TO DERIVE A BASIS FOR AN OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF POLICE MANPOWER AMONG CONTIGUOUS COMMUNITIES, CRIMINAL SPILLOVERS AMONG THESE COMMUNITIES MUST BE EXPLICITLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CHOICE PROPOSES THAT CRIMINALS ARE RATIONAL AND THAT THEY ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THEIR WELL-BEING ACCORDING TO CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS, I.E., THE PROBABILITIES OF DETECTION, APPREHENSION, AND IMPRISONMENT AGAINST THE POTENTIAL GAIN WHEN SELECTING AN ACTIVITY TARGET. THE ACTUAL MODEL USES THE SUPPLY OF OFFENSES IN EACH COMMUNITY AND THE DEMAND FOR CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION IN A COMMUNITY IN AN EQUILBRIUM SITUATION. THE MODEL IS TESTED USING DATA ON JUVENILE OFFENDERS, SUPPLIED BY THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES (CALIF.), FOR THE CRIMES OF ROBBERY, BURGLARY, AND LARCENY. THE RESULTS SUGGEST THAT, ON AN AGGREGATE BASIS, JUVENILE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IS NOT PURELY OPPORTUNISTIC AND THAT CERTAIN CONTROL AND MOTIVATING FACTORS ARE SIGNIFICANT IN JUDGING THE SPATIAL SELECTION OF OFFENSE TARGETS. FOR EXAMPLE, JUVENILES SELECTING AN AREA TO COMMIT A ROBBERY CONSIDER FACTORS SUCH AS COSTS AND RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE RELATIVE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES BETWEEN DIVISIONS. THE STUDY FOUND THAT A TESTABLE MODEL, DIRECTLY RELATING CRIMINAL SPILLOVERS TO VARIOUS MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS, CAN BE EXPLICITLY DERIVED TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE ECONOMIC AND CONTROL VARIABLES AFFECTING SPATIAL ALLOCATION OF CRIME IN AN URBAN SETTING. STUDY DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (DAG)