The U.S. Supreme Court held in this case that search of a probationer's residence need not be based on probable cause. A lesser level of cause -- reasonable suspicion -- is all that is required to justify a search. According to the Court, the fact that the state must consider the offender's rehabilitation and ensure that the community is not put at risk by the probationer's being at large justifies reducing the normal probable-cause requirement for searches. The Court also reasoned that a probable-cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of probation supervision. Also, the Court ruled that the normal fourth amendment requirement for a search warrant does not apply to probationer searches. The Court's majority decided that requiring an officer to obtain a warrant would interfere with the probation system. In addition, the delay involved in obtaining a warrant would "make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create." The "Griffin" decision clearly puts the probationer and parolee outside the mainstream of the fourth amendment safeguards. According to the decision, although a probationer's or parolee's home is not precisely analogous to the search of a prison cell, it is not the legally sanctified home that other citizens expect.