGENCY	CHAR	2	1-2	Agency code
ACTTYPE	CHAR	2	4-5	Activity type code CC = Crime Case (Theft)
ACTSEQNO	CHAR	10	7-16	Activity sequence number
FROMDATE	DATE	8	18-25	Starting date of occurrence
SUSACT	INTEGER	5	27-31	ARJIS suspect action
END	CHAR	3	32-34	End of Record

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SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS

Chi-Square Tests

Case Type	X^2 (2, N=1,017) = 322.13, $p < .001$
Suspect Gender	X^2 (1, N=1,195) = .62, $p = .43$
Suspect Race	X^2 (3, N=1,129) = 37.56, $p < .001$
Suspect Age	X^2 (3, N=1,026) = 54.24, $p < .001$
Vehicle Year	X^2 (3, N=1,181) = 13.81, $p < .005$
Vehicle Recovered	X^2 (1, N=1,169) = 3.15, $p = .08$
Recovery Status	X^2 (2, N=991) = 3.99, $p = .14$
Property Recovered	X^2 (1, N=719) = .42, $p = .52$
Recovered Vehicle Driveable	X^2 (1, N=726) = 46.74, $p < .001$
Vehicle Ignition Altered	X^2 (1, N=541) = 8.89, $p < .005$
VIN Status	X^2 (1, N=993) = 129.98, $p < .001$
License Status	X^2 (1, N=999) = 115.71, $p < .001$
Suspect Arrest	X^2 (1, N=1,149) = 10.68, $p < .001$
Drug Charge(s) at Arrest	X^2 (1, N=524) = .10, $p = .75$
Weapon Charge(s) at Arrest	X^2 (1, N=523) = .00, $p = 1.00$
Auto Theft Charge(s) at Arrest	X^2 (1, N=524) = 57.07, $p < .001$
Arrest Disposition	X^2 (3, N=842) = 89.97, $p < .001$
Drug Charge(s) Filed	X^2 (1, N=388) = .37, $p = .54$
Weapon Charge(s) Filed	X^2 (1, N=388) = .56, $p = .46$
Auto Theft Charge(s) Filed	X^2 (1, N=388) = 31.17, $p < .001$
Vertical Prosecution	X^2 (1, N=354) = 92.47, $p < .001$
Plea Bargain	X^2 (1, N=358) = 1.85, $p = .17$
Case Disposition	X^2 (1, N=388) = 2.67, $p = .10$
Drug Charge(s) at Conviction	X^2 (1, N=358) = .00, $p = 1.00$
Weapon Charge(s) at Conviction	X^2 (1, N=358) = .17, $p = .07$
Auto Theft Charge(s) at Conviction	X^2 (1, N=358) = 11.09, $p < .001$

T-tests

Number of Vehicles Per Case	t (1,017) = -6.78, $p < .0001$
Number of Suspects Per Case	t (1,017) = 1.74, $p = .08$
Number of Recoveries	t (1,093) = -3.25, $p = .001$
Number of Vehicles Recovered	t (1,094) = 9.59, $p < .0001$
Number of Parts Recovered	t (1,037) = -7.18, $p < .0001$
Number of Arrest Charges	t (522) = -3.17, $p = .002$
Number of Charges Filed	t (386) = -7.99, $p < .0001$
Number of Conviction Charges	t (356) = -4.91, $p < .0001$
Time Sentenced	t (292) = -1.57, $p = .12$

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