There are a number of cases that suggest a polygraph examination given for the purpose of gaining a confession, rather than to facilitate an investigation, is so inherently repugnant that the confession is inadmissible. This was the primary reason for overturning the conviction of a man who admitted after a polygraph examination that he burned his restaurant and warehouse for the insurance. In Amyot v. Her Majesty the Queen, a Quebec appellate judge overturned the conviction for that reason. In State v. Craig, the Montana Supreme Court rendered a similar decision, that is, that a confession following a polygraph examination is inadmissible. The author of this article suggests that polygraph examiners should stop stating that a polygraph examination has three parts: pretest, test, and posttest. Any confession coming in the pretest or posttest, despite a Miranda warning, may be so tied to the polygraph examination that it will be excluded. It has already happened in Johnson v. State (Georgia), in which the appellate court said the trial court erred in admitting the inculpatory statements of the defendant made during the pretest and posttest phases of a polygraph examination. The author recommends that polygraph examiners dissociate the pretest and posttest phases from polygraph examinations, since this teaching is unnecessary and imprudent.