Structural analyses of the causes of revolution assumes that economic outcomes associated with structural causes are the necessary and, usually, sufficient conditions for revolutionary mobilization. In the Iranian case, however, strictly economic incentives, while present, were clearly of tertiary importance. In the case of Iran, the recently urbanized peasants chose to accept the leadership of Khomeini and the religious opposition because the revolutionary leadership possessed more credible political entrepreneurs and provided very strong special incentives, the byproduct of which was collective revolutionary action. Khomeini's success is attributable to the degree to which he communicated in terms and symbols that his audience understands, presented a credible vision of the future, embodied a persuasive moral code, was a familiar figure of authority, and was able to provide local goods and goods with immediate payoffs to convince the target audience of his efficacy. The Iranian case highlights the way in which prior factors, particularly cultural ones, affect the determinations of actors and the way in which actors make calculations about their interests. In Iran, cultural factors provided plentiful special incentives wherein the free-ride problem of collective action could be more easily surmounted. 2 tables and 17 notes.