Certain dimensions of contemporary organization appear to contribute to the opportunity for white-collar crime. Agents have much power because they hold information that cannot readily be assessed or verified by their principals. Malpractice also grows from the dependence of salespersons on individual commission payments, from the setting of high organizational profit targets with relatively little attention given as to how those targets are to be achieved, and from loose regulation. The offender's motive for taking advantage of these opportunities is greed rather than need. Controlling white-collar crime requires more than screening the competence and integrity of those who hold funds in trust. It also requires a more continuous flow of monitoring that ensures that even if people are able to defraud, their gains will not continue for long without detection. The values of those in power may also have to be modified by reducing the amount of social distance between themselves and the other stakeholders in society: workers, consumers, and the general public. A more integrated approach to global regulation is also needed. 62 references