The Hobbs Act was passed in 1942 to extend the reach of earlier racketeering legislation. A violation of the act is neither a strict liability nor a general mens rea crime. Rather, the violation is a special mens rea offense. As such, the act does not impose a blanket prohibition on politicians from seeking political contributions, but merely prohibits a species of extortion. Specifically, the act forbids the legislator from knowingly inducing a person to pay the legislator money or other property by threatening to take or withhold official action. Testimony by other legislators may be relevant to negate mens rea elements of a charged offense. Since the testimony is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, it is presumptively admissible under Rule 402. The testimony, however, can still be barred under recognized exclusionary rules. One applicable exclusionary doctrine restricts the admissibility of expert testimony. Another applicable exclusionary doctrine empowers the trial judge to bar relevant evidence when probative dangers incidental to the admission of evidence significantly outstrip the probative worth of evidence. The authors suggest that trial judges should rethink their attitudes toward prosecution attempts to block the admission of testimony by other legislators in official corruption prosecutions. Legislators are not above the law; if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has violated the Hobbs Act, the accused should be held criminally responsible. 210 footnotes