The author draws on the writings of Plato, Augustine, and Montaigne, three skeptics who gave the theory of injustice its main structure and intellectual force as well as on political theory, history, social psychology, and the work of authors as diverse as Rousseau, Dickens, Hardy, and Doctorow. The book argues that rigid rules cannot be set to distinguish instances of misfortune from injustice, as do most theories of justice, because such definitions do not address historical variability and differences in perception and interest between victims and spectators. From the victim's perspective, whether the victimization results from an earthquake or social discrimination, injustice must include not only the immediate cause of disaster, but also the refusal of persons and institutions to prevent and mitigate damage ("passive injustice"). This broader definition of injustice calls for greater responsibility from both citizens and public servants in dealing with the suffering of others. The book argues that the best impulses of democracy require that society listen to victims' perceptions of their suffering, its causes, and how it may be relieved. Chapter notes and a subject index (Publisher summary modified)