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Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence

NCJ Number
108612
Journal
Southern Economic Journal Volume: 52 Issue: 1 Dated: (July 1985) Pages: 68-89
Author(s)
S K Layson
Date Published
1985
Length
22 pages
Annotation
This paper presents updated estimates of the U.S. homicide function that strongly confirm Isaac Ehrlich's deterrence findings regarding the impact of capital punishment on the homicide rate.
Abstract
The study first critically examines Hoenack and Weiler's argument that Ehrlich's results are spurious. The study then makes several improvements over Ehrlich's method in the estimation of the U.S. homicide function. The time-series sample is updated to 1977, and numerous alternative sets of explanatory variables are considered. Most importantly, the homicide rate is measured using Vital Statistics data rather than FBI data, which Ehrlich used. The results confirm Ehrlich's findings. The t-statistics of the estimated coefficients on the probabilities of punishment are, in general, highly significant and much larger than the t-statistics reported by Ehrlich. Also, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the probabilities of punishment are consistent with the 'elasticity conditions' derived by Ehrlich. The study then analyzes the stability and proper functional form of the homicide function, which reveals that the homicide function is reasonably stable over time. The choice of the proper functional form is carefully analyzed using the Box-Cox analysis. The hypothesis that the homicide function is log linear cannot be rejected; whereas, the hypotheses that the homicide function has a semi-logarithmic or a linear functional form are decisively rejected. The optimal functional form resulting from the Box-Cox analysis is consistent with the deterrence theory. 10 tables and 29 references.

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