Existing rules governing the questioning of suspects in custody are based on the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966). In Miranda the Court promulgated a new, code-like set of rules for custodial questioning, including the creation of a right to counsel in connection with custodial questioning, a requirement of warnings, a prohibition of questioning unless the suspect affirmatively waives the rights set out in the warnings, and a prohibition of questioning if the suspect asks for a lawyer or indicates in any manner he is unwilling to talk. This paper concludes that these nonconstitutional standards impede the search for truth by conditioning inquiry, no matter how brief and restrained, on a suspect's consent to be questioned, and by excluding a suspect's statements at trial, though fully voluntary and reliable, if obtained in violation of Miranda's procedures. The Miranda rules are also inept and effective means of promoting fair treatment of suspects. This paper recommends that the Department of Justice seek to secure a decision by the Supreme Court overruling or abrogating the Miranda decision and that the Justice Department develop and implement an administrative policy governing the conduct of custodial questioning by the department's agencies. The appendix summarizes miscarriages of justice resulting from Miranda nad related decisions. 189 footnotes. (Author summary modified)