Economic analysis is utilized to discuss deterrence such that it is seen that actors will decline to commit or attempt the undesirable behavior if the sanctions that are threatened for the act or the attempt outweigh the possible value of commission of the act to the actor. Punishment of attempts is justified because it raises the probability of sanctions rather cheaply compared to the added cost of trying to prosecute more often those who actually do harm. The punishment of attempts depends on, among other things, the court's information regarding the probability of causing harm and the magnitude of the potential harm. Justifications for punishing attempts and determining the magnitude of the sanction for optimal deterrence are discussed under conditions where the court has perfect information in one example and imperfect information in another example. The analysis also treats as an attempt any activity that is potentially harmful, which differs from the criminal law definition that would define attempt that would potentially cause criminal harm. The sanction for attempts would be determined by calculating the potential harm caused by the attempt and the dangerousness of the attempt. It is asserted that the deterrence model fits the goals of punishment of attempts, but that in some cases the harm and dangerousness of the attempt may not equal that of the actual harm and would thus require a lesser sanction to obtain optimal deterrence.