Part I contains two chapters on theories of the state and the origin of criminal organizations, and Part II has two chapters on the criminal organization as a firm. The two chapters in Part III focus on organized crime and state intervention in the economy. Part IV contains two chapters on deterrence policies against legal firms involved in illegal activities, and the two chapters of Part V address deterrence policies against organized crime. The theory of rent-seeking is adopted to help understand the origin of criminal organizations from a state of anarchy, and modern industrial organization theory is used to explain the design of internal rules in the organized crime sector. The market behavior of organized crime is analyzed by taking into account its double nature of competitive firm and monopolist on rule-making. Finally, the "crime and economics" approach is applied to the analysis of corruption that occurs when the organized crime sector and the government collude to exploit their monopoly on rule-making. The chapters provide a balance between theoretical and institutional or empirical contributions. Each chapter outlines the normative results of the analysis, so as to design more sophisticated deterrence policies. 11 tables, 6 figures, and chapter notes and references