The security strategy, called Operation RADCOT, included a steering group, a planning coordinator, and 12 key task commanders. Key task commanders and their planning teams relied on the advice, expertise, and resources of a wide variety of individuals and organizations both within and outside the police service. A significant vetting operation was initiated 6 months prior to the conference, the intention being to insure that only accredited persons could obtain a pass and access to secure areas during the conference week and to identify any person whose presence might compromise security arrangements. The Army's Royal Engineers assisted with searching for improvised explosive devices. Additionally, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps conducted an electronic sweep of secure buildings and surrounding areas and was responsible for bomb disposal. Physical security for the conference site was maintained by a double line of pedestrian barriers, guarded by uniformed police officers and separated by a no-man's land or a building line and augmented by concrete vehicle obstructions. Both the immediate hotel area and surrounding areas were policed and secured, and persons attending or involved in the conference were protected. Contingency plans were formulated to deal with bomb threats, suspect vehicles, explosions or overt attacks, proxy bombs, mortar and rocket attacks, and sniper and hostage situations. Logistical support was provided for personnel, transportation, accommodations, equipment, and communications. Lessons learned from Operation RADCOT are delineated; the point is made that there is no such thing as total security in a democratic society.