The analysis begins with a 1973 case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, in which the Court asserts that if a right to privacy exists, it exists for the unconsenting majority and not for those consenting adults who want to view obscene material. Even though privacy is not enumerated in the Constitution as a right, it has evolved through such cases as Griswold, v. Connecticut. The article traces the development of a doctrine of privacy in relation to obscenity and pornography, observing that both privacy and pornography, when they are defined precisely, enjoy certain protections under the Constitution. Privacy is protected if it does not violate the principle of an open and democratic society. Pornography is protected if it is found to have a useful purpose. The author concludes that the Justices of the Supreme Court are uncomfortable moralists and that the formulas they use to regulate privacy and pornography are ineffective. 127 footnotes.