This study examines the impact of two group decisionmaking processes (majority rule and agenda) and one cognitive-motivational frame (aspiration level) on the quality of negotiated outcomes in small groups. Negotiation groups using a unanimous decision rule were more likely to integrate interests to achieve higher group outcomes than were groups using a majority rule. Negotiation groups following an explicit agenda and using a majority decision rule distributed resources more unequally and were more likely to form coalitions against a remaining party than were groups with no agenda/majority rule, explicit agenda/unanimity rule, and no agenda/unanimity rule. There was no support for the hypothesis that group members who held high aspirations and followed a majority decision rule would distribute resources more unequally than groups with high aspirations/unanimity rule, low aspirations/majority rule, and low aspirations/unanimity rule. Also not supported was the fact that adherence to explicit agendas would lead to lower group profits and the absence of high aspirations would lead to lower group profit. The results are discussed in terms of a mixed motive analysis of group decisionmaking. The implications of methods designed to increase the effectiveness of small group decisionmaking are examined. 4 tables, 8 footnotes, and about 70 references. (Author abstract modified)