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Popular Moderation Versus Governmental Authoritarianism: An Interactionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions

NCJ Number
106652
Journal
Crime and Delinquency Volume: 33 Issue: 3 Dated: (July 1987) Pages: 337-357
Author(s)
D R Thomson; A J Ragona
Date Published
1987
Length
21 pages
Annotation
Public opinion polls consistently highlight discontent with criminal court sentencing practices.
Abstract
Generally, respondents find courts to be too lenient. Although these findings are often used in political arguments as evidence of a cogent public desire for harsher sentencing, the conclusion is suspect. Since such surveys generally do not ask respondents to consider contingencies such as offense circumstances, behavioral content of various sentence, or fiscal cost differentials, conventional assessments of public attitudes toward sentencing are deficient in two respects. First, they do not simulate the decisionmaking task facing judges. Second, they do not allow citizens to consider the relative fiscal costs of current and alternative sentencing practices. By incorporating these two elements, the present study approximates an interactionist approach to the issue of public sentiments toward criminal sanctions. A probability sample survey of 816 Illinois adult residents reveals that, on several dimensions, the public is less vengeful than typically portrayed in public opinion poll and media accounts. Central findings concern public preferences for the sentencing of convicted residential burglars. In particular, there is a strong preference for community sentences, yet a desire for a sanction stronger than straight probation. Such findings are noteworthy given the policy context of recent mandatory incarceration legislation for this offense. Thus, this study provides evidence of a previously unremarked phenomenon of legislative sanction escalation for exceeding public preferences. (Author abstract)