Although Section 20409 of the Crime Act was clearly intended to scale back the involvement of Federal courts in prison and jail overcrowding cases, analysis of four important provisions in that section and two related legal issues suggest that the purpose of Section 20409 may not be achieved. The requirement that an inmate who alleges unconstitutional overcrowding must prove that he has been harmed personally by the overcrowding may be unconstitutional because of a conflict with the holding in Helling v. McKinney (1993). This provision may also attempt to eliminate class-action overcrowding suits. Even if it does, it probably does not hinder significantly the ability of inmates to succeed in these suits. The prohibition against the imposition of population ceilings appears to do no more than require an inmate suing for overcrowding to persuade at least one other inmate who is also being harmed by the overcrowding to file suit. Then a judge could order a population ceiling. The provision that allows prisons and jails that have lost overcrowding suits to reopen the suit after 2 years does nothing to change the standards that govern when an ordinary decree or the terms of a consent decree may be altered by a court. The only provision with a potential "bite" to it is the requirement that courts impose the narrowest possible remedy when an inmate succeeds in proving that he has been a victim of unconstitutional overcrowding. In addition to the aforementioned limitations, Section 20409 may be void because it is an unconstitutional legislative restriction of judicial power that violates the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. Furthermore, a restrictive definition of crowding by the courts would exclude many cases that arise in a context of overcrowding from the reach of Section 20409. 5 notes and 30 references