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Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence

NCJ Number
113785
Journal
Criminal Law Bulletin Volume: 24 Issue: 5 Dated: (September-October 1988) Pages: 379-423
Author(s)
B S Ledewitz
Date Published
1988
Length
45 pages
Annotation
In the past 10 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated the rule of procedural default, which precludes Federal habeas corpus review of many claims of constitutional violation in State criminal cases.
Abstract
The consequence of procedural default is that the defaulted claim may not then be considered on the merits unless there is some extraordinary justification. The justification for allowing Federal habeas corpus review despite a procedural default includes a showing of cause and prejudice and a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Three 1985 cases, Murray v. Carrier, Smith v. Murray, and Kuhlman v. Wilson, demonstrate a growing preoccupation of most of the judges with the issue of innocence in habeas corpus cases. The Court's commitment to the concept of innocence as the focal point of miscarriage of justice inquiry extends from wrongful incarceration to death penalty sentencing issues. In Smith v. Murray, the defendant argued that because of a failure to warn him of his right to remain silent at a pretrial psychiatric interview, his death sentence should be reversed. The Court held that the claim had been procedurally defaulted. Justice O'Connor noted that although a sentencing error can lead to a miscarriage of justice, actual innocence does not translate easily into a discussion of alleged error in the imposition of the death penalty. Distinguishing between actual and legal innocence permitted the Court to consider illegally obtained evidence in deciding the issue of actual innocence. This distinction should be equally applicable in considering the role of innocence at sentencing. 205 footnotes.

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