A number of practical failings prevent courts from gaining access to the best developmental and other information available from research. Those in charge of cases are rarely aware of the availability of such data or where to find them. Lawyers are typically overextended and frenetically busy. Even when data are offered, lawyers often fail to appreciate their value. In addition, lawyers tend to find their evidence and experts through informal friendship networks. Experts also may be chosen because their views are congenial to the needs of winning the case or because the lawyer has used them in previous cases. Having chosen an expert, attorneys often are unlikely to prepare the expert adequately or present evidence effectively. In other cases, attorneys may distort the information presented or witnesses may find themselves in conflict about their roles as disinterested presenters of information and as members of the advocacy team. Distortions also may occur during cross-examination or as a result of cultural stereotypes or personal beliefs and perceptions of jurors or judges. In addition to such practical barriers to the dissemination of research information, there are more theoretical barriers related to distinctions between legislative versus adjudicative facts and aggregate data versus particularistic evidence. Continuing education, structural change to encourage more distributional justice, and expert involvement in trials may help alleviate some of these problems. 35 references.