The proposed strategic negotiation model has four principal elements: negotiation, concession, attrition, and intervention. When both sides opt for negotiation, progress can be made towards resolution. The process of concession bargaining is an extension of negotiation strategy. Where the authority enters upon concession bargaining, its aim is to create a dependency in the perpetrators upon the negotiator. When the negotiator declines to make any concessions, the aim is to dominate the negotiation process by enhancing perpetrator fatigue, reducing his credibility, and thereby accelerating the surrender process. Strategies that incorporate attrition tactics are overtly combative and incompatible with negotiation. There are dangers involved in a fear-inducing strategy that cannot be backed by the capacity to intervene forcibly. From the viewpoint of the authorities, resort to forcible intervention should only be made when the actual risk or danger (loss of life, damage) posed by perpetrators is greater than if intervention did not occur. When neither side opts for intervention or resistance, having the capacity to do so, the potential exists for a direct resumption of negotiation, since neither party desires a violent outcome. Although each component of the model may appear to be a regressive step from its predecessor and an escalation of the risk of a violent outcome, even at the stage when forcible intervention is actively considered, there is still the potential for a return to negotiation. The paper discusses how the needs of damage limitation and the number of perpetrators will affect the selection of siege-resolution strategies and the use of the tactical components of these strategies in various combinations. 9 figures and 17 references