The speaker is a professor at Harvard Law School. The discussion focuses on cases in which race is part of an array of factors being considered and is neither the sole factor nor an identifying feature of a specific suspect. Police use racial profiling in many contexts. Most courts have upheld this practice and have required only reasonableness as a justification. However, this form of racial discrimination should be handled in same way as other racial discrimination. Police and courts often lack a firm factual foundation for the practice. Even if a correlation existed between race and criminal conduct, officials should be sensitive to the special issues related to the country's history of racial discrimination. Thus, courts should uphold racial profiling only if a compelling justification exists. Nevertheless, the crucial issue is not constitutional. Routinely and casually using race as a risk factor is profoundly unwise in that it can be used as a means of racial harassment, increases minority fear and mistrust of the police, and reduces the potential for cooperation between minority communities and the police. The arguments often raised against this position are all inadequate. Therefore, except in extraordinary circumstances, police officers should not take race into account regarding the potential for criminality; courts should uphold this position; and even if they do not, police should avoid the practice on the grounds that it is counterproductive. Questions and comments from the audience; answers from the speaker; and additional comments by a member of Congress, an editor, a law enforcement administrator, and an assistant chief of police