Traditional rationales for imposing criminal punishment do not justify the admissibility of victim impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing because potentially irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial aspects of such evidence violate the policies underlying evidentiary law and capital sentencing. In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court overturned prior decisions which held that victim impact evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. By equating victim impact evidence with harm caused by the defendant and by implying that a victim rights rationale was relevant to the admissibility of evidence in capital sentencing, the Supreme Court moved away from traditional considerations regarding the decision to impose the death penalty. The author concludes that the Payne v. Tennessee decision may be seen as implicitly based on a victim rights rationale, that victim participation is of questionable benefit to crime victims, and that the victim rights rationale cannot overcome inherent weaknesses of victim impact evidence. By allowing the admission of victim impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court has unwisely opened the door to potentially inflammatory and irrelevant evidence in death penalty cases. 165 footnotes