The author begins with a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United States (1966), the only Supreme Court case to address the constitutionality of judicial waiver, and the effect of the Court's holding on subsequent statutory enactments regarding judicial transfer. Specifically, this article focuses on how the lower courts' decisions to transfer jurisdiction in the "Eddings," "Thompson," "Stanford," and "Wilkins" Supreme Court cases are structured by the Court's decision in "Kent." The article then discusses the significance of the lower courts' decisions to transfer jurisdiction to criminal court and the impact of waiver on the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment analysis. In addition, the continued justification for a separate juvenile court is assessed in the context of a growing trend to remove from the court's jurisdiction the most serious juvenile offenders. The article concludes by proposing an alternative analysis for the constitutionality of a juvenile death penalty and the need for reform. In considering the constitutionality of a juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to reconsider the validity of judicial waiver provisions. At the very least, waiver implicates and potentially undermines the underlying justifications for a separate juvenile justice system. 341 footnotes