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From Volitional Action to Automatized Homicide: Changing Levels of Self and Consciousness During Partial Limbic Seizures

NCJ Number
202017
Journal
Aggression and Violent Behavior Volume: 8 Issue: 5 Dated: September-October 2003 Pages: 547-561
Author(s)
Anneliese A. Pontius
Editor(s)
Vincent B. Van Hasselt, Michel Hersen
Date Published
September 2003
Length
15 pages
Annotation
This article proposes refined definitions for subtle, transient changes primarily of the "sense of self," expressed in observable action behavior due to neuro-pathological disturbances, especially during partial limbic seizures interfering with volition.
Abstract
Neuro-pathological changes in the ability to act can occur at various levels of neural organization. When volitional action becomes impaired, there is the need to exclude a diagnosis of a seizure. This article proposes a refined definition that takes into account the subtle seizure-driven gradual impairment of volitional action affecting the state of the self and thereby of consciousness. Discussion capitalizes on the preservation of memory for the bizarre acts during Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction (LPTR), enabling stricken persons to report on their subjective experiences in relation to bizarre acts that are incomprehensible to them. The acts are nonvolitional, unplanned, nonintended, motiveless, and out-of-character, ranging from socially bizarrely inappropriate behavior to homicide. In summary, “paleo” levels of consciousness and the sense of self mediate certain explicit memory functions. Basic “paleo” levels of sense of self and of consciousness are preserved. Such patients know the nature (i.e. the kind of action) while they transiently lose their previously characteristic ability to fully appreciate the quality of their acts, consequences, and implications. There is dissociation between the retained memory of the what, of the mode of ictal action as against a lack of memory of experiencing such nonvolitional action. Deductions on changes of the sense of the self and of consciousess require a relatively objectifiable basis. References

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