NCJ Number
142447
Date Published
1992
Length
19 pages
Annotation
This paper argues that confessions obtained by undercover agents or government-paid informants should not be admissible in court unless the plan of the undercover operation was submitted to a judge and a warrant obtained based on probable cause that a crime has been committed by the target of the undercover operation.
Abstract
Under the ninth and fourth amendments, government infiltration through agents or paid informants into the life of a suspect to obtain a confession is an intrusion of privacy that is reasonable only if there is probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a serious crime and no other means of obtaining evidence for a prosecution exists. A warrant procedure should be required in such cases. The right-to-privacy concept has been established under a form of ninth amendment reasoning in "Griswold." To extend the right to privacy to the undercover confession scenario is an extension of the intimate privacies thus far covered by the ninth amendment, but it is not a radical departure from the kinds of concerns raised in criminal procedure. A right to privacy from unwarranted and unreasonable police insinuation would allow law enforcement to use this drastic tool in the most serious criminal cases but would check police excesses and limit the risk of police-state tactics. 52 notes