In "Bagwell" the Court specifically addressed the issue of "whether contempt fines levied against a union for violations of a labor injunction are coercive civil fines or are criminal fines that constitutionally could be imposed only through a jury trial." The "Bagwell" opinion suggests that the Court focused on the seriousness of the penalty in determining whether the contempt proceeding was criminal, instead of assessing the seriousness of the penalty after it determined the nature of the contempt proceeding. Underlying this decision is the Court's desire to expand procedural protections (mainly by preserving the constitutional right to a jury trial allowed in serious criminal contempt cases) to contempt cases where the criminal/civil distinction is not so clear. One section of this Comment explains the historical differences between a coercive civil order and a punitive criminal order and the procedural protections attending each. Another section explores the procedural history of the case and the Supreme Court's decision, including the concurring opinions of Justice Scalia and Ginsburg. A third section analyzes the Supreme Court's new rationale for labeling a contempt as either civil or criminal and the effect it will have on the contempt power of lower courts. This section also compares and contrasts prior Supreme Court decisions and analyzes the Court's motive behind providing criminal procedural protections in contempt cases in which the dividing line between civil and criminal contempt is unclear. The author concludes that although the Court afforded a jury trial in a case where the severity of the fines alone warranted this protection, it failed to set a clear standard for other courts to follow when faced with a situation where the severity of a contempt sanction is arguable. 286 footnotes