Part 1 parses the relevant Federal statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and then recounts the interpretive case law. Part 2 examines the preenactment case law, the purposes of Title III, and the theory of congressional power underlying Title III. Part 3 argues that Title III should be interpreted to make inadmissible evidence derived from eavesdropping on cordless telephone conversations, noting the consequences of allowing the admission of such evidence in view of the existing and developing modes of communication. Part 4 considers whether, apart from Title III, the fourth amendment independently mandates the exclusion of such evidence. The language and legislative history of Title III compel a construction of the statute that includes cordless telephone conversations within the definition of wire communications. Moreover, cordless telephone users often will expect the privacy necessary to have their conversations protected as oral communications. The use of a radio to eavesdrop on these conversations constitutes an interception contrary to the prohibitions of the statute. Title III thus operates to exclude unauthorized eavesdrop evidence of cordless telephone conversations. The present U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment constitutes official eavesdropping on a private conversation as a search and seizure if the speaker has a justifiable expectation of privacy; cordless telephones may logically be protected under a balance of privacy versus law enforcement interests. In spite of continuing technological advances, the strong congressional purpose of protecting the privacy of communications is best interpreted by excluding unauthorized eavesdrop evidence of cordless telephone conversations. 167 references. (Author abstract modified)