Relevant empirical studies robustly and consistently show that death-qualified juries, which exclude persons reluctant to impose the death penalty, are attitudinally and demographically different from nonqualified juries. The magnitude of this effect, however, is substantially diluted by the relatively small proportion of excludable jurors in the eligible jury populations and by the relative degree of differences between qualified and nonqualified juries. The resulting effect thus falls short of the proof required for a challenge to jury selection procedures. Empirical evidence indicates that death-qualified juries will sometimes be more prone to convict than nonqualified juries. This occurs even though the jury is 'impartial' in the legal sense. Although the courts do have legal grounds for ruling against conventional constitutional challenges to death-qualified juries, the selection process overtly excludes substantial segments of the community from jury service, and these persons have attitudes and perspectives essential to a jury that represents a cross section of community attitudes. The courts should make an effort to devise a selection procedure that will provide more representative juries without undermining the intent of capital punishment statutes. 183 footnotes.