Focus is on the central role of the building superintendent as a social control agent acting for the landlord. The superintendent is equipped with only weak sanctions and, therefore, must generate a reward system. This system of sanctions and rewards is offset by countervailing systems of sanction and reward developed by the tenants. This situation encourages two modes of adaptation: a strong emphasis on the selection of tenants who are likely to conform, and the cultivation of the good will of tenants through interpersonal relations and the provision of services. Both adaptations serve the interests of landlords by allowing owners to distance themselves from the dirty work of discrimination and providing built-in motivation for job performance in excess of minimum requirements for low-paid, largely unsupervised labor. The embedded system in which tenants and superintendents find themselves is, in effect, one in which they control each other for the benefit of the landlord. 9 notes and 57 references. (Author abstract modified)