In 1994 in Dallas, 17,681 residential and commercial burglaries were reported. In contrast, in that same year 134,387 burglar alarm calls were received by the Dallas Police Department (DPD). Of the alarm calls received, DPD dispatched officers to 124,013. From these, 1,737 Part 1 offense reports resulted, or 1 report for every 71.4 dispatches. North central and northeast Dallas generated 62,180 alarm calls, and over 99 percent were false alarms. Only 420 out of 62,180 were "true" alarms. These two sections of the city experienced 5,213 actual burglaries, less than one-third of the total number that occurred in Dallas. Conversely, southeast and southwest Dallas generated 37,152 total alarm calls, of which 713 were "true" alarms. Residents of the southside of the city experienced 8,396 actual burglaries. The data offer some stark comparisons. There were 40 percent fewer alarm calls, 59 percent more "true" alarms, and 62 percent more actual burglaries on the southside compared to the northside. Given that the residents of the southside are far less able to afford alarm systems, especially monitored systems, they are under-protected compared to the more affluent areas where such systems are more common. Because the number of false alarms in the affluent areas is high, the police respond disproportionately to affluent areas without any practical benefit for burglary reduction. Although some of the costs of responding to false alarms is recovered in fees and fines, there remains an estimated $1,672,305 gap between revenues generated and revenues expended. The Canadian Alarm and Security Association recommends two approaches to reducing false alarm rates. One is the use of a double-motion detector system. Also, if sensors were set to detect only forced entry rather than any entry where the system is not first deactivated, the rate of false alarms would be even further reduced. 4 tables, 5 notes, and 15 references