Part I argues that three main considerations lie behind the law's general requirement that S's help or encouragement of P's crime be intentional: culpability, the policy of not subjecting lawful practices to excessive risk, and an ethic of individualism and self-determinism. The remainder of the paper considers whether those considerations are incompatible with recklessness as an alternative basis of complicity liability. Parts II and III address the culpability consideration. Part IV considers whether the policy of not chilling lawful activities precludes the creation of a general reckless complicity principle untied to the situation where S is already an accomplice of P in some other crime. The author argues that it does not, and therefore concludes that neither the principle of culpability nor policy considerations require rejection of a general doctrine of reckless complicity. The final section, Part V, considers the ethic of individualism and self-determinism. It concludes that this ethic does indeed stand against reckless complicity as a general ground of liability and is the real force behind the law's requirement of intention; further, although deeply ingrained, this ethic is normatively problematic. 65 footnotes