There are four possible strategies for resolving this issue. In one case, actual results from the offense would determine both liability and the extent of liability. In the second case, actual results would be irrelevant, and the defendant's liability would be based only on what the defendant intended or foresaw and tried to bring about, and not on what results actually materialized. In a third case, fortunate results would count in the defendant's favor, but unfortunate results would not count against the defendant. In the fourth case, unfortunate results would count against the defendant, but fortunate result would not count in the defendant's favor. The first section of this article examines the theoretical justifications for punishment, as it focuses on the rationale for the current state of the law, in which many crimes are defined more by result than by the process by which the results were produced. The second section of the article explores how the issue of results related to offenses has been handled in English criminal law and associated problems. In the final section of the article, the author argues for basing criminal liability only on the harm the defendant intended or foresaw and tried to implement, regardless of the actual harm that occurred. Under the author's proposed policy, consequences could be an appropriate consideration in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and in the determination of the appropriate sentence upon conviction; it may have evidentiary significance at trial as well. 80 footnotes