The current bases for insider trading liability are the duty to disclose or abstain from tradition, the misappropriation theory, and Rule l4e-3 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The first two theories emphasize a fiduciary relationship and a potential breach of a duty arising out of such a relationship. However, focusing on breach of duty has led to an inconsistent and incoherent body of law that inadequately regulates a variety of abusive trading practices, especially in relation to misuses of nonpublic information relating to corporate takeovers. Proposals being considered by Congress would establish a statutory definition of insider trading. Although the proposals all clarify some of the current ambiguities, they also retain the duty-based analysis required by current law. As a result, they perpetuate several anomalies resulting from the current law. The most important anomaly is the fact that the remedies available to investors injured by insider trading on the basis of nonpublic takeover information largely depend on the identity of the takeover player who is trading contemporaneously with the investor. Another anomaly is that the selling target shareholder's rights vary widely depending on the nature of the takeover transaction, the identity of the purchaser, and the source of the nonpublic information about an imminent takeover play. These problems indicate the need for further consideration of the issues involved. 98 footnotes.