The mandate can and should be read to require a structural impartiality of the bench as a whole, in addition to the impartiality of individual judges. Structural impartiality exists when the judiciary as a whole is comprised of judges from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints. The interaction of these diverse viewpoints fosters impartiality by diminishing the possibility that one perspective dominates adjudication. In effect, judicial impartiality must be realized both individually and structurally. In developing this thesis, this article analyzes racial representation on the State rather than the Federal bench and on the State trial rather than appellate courts. Part I of the article reviews the efforts of minority voters to challenge the racial homogeneity of the bench in several States by asserting claims brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Part II explores the impartial-judge mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment as it is currently interpreted. In Part III, the author argues that the impartial-judge mandate has been interpreted too narrowly and should instead be construed to require both individual and structural impartiality for judges. Part IV examines the role of State judges as representatives. 285 footnotes