Under socialism in Hungary, crime prevention and crime control measures focused on strong politicized efforts to define and enforce prescribed collective behaviors. With the collapse of these political institutions, two levels of norm-violating conduct developed. One developed among those who participate in the "quasi market" in some way; these people knew the rules of the new economic market and had the opportunity to participate in it as "sellers" or "buyers." The institutionalized mechanisms against this type of conduct were undeveloped, and their operations were inhibited by a silent "consensus." The other level embraced those excluded from the "game," that is, people who were able to participate in the officially undeclared competition only by violating the most traditional norms. Control regulated by criminal law has not increased in Hungary since the change of regime, and the scope of acts controlled by criminal laws has not expanded. Deterioration of social control mechanisms has not resulted in an increase in sentence severity or an increase in the number of persons under the control of the criminal justice system. The effectiveness of law enforcement has diminished, as clearance rates have decreased. The formation of a coordinated system of comprehensive crime prevention may assist in clearly defining the social function of criminal policy. Crime prevention should find its place in the broader system of the social control of deviance, as various social institutions cooperate in the way determined by law. 14 references