In "Caplin and Drysdale" (1989), the petitioner, a law firm, sought to recover legal fees from the forfeited assets of its client. The Court concluded that the government has a strong interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets that overrides any sixth amendment interest in allowing a defendant to use the assets to pay for a defense. In United States v. Monsanto (1989), the Court considered whether freezing a defendant's assets before conviction and before the assets are conclusively held to be forfeitable is unconstitutional. The Court concluded that such freezing is permissible when the trial court's restraining order is based on a finding of probable cause that the assets are forfeitable. This article concludes that the use of forfeiture to take the profit out of crime and reduce the economic incentive to engage in future criminal acts is the only legitimate governmental interest significantly served by asset forfeiture. It further argues that this interest is not undermined by recognizing an attorney's fees exception to forfeiture. Such an exception would serve an array of sixth amendment interests without significantly eroding deterrence of future drug felonies. 188 footnotes