Security is never absolute; it only provides for deterrence against risks. Deterrence is achieved by increasing the costs to the party posing the risk. Security is about countering the risk. From which quarter, at what point in time, in which place, and for what reason the risk is arising should not be a matter of conjecture and chance. It must be predicted on a rational and scientific basis. Security typically relies on the assumption that the probable assassin wants to avoid apprehension after the deed is done, but it is clear that many would-be assassins do not care if they die in the course of or immediately after an assassination attempt. The only security against these would-be assassins is detection and apprehension before any attempt can be made. Prevention is particularly imperative given the current preferred weapon of the assassin, i.e., the bomb. Prevention and detection requires a daily threat assessment that involves an ongoing assessment of the public figure's popularity personally and politically. Security agents must guard against allowing security measures to become routine, such that they can be studied and defeated by would-be assassins. The absence of assassination attempts over time can create a false sense of security among security personnel. This inevitably leads to a decline in security standards. Security personnel should always assume that danger is lurking around every corner, that assassination attempts are being planned, and that the assassin is present and about to strike.