Proponents of that view advance two main arguments: (1) the unique nature of such illegalities necessitates their different treatment under the law, and (2) corporations are not "amoral calculators," but rather "political citizens" who may sometimes err, but are more prone to organizational incompetence than deliberate wrongdoing. Thus corporations need advice rather than chastisement; regulatory agencies should act as consultants rather than policemen. They advocate a strategy that produces compliance through persuasion rather than through the threat of sanctions. The authors take each element of this argument in turn and show that it is neither logically nor empirically persuasive. They then turn to the issue of how to make corporate regulations more effective and demonstrate that this requires a consideration of both the most suitable strategies for the enforcement agencies to adopt and the most appropriate legal framework for determining the criminal responsibility of these corporations. 11 footnotes and 80 references (Author abstract modified)